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ABSTRACT
Transfer, the use of acquired knowledge, skills and abilities across tasks 
and contexts, is a key and elusive goal of learning.
Most evidence available in literature is based on a limited number of 
tasks, predominantly open-ended problems, game-like problems and taught 
school subjects (e.g. maths, physics, a lgebra). It is not obvious that findings 
from this work can be extended to the domain of decision making problems.
This thesis, which aims to broaden the understanding of enhancing and 
limiting factors o f transfer, examines transfer o f binary decision making 
problems (analogs o f the Monty Hall problem) under various conditions of 
semantic distance between learning and target problems, contextual shifts, 
and delay between learning and target.
Our results indicate that not all findings of the classic analogical transfer 
studies based on open problem solving tasks extend to binary decision 
making transfer. Specifically, analogical encoding (i.e. learning two analogs 
by comparing them) did not lead to higher transfer than summarization. 
Furthermore, in our experiments, transfer rates were never significantly 
higher for participants learning two analogs by comparison (thus 
presumably forming a schema) than for those learning one analog by 
summarization (thus presumably not forming a schema). This leads us to 
cautiously hypothesize that the role of schema in mediating transfer could 
be less relevant in binary decision making than it is in open-ended problem 
solving. Finally, context shifts up to medium level, even coupled with 
several days delay, did not significantly reduce transfer, although high 
context shifts did. On the other hand, semantic distance, quality of learning 
and explicit recognition, were confirmed to have a significant relationship 
with transfer.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1. INTRODUCTION
Transfer, the use o f acquired knowledge, skills and abilities across tasks 
and contexts, is a key goal o f learning and a central topic in formal and 
workplace education. In formal education, learning is valuable if it can be 
transferred from one discipline to another (e.g. from maths to physics) and 
from the classroom to work (e.g. learning from an accounting class must 
transfer to capability of performing accounting jobs). In workplace training, 
learning must transfer to the performance context (e.g. communication 
training must transfer to real colleague and customer interactions) to achieve 
its goal. In real life experiential learning, learned knowledge and skills 
usually must be reused in order for benefits to outweigh costs. In general, 
the value of learning -  i.e., its “return on investment” — increases if it 
transfers to many situations where it can be useful, while avoiding the 
mistake o f over-application (negative transfer).
Transfer, despite the good intentions o f educators and trainers, cannot be 
taken for granted: over a century o f investigations on the topic, beginning 
with Thorndike and Woodworth’s (1901) studies on form al discipline, have 
documented both successes and failures. In some cases, typically with 
specific procedural skills which need simple adaptations in order to be 
applied to slightly different situations, transfer is achieved with little effort 
and the benefits of learning can be wide-ranging and long-lasting. When a 
particular problem or task is learned to a high level o f automaticity, similar 
problems or tasks are automatically solved with little or no conscious 
thought. An example o f this near transfer are reading skills: once people 
learn to read, they can apply their learning to any type o f content and 
decoding appears automatic (i.e. no conscious attention needs to be invested 
in it). In other cases, typically with more complex and subtle competencies 
or when context changes are greater, transfer proves to be elusive. Classic 
studies o f analogical transfer to isomorphic (i.e. structurally similar) tasks
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have illustrated the difficulties of transferring learning between problems 
that are related, but that, in some other sense (e.g. semantic or physical 
context), are relatively far removed from each other. This type of fa r  
transfer is more difficult to reach, requires cognitive understanding, 
conscious analysis and application of strategies that cut across disciplines.
The motivation behind this research is to contribute to the understanding 
of transfer of learning, specifically focusing on what enhances it and what 
hinders it. Since the real challenge lies in fa r  transfer, more common in real 
life learning situations and potentially most rewarding, we decided to 
concentrate our efforts on this type of transfer. Further reflection, based on 
our experience of work related environments, made us select transfer o f 
decision problems as our research space due to their relevance in managerial 
and professional activities. Finally, since in real contexts, decisions are often 
not open-ended, but, rather, require a choice between a small number o f 
options, we decided to study the case of closed decisions.
Reviewing existing literature, one element was compellingly evident: 
much of the evidence was based on open-ended problems (e.g. Dunker’s 
Radiation problem, discussed below), on legal moves problems (e.g. 
Jealous Husbands) and on school taught subjects (e.g. maths, physics, 
algebra, refraction). Studies on analogical transfer seemed to be based on a 
limited number o f tasks, with a predominance o f a couple of classic open- 
ended problems, which raised the question o f whether the findings were 
extendable to different tasks or task-dependent. The search revealed that 
decision making problems, which we thought represented an interesting 
case, had not been studied by transfer research and that many o f the studies 
were on immediate transfer without context shift. The conclusion of our 
reflections and of the literature review was that the analysis o f transfer o f 
decision problems characterized by long delays and large context shifts was 
a gap worthy o f being filled.
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Reviewing decision problems and pre-testing them, we found that the 
Monty Hall problem (which requires making a binary decision based on 
probability calculation) had all the characteristics we were looking for: it 
was counterintuitive, it did not require previous knowledge and it did not 
pose excessive demands on short-term memory (which would otherwise risk 
becoming a confounding variable), it was structurally simple and it was well 
documented. In essence, the problem, or dilemma, asks solvers what they 
would do if  they were in the shoes of a final participant in the “Let’s make a 
deal” TV show. In the final part of the show, host Monty Hall asks the 
contestant to select one of three doors, explaining that one o f them conceals 
a valuable prize while the others conceal goats. After the guest makes his 
selection, Monty Hall, who knows where the prize is, opens one o f the two 
unselected doors, revealing a goat. The guest is then asked if he wants to 
stay with his initial selection or to switch to the other unopened door. While 
most participants perceive that probabilities of winning are equal for the two 
unopened doors (50% each since a goat has been eliminated), from a 
normative point of view it is best to switch. The demonstration relies 
crucially on the fact that Monty Hall’s choice of which door to open is 
constrained by the fact that he must avoid the prize door. Consequently, if 
the prize door is one of the two doors which the participant has not initially 
selected (which is true in 2/3 of the cases), switching leads to the prize (the 
door Monty does not open is the winning door because he had to choose 
between the one with the prize and one with a goat). If the initially selected 
door was the prize one (which is true in just in 1/3 of the cases), then it is 
best not to switch. Therefore, winning probabilities o f the two doors are in 
favour of the unselected door (2/3 vs. 1/3).
Beyond its proved counter intuitiveness, which is a crucial characteristic 
to contain the number of participants who solve correctly without previous 
exposure to analogs, this problem appeared interesting for two other 
reasons. First o f all because it lies somewhere in-between open ended
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problems and legal move problems, both of which were represented in 
transfer literature. Analogs of the Monty Hall problem require, in order to be 
solved, some insight in recognizing that the type of probabilistic calculation 
required is not the “ordinary” one i.e. in inhibiting the easiest, but incorrect, 
approach. However, similarly to legal moves problems, insight is not 
enough to arrive to the solution which requires some steps to be undertaken 
(simple probability calculations). Secondly, we thought the problem was an 
interesting case because we predicted that its closed nature would make it 
easier to spot the analogy between learning and target even if they belonged 
to distant domains and the wording did not contain cues. In the light of all 
this, the Monty Hall problem seemed an ideal task to test if findings derived 
from open ended problem solving transfer held true and to extend them to 
greater context and time shifts.
Studying transfer of learning in a naturalistic setting, e.g. in real-life 
training situations, was a tempting option, but it was discarded because, as is 
often the case in a non-controlled environment, there was no way of 
adequately accounting for all the variables that affect transfer. It was 
decided, instead, to run controlled experiments which would focus on a few 
key independent variables of learning and transfer situations. It is evident 
that real-life transfer is much more complex than what can be possibly 
reproduced in a lab and, thus, that any set of guidelines to teaching for 
transfer is only a step in the right direction and not a final solution to the 
transfer problem. Moreover, it is clear that not all o f our findings are 
directly translatable into practical suggestions because some parts o f the 
transfer process, for example the transfer context or how much time will 
have gone by since learning, are non-controllable in real life. Nevertheless, 
knowing where the road-blocks are brings increased awareness which, in 
turn, may assist in the elaboration o f strategies and heuristic rules to help 
overcome the obstacles as well as suggest some meta-competencies to 
develop in support o f transfer. In conclusion, a better understanding of the
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essential processes and mechanisms underlying transfer would surely 
contribute towards the goal of designing transfer oriented instruction.
The main research questions which we wanted to answer all revolved 
around factors which previous research had indicated as facilitators and 
obstacles of transfer. Our starting point was to confirm that one analog was 
enough to trigger transfer in the case of our binary decision making task. 
More importantly, we wished to answer the question if two analogs led to 
significantly higher transfer than just one. From literature, based on open 
ended problem solving and, mostly, on immediate and contextually near 
transfer, we knew that increasing number of analogs learned from one to 
two, coupled with analogical encoding (i.e. learning by comparison), had 
boosted transfer performance in immediate transfer (Gick and Holyoak, 
1983) but not in delayed un-hinted transfer (Spencer and Weisberg, 1986). 
We wanted to investigate if number of analogs would make a significant 
difference in our binary decision making task and if changes in delay, 
context shift and semantic distance would affect the relationship between 
number of analogs and transfer. The fact that learning two analogs by 
analogical encoding leads to higher transfer than just one is one of the 
founding pillars of pragmatic reasoning schema theory since it supports the 
claim that schema induction increases probability of transfer. Since a 
mapping process usually cannot operate on a single analog to derive schema 
(a possible exception to this is the case in which enough domain knowledge 
is possessed and an explanation is constructed, as shown by Ahn, Brewer 
and Mooney, 1992), then transferring based on learning with one analog 
should not be schema mediated and thus inferior.
Moreover, we wished to study the effect of learning method on transfer 
in binary decision making tasks. When Catrambone and Holyoak (1989) 
compared summarization to analogical encoding using open ended 
problems, they found the latter to be superior in immediate but not in 
delayed (30 minutes or one week) transfer. The question of whether these
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results would hold true with a different type of task and with longer delays 
and larger contextual and semantic shifts was still open. Moreover, a study 
based on open-ended problem solving had collected evidence on the 
positive impact on transfer of detailed schema-oriented questions 
(Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989). We wanted to test if this facilitative 
effect would work with our type of task as well.
Connected to the two previous research questions, we also wanted to 
shed light on the role of schema in binary decision making tasks. In open 
ended problem solving, as we mentioned above, schemata were found by 
Gick and Holyoak (1983) to mediate transfer. Would this be the case with a 
closed decision as well?
Another relationship which we wanted to investigate was that between 
analog diversity and transfer. It is widespread belief amongst educators that 
increasing the variety of exemplars increases transfer. However, Gick and 
Holyoak (1983) did not find this to be the case in their analogical transfer 
studies on open ended problems. Would transfer of a closed decision 
making task confirm Gick and Holyoak’s findings?
Furthermore, Gick and Holyoak (1983, 1980) had found significantly 
higher transfer when the learning and target were from similar domains (i.e. 
when the semantic distance was lower). Although this seemed an intuitive 
result, we wished to confirm that it could be extended to binary decision 
making problems.
In some classic experiments conducted with open ended problems 
(Spencer and Weisberg, 1986; Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989) context and 
time shifts were found to impair transfer. This finding was consistent with 
Wiseman and Tulving’s (1976) encoding specificity principle from memory 
research. Research also seemed to indicate that time delay was a less 
important obstacle (Spencer and Weisberg, 1986). We thought that, given 
the relevance of time and context shifts in real life transfer, it would be a 
valuable goal to investigate their effects on transfer using a closed decision
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as transfer task. Again, much of the available literature had explored shorter 
delays (usually a few minutes) and more rarely delays up to a week 
(Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989). Specifically, we wanted to better 
understand the effects of context shifts, time delays (up to over 20 days) and 
semantic distance on transfer. We wished to understand if the relative 
importance o f these variables was the same with a binary decision as 
transfer task. Moreover, we wanted to study how these variables interacted 
and we were looking to extend the findings on the impact of transfer delays 
to longer periods.
Finally, we wanted to understand the role of quality of learning and of 
explicit recognition in transfer. Both were reported to have a positive 
relationship with transfer in open ended problem solving transfer. The 
former had been found of key importance in same context hinted and un­
hinted transfer (Gick and Holyoak 1983), in delayed and contextually 
shifted hinted transfer, but not in delayed and contextually shifted transfer 
(Spencer and Weisberg, 1986 and Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989). As for 
explicit recognition, although not studied directly (participants were not 
asked if they explicitly recognized the analogy), it appeared very relevant in 
open-ended problem solving transfer because, when participants were given 
hints to use the analog, i.e. when explicit recognition was induced, transfer 
soared. We wanted to verify if quality o f learning and explicit recognition 
had the same role when the task was a binary decision.
To help make concrete our research questions, we defined a dependent 
dichotomous variable called transfer. The variable took value “yes” when 
sub-task 1 (our transfer proxy) was solved and explained correctly and “no” 
when it was either incorrect or correct but not explained. We also identified 
eight independent variables which could influence transfer, o f which six 
were directly manipulated by us and two were endogenous (i.e. were 
internal to the leaming-transfer process, thus not directly manipulated). The 
research plan was to study not only the impact of the single variables on
transfer, but also the effects o f two and three way interactions between 
them.
The manipulated variables were divided in two groups, controllable 
variables (these were the variables belonging to the learning phase) and 
non-controllable variables (these were the variables belonging to the 
transfer phase) because, from a practical point of view, controllability has 
relevant implications. While the controllable variables are a natural target 
for teaching and learning strategies aimed at enhancing transfer, the non- 
controllable ones are a “given” over which little can be done other than 
creating awareness of their impact and, possibly, devising measures to 
counter their effects on transfer when they are negative.
The controllable variables that we selected were: number of analogs 
learned (one vs. two), learning method (summarization, free-comparison 
and question-guided comparison) and diversity of analogs learned (low vs. 
high). The non-controllable variables we included were semantic distance, 
level of context shift and delay between learning and transfer, were, again 
the ones on which some literature existed. The internal factors we 
considered were quality of learning (measured by rating the learning output) 
and explicit recognition of the analogy (self-reported by participants). 
Lastly, our research also investigated how variables belonging to the 
learning phase (number of analogs, learning method and diversity of learned 
exemplars) influence quality of learning and explicit recognition.
From a methodological point of view, we were planning to collect data 
via a number of experiments. These experiments would be analysed 
separately before compiling all the cases in a single database on which 
various regression analyses could be run. The aggregated data analyses 
would be key in drawing sound conclusions as it would be based on a larger 
number of cases, it would allow to rank the importance of the variables and 
to identify when and how they interacted.
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A final point needs to be mentioned concerning how the experiments 
were run. After a few lab-based experiments, we understood that there was a 
limit to what we could do using this type of experimenting. The nature of 
the experiments, requiring learners to come back to the lab after days or 
weeks without us being able to reveal why we needed them to come back, 
made it difficult to reach the high numbers of participants that we needed to 
run a proper statistical analysis. This made us decide to adopt web-based 
experimenting, which not only allowed us to reach almost a thousand 
participants but also opened our research to a much wider population in 
terms of ages, cultural, educational and racial background. This brought the 
additional benefit o f making our results more apt at being generalized.
In the chapters following this introduction, we will present the outcomes 
of our research in a chronological order. Chapter two will report our 
literature review, which we performed as a starting point of our work and 
which allowed us, as explained, to identify the areas where additional 
research might be useful. In chapter three, we will describe our first 
experiments, conducted in the lab, which supported our selection of 
materials as well as our choice to go online. These experiments are also 
relevant (although this is limited by the small number o f cases) because they 
were the only ones in which we were able to create a large context shift. 
Chapter 4 will discuss benefits and risks of web-based experimenting and 
illustrate its validation, in our specific situation, through the replication of 
Gick and Holyoak’s 1983 experiment 4. Chapters 5 and 6 present and 
discusses all the online experiments one by one. Chapter 6 ends with a 
summary, by key issue, of the evidence gathered so far from our online 
experiments. It will be apparent from this review that some findings were 
very consistent throughout the experiments while in other cases we found 
mixed results. On the latter, chapter 7 will shed some light, reporting and 
commenting the results of our aggregated data analyses. Finally, in chapter 
8, we will be able to finalize conclusions from our research, to highlight the
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issues that remain open and how they might be investigated and to indicate 
how training might benefit from these and previous findings.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELEVANT 
LITERATURE
2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
As stated in the introduction of this thesis, the motivation behind our 
research was to contribute to understanding of transfer o f learning in binary 
decision making problems, which we identified as a relevant category of 
problems tackled in managerial and professional activities so far untouched 
by analogical transfer research. The seminal studies on analogical transfer 
(Gick and Holyoak, 1980 and 1983) are based on an open-ended problems, 
i.e. problems lacking definition in some respect (Simon, 1984). One of the 
goals of our research was to understand if Gick and Holyoak’s conclusions 
would generalize to transfer of other types of problems and, more 
specifically, to the seemingly very different class o f binary decision 
problems (i.e. decisions between two specified options).
In their 1980 and 1983 experiments, Gick and Holyoak mostly use 
Duncker’s Radiation problem , a classic open-ended problem, as their 
transfer task. The problem asks the solver how to cure a patient affected by 
a deadly tumour. The only information given is that surgery cannot be 
performed due to tumour location and that a certain type o f ray, at high 
strength, can destroy the tumour, but also the surrounding tissues. No 
further indication nor constraint is provided and, in fact, solvers tend to beat 
different paths in their search for the solution (e.g. some ignore the ray 
information and suggest micro-surgery, others prefer to employ the ray and 
then try to reconstruct damaged tissue, others yet employ rays at lower 
strength converging on the tumour). Gick and Holyoak’s experimental 
condition participants had previously been exposed to one or two stories, 
from different domains, which illustrated the concept of using converging 
forces to conquer a danger or an enemy. Those who, out of all possible 
solutions to the Radiation Problem , selected the convergence one were 
considered to have achieved transfer. These participants transferred the 
similarity in structure between the problem they were asked to solve and the
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previous stories and transferred the principle they had learned to the new 
domain.
Closed decisions are at the opposite end of the spectrum with open-ended 
problems because the solver must select one of two specified options, only 
one of which is correct. While open-ended problems have a very wide 
problem space, closed decisions have a very narrow one. Moreover, in the 
latter, the type of decision to make (e.g. “switch or keep your choice”) -  to a 
greater or lesser extent -  tends to function as a cue. Due to this, the 
importance of insight in finding the correct solution is probably somewhat 
reduced.
As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the tasks we have 
chosen to study transfer in analogs of the Monty HalI problem - a 
structurally simple but very counterintuitive probability puzzle which 
requires a binary decision to be made. The task is similar to well-defined 
problems because means and ends are clearly defined in the problem 
statement. On the other hand, the problem requires some insight because, in 
order to apply the correct steps to reach the solution, it must be recognized 
as an “unusual” probability problem (i.e. it must be understood that the 
game-show host, Monty Hall, is operating a constrained choice, rather than 
sampling randomly, and that this crucially affects the relevant probabilities).
Positioning our research will require us to investigate the problem 
solving and decision making literatures as well as specific literature on the 
Monty Hall problem. Before touching on the main topic of transfer of 
learning, it will also be useful to briefly review related subjects. Since 
ability to learn implies ability to remember, a short analysis of the memory 
literature has been included with a focus on the aspects that are most 
relevant for our research. Moreover, since learning is the pre-condition for 
transfer to take place and is known to influence transfer, theories o f learning 
are briefly reviewed, mainly in order to better understand the type of 
learning taking place in our experiments. An overview o f transfer of
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learning’s rich specific literature, an essential starting point for our research, 
is provided together with a taxonomy of transfer that will help us place our 
experiments amongst the many others conducted on similar topics and thus 
to better interpret their results. Finally, analogical transfer i.e. the specific 
transfer based on an analogy, is discussed. Reflecting our focused approach 
in the literature review, we have gone more in-depth on the topics most 
closely related to the present study.
It should be underscored that, although the mentioned topics have distinct 
literatures, this seems due, at least in part, to the fact that they have been 
investigated in historically distinct research traditions. In fact, many themes 
that these literatures touch upon are the same, but viewed from a different 
perspective and analysed emphasizing different aspects. The fact that 
memory, learning, transfer of learning and analogical transfer literatures 
cover closely related and even overlapping content is reflected in our 
literature review with some subjects being discussed more than once from 
different angles. For example, since two of analogical transfer’s sub­
processes, encoding and retrieval, are based on the corresponding memory 
mechanisms, they are covered in both our reviews on analogical transfer and 
on memory literatures. Moreover, the encoding specificity principle is 
discussed both from a memory perspective and in terms o f implications of 
context changes on transfer of learning. Case-based learning, finally, is 
analysed as a type of learning and as the driver of a type of reasoning in 
analogical transfer.
The chapter will open presenting a brief analysis and review o f literatures 
on problem solving and on decision making in which we will position our 
transfer task highlighting the main differences with open-ended problem 
solving. We will follow with a review of the literature on the Monty Hall 
problem. The chapter will then move on to reviewing aspects of memory 
and learning most important for our research. Finally, we will conclude
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reviewing transfer of learning and analogical transfer literatures which are 
the core starting point of our work.
2.1 Problem Solving
Problem solving, as studied in psychology, typically requires that a 
person has to exert deliberate effort to overcome obstacles in the path to a 
solution (Reed, 2000). Thus, when an answer or an approach can be quickly 
retrieved from memory, this does not count as a problem. If that is not the 
case, then a number of steps should be undertaken to find a solution. The 
steps usually undertaken are: problem identification (i.e. finding the 
problem), problem definition and representation (i.e. formulating a clear 
description of what the problem is), strategy formulation and application 
(i.e. choice and implementation of the most appropriate strategy to solve the 
problem), organization of information (i.e. integration of all available 
information that is believed to be needed to solve the problem), resource 
allocation (i.e. allocation o f resources such as time and effort to reaching the 
solution), monitoring (i.e. check on the evolution of the process) and 
evaluation (i.e. adequacy check of the solution). These steps, are often 
viewed as a cycle (the problem-solving cycle), because some or all o f them 
may need to be undertaken more than once before reaching the solution. It 
should be underscored that flexibility in following the steps is allowed and, 
in fact, may be appropriate (i.e. it may be functional to change the order of 
the steps or to skip steps).
Most of the literature on transfer is based on problem solving tasks, 
which constitute a very broad and diversified class. In this wide class, we 
identified the Monty Hall problem as an interesting, and so far unexplored, 
decision problem to study. In the opening o f this chapter we mentioned a 
categorization of problems which is useful in positioning our research, the 
one based on level of definition o f the problem structure. This type of
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distinction gives rise to two types o f problems: the well-defined and the ill- 
defined ones.
Well-defined problems (also known as well-structured or non-insight 
problems) are problems for which the necessary information, the operations, 
and the goal state are completely specified. As a consequence, they can be 
solved within the initial representation (i.e. no restructuring is needed) 
following a sequence of steps. The sequence can be easy and pre­
determined as it would be in the calculation of the perimeter o f a 
geometrical shape or it could be more difficult and not pre-determined as in 
the game of chess. In both cases, however, all the required information is 
available (i.e. is given or can be found using other information which has 
been provided), the operations or moves that can be made are limited and 
declared from the beginning and the desired final state is clear. In sum, the 
key features of these problems are that no particular insight is typically 
necessary to solve them and that the path leading to the solution is made of 
incremental steps. The fundamental strategy to reach the solution, therefore, 
is to proceed step-by-step avoiding illegal moves and using available 
heuristics which reduce the requests on working memory.
Examples of well-structured problems are abundant in instruction and in 
training, where a number of steps to reach a goal are explained before an 
isomorphic problem is handed-out for solution (e.g. calculate a volume, find 
the speed, etc.). Syllogistic reasoning problems (i.e. problems in which, 
from two categorical premises, a necessary conclusion must be drawn) are 
an example of well-structured problems. Another typical example is given 
by the legal-move problems (e.g. Cannibals and Missionaries, Hanoi Tower, 
etc.) which derive their name from the fact that a series of specified moves 
(legal moves) allow to reach the desired final state. Consistent with the well- 
structured nature of the problems and the fact that they require an 
incremental approach, success in solving them is usually easily predictable 
and, indeed, well predicted by problem-solvers who experience a feeling of
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warmth (i.e. the sense that the solution is getting closer) as they progressed 
in solving the problem (Metcalfe, 1986; Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987).
Ill-structured problems, also known as ill-defined or insight problems, on 
the contrary, are problems in which there is some uncertainty in the given 
information, the permissible operations or the final state. The first and 
possibly greatest challenge they pose is in problem definition and 
representation. Insight problems do not have a well-defined problem space 
and the quest for possible solutions can move in any direction and draw on 
any previous learning or experience. A correct or incorrect representation of 
the problem can “make the difference”, by sending the search off on a 
completely unproductive path or by leading to the solution in a few steps.
Despite the described differences appearing rather stark, classifying 
problems as insight or non-insight may not always be straightforward. Some 
authors (Metacalfe and Weibe, 1987) base the distinction on the different 
phenomenology that accompanies insight vs. non-insight problem solving 
(e.g. the increasing feeling-of-warmth as the solution becomes closer that 
characterizes mainly non-insight problems). Other authors 
(Knoblich, Ohlsson and Raney, 2001) have proposed a classification based 
on the problem representational change that must take place in order for the 
solution to be found. They claim that insight problems are characterized by 
an impasse (i.e. a point of no progress) which can be overcome by revising 
the initial mental representation, which, in turn, allows to access knowledge 
elements previously inactivated. Finally, Kaplan and Simon (1990) have 
proposed an approach that distinguishes between insight and non-insight 
problems based on the processes underlying the two types of problem 
solving.
A more empirical approach is the one proposed by Weisberg (1996), who 
produced a diagnostic method that can help separate insight from non 
insight problems. The first step is to ask if  the problem solving process 
shows discontinuity (i.e. a change in the direction followed in looking for a
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solution). If the answer is yes, the next question to ask is if  the discontinuity 
calls for a restructuring of the problem (of course, it could simply be that 
another direction needs to be explored within the same problem 
representation). If even this question is answered affirmatively then we are 
in the presence either of a pure-insight problem or of a hybrid problem. The 
former type is characterized by the fact that restructuring is the only way to 
reach the solution, while the latter type can also be solved by other methods 
(e.g. trial-and-error).
It should be underscored that insight problems may not be recognized as 
such immediately, i.e. they may seem the type of problem that simply 
requires methodical application of incremental steps to reach a solution, 
until an impasse is reached, making it obvious that an alternative approach 
must be adopted. An example of this is the mini-mutilated checkerboard 
problem (In a 6X6 checkerboard where two black squares have been 
removed from opposite angles, can the remaining 34 squares by covered by 
dominoes?). Solvers could try to tackle this problem attempting different 
arrangements of the dominoes, but finding the correct solution relies 
crucially on the insight that two squares of the same colour have been 
eliminated, thus rendering unequal the number of blacks and whites to be 
covered. If this is understood, it is evident that there is no way the 
chessboard can be tiled with any arrangement of dominos as they come with 
equal numbers of blacks and whites. Analogously, the nine-dot problem 
(connect all dots with four lines without taking the pencil off the paper) and 
the match-stick problem (Make four equilateral triangles using six matches, 
with one complete match making the side of each triangle) usually see 
solvers try various ways of connecting the dots and numerous arrangements 
of the matchsticks before reaching an impasse and realizing that the problem 
cannot be solved applying a conventional approach but requires 
restructuring to remove unnecessarily restrictive conditions (to stay within
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the perimeter of the nine dots and inside a two dimensional space 
respectively).
The nature o f the insight leading to problem restructuring is still an open 
topic. Some authors have questioned the classic view by which insight is the 
sudden enlightenment that follows restructuring and leads to the solution “in 
one leap” and argued that the solution to insight problems is achieved more 
gradually. Moreover, some heuristics traditionally associated to 
transformation problems, such as hill-climbing (i.e. the search for an 
optimum combination o f a set of variables by varying each variable one at a 
time so far as the result increases and stopping when the result decreases), 
have been found to work for insight problem solving, suggesting that it may 
have similarities with non-insight problem-solving (Weisberg, 1986; 
Chronicle, MacGregor and Ormerod, 2004).
A classic example of an insight problem, very relevant for our research 
because many experiments on transfer of learning are based on it, is 
Duncker’s Radiation problem. As we explained, the problem requires to 
find a way to eliminate the tumour without destroying the surrounding 
tissues. The problem mentions the existence of a powerful ray which would 
eliminate the tumour, but also destroy the surrounding tissue, without, 
however, indicating that it would be the best solution to use it. As no further 
information or instruction is given, the solution can be of any type. 
However, if the Radiation problem is represented as a medical problem, 
probably the search for a solution will draw on the problem-solver’s medical 
knowledge and experience and, thus, it is unlikely that a principle learned in 
a military or fire-fighting story (these were the domains o f the learning 
analogs used in Gick and Holyoak’s experiments) will be retrieved. If, 
instead, the representation is more abstract (e.g. as a problem in which a 
great force must concentrate in one point to overcome an enemy) it is easier 
for the analogy with the military or fire-fighting stories to be identified.
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M aier’s Cord problem, which Gick and Holyoak used in some of their 
experiments as an alternative transfer task, is another example of insight 
problem. The solver is asked how she would tie together the ends of two 
cords hanging from the ceiling where the two cords are of such a length that 
when you hold one cord in either hand, you can’t reach the other. To attain 
the goal, any of the objects provided in a list (which includes poles, 
extension cords etc.) can be used. The solution that shows transfer was the 
pendulum solution (i.e. hanging an object o f the list to one of the cords and 
obtaining a pendulum effect that would allow to grab the cord “on the 
swing” while holding the other) because participants had been previously 
reading analogous stories using the principle. In this case, the solution 
requires insight because the objects provided must be used in an unusual 
way (i.e. not for their primary function but as weights).
Another typical example of this class o f problems are creativity 
exercises, which lack a set of pre-defined moves to reach the goal, although 
they may have a set o f moves which are not allowed (e.g. the nine-dot 
problem, in which all dots must be connected with ju st four lines and 
without taking the pencil o ff the paper).
Finally, it should be noted that, when dealing with insight problems, 
people are not very good at predicting their own success or failure (feeling 
o f warmth is unrelated to solution, Metcalfe and Wiebe, 1987). This is 
consistent with the fact that they do not know what they will need to do to 
solve it and in contrast with what happens solving non-insight problems.
The distinction between well and ill-defined problems has no direct 
implication regarding difficulty: it is possible that a well-structured problem 
is very difficult to solve, maybe because it demands several calculations 
which pose heavy requests on our working memory or because one cannot 
recall the exact steps that lead to the solution. On the other hand, since the 
type of difficulty that insight vs. non-insight problems pose is different (i.e. 
discovering which path will lead to the solution vs. recalling some steps and
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applying them to the problem), it seems plausible that different cognitive 
processes play different roles in reaching the solution. In fact, literature 
based on a dual process approach to thinking (Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich 
and West, 2000), seems to indicate that that the two distinct cognitive 
systems, System 1 (which is automatic, fast and generates intuitive answers) 
and System 2 (which supports abstract and hypothetical thinking is slow and 
sequential) are involved in different ways in the solution o f insight and non­
insight problems.
Although insight-problems have been thought to rely mainly on System 1 
processes (Ohlsson, 1992 and Schooler, 1993), some studies indicated that 
System 2 processes are also involved (Kaplan and Simon, 1990). Further 
research (Gilhooly and Murphy, 2005) has confirmed that System 2 
processes are indeed part of insight problem-solving but that the type of 
System 2 processes involved differs from the type required by non-insight 
problems. Insight-problem solving has been found to involve System 2 
executive process o f strategy switching and inhibition, while non-insight 
tasks have been found to activate System 2 systematic search processes. 
These findings reframe the original question of whether System 2 processes 
are also involved in insight problem solving into a question of which level 
of involvement they have.
Finally, research carried out with electroencephalogram (EEG) and 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) found differences in neural 
activity between solving insight and non-insight problems (Jausovec, 1997, 
Bowden and Jung-Beeman, 2004). Jn conclusion, the role of the cognitive 
processes involved in solving the two types of problems are different, but 
these differences may be less sharp than was initially thought.
As we said earlier, the reason why this distinction between different 
problem types is relevant to our research is that we will compare our 
findings to those by Gick and Holyoak (1980, 1983), who were using, in 
their experiments, classic insight problems (the Radiation problem and the
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M aier’s Cord problem). The insight vs. non-insight distinction helps us 
highlight some of the key differences between the Radiation and the Monty 
Hall problem.
A difference with the pure-insight problem used by Gick and Holyoak is 
that our binary decision making task presents characteristics both o f insight 
and non-insight problems. It is similar to insight problems because the 
initial mental representation tends to be the incorrect one (i.e. that it is an 
“ordinary” probability problem) and thus evokes the wrong strategy, which 
must be inhibited for a correct solution to be reached (i.e. the problem needs 
to be solved as a conditional probability problem or, for those not familiar 
with probability theory, as a “non-obvious” probability problem).
On the other hand, the Monty Hall problem also has differences with 
insight problems. To begin with, it does not reach an impasse point (in fact, 
most people are certain o f having reached the correct solution applying the 
“number of cases” heuristic i.e. assuming that, since the number of 
alternatives is N, the probability is 1/N). Moreover, it can be solved 
correctly by adopting an analytic approach (i.e. listing all possible 
arrangements of doors and goats, all possible selections by the contestant 
and by Monty and all outcomes and finally counting how many are 
favourable to switching), thus it does not strictly require restructuring, 
although restructuring makes it quicker to reach the solution. Furthermore, 
the Monty Hall problem requires some calculations to be undertaken 
correctly and, consequently, reaching a solution does not follow necessarily 
nor immediately the adoption of the correct representation. In conclusion, 
the Monty Hall problem has a combination of characteristics belonging to 
both insight and non-insight problems.
Our Monty Hall problem task, finally, seems to require less of an effort 
than the Radiation problem in recognizing the analogy due to its closed 
structure. As we mentioned, in the case of the Radiation problem, 
recognizing the analogy, i.e. understanding that the same principle learned
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in the military story could be applied, required a restructuring o f the 
problem: in order to transfer from the military/fire-fighting learning stories 
to the Radiation problem, it was crucial that both learning and target stories 
be represented abstractly, so that the relevance of the principle learned in the 
military/fire-fighting stories could become evident. In the case o f our target 
task, a Monty Hall problem analog, seeing the analogy with the learning 
stories was probably not as difficult and possibly did not require 
restructuring, since both involved probability calculations, although in very 
different domains, which possibly worked as a cue to the learning stories. 
Moreover, in one of our two target stories, Lucrezia, the final choice 
(“switch-or-keep”) was similarly structured to the learning story final 
choice, which also had the potential o f functioning as a cue.
Determining why the differences with the type of problem used by Gick 
and Holyoak matter to the transfer process is beyond the scope of our 
research. It is nevertheless useful to point out once again that our transfer 
task was different from theirs under several points of view. If we are unable 
to confirm some of the findings from the seminal Gick and Holyoak 
experiments, this may well be due to the fact that those findings were, to a 
certain extent, dependent on the characteristics of the problems they used.
Another topic in the problem solving literature which we want to 
comment on is the role of past experience and knowledge and how they can 
interfere positively or negatively with problem solving. It has been shown 
that past knowledge can influence problem solving in various ways 
(Whitten and Graesser, 2003). Chase and Simon (1973), in their famous 
studies on the game of chess (which can be framed as a problem solving 
task where the goal state is to checkmate the adversary’s king), found that 
experts performed better than novices in recalling the positions o f pieces on 
the chessboard when the positions made sense in terms of an actual game. 
This clearly helped them in the specific problem solving required by a chess 
game because they were better able to associate chunks o f related pieces
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(i.e. clusters) with stored representations of those pieces which they could 
then associate to strategies which had proved successful in the past. 
However, experts lost their advantage when the task was to recall a random 
arrangement of pieces. The experiment was successfully replicated in 
different problem solving domains, from computer programming 
(McKeithen, Reitman, Rueter and Hirtle, 1981) to board games such as Go 
(Reitman, 1976) and Othello (Wolff, Mitchell and Frey, 1984). In 
conclusion, knowledge makes a significant positive difference in problem 
solving in the expert’s domain but this does not appear to transfer to other 
domains.
Another consequence, this time negative, of previous knowledge is that it 
can create a powerful and dysfunctional mental set or entrenchment from 
which the problem solver has difficulty in breaking free. In other words, 
past knowledge can bring with it fixedness (on a particular strategy which 
worked in the past but might not help solve the problem at hand or on a 
particular function for an object which could impede seeing that it can be 
used for something else). A typical example of how mental sets can 
influence the solution of mental problems was given by Luchins (1942) with 
his water-jar problems: problem-solvers who had been exposed to a more 
difficult (algebric) solution to that type of problem failed to realize there 
was a much simpler way to solve it. Other experiments, such as the famous 
Candle Problem by Duncker (1945), replicated by Adamson (1952), and 
Birch and Rabinowitz’s (1951) experiments using M aier’s Two Cord 
problem supported the notion that functional fixedness creates a mechanized 
state of mind which blinds us in seeing novel solutions (in the specific case 
to see a new use for the given objects).
It is possible that for some “experts” in probability which we could have 
had amongst our participants, previous knowledge might have helped or 
hindered understanding and memorizing the principle in the learning stories. 
However, since the Monty Hall problem is a very unusual and difficult
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probability problem even for people with very high knowledge o f statistics, 
we think that prior expertise actually played a less relevant role in arriving 
to a correct solution than would be the case with most problems.
2.2 Decision Making
Decision making is the thinking done when an action must be chosen, 
selecting it among alternatives. Decision making, which includes multiple 
and very different decision types, can be a stand-alone action end-in-itself or 
it can be embedded in other tasks or other processes, such as problem 
solving. Moreover, making a decision may rely on finding the solution to 
one or more problems. Due to this intertwining, the distinction between 
problem solving and decision making is not always an easy one to make in 
practice, particularly in real world problems. Even if both problem solving 
and decision making rely on similar cognitive processes, however, the 
emphasis of the two areas is different. Decision making typically focuses on 
cases where choices have given payoffs/risks associated to them. 
Consequently, decision making is usually studied as the trade-off between 
different aspects of value. On the contrary, problem solving is usually 
viewed as “value-free” i.e. the correct solution doesn’t depend on 
preferences and desires.
Decisions vary in their degree of uncertainty and on where the locus of 
uncertainty lies. In some types of decisions, the probabilities associated to 
the outcomes are given but are expressed in probabilistic terms (i.e. “if you 
select option A, you have an 80% probability of winning 100 $ and a 20% 
probability of loosing 20 $, if you select option B you will get 50 $”), thus 
the outcome is uncertain. In making these decisions, the initial step is to 
calculate utilities of each option (i.e. an 80% chance to win 100 $ is worth 
80 $, a 20% chance of loosing 20 $ is worth 4 $, so the option is worth 76$) 
and then to select the highest (e.g. 76$ is better than 50$). Although this
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may seem a very linear process, it is not always entirely rational and it may 
suffer from various biases (e.g. certainty effect, in the previous example, 
may induce people to choose 50 $ “for sure” over the other option which 
has a higher utility). In other decisions, the probabilities are also known, but 
selecting the best option may be more complicated than in the previous 
example and may be mostly a function of individual preferences and values. 
For example, in the medical field where undertaking a given surgery may be 
known to solve a specific low-quality-of-life condition but carries a 50% 
chance of complete recovery and a 50% chance of death. In yet other types 
o f decisions which we face in real life, probabilities of outcomes are 
unknown and must be estimated on the basis of the available information, 
which may be very little or nil. Finally, there are decisions which might be 
difficult to make, even dilemmatic, despite outcomes being certain e.g. the 
decision to get married or to fire an employee. The difficulty might be, as in 
these examples, in the goals the decision maker pursues which may be 
conflicting or unclear. Moreover, the final state may be uncertain (i.e. not all 
the consequences o f the decision may be known). Similarly to what we 
found analyzing problems, some decisions can be deceivingly simple but in 
reality very difficult to make correctly while others, which seem complex, 
can be relatively easy to make, provided some previously learned steps are 
applied.
Attempts have been made to find a common thread in the multitude of 
decision types and to model decision making normatively and descriptively. 
The most relevant models will be briefly reviewed.
According to utility theory by von-Neumann and Morgenstem (Neumann 
and von Morgenstem, 1944) and the rational-choice model, which are intended 
to be descriptive and normative models, a decision firstly requires 
identification o f alternative actions and possible outcomes, followed by 
comparison of alternatives, in terms of utility, with respect to one or more 
goals. The decision maker then selects the best alternative i.e. the one that
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maximizes his utility. The strategy behind the rational choice model is 
optimizing (i.e. optimizing utility of the decision). This model is based on 
the assumption that decision goals are clear and, if they conflict, that this 
can be solved by attributing utilities to outcomes and comparing them. 
Moreover, it assumes that all necessary information (alternatives, 
consequences, etc.) are available to the decision maker, that humans act 
only out of self-interest, and rationality, attempting to maximise their own 
utility and that human rationality is unbounded, i.e. it is not subject to 
constraints of time, knowledge and computational capacities.
Organizational analysts and psychologists have called into question all of 
the assumptions on which the rational-choice model is based, claiming that 
the model is not descriptive o f human behaviour. It is nevertheless true that 
some prima facie  violations of the rational choice model are easy to observe 
and this has led, as a consequence, to the elaboration of other models 
(Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982). A similar model to rational-choice 
model, named optimization under constraints, posits that optimization is 
terminated when marginal search costs exceed marginal benefits from the 
search. This model, however, may require even greater knowledge and 
computation than the rational choice model and has been heavily challenged 
on the grounds that limitations of human mind make the search for optimal 
decisions, with or without constraints, hardly descriptive of human 
behaviour.
Herbert Simon contrasted observation o f how people actually make 
choices with the rational model. He posited that, since human rationality is 
bounded, the strategy that people actually, and reasonably, adopt is 
satisficing. This strategy aims at reaching a predetermined aspiration level, 
considered satisfactory, rather than the optimal level (i.e. the best 
alternative). The observation that models based on optimization may not 
even be the most useful to apply has given rise to new decision models, 
which are called ecologically rational (i.e. able to perform extremely well in
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real-world environments). It has been pointed out that satisficing strategies 
are, for example, successfully adopted when time is heavily constrained 
(e.g. fire-fighter behaviour). A model such as Recognition-Primed Decision 
(RPD) Model of Rapid Decision Making (Klein, 1993, 1998) seems to be a 
better model of people’s strategies for making complex decisions under 
extreme time-pressure. In this model, the decision-maker is assumed to 
generate a possible course of action based on a similar previous case (i.e. a 
prototypical situation encountered before which appears similar to the one at 
hand) and compare it to the constraints imposed by the situation. The first 
course of action that is not rejected is selected, favouring rapidity over 
optimization. Another successful example of departure from the rational 
choice model is the use of fast and frugal heuristics which short-circuit the 
rational process for the sake of time and/or energy. These heuristics exploit 
environmental structure to yield adaptive solutions which work very well in 
the real-world.
Prospect theory was developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
(1981) as a psychologically realistic alternative to expected utility theory. It 
is a descriptive theory of decisions under risk (in the original formulation 
the term prospect referred to a lottery) which accounts for the observed 
violations of utility theory. Starting from empirical evidence, it predicts two 
kinds of deviations from expected-utility theory. Firstly, it predicts that 
individuals won’t deal with probabilities as they ought to from a purely 
rational point of view, but rather distort them when evaluating losses and 
gains. Moreover, it tells us that individuals think of utility as change from a 
reference point and that this point can be manipulated.
Emotional theories for decision making account for behaviour (not only 
for choices but also for emotional response) observed in applied settings. 
These theories, which also provide an alternative to purely cognitive 
models, posit that people maximise their subjective expected emotions. In 
fact, according to decision affect theory (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, Ritov
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1997), people evaluate outcomes based on the value of the expected 
emotional response to outcome and compare them to counterfactual 
outcomes.
Finally, Decision by Sampling theory (Stewart, Chater, Brown, 2006) 
unifies traditional models o f decision making and contextually driven 
models. According to this model, an attribute’s subjective value is 
constructed from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons to attributes drawn 
from memory (e.g. attribute values encountered in previous decisions). The 
model succeeds in accounting for various phenomena such as concave 
utility functions, losses looming larger than gains, hyperbolic temporal 
discounting and over/under estimation of small/large probabilities 
respectively.
In experimental tests of expected utility and its descriptive variants— e.g., 
Prospect theory (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982) and Decision by 
Sampling theory (Stewart, Chater, Brown, 2006) the typical assumption is 
that probabilities are given (usually numerically) and what must be 
computed is their value (utility) based on the potential outcomes and their 
respective probabilities. The decision with highest utility is then chosen. In 
the Monty Hall problem, which we used in our experiments under various 
guises (several different analogous stories were drawn form it), by contrast, 
probabilities must be calculated in order for the decision to be made. 
Moreover, the correct calculation is rather counterintuitive, as we have 
already commented, because it requires understanding the effect on 
probability of a constrained choice. On the other hand, the desired final state 
of the problem is very clearly defined as maximizing the probability of 
selecting the prize door or minimizing the probability of selecting a 
poisoned dish.
As we pointed out, the type of decision in the learning stories of our 
experiments was a structurally simple binary decision in which the goal was 
clearly maximizing the probability o f a positive outcome or minimizing the
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probability of a negative one. The crucial activity was probability 
calculation, not deciding what utility the different decisions had. The type of 
decision model which we think best describes this type of decision and 
which certainly is most appropriate to the goal is therefore the rational 
choice one (notice also that there were no constraints in computing capacity 
nor in time that would require bounded-rationality or satisfacing models to 
be applied).
It is interesting to observe that, probably, in the real life Monty Hall show 
contestants behaved more according to decision affect theory than to 
rational choice model (the decision not to switch is consistent with the loss 
aversion property as participants would perceive switching away from a 
winning choice as a loss, thus would regret a negative outcome if they 
changed their initial selection than if they kept it). However, it is unlikely 
that emotions interfered significantly with the decision we required 
participants to make in the target stories of our experiments.
2.3 The Monty Hall Problem
The Monty Hall problem, which we briefly described in the introductory 
chapter of this thesis and which we will now examine more deeply, is a 
classic probability problem requiring a closed decision to be made.
As already explained, the Monty Hall problem takes its name from the 
presenter of a successful TV game show called “Let’s make a deal” in 
which contestants were faced with a very tricky binary decision (i.e. a 
choice between two discrete alternative options). The problem requires 
solvers to put themselves in the shoes of a contestant on the game show 
called “Let’s make a deal”. Initially the contestant chooses, at random, one 
of three closed doors. Behind one of them there is a prize and behind the 
other two a goat. Rather than opening the door selected by the contestant 
immediately, Monty Hall opens one of the two unselected doors himself.
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Monty knows which door has the prize behind it and must avoid it 
(although, as we will comment further on, the original version of the 
problem does not explicitly say so), thus systematically opens a door with a 
goat behind it. At this point, the contestant is asked by Monty Hall if he 
wants to “switch-or-keep” his initial selection. The key to making the right 
choice is to understand that Monty Hall was constrained in his choice (i.e. 
the choice was not random) because he was not allowed to select the prize 
door. In practice the constraint means that if  one of the two unselected doors 
was the winning one, Monty Hall had to open the other one. Since in two 
out of three cases the winning door is in fact one of the two unselected ones, 
this means that in two out of three cases Monty eliminates the loosing door 
and leaves the winning one. Therefore, switching is the best strategy in two 
out of three cases. O f course, in one out of three cases, the wining door is 
the one initially selected and keeping would be best. From a probabilistic 
point of view, switching is surely better because the fact that Monty 
eliminates one of the doors under the constraint that it can’t be the prize one 
changes the probabilities of the unselected-unopened door, but not of the 
initially selected one. In conclusion, contrary to intuition, the elimination of 
one of the doors by Monty does not increase both door’s probabilities in the 
same measure making them “take over” the winning probability of the 
eliminated one. The winning probability (1/3) of the door opened by Monty 
is taken over only by the other unselected door. It should be noted that if  the 
choice of which door to open were operated randomly (i.e. in absence of 
knowledge of where the prize is and of a constraint to avoid it), then the 
problem should be solved using ordinary probabilistic reasoning. In this 
latter case, the probability o f hiding the prize would equally increase to 50% 
for both unopened doors if, o f course, by chance, the winning one was not 
opened.
The majority of people who tackle this problem disregard the effect on 
probabilities of the constrained choice and therefore conclude that all doors
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have the same probability (50% success) after Monty Hall’s has opened one 
o f the unselected doors. The problem is considered one of the most striking 
examples o f normative/descriptive gap in the literature. The entire history o f  
the Monty Hall problem, in fact, documents clearly to what extent the 
problem bears a “cognitive illusion” and provides useful indications of 
which mental road-blocks people encounter in solving it. Twenty-eight 
years of Monty Hall’s “Let’s make a deal” TV show -  with the great 
majority of contestants not switching door -  confirm the counter­
intuitiveness of the problem. If this were not enough, it should be 
remembered that the problem sparked a heated debate both within the 
general public and the academia. After a reader o f Parade magazine raised 
the question of whether it was better to switch or keep the initial selection in 
the Monty Hall problem and vos Savant answered explaining that it was 
better to switch, thousands of letters from readers were received by the 
magazine. O f these, 92% claimed that she was wrong. As far as letters from 
universities were concerned, 65% of them also stated that the answer given 
was incorrect (vos Savant, 1997). Indeed, the Monty Hall problem seemed a 
problem that would, with all probabilities, not be solved correctly applying 
ordinary logic and knowledge. Citing Piattelli-Palmarini “no other statistical 
puzzle comes so close to fooling all people all the time...this phenomenon 
is particularly interesting precisely because of its specificity, its 
reproducibility, and its immunity to higher education.” (vos Savant, 1997).
The amount of evidence supporting the counter-intuitiveness of the 
problem was a key element in its selection for our experiments as it would 
ensure, as much as possible, that a correct solution was an effect o f transfer 
and not problem solving skills. Most of the published studies on the Monty 
Hall problem report that the switch rate of participants not previously 
exposed to the problem and not receiving hints ranges from 9% to 23% with 
a mean of 14.5% (Krauss and Wang, 2003; Friedman, 1998; Granberg and 
Brown, 1995; Granberg and Dorr, 1998). It should be underscored that the
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cited studies present large differences in languages and cultures involved, in 
methods of presentation and in wording of the problem, indicating that the 
difficulty is somewhat intrinsic.
The fact that the most typical mistakes made in solving it were well 
documented, was also relevant for us because we needed to give a clear and 
convincing explanation of why the solution suggested in the learning phase 
o f the experiment (the learning stories contained the solution and 
explanation) was correct, in order to minimize the number of participants 
who would not understand the point or disagree with it.
The difficulty of the problem also appears independent of its semantic 
content, as documented by the fact that a structurally equivalent problem -  
the Three Prisoners problem -  induced the same mistake in participants 
(Shimojo and Ichikawa, 1989). The Three Prisoners problem is about three 
prisoners, Tom, Dick and Harry, of which it is known that one will be 
pardoned and the other two will be executed. The name of the pardoned 
prisoner is known by the warden, who has been instructed not to reveal it. 
One of the three prisoners, Dick, manages to convince the warden that he 
will not violate the instructions received if he reveals who, o f the other two 
prisoners, will be executed (since two prisoners must be executed, revealing 
one of the two who is executed does not automatically indicate who will be 
pardoned). The warden reveals that between Harry and Tom, Harry will be 
executed. The problem asks the solver to determine if, after the revelation 
that Harry will be executed, the chances of Dick and Tom have changed and 
how.
Once again, it is crucial that the warden knows who will be pardoned and 
cannot reveal it (as Monty knew where the prize was and could not open the 
corresponding door). This constrained choice affects the probabilities of 
Tom and Dick differently, exactly for the same reason that made the 
unselected-unopened door in the Monty Hall problem takes over the 
winning probabilities o f the door opened by Monty under the constraint of
34
not opening the prize one. Tom will take over Harry’s probabilities because, 
having to indicate who would be executed between him and Harry, the 
warden selected Harry. Dick’s probabilities of being freed, consequently, 
will remain the same. In conclusion, after the warden has revealed that 
Harry will be executed, the answer is that chances have changed unequally: 
Dick still has 1/3 probability of being freed while Tom has 2/3. As we did 
for the original version of Monty Hall, we shall again underscore that, if  the 
warden had not been informed of who would be freed and if he had not been 
asked to refrain from revealing it, probabilities would not be affected in the 
same way (both prisoners would see their survival chance increase to 50%).
Existing literature which we now briefly review, besides reporting some 
interesting findings concerning the mechanisms leading to correct and 
incorrect choices and transfer to analogous decision problems, attempts 
explanations for the difficulty of the problem. We distilled out of this 
literature a few tips on how to explain the problem intuitively and 
convincingly and applied them to our learning stories. This section will 
report what is known about this problem and discuss these findings in 
relation to the use we will make of it. Krauss and Wang, who have 
extensively studied the mental mechanisms leading to choices in the Monty 
Hall problem (Krauss and Wang, 2003), found that some approaches work 
better than others in order to understand the correct solution. To begin with, 
they suggest, one “needs to consider the three arrangements and to reason in 
terms of frequencies”. The finding that using natural frequencies, rather than 
probability, helps participants solve Baysian reasoning problems was also 
documented by Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995). We opted for using both 
the formulations in our learning stories.
Moreover, Krauss and Wang found that it helps to assume Monty Hall’s 
perspective rather than the contestant’s because visualizing what is behind 
the doors focuses attention on the actual probabilities and on Monty Hall’s 
constraints rather than on the contestant’s behaviour. In fact, the
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probabilities are independent o f the contestant’s behaviour but dependant on 
the host’s behaviour. The impact o f changing perspective on human 
reasoning has been documented also by others using different reasoning 
tasks (Fiedler, Brinkmann, Betsch and Wild, 2000; Gigerenzer and Hug, 
1992; Wang, 1996). We implemented this knowledge in our learning story: 
“The host of the show knows which of the balls is the gold one (this is 
crucial) and can’t choose it because the game must go on.”
Another finding from Krauss and Wang is that providing less information 
can actually help solvers arrive to the correct solution. Specifically, when 
explaining the game dynamic, providing the precise indication o f which 
door is chosen by the contestant and which is opened by the host can be 
misleading. What happens, in the case a precise scenario is indicated (e.g. 
“Monty Hall opens, say, door N. 3”), is that the reader may be induced to 
disregard the other possible scenarios i.e. to consider all the possible 
arrangements of doors, goats and car. We found this intuitively convincing 
and avoided providing precise indication of the selection (as would be the 
door number) in our story. As an example, in a story in which the equivalent 
o f Monty Ha/Vs doors were balls we wrote: “The contestant initially 
chooses one ball.” and later “The host then selects one of the two remaining 
balls, his assistant takes it and puts it on the scale, revealing that, in fact it is 
not the gold one.”
An interesting question is what causes the Monty Hall problem to be so 
difficult. Research indicates that wrong, but powerful and widespread, 
intuitions and heuristics are responsible for many failures. Shimojo and 
Ichikawa (1989) found that most people base their answer in the Monty Hall 
problem on the “number of cases” heuristic (i.e. when the number of 
alternatives is N, the probability is 1/N). This is rather typical of human 
reasoning and is in fact included in the fundamental computational bias in 
human cognition (an overarching style that conjoins a number o f processing 
biases that cause normative and evolutionary rationality to dissociate,
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Stanovich, 1999). The persistence of the fallacy has been similarly 
explained (Friedman, 1998) underscoring how the task ties together several 
classic anomalies, including illusion of control (i.e. participants believe they 
can somehow intuit which door is the winning door), commitment 
escalation and endowment effect (i.e. once an initial choice is made a 
participant is reluctant to change it and values the chosen door more because 
he has “property right” to it), Baysian updating failures (i.e. the participant 
fails to update probabilities after the non-random process of door 
elimination by Monty) and probability matching (i.e. the participant does 
not always choose the most likely alternative, but rather matches choices to 
likelihood probabilities). Along the same lines, Franco-Watkins et al. 
(2002) suggest that the problem is counterintuitive because the problem 
space is incorrectly reinterpreted after the door is opened by the host i.e. 
solvers respond as if revealing a door creates a new problem space that is 
not conditional on the prior problem space. Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, 
Girotto, Legrenzi and Caverni (1999), similarly, have proposed that people 
do not differentiate the options in the Monty hall problem because they 
create the wrong set of mental models.
Nickerson (1996) argued that the Monty Hall problem is an example o f a 
class of problems which contain un-stated assumptions (i.e. are not 
sufficiently defined and are formulated ambiguously). The ambiguities can 
be of two types (Margolis, 1987): semantic ambiguities (when language has 
different meaning in propositional logic and in informal discourse) and 
scenario ambiguities (when the experience from real world problems is 
brought to bear on a psychology puzzle for which it does not apply). The 
assumptions which the solver is required to make, in order to correctly solve 
the Monty Hall problem, concern the host’s behaviour which, in fact, is not 
clearly specified in the original version o f the problem (i.e. it must be 
assumed that the host is not motivated to minimize the contestant’s chance 
of winning and that he will always open a door with a goat behind it and
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never the one selected by the contestant). Although it is clear that a 
probability problem like Monty Hall is difficult even when formulated very 
clearly, it is nevertheless true that part of the difficulty can be explained by 
ambiguity. Nickerson writes, concluding his review of ambiguities and un­
stated assumptions in probabilistic reasoning (1996): “It is important, I 
argue, to be sensitive to the possibility of ambiguities in the description of 
probabilistic situations and to make explicit those assumptions that are 
essential to disambiguate the situation.” Following this advice, we carefully 
formulated our Monty Hall problem analogs trying to specify the characters’ 
behaviour as clearly as possible (e.g. “The host of the show knows which of 
the balls is the gold one -this is crucial- and can’t choose it because the 
game must go on.”).
A further explanation of why the correct representation is so difficult to 
achieve once an option is eliminated was given by Bums and Wieth (2004). 
They were able to provide empirical support to Glymour’s (2001) insight 
that the causal structure o f the Monty Hall problem has what is known in 
the technical literature on Bayesian networks, as a “collider” structure (i.e. a 
structure in which two independent causal factors influence a single 
outcome) and that people generally fail to understand the implications of 
this particular structure. Correct application of the collider principle means 
that, conditional on the information on which door Monty opened, the 
contestant’s initial choice provides useful information on where the prize is 
most likely to be. In addition, Bums and Wieth showed that training on the 
collider principle transferred to a standard version of the Monty Hall 
problem.
Finally, according to Stanovich and West (2000), correct normative 
reasoning requires executive working memory resources to inhibit the 
heuristics reasoning in tasks that require more analytic processing (i.e. 
where heuristics would be biasing), but this does not always happen. De 
Neys and Verschueren (2006) were able to show that indeed individuals
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who responded correctly to the Monty Hall dilemma had a significantly 
larger working memory capacity. Moreover, correct responding also 
decreased under secondary task load. It therefore seems that working 
memory capacity plays a key role in correctly solving the Monty Hall 
problem.
It should be noted that, although most people think that the unopened 
doors in the Monty Hall problem have equal chances, thus it would be 
expected that approximately half of them would switch, most o f them stick 
to their choice. This appears to be a general bias: people stay in anticipation 
of regret (e.g. reluctance to exchange lottery tickets, Tor and Bazeman, 
2003).
Finally, it has been found that when participants experience multiple 
trials of Monty Hall problem their switch rates improve (Franco-Watkins, 
Derks and Dougherty, 2003; Friedman, 1998). However, since people are 
good at detecting frequencies, this does not ensure that that the 
understanding of the problem is improved.
One of the problems we were anticipating was that o f finding a more 
“distant” version of Monty Hall problem to collect data for the analysis of 
the relationship between semantic distance and transfer (semantic distance 
was one of our manipulated variables). Lacking a formal metric for 
semantic distance, we found the indication coming from Krauss and W ang’s 
2001 Experiment 3 very useful. In that experiment, participants were 
previously exposed to the Monty Hall problem and then asked to solve 
different analogous problems. One of the analogous problems was the 
Monty Hall problem replication with four doors instead of three and two 
goats instead of one, which required applying the same principle but also 
expanding the structure of the training problem. The other problem was the 
Three Prisoners, which is isomorphic to the Monty Hall problem, but in a 
distant semantic context and with a different formulation o f the final 
question. Participants solved Three Prisoners in significantly lower numbers
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than Monty Hall’s replication with changed numbers (9.3% vs. 26.7%). This 
finding, it should be noted, is in contrast with previous findings (Reed, 
1993) which reported that it is easier to solve isomorphic problems (i.e. 
problems having the same formal structure) than similar problems (i.e. 
problems with same story content but different solution). The interest this 
finding holds for us is that it indicates that semantic distance might be very 
relevant to transfer, possibly because the mapping process becomes more 
difficult (in this case, humans must be mapped to doors). Moreover, the 
evidence from Krauss and W ang’s experiment indicated that Three 
Prisoners was in fact a distant target story. Three Prisoners became a natural 
choice for those experiments in which we wished to increase semantic 
distance between learning and target stories.
2.4 M emory
2.4.1 Views of Memory
Memory is the means by which we retain and draw on our past 
experiences to use that information in the present (Tulving, 2000). It could 
be argued, therefore, that transfer from past experience to present problems 
and decisions is a central function o f memory.
A traditional concern for memory research has been attempting to define 
distinct memory stores and their inter-relationships. Explicit memory (i.e. 
memory based on conscious recollection, as explained further on in this 
section), for those holding this perspective, is thus viewed as storage-and- 
retrieval: memories are stored in specific locations within the mind and 
retrieval consists in a search (Roediger, 1980). James (1890) was probably 
the first to describe primary memory as that which is held momentarily in 
consciousness and secondary memory as unconscious but permanent. An 
important impetus to this model was the discovery that a short sequence of
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items is forgotten in a few seconds if rehearsal is prevented by a distractor 
task placed between item presentation and recall (Brown, 1958, Peterson 
and Peterson 1959). Other findings that also supported the distinction 
between primary and secondary memory included neuropsychological 
studies of amnesic patients unable to form new long-term memories 
(Milner, 1966) and studies showing that short-term memory (STM) tended 
to rely on phonetic coding and long-term memory (LTM) on semantic 
coding (Baddeley 1966). A modem version of this view, which added 
sensory memory to the primary and secondary memory dichotomy, was 
proposed by Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968). The underlying representation of 
memory is that o f a storage device with distinct memory stores (multi-store 
model of memory). According to this view, information is initially received, 
and briefly held, by the sensory store. Some information is attended to and 
processed by the short-term store (primary memory). Only a subset of this 
information is transferred from short to long-term store (secondary 
memory).
Although the three-stores model continues to be popular, it has fostered 
much debate concerning its validity. In fact, a simple version of the storage- 
and-retrieval approach does not explain some findings o f memory research 
such as distorted memories (i.e. memories that are a distortion of an actual 
experience) or false memories (i.e. memories of an event that did not 
happen). Equating human memory with a storage-retrieval mechanism, in 
other words, does not account for the "constructive" nature of memory (i.e. 
the fact that memory is not a literal reproduction of the past but instead 
depends on constructive processes enacted in the process of pattern 
completion which takes place as a past experience is retrieved) which has 
been widely demonstrated (Deese, 1959; Roediger and McDermott, 1995; 
Loftus and Palmer, 1974; Loftus, 2003). Moreover, the three-stores model 
cannot explain cases such as autism or savants.
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A different view of memory, which overcomes these weaknesses, 
describes it as a re-computational device. This approach emphasizes that the 
person’s knowledge, reasoning, goals, values may be key in determining the 
content o f any specific memory. According to this view, during retrieval of 
memories people actively reconstruct their memories. From the point of 
view of our research, an approach to memory which views it as a system 
driven by the processing of external and internal stimuli provides a useful 
perspective.
2.4.2 Types of Memory
Memory can be distinguished as explicit or implicit depending on 
whether recollection is conscious i.e. implies awareness of the process and 
can thus be reported, or unconscious (Mulligan, 2003). The distinction 
between these two types of memory is relevant for our research because we 
wanted to better understand if the analogous binary decisions that had been 
learned elicited explicit memories or if it simply facilitated the unconscious 
retrieval o f the analogy.
Explicit memory, on which we found that binary decision making 
transfer is largely based, may be measured testing for recall or recognition. 
Recall requires that a fact, a decision or any other item, be recalled from 
memory, while recognition requires that it is recognized (i.e. singled out 
amongst others) as something which has been learned previously. Usually 
recognition memory is better than recall. As for our transfer tasks, they 
required recalling and adapting the correct steps in the probability 
calculation which we had described in the learning stories.
As for implicit memory, various experiments (Jacoby and Dallas, 1981) 
have shown the existence of this type of memory - unawareness of its 
retrieval attempts and o f the previous experience. Implicit memory is non­
declarative memory and comprises procedural memory, priming effects,
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conditioning and non-associative memory (e.g. habituation). Implicit 
memory can be tested using the facilitation paradigm (i.e. assuming that if  a 
prior task facilitates a later one, even without awareness, some unconscious 
processing must have occurred). Typical tests are fragment and word stem- 
completion tasks. In the latter tasks, a person is given a word stem such as
"tri " and is asked to complete it with the first word that comes to mind. If
the probability of completing such stems with studied words is above base­
line, then we observe an effect o f prior experience.
It is possible that transfer in our experiments was based, for some 
participants, on implicit memory since some of them correctly made and 
explained the decision but did not remember where they had learned how to 
make it. Caution, as usual, should be used in interpreting self-reported data: 
it has been shown by many studies that adults vary enormously in the 
sophistication they apply to questions about processing. It is therefore 
possible that some of those declaring that they could not explicitly 
remember where they learned to make the decision were giving a 
thoughtless answer as may happen when rapid introspection is required. It is 
also possible, although unlikely in our case because the questionnaire 
followed the task immediately, that forgetting occurred between task 
performance and administration of the questionnaire. It would appear in 
conclusion, that most of the memory on which our transfer task was based 
was explicit.
Another key distinction in permanent memory is between episodic 
memory (instance-based, which typically comprises auto-biographical and 
personal memories organized by time and place of occurrence) and semantic 
memory (non-instance based, which contains knowledge of the world 
organized by abstract principles). The memory that we tested in our 
experimental tasks was semantic, but we were also anticipating some 
episodic memory to be associated with learning (e.g. where and when it had 
taken place).
43
2.4.3 Memory Processes
Memory processes are based on three dynamic mechanisms: encoding, 
storing and retrieving information about past experience (Baddeley, 1999). 
All of these processes are crucial for transfer of learning to take place and 
therefore will be discussed again, from the point of view of transfer, in the 
homonymous section. Encoding is the process through which a sensory 
input is transformed into a representation that can be placed in memory. 
Storage refers to the process of retaining memories. Retrieval is the process 
through which we access stored memories. A few findings concerning these 
processes should be mentioned because they are relevant for our research.
First of all, it is known that, at the moment in which we encode a 
memory, we more or less consciously encode other elements with it, such as 
internal and external context. Context, to use a broad definition, is made of 
any environmental or internal stimulus that is present when we learn and 
remember something (e.g. the room in which we learn, its illumination and 
temperature, our mood while learning). Even when the context is not 
encoded intentionally or consciously, it is known to produce biasing effects. 
A stimulus has many properties from which we select the ones that will be a 
basis for encoding, therefore what we learn can be encoded in many ways 
(Hulse, Deese and Egeth, 1975). Context, therefore, influences our 
representation of learned materials in memory. This specific encoding then 
influences retrieval: it has been found that, since representation includes 
context details, a context change significantly diminishes retrieval (Light, 
L.L. and Carter-Sobell, L, 1970) while, the same context operates as a cue. 
Tulving and Wiseman (1976) summarized these findings in what they called 
the encoding specificity principle which stated that “a to-be-remembered 
item is encoded with respect to the context in which it is studied, producing 
a unique trace which incorporates information from both target and context. 
For the to-be-remembered item to be retrieved, the cue information must
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appropriately match the trace of the item-in-context.” And that “the 
probability of successful retrieval of the target item is a monotonically 
increasing function of informational overlap between information present at 
retrieval and the information stored in memory”. As will be discussed in the 
following sections, this principle can be used to explain forgetting.
The other finding which has potentially relevant implications for our 
research comes from Leonard and Whitten (1983) who showed that, if  the 
type of memory task which will be required is known at the time of 
encoding (i.e. if it is known how the material will need to be recalled, e.g. 
rhyming vs. semantic retrieval), we encode in a way that will maximize our 
chances o f retrieval. In other words, the intended retrieval strategy affects 
encoding. This strategy is effective because the cognitive processes used 
during encoding interact with the cognition used at retrieval time. This 
finding is significant for our research, not because participants were 
informed of the type of retrieval they would need to do (of course, they were 
not told there would be any retrieval) but because they were made to use 
different learning methods which, we thought, should influence the type of 
encoding via different learning strategies.
The rational analysis o f  memoiy (Anderson, 1990) proposes that memory 
is sensitive to statistical structure in the environment, i.e. that it estimates 
the odds that a particular memory trace will be needed now based on the 
pattern o f prior use. It appears that the memory system tries to make 
available the most useful memories, predicting this on the basis of how 
often the memory has been used, the spacing between uses (latency) and 
how recently it has been needed (recency). As a result, the likelihood and 
speed of retrieval are correlated directly with the frequency of 
environmental demands. According to Anderson, the fact that memory 
relates the odds that a particular memory is needed to its history of use is the 
best behaviour possible given the constraints of limited resources and a non- 
deterministic environment.
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Anderson and Schooler (1997) were able, through an analysis of 
informational demands in the environment, to develop a theory to make 
precise predictions regarding the odds of encountering an item (need odds). 
They showed that such odds vary as a joint function of contextual and 
historical information regarding the item. As for the context factor, it 
measures strength of associations between a memory structure and elements 
of the current context i.e. it is measured in terms of associative ratios similar 
to the likelihood ratios in Bayesian statistics (the denominator of the ratio is 
the base rate probability of needing the memory and the numerator is the 
conditional probability of needing the memory given the presence of some 
cue). Need odds can be predicted by a multiplicative relation that combines 
the independent predictions of the history and the context factors.
Since the stories which we used for learning and transfer tasks, based on 
the Monty Hall problem , are unlikely to be encountered outside of our 
experiment, particularly in the timeframe between learning and transfer, 
frequency of environmental demands should not act as a confound. Context, 
on the other hand, was one of the manipulated variables of our experiments, 
with the caveat that, in web-testing, the control over context is not as strong 
as it can be in the lab.
As already mentioned, it has been found that memory retrieval is not just 
reconstructive (i.e. finding the original memory traces of experiences and 
then rebuilding them as a basis for retrieval), but also constructive. 
Construction of memory may occur because a person cannot recover all of 
the pieces o f a memory (if one can only remember a few features o f a 
memory, then the memory that one produces may be distorted) or because 
retrieval cues are too broad (if a set of retrieval cues matches more than one 
experience, the memories o f several experiences get confused). An account 
o f why this happens is provided by Fuzzy Trace Theory (Reyna and 
Brainerd, 1995) which assumes that in a wide variety of tasks people encode 
multiple representations which vary in terms of their level of precision.
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Some memory traces that represent item level information including surface 
features o f items are very accurate (verbatim representations). Other 
memory traces that represent general senses and meanings including 
relational information are less precise (gist traces). Moreover, suggestions 
may result in constructed memories (i.e. suggestion of an occurrence can 
lead an individual to believe that such an occurrence actually happened). 
False memories consist in false recognition (i.e. the fact that subjects claim 
that a novel word or event is familiar), intrusions (i.e. the production o f non­
studied information in memory experiments) and confabulation (i.e. 
fantasies that have unconsciously modified /replaced facts in memory based 
on past-event suggestions). It should be mentioned that gist traces seem to 
decay less rapidly than verbatim traces (i.e. the false memory persistence 
effect): it has been found that decline in false recall and false recognition is 
less pronounced than the decline in accurate recall and accurate recognition 
(Brainerd, Reyna, and Brandse, 1995). The notion o f constructive memory 
(although out of the scope o f this research) is mostly relevant in the 
courtroom because it can seriously challenge the reliability o f eyewitness 
testimonies, but is also of interest in the study of transfer as it can lead to 
inverse or negative transfer.
2.4.4 Forgetting
Finally, a very relevant aspect of memory which our experiments needed 
to take into account was time-based forgetting. We were planning to test 
delayed transfer (between 5 minutes and several days from learning), thus 
forgetting would certainly play a role in it. The first studies on forgetting 
were conducted by Hermann Ebbinghaus between 1885 and 1913. The basic 
measure of forgetting that he used was the savings method i.e. the reduction 
in number of trials during relearning compared to original learning. His 
findings show that forgetting occurs mainly in the first hour after learning,
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with the rate of forgetting slowing considerably thereafter i.e. forgetting is a 
negatively decelerated curve which, after a high initial loss, levels off. The 
relationship between performance and delay can be expressed as a power 
function (i.e. a function with a variable base and a constant exponent) at'h, 
where a and b are free parameters and t is time. The accuracy of a memory 
test P  at time t can therefore be expressed as:
P=afb
Anderson and Schooler (1991) used this equation to fit the original 
Ebbinghaus data. Once the parameters a and -b  were been fitted to the data, 
the equation became:
P= 47.56/"126
The value b in this equation, which is -.126, is the forgetting rate. 
Moreover, Anderson and Schooler logarithmically transformed both the 
performance measure data (percentage of savings) and of the delay variable 
data (hours since learning) to find a linear function (i.e. a straight line) 
which confirms that indeed the variables of performance and time are 
describable by a power function.
Wixted and Ebbesen (1991) later showed that forgetting functions across 
various materials and memory tests are often well described by the power 
function. Further studies (Rubin and Wenzel, 1996) also confirmed the 
power law with different data sets showing few exceptions (e.g. auto­
biographical memories).
There are three main theories explaining why forgetting occurs: fading 
over time (trace-decay forgetting), interference o f old and new memories 
{interference-based forgetting) and lack of retrieval cues {cue-based 
forgetting).
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Trace-decay theory has been put forward by many theorists including 
Ebbinghaus (1885/1913). It argues that forgetting occurs because memory 
traces decay over time, in other words that forgetting depends on the length 
of the retention interval. It should be pointed out, however, there is little 
direct support for this theory: tests of decay theory have in fact favoured 
other explanations, such as interference (Minami and Dallenbach, 1946). 
Trace decay cannot easily explain false memories nor why we remember 
even far away events very well (e.g. flash-bulb memories) if the crucial 
factor in forgetting is elapsed time.
Another explanation of forgetting, which may be complementary to trace 
decay, and which can account for false memories and flash-bulb memories, 
is interference-based forgetting. The theory argues that forgetting depends 
on what interferes with the memory during the time between learning and 
recalling. Our ability to remember, in other words, is interfered with by 
older or more recent memories (proactive interference and retroactive 
interference). Examples of these phenomena are recent memories seemingly 
“overwriting” previous similar memories and older memories “getting in the 
way” when we are trying to retrieve similar but more recent ones. In this 
view, what impairs our ability to remember an item correctly is it’s 
similarity to other items stored in memory i.e. the fact that a particular cue 
becomes associated to additional memory items. According to this 
explanation, successfully recalling an item depends not only on availability 
of the cue and on it’s being sufficiently related to the item in memory, but 
also on whether it is related to other items as well. The theory proposes that, 
when a cue is linked to more than one item in memory, those items compete 
with the target for access to conscious awareness (Anderson, Bjork and 
Bjork, 1994) affecting retrieval performance negatively. This theory 
explains how false memories can be formed (i.e. multiple items are brought 
up by a cue and they get “muddled up” while the memory is reconstructed)
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and how flash-bulb memories persist in time (i.e. they are “unique”, thus do 
not get confused nor overwritten).
Many explanations have been proposed regarding why associating 
additional items to a retrieval cue might make those items susceptible o f 
interference hindering retrieval performance. These theories differ on the 
relative importance that each attributes to the cues, to the links between cues 
and target memory and to the target memory in provoking the failure to 
retrieve. Possibly the best accredited theories to explain interference in 
terms of ineffective associations is occlusion. It posits that failure to retrieve 
an item can be caused by intrusive memories of similar items which occlude 
the target item. The intrusive memory is an item which has a stronger 
association to the cue that is being used in retrieval and thus manages to 
displace the other items associated to that cue in their competition for 
conscious awareness. Another possible explanation, response-set 
suppression theory (Postman et al, 1968), proposes that interference is the 
result of a suppression of items practiced when learning new items, as is the 
case when subjects learn to suppress items from an original list when 
learning a new list. Continuation of this suppression after learning is also 
possible and would explain retroactive interference.
Underwood’s studies (1957) have shown that proactive interference plays 
a major role in forgetting and several lab experiments, in general, have 
confirmed its importance. Even if outside the lab interference seems less 
powerful (Slamecka, 1966), we cannot exclude the possibility that 
interference might have played some role, which was outside our control, in 
our experiments. However, this event is not likely because, the Monty Hall 
problem  is a very unusual story and it would be surprising that our 
participants would come across anything similar enough to interfere with 
(or, for that matter, to reinforce) their learning in the timeframe between 
learning and transfer. As for proactive interference, participants with any
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type o f familiarity with that type of problem were screened out through the 
questionnaire and excluded.
Finally, cue-based forgetting  is possibly the most relevant type o f 
explanation of forgetting for our research. In cue-based forgetting  
information is said to be available but not accessible due to lack o f cues. 
These cues may be external (such as context) or internal (such as mood). In 
both cases, the underlying assumption is that remembering is made easier if  
cues are the same at encoding and retrieval. In support of this theory, Ucros 
(1989) found, reviewing 40 studies, that when the mood state at learning 
and at retrieval is the same, there is evidence of less forgetting (mood-state 
dependent memory). Cue-based forgetting  theory could also, at least in part, 
explain forgetting through time, as passage o f time is likely to affect 
background context. All these findings on relevance o f context in retrieval 
are relevant for our research because, in some of our experiments, we 
manipulated context between learning and retrieval in order to study the 
effects on transfer. It is also interesting that context effects are not 
necessarily binary in their operation. In other words, contextual cues may 
not be enough to drive complete retrieval but can be sufficient to put the 
memory system in a state of partial knowledge, not necessarily a reduced 
remembering, but possibly a different state of retrieval. The implications of 
encoding specificity principle will be further commented in the section on 
transfer of learning when discussing the importance o f context.
2.5 Learning
Learning is a transition from one mental state to another in which 
information is encoded in some different way. This change typically, though 
not necessarily, leads to changes in actual or potential behaviour (Shanks, 
1995). Learning is at the core o f our research as we indirectly made our
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participants learn (i.e. we did not ask that they learn the stories, but made 
them perform tasks capable o f supporting learning) a particular type of 
decision from a worked-out example (the correct decision was explained at 
the end of the story in a step-by-step way).
As mentioned in the introduction o f this chapter, there is some overlap in 
the topics investigated in memory and in learning research which is 
reflected in this review. It should however be pointed out that most research 
concerning learning is centred on performing tasks (which clearly requires 
information to be stored in memory) while experiments on memory are 
more focused on recall of facts.
We will first outline four main theories of learning (behaviourism, 
cognitivism, constructivism and social learning) and then proceed to discuss 
those aspects of learning which are most relevant to our research.
Behaviourism takes its name from its focus on the study o f overt 
behaviours that can be observed and measured. According to this theory, 
whose key proponents were Watson, Thorndike, Skinner and Pavlov, we 
learn through trial-and-error as elements of a stimulus are associated to co­
occurring outcomes. Stimulus and response is the key mechanism of 
learning.
Cognitivism was in part a response to the limitations in the behaviourist 
approach to learning (behaviourism, for example, did not account for the 
ability that both animals and humans have to learn discriminations). The 
view of learning proposed by cognitivists (Koffka, Koheler, Piaget and 
others) emphasized the importance of acquisition and reorganization of 
ideas. Learning was described as the building o f an organized whole which 
required the construction of new entities rather than simple connections 
between ideas.
Constructivism is founded on the idea that learners construct knowledge 
for themselves i.e. learners individually (and socially) construct meaning by
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reflecting on their own experiences. Learners generate their own "rules” and 
"mental models" to make sense of their experiences. In practice, learning 
occurs through questions and answers, interaction and interpretation o f the 
environment. Learning, according to this view, is simply the process of 
adjusting our mental models to accommodate new experiences.
According to social learning theory (whose main proponents are 
Bandura, Lave and Wenger) people can learn by observing the behaviour of 
others and the outcomes of those behaviours. According to Bandura (1977), 
much human behaviour is learned observationally (i.e. observation o f others 
is coded and serves as a guide for action). The conditions necessary for 
effective modelling to occur are that the person pays attention to the model, 
is able to retain the observed behaviours, is able to replicate the behaviour 
and is motivated to demonstrate learning.
Various taxonomies of learning exist. We will comment on those that 
that help us position our research.
A key distinction which can be made is between declarative learning i.e. 
learning of factual knowledge (this is the type of learning most memory 
research is based on) and procedural or non-declarative learning i.e. learning 
of skills and procedures. The learning required by our experiments involved 
both types of learning: we required, in the transfer task, that the participant 
calculate probabilities (procedural knowledge) and explain how she had 
made the decision (declarative knowledge).
Another popular but slightly controversial distinction found in the 
learning literature is between explicit and implicit learning. Implicit learning 
has been characterized as a passive process, where people are exposed to 
information, and acquire knowledge of that information simply through that 
exposure. Learning is said to be implicit when it happens unconsciously, in 
the process of doing something (such as comparing or summarizing stories, 
in our experiments, for example), without the learner being (fully) aware 
that she is actually learning. In other words, this type of learning results in
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an increase of information or knowledge that is not recognized as such 
during the learning process. Moreover, the learner might not be able to 
make her knowledge (fully) explicit after learning has taken place, despite 
reflecting it in her behavior. The main characteristic of implicit learning is, 
in fact, the inability to free-report rules and strategies that have, none the 
less, been acquired, i.e. to verbalize what drove the choice or action that was 
undertaken while applying knowledge (Dienes et al., 1991). Reber (1989) 
claims that implicit learning relies on abstract knowledge (i.e. can imply 
learning of rules) like explicit learning, but this abstraction happens out of 
the conscious control o f the learner and without meta-knowledge of the 
knowledge acquired. According to this view, despite implicit learning 
occurring below the subjective threshold (Cheesman and Merikle, 1984), it 
implies abstraction of patterns of invariance (structural or featural 
information) from training exemplars and storage o f this information as a 
high-level generalization. Related to this absence o f meta-cognition on 
knowledge, implicit learners are less confident on their ability to correctly 
perform tasks that require application of learning). Explicit learning, on the 
other hand, is characterized as an active process in which people seek out 
the structure o f any information that is presented to them. In this case, 
learning is concurrent with awareness and learners who have learned 
explicitly are able to state the rules they learned. Finally, explicit learners 
are capable of accurate predictions of the performance based on their 
learning, i.e. show meta-knowledge.
An alternative account and classification has been put forward by Shanks 
and St. John (1994) who propose that a more fundamental distinction is 
between rule learning and instance learning, regardless o f whether they are 
conscious or unconscious. The former is the acquisition of abstract 
knowledge (i.e. a rule is induced and memorized); while the latter refers to 
the acquisition of fragmentary knowledge (i.e. the actual exemplars are 
memorized). According to their theory, implicit learning is actually the
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learning o f instances i.e. previously learned exemplars, which would explain 
why learners can’t report rules learned in an explicit manner (they did not 
learn rules, just instances). Shanks and St. John don’t recognize implicit 
learning as a learning system. A similar account, referred to as fragmentary 
account, emphasizes fragments rather than whole exemplars. Both accounts 
are referred to as similarity-based processing accounts because they 
emphasize similarity between previously stored exemplars and new items as 
the basis for classification decisions and information retrieval. Similarity- 
based or exemplar-based processing can also be described as lazy-learning 
because the complete set of classified examples is stored and all further 
processing is delayed until requests for classification of new examples are 
received. Rule-based learning, on the other hand, would be defined eager- 
learning as generalization occurs before observing a new query (Ashley and 
Rissland, 2003). This view is relevant to our work because transfer from an 
analogous instance (in our case, the learning story/ies) can be a type of 
similarity-based process which bypasses the need for abstract rules.
Case-based learning and reasoning merits some additional comments 
because the learning that took place in our experiments was initiated by 
one/two cases that we provided under the guise o f stories to be summarized 
or compared. Case-based learning is instruction by the use of stories about 
individuals facing decisions or dilemmas. The learner benefits from the 
lessons learned by others (the characters portrayed in the case) by being 
exposed to what was, correctly or incorrectly, done and its consequences. In 
its most well known form this method is used in a classroom setting and 
implies that the cases are discussed by a group of people, as is done in law- 
schools, business-schools and medical-schools. It is however possible to 
learn from cases even individually as was done in our experiments. 
Learning from a case can imply different things. The case can become a rule 
i.e. the underlying rule can be eagerly abstracted and memorized for future 
problem-solving use or the case can be encoded as such and be used as a
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prototype in future problem-solving. The former case is more likely when 
more exemplars are learned while the latter is more frequent when just one 
or few similar cases exist (paradigmatic cases).
We do not know what type o f learning our tasks elicited and, indeed, it is 
possible that different types of learning took place and interacted. The fact 
that the learning stories included a detailed (but mathematically simple) 
explanation could have facilitated the induction of a rule even from one or 
two exemplars, addressing participants towards rule-leaming. On the other 
hand, it is known that people default to implicit learning when they can’t 
find or fully understand rules. This could have been the case for some 
learners. It is possible that participants recalled the learning stories and not 
the underlying rule while making the decision in the transfer task. Since in 
our transfer task we asked participants to explain the decision they made 
(this was necessary because there was a 50% chance of guessing correctly), 
we were able to capture only learning that resulted in the ability to verbalize 
the rule we had provided them, at least in the transfer phase. However, we 
cannot be sure that the rule was induced at the time of learning. We believe 
that, even in the case of explicit recognition o f the analogy (self-reported by 
participants in the final questionnaire) and o f positive transfer, learning 
might have been instance based. The explanation we had provided in the 
learning stories could have been recalled and adapted only as the analogy 
was recognized, i.e. the rule could have been induced in this phase and not 
previously.
Similarly, the type of learning which took place during our experiments 
could have been more or less consciously aware. Since we did not explicitly 
ask participants to learn the materials, but rather to “write a summary of 
each story that will help you remember the key elements” or to “outline 
ways in which the two stories are similar and report the main points that 
both contain”, it was up to each individual to explicitly decide to learn the 
material or not (we chose to do this because, particularly in the experiments
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where transfer followed learning after a few minutes, we were thought that 
asking participants to learn the stories might create a demand to use them 
immediately after). However, the type of knowledge that our experiments 
measured in the transfer phase was only the conscious one, as we required 
an explanation to be provided for the choice that was made.
In conclusion, the tasks we were requiring were expected to induce 
learning if performed diligently, but this learning could have been rule- 
based or instance-based, unconscious or conscious.
2.6 Transfer of Learning
Transfer of learning is the use of acquired knowledge, skills and abilities 
across tasks and contexts. It can happen by way of two rather different 
mechanisms: reflexive or low road transfer occurs when a previously 
practiced routine is triggered by stimulus conditions similar to those in the 
learning context, while mindful or high road transfer involves deliberate 
search for connections.
Transfer of learning can produce a gain (positive transfer) or loss 
(negative transfer) in performance. Ideally, we would like positive transfer 
to be extended (near and far) and to have a wide breadth (many 
applications) in order to maximise its exploitation. Conversely, we would 
prefer to inhibit negative transfer, which would hinder rather than help 
future problem solving. Literature is rich in both success and failure 
accounts o f transfer. This is, at least in part, due to the fact that the topic is 
wide and multifaceted with many dimensions along which research can be 
conducted and classified (i.e. transfer is many different things) and that only 
recently a taxonomy of transfer has been worked out (Barnett and Ceci, 
2003) allowing sounder interpretation and comparison between results.
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The above cited taxonomy provides a framework for evaluating how 
transfer occurs considering a number of contextual dimensions (i.e. when 
and where learning is transferred from and to) and of content dimensions 
(i.e. what transfer consists of). The former dimensions capture issues 
regarding distance between learning and transfer, which can be physical 
(regarding the places where learning and transfer happen), functional 
(regarding the function of learning and transfer), social (concerning the 
social context of learning and transfer), temporal (concerning the time 
elapsed between learning and transfer), modal (concerning the modes of 
learning and transfer) and/or relative to the knowledge domains of learning 
and transfer. The issues considered by the content dimensions concern the 
memory demands o f transfer (i.e. what is needed of memory to support 
transfer), the type of performance change that defines transfer (i.e. what is 
measured or assessed) and specificity-generality of the learned skill to be 
transferred (i.e. is the skill to be transferred more like a series o f steps to be 
undertaken or like a principle to be applied).
Barnett and Ceci’s taxonomy identifies nine variables which help classify 
transfer. These variables are separated in two groups- variables regarding 
content and variables concerning context - reflecting the two main 
dimensions of classification. The variables used to break-down content are: 
the generality-specificity of the learned skill (from specific to general: 
procedure, representation or principle), the nature of the performance to be 
assessed (speed, accuracy or approach) and the memory demands of the 
transfer task (execute after a prompt, recognize which approach is 
appropriate and execute it or recognize the appropriate approach, 
spontaneously recall the steps to be followed and execute them).
In terms of the nature of the performance in our experiments, it was the 
use of a specific approach in a situation in which speed was not 
discriminatory (time allotted was enough even for slow participants, we did 
not receive comments on time being insufficient from anyone) and in which
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accuracy was not crucial (we accepted miscalculation of the probabilities if 
the participant showed that he was applying the procedure correctly). In 
terms of memory demands, in our experiments we required the problem to 
be recognized as “not the usual probability problem” and the correct 
approach to be identified. We also required that the necessary steps for 
probability calculation be recalled and executed (although, as we said 
above, we allowed arithmetical mistakes).
The variables proposed by the cited taxonomy to break down context are: 
knowledge domain (i.e. the knowledge base on which the skill is to be 
applied), physical context (i.e. the place where learning and transfer take 
place), temporal context (i.e. elapsed time between learning and transfer), 
functional context (i.e. the function for which the skill is positioned and the 
mind-set it evokes), social context (i.e. performed alone or in collaboration), 
modality (i.e. how tasks are presented). These dimensions all vary in a 
continuum from near to far. Truly far transfer (which is very rare) is defined 
as transfer which is far on all dimensions. On the other hand, transfer which 
is near in all dimensions probably does not qualify as transfer.
Despite the improvement that this taxonomy brings in classifying 
transfer, proper metrics are still lacking (e.g. a metric o f semantic distance 
or of context changes) to precisely allocate research to a class. Our transfer 
task varied in the context and temporal dimensions between experiments, 
thus we shall position it in the single experiments according to this 
taxonomy. We do not know what mind-set the task evoked because we 
presented it neutrally (it was not a manipulated variable) and we did not ask 
participants. It should be noted, and will be discussed presenting the 
relevant experiments, that in some cases the positioning o f the learning and 
transfer tasks was differentiated (one was presented as a pre-test of college 
materials, while the other as an experiment). Our experimental tasks were 
intended to be performed alone and we presume that this was the case but
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since most o f our experiments were performed remotely via the web we 
cannot be certain.
A key distinction to be made in classifying the transfer literature 
concerns whether the emphasis is on the learner (i.e. on the individual 
characteristics such as, for example, cognitive, emotional and personality 
profile, knowledge level, motivations, etc.) or on the learning and transfer 
situations (i.e. on the characteristics of the two situations alone and in 
interaction, such as the learning method, the conditions in which transfer 
takes place and the distance in context between the two). Despite learner 
and situations being interactive and very difficult or impossible to isolate, it 
is nevertheless functional to classify research based on its main focus. Our 
research belongs to the category investigating the impact of learning and 
transfer characteristics on transfer performance. We did not investigate 
individual differences of any type.
Regarding the learner, several studies investigated the various 
dimensions involved and were able to identify some which appear to have 
an important role in transfer, e.g. mastery of original learning (Alexander, 
1997), degree of practice, motivation/interest to learn and self-efficacy 
(McKeachie, 1987; Ford et al., 1998); self-regulated learning (Boekaerts, 
1997) and individual dispositions (Bereiter, 1995).
Numerous studies of transfer have examined the impact of the learning 
situation (which includes learning task, learning method and context). From 
an instructional standpoint, several procedures favouring analogy 
recognition have been proved to be effective: analogical encoding i.e. 
learning through comparison of two or more analogs (Gick and Holyoak, 
1983), variability of procedural features in source examples i.e. the use of 
problems with different procedural features in the learning phase (Zhe Chen, 
1999), problem-oriented training i.e. a type o f training in which the learner 
tries to solve the problem before hearing the solution (Needham and Begg, 
1991), instructional use o f complex learning environment (Stark, Mandl,
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Gruber and Renkl, 1999), presentation o f learning materials in various 
forms (Mayers, 2001), self-explanation of the rationale o f the presented 
solutions i.e. coming up with an explanation of what is being learned (Chi, 
Bassok, Lewis, Reimann and Glasser, 1989; Renkl, 1997; Renkl, Stark, 
Gruber and Mandl, 1998; Aleven and Koedinger, 2002), active self­
monitoring i.e. meta-cognitive reflection on one’s thinking processes 
(Belmont, 1982); self-regulated learning strategies i.e. goal setting and self- 
assessment (Fuchs et al., 2003), learning situations which emphasize 
mastery, i.e. learning and improvement rather than social comparisons 
(Bereby-Meyer and Kaplan, 2005) and, in general, the use of processing 
strategies i.e. cognitive and meta-cognitive learning strategies (Pressley, 
Snyder and Cariglia-Bull, 1987).
The transfer situation is usually defined in terms of distance or difference 
from the learning situation. Transfer of learning research, consistent with 
memory research, has found that shift in context reduces transfer (Carraher 
et al., 1985; Spencer and Weisberg, 1986; Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989). 
Moreover, as we will see in more detail discussing analogical transfer, 
coupled context and time shifts have been found to have a negative effect, 
possibly interactive, on transfer (Spencer and Weisberg, 1986) and semantic 
similarity between learning and transfer to facilitate transfer (Gick and 
Holyoak, 1983).
Research relevant to transfer of learning has been conducted under 
various guises. The most relevant studies for our research are those on 
analogical transfer, the process at the core o f transfer o f learning. Reflecting 
this, a separate section is devoted to the review o f analogical transfer 
literature. Hereafter, we will briefly touch upon the other types of studies 
which have implications for transfer of learning, namely those designed to 
test formal discipline, the ones focused on teaching intelligence and higher 
order skills and, finally those on the impact of schooling.
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Studies on the doctrine of formal discipline investigate the claim that 
sharpening the 'faculties' or powers of the mind through the study of abstract 
subjects such as classical philosophy, literature, and languages, as well as 
advanced mathematics, transferred to other domains and equipped students 
for whatever might be required of them in life. The claim that education in 
abstract subjects can build generally transferable skills was strongly 
challenged by Thorndike (1924). However, VanderStoep and Shaughnessy 
(1997) were able to document transfer of general thinking skills in 
undergraduates. Other studies were able to show successful transfer, but just 
for some disciplines and not others (Lehman, Lempert, and Nisbett, 1988). 
In conclusion, although these studies yield mixed results, it has been 
demonstrated that successful transfer of learning is possible in many 
circumstances.
Transfer of reasoning skills is also a relevant area of research for transfer. 
This type of transfer has given successful results in most of the cases. 
Sternberg (1988) found positive transfer from teaching learning-from- 
context skills to adults and insight skills to children. Herenstein et al. 
(1986), in an experiment conducted on Venezuelan school children, found 
that thinking skills transferred to a creative design task and a practical 
reasoning question on health (neither of which was covered during training). 
Other studies (Bielaczyc, Pirolli and Brown, 1995) found that teaching 
meta-cognitive strategies brought increase in performance on trained tasks 
(despite not qualifying as pure transfer, this is an interesting example).
Another area o f research relevant to the question of transfer is the one 
investigating the impact of schooling on measures different from those 
directly taught. Evidence, even in this case, seems optimistic on transfer 
possibilities: schooling has a positive impact on IQ (Ceci, 1991; Ceci and 
Williams, 1997) and on income (Ceci and Williams, 1997). Clearly both 
these findings refer to non-experimental evidence and should be treated with
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caution, but nevertheless seem to indicate that at least some of the topics 
learned in school transfer outside o f it.
In conclusion, transfer has been documented to take place under many 
circumstances. However, looking into the process of analogical transfer, as 
we will do in the following section, it will also be clear that there are many 
potential obstacles in the various sub-processes of transfer which can reduce 
it or inhibit it completely.
2.7 Analogical Transfer
One of the triggers of high road transfer (i.e. the more deliberate type of 
transfer) is analogy which can be defined as a similarity in relational 
structure i.e. a one-to-one mapping from one domain representation into 
another. For example, in drawing an analogy between the atom and the solar 
system, the electrons hovering around the nucleus in diffuse cloud-like 
waves are mapped to the planets orbiting the sun in elliptical orbits. It 
should be noticed that the analogy holds despite radical differences in the 
types of systems and in their size scales. An analogy, as the example 
illustrates, is such if a system of relations that holds among the base objects 
also holds among the target objects, independently of any similarities 
between the objects to which the relations apply (Gentner, Ratterman and 
Forbus, 1993). Analogy is usually more difficult to recognize than similarity 
which shares both relational predicates and object attributes. On the other 
hand, once it has been recognized, analogy can be a means of boot-strapping 
transfer, it can provide a true illumination in understanding a far 
phenomenon and can be a powerful tool in explaining new concepts by 
making them familiar. All these uses have been observed to take place in 
science laboratories, thus confirming the role of analogy in scientific 
discovery (Dunbar, 2001).
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The sub-processes necessary for analogical transfer to take place are 
encoding, retrieval and mapping, which will be described in the following 
sections. O f the three sub-processes, only mapping is specific to analogical 
transfer as encoding and retrieval are memory processes.
Encoding occurs in the learning phase and consists, depending on which 
view one adopts, in memorizing either rules or specific instances (full or 
fragments) derived from one or more cases. In this phase the problem is 
represented and is indexed (i.e. discriminatory labels are assigned to the 
newly learned information and categorization takes place). It has been found 
that representation is also a function of expertise, with novices’ 
representations primarily containing information on surface features and 
experts’ including more structural features (Duncker, 1945; Adelson, 1981, 
1984; Chi et al, 1981). The labels assigned correspond to the applicability 
conditions i.e. the circumstances in which that piece of learning ought to be 
retrieved (Kolodner, 1997). Conditions of applicability can be related to 
three types of information: surface content (features specific to the domain), 
structure (usually features capturing relations) and context (features derived 
from the situation in which encoding takes place).
Findings on encoding suggest that subsequent analogy recognition and 
transfer are made easier if certain conditions are met at the time of 
encoding. In general, if  a piece of learning is encoded at a general level (i.e. 
with wide applicability conditions) it will be easier for it to be retrieved in 
far transfer than if it has been encoded at a more specific/domain dependent 
level. Encoding which results from comparing two analogs (known as 
analogical encoding), moreover, was found to lead to higher levels of 
transfer than encoding with one analog. The finding is largely based on ill- 
defined problem solving transfer experiments, but has been confirmed also 
in other types of learning, such as spatial mapping ability (Lowenstein and 
Gentner, 1997) and negotiation principles (Lowenstein, Thompson and 
Gentner, 1999 and Gentner, Loewenstein, and Thompson, 2003). The
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finding is consistent with the understanding that comparisons between two 
analogs help to focus on their structural commonalities and foster 
generalization, thus favouring retrieval when a problem with the same 
structure is encountered. Furthermore, memory retrieval and artificial 
intelligence literatures (Hammond, 1989; Kolodner, 1983) suggest that 
encoding which anticipates conditions for retrieval (i.e. which manages to 
encode also when a lesson learned might be useful) facilitates retrieval. Yet 
another contribution in understanding what type of encoding facilitates 
transfer comes from already cited research on the role o f self-explanation in 
problem solving (Chi, Bassok et al., 1989). Generating more self­
explanations of examples leads to example-independent knowledge, 
consisting of inference rules (i.e. rules that spell out specific conditions in 
which action is to be taken) which facilitate near and far transfer. Moreover, 
another study (Scholckow and Judd, described in Judd, 1908) found that 
students who learn from examples “with understanding” transfer better than 
those who don’t. In this classic experiment children were given practice in 
throwing darts at an underwater object. Some o f the children were also 
instructed in how light is refracted in water, and how this produces 
misleading information regarding the location of objects under water. While 
all the children did equally well on the task they practiced on (throwing 
darts at an object 12 inches under water) the children who had been given 
the additional instruction on refraction did much better when the target was 
moved to a place only 4 inches under water. Finally, research on encoding 
has shown that, experts are better than novices at encoding structure in 
examples, thus they are also better at recalling examples on the basis of 
structural commonalities (Dunbar, 2001).
Retrieval is a critical process in analogical transfer and is possibly the 
biggest impediment to some classes o f problem solving. Several 
experiments on transfer of ill-defined problems have highlighted the inert- 
knowledge problem i.e. the failure to access prior examples that would be
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useful if retrieved. Giek and Holyoak (1983) have shown that, although one 
or more analogs may be present in long-term memory, this does not 
guarantee that they are accessed (30% of participants who had been exposed 
to analogs managed to spontaneously retrieve them, but 75% of them did 
when hinted). A key characteristic of spontaneous analogy recognition, 
particularly in novices (Dunbar, 2001) is that it appears to be largely based 
on semantic cues (Gentner, 1989, Gentner, Ratterman, and Forbus, 1993, 
Gick and Holyoak, 1983; Medin and Ross, 1989; Ross, 1984). Although 
reliability on surface commonalities can be useful in many cases (e.g. in 
near transfer, where superficial cues tend to be shared between target and 
analog), it is less advantageous, and even potentially damaging, when more 
distant transfer is required. In fact, semantic cues typically differ in different 
contexts/tasks making recognition harder. In other cases, superficial cues 
can be the same but without there being an analogy, potentially leading to 
negative transfer. In order to recognize analogies correctly, particularly in 
far transfer, learners should look for commonality o f deep structural features 
between source and target rather than in idiosyncratic surface features 
pertaining to domain or context.
The mapping phase of transfer, specific to reasoning by analogy, consists 
in a process of alignment of the structured representations of base and target 
problems through one-to-one correspondences seeking to maximize 
matches. This phase consists firstly in finding correspondences between 
arguments i.e. in deciding which relationships between elements o f a base 
analog are to be applied to which objects of the target problem (which may 
be non-obvious when domains are distant), secondly in applying the 
relationships between arguments o f the base problem to arguments o f the 
target and finally in generating a solution based on this parallelism. 
Differing views, which we will review in the following paragraphs, exist on 
what drives this phase of the process i.e. in how the learned problem, to be
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transferred, is represented (as abstract level information or as previously 
learned specific instances).
As already mentioned discussing memory, context is a very important 
element in facilitating or impairing analogical transfer. It has been found 
that, if  external context differs between learning and transfer, transfer will 
be impaired (Weisberg, 1986, Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989). This is also 
true for psychological context shifts, i.e. changes in the set o f expectations 
that are held about the problem solving task. As examples, Shoenfeld (1985) 
found that students would fail to use deductive reasoning in construction 
problems because they thought a trial-and-error approach was more 
appropriate, Caramazza, McCloskey and Green (1981) showed that students 
could apply physics knowledge to textbook problems but not to everyday 
physical phenomena and Carraher et al. (1985) found that mathematical 
problems presented in an abstract form to Brazilian children who had 
learned how to solve them in street commercial transactions, were solved 
less easily than identical context-embedded problems. Finally, Godden and 
Baddeley (1975) showed that divers recalled words learned underwater or 
on land better when the recall condition matched the original learning 
environment.
Various models, based on experimental findings in the area o f problem 
solving, have tried to explain analogical transfer process. Three main classes 
of theories exist which differ mainly in the assumptions on the nature of 
representations used in problem solution and in the relative importance of 
abstract information versus content in transfer. On one end of the spectrum, 
two of these theories, Gentner’s Structure-Mapping view and Holyoak’s 
Pragmatic Schema view, posit that abstract information (structural or 
schematic) plays the key role in mapping, with content information being 
used primarily in the access phase. Both Structure-Mapping and Pragmatic 
Schema thus provide a “content-independent” account o f the mapping
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process i.e. claim that abstract level information is used in the mapping part 
of the process.
According to structure mapping theory (Clement and Gentner, 1991; 
Gentner and Gentner, 1983; Gentner and Toupin, 1986), analogical transfer 
involves a structure mapping whereby the relations between elements of a 
base analog are retrieved and applied to a target problem. According to this 
view, the transfer of deep-structure characteristics from the base analog to 
the target is of key importance. Computer models were created to exemplify 
this view: the “structure-mapping engine” program by Falkenhainer, Forbus 
and Gentner (1986) and MAC/FAC (“Many are called but few are chosen”) 
by Gentner, Ratterman and Forbus (1993) and Forbus, Gentner and Law 
(1994). The “structure-mapping engine” proposes that initial matches (i.e. 
retrieval phase) are made at any level (surface features, predicates, etc.), but 
then only those matches yielding higher similarities will be chosen for 
mapping. MAC/FAC is based on a two stage similarity retrieval process. 
The first stage is computationally cheap: it retrieves potentially useful long 
memory items based on superficial similarity without worrying about 
structural match. In this phase, since access to long term memory is 
influenced by surface similarity more than by overlap in relational structure, 
many items will be called that are non-relevant. In the subsequent stage, 
which is computationally more expensive, the potentially useful items are 
processed by a more powerful and structural matcher which judges 
soundness.
Pragmatic schema theory (Holland et al., 1986; Holyoak, 1985; Holyoak 
and Thagard, 1989) differs from the structure-mapping view mainly because 
it emphasizes the role of schema induction in analogical transfer. Pragmatic 
schema are abstract representations encoding details with causal relevance 
(in essence, solution principles) which are elaborated during learning, in an 
eager fashion. They are accessed during retrieval and facilitate transfer. This 
view, as well as the previous, has been modelled in a few computer
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programs such as PI (Holland et al., 1986), ARCS (Thagard et al., 1989) and 
ACME (Holyoak and Thagard, 1989).
Exemplar theories are different from the previously cited ones because 
they posit that low-level information such as previous exemplars, is stored 
and used to solve new problems. Exemplar views thus claim that, even if a 
schema is induced, it is tied to the stored exemplars inextricably and that 
content is relevant even in the mapping phase.
The best known exemplar theories are Hintzman’s (1986) multiple-trace 
model (exemplified in the MINERVA 2 program), Ross’s reminding view 
(Ross, 1984) and case-based reasoning models (Hammond, 1989; Riesbeck 
and Schank, 1989). The multiple-trace model, centred on schema 
abstraction, posits that each exemplar creates its own memory trace and that 
structural as well as surface details are encoded and equally relevant. 
According to the model contextual information about the setting and the 
time of encoding is also registered, consistent with an episodic memory 
trace. According to this model, a schema can be induced automatically, as a 
by-product of numerous retrievals or, more rarely, through deliberate 
encoding. Induction in this model is conservative as schemata and 
exemplars can both be stored in separate representations.
Remindings theory emphasizes the role of previous exemplars in problem 
solving, but also allows the induction of more general solution problems. 
Ross claimed that most problem solving occurs through retrieval o f earlier 
specific episodes which is driven by temporal contiguity and, particularly 
for novices, by the level of similarity (superficial and/or structural) between 
target and base problems. Ross’s “principle-cuing” theory allows abstract 
principles to be derived from previous exemplars and used to solve new 
problems. The earlier problem, in this view, is used in the access or noticing 
phase and then directs application of the abstract principle to the new 
problem. In this theory content plays a vital role in all stages o f transfer.
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Finally the previously mentioned case-based reasoning approach 
(Hammond, 1989) argues that a rich representational scheme is necessary to 
describe the similarities in cases that we are reminded of. The access to 
analogies is based on overlap of features between the prior cases stored in 
memory and target. The features are then analysed to find the closest related 
case in memory.
The common point is that all models attribute an important role to the 
content of a problem (i.e. superficial features) during retrieval of base 
analogs and allow content to influence subsequent processes. The main 
difference between abstract views vs. exemplar based views lies in problem 
representation (i.e. in which details are stored and how relations between 
surface elements are understood) and in the role of problem content (i.e. 
semantic domains of base and target) in the mapping (application) phase. 
The abstract theories suggest that no episodic or contextual cues enter into 
the problem representation and that structural features are the most relevant 
element in mapping. The exemplar theories propose that episodic and 
contextual details are part o f problem representation and that content is 
relevant in mapping.
As mentioned in the opening remarks of the chapter, transfer o f learning 
is a topic with many connections. Following them, we reviewed, besides 
transfer of learning, also memory, learning and analogical transfer 
literatures. The specific task which we chose in order to investigate transfer, 
the Monty Hall problem, requires a closed decision to be made based on a 
counter-intuitive probability calculation. Positioning our task required us to 
discuss problem solving and decision making, besides the specific literature 
regarding the Monty Hall problem itself. Completing our literature review 
confirmed that what is known on analogical transfer is based primarily on 
the study of open-ended problem solving tasks and that the problem we 
were planning to use in our experiments had some potentially relevant 
differences with the types o f problems used so far. This reinforced our
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conviction that it would be a worthy aim to test if previous findings would 
generalize to binary decision making. Moreover, as our literature review 
highlighted that few studies had analysed the impact on transfer of longer 
time shifts and greater context changes, we were also able to confirm our 
second goal, which was to investigate what happened in situations 
characterized by longer delays and greater context shift.
CHAPTER 3 
LAB-BASED EXPERIMENTS
3. LAB-BASED EXPERIMENTS
The general goal of our research, as explained in the introduction to this 
thesis, was to contribute to the understanding of transfer of learning, 
specifically focusing on what conditions prior to the decision-making 
experience enhance or hinder later decision making. The focus was 
particular on how the impact of prior experience is affected by different 
time delays and context shifts. The main differences with the seminal Gick 
and Holyoak’s (1983) studies on analogical transfer in problem solving and 
with most of the literature on the topic were in the type of task we were 
planning to use (binary decisions vs. open-ended problems), in the length of 
the time delay (we were looking to introduce longer delays) and in the 
context shifts between learning and transfer which we also wanted to 
include.
The first o f the mentioned differences implied that we must identify and 
pre-test the decision-making problems to use. The second difference - the 
introduction of delays and context shifts - meant that we had to “re-capture”, 
after a number of days, the same participants who had performed the 
learning task and have them perform the transfer task, under the constraint 
that we could not reveal to them any connection between the two (e.g. we 
could not require them to come back nor ask them, on the day of the 
learning task, if they could schedule to come back for the transfer task). We 
therefore decided that, for each experiment, we would launch two 
completely independent experiments (i.e. independent recruiting activities, 
different investigator and experiment name) in order to avoid cues. 
Obviously, we were hoping that participants would take part in both 
experiments (which were, in fact, parts 1 and 2 of our experiment) since 
only in this case we could include them in the experimental conditions. We 
were well aware, however, that there was nothing we could do to maximise 
the overlap in participants between the two experiments without making
participants suspect that there was a connection. It was immediately clear 
that this practical aspect o f our delayed experiments would not be easy to 
manage and that the risk of ending up with a small number of cases was 
high.
We started with a series of pilot experiments. The main goals of the 
piloting phase, for the reasons explained, were pre-testing our materials, 
particularly the learning and transfer stories, and resolving what seemed the 
most critical practical aspect in our procedure, i.e. how to “re-capture” the 
same participants so they could complete the transfer task one week later. 
O f course, we also wished, with our pilot experiments, to start answering 
some research questions on transfer determinants.
The first two pilot experiments, as we had anticipated, highlighted the 
difficulties of getting a significant number of participants. On top of the 
normal recruiting difficulties (many competing experiments on campus and 
students busy with other activities), we found that only a limited number of 
participants who had taken part in the first experiment (which was the 
learning phase) also enrolled in the second (which was the transfer part). As 
a consequence, many learning phase participants were “wasted” because 
they did not enrol in the experiment which contained the transfer task. On 
the other hand, as we could not do selective enrolment without creating 
suspicion that we were “up to something”, we had to enrol in the transfer 
task (i.e. the second experiment) several participants who had not performed 
the learning task (i.e. the first experiment). These participants, at least, were 
not wasted as we decided to allocate them to the control group.
These difficulties resulted in small number of participants overall, with 
fewer participants in experimental conditions than in control and unevenly 
balanced participants in each condition (we had control over the allocation 
of participants to conditions in the first experiment, but not on who would 
enrol for the second). A critical examination o f the situation after our first 
two pilot experiments induced both a decision and a reflection. On the one
hand, it made us decide to run a third lab experiment with just 20 minutes 
delay between learning and transfer so that we could keep the participants 
busy with another task, without having them leave the lab. This would allow 
us to collect more data which we felt was necessary to successfully close 
this experimental phase. On the other hand, it made us think that, given the 
type of experiments we were planning to run and the practical problems we 
had experienced, lab-based experimenting might not be the best option. We 
started building a rather strong conviction that web-based experimenting 
was a more suitable alternative which needed to be carefully analysed.
The important outcome of our lab experiments ( 1 , 2  and 3) was that it 
supported the selection of materials, that it highlighted the practical 
problems that our type of experiments would have to overcome and that it 
allowed us to gather some data on which to base our first findings. A few 
important differences with problem solving type transfer began to emerge, 
such as non-significantly higher transfer in the case o f analogical encoding 
versus summarization, while the combination o f time and context effects 
was strongly confirmed, but not as much as it had been found in problem 
solving studies. Although strong conclusions were still unwarranted in this 
phase, these first experiments raised some flags regarding potential 
differences in transfer, possibly due to differences in the tasks, which 
supported our interest in pursuing the research topic.
The chapter will first explain our initial selection o f decision problems, 
then describe and discuss the three lab based experiments separately and 
finally summarize the results and the lessons learned, explaining how these 
led to the choices we made.
3.1 Selection of Decision Problems to Use
In the choice of the problems to use for learning and transfer we were 
looking for binary decision stories with a “counterintuitive” correct solution, 
i.e. a solution that one would not normally arrive at without being exposed 
to the underlying logic, so that solving it correctly could be used as a proxy 
for transfer. The ideal type of stories we were looking for were those that 
the control group would almost systematically fail to solve correctly, while 
the experimental condition participants would solve in reasonably high 
proportion so that the transfer effect could be clearly detected if present. As 
much as possible, we were also looking for a task that would not require 
previous knowledge nor high cognitive abilities in order to avoid confound 
variables. Using these criteria, we short-listed two types of problems: Monty 
Hall and Simpson’s Paradox.
In Monty HalVs original problem, as described in chapter 2, a contestant 
on a TV show was made to choose one of three doors. One o f them hid a 
prize behind it, the other two a goat. After the contestant selected the door 
that he wished to open, the host declared that he would open one of the 
remaining (i.e. not selected by the contestant) two doors. The door selected 
by the host clearly was a non-winning one and revealed a goat behind it. At 
this point, the contestant was given the option to either keep her initial 
selection or to switch to the other un-opened door. The pivotal point to 
understand in solving this problem is that the choice made by the host is 
informed (the host knows where the prize is) and constrained (he cannot 
select the winning door). This constraint (i.e. if one of the two unselected 
doors is the winning one, the host must choose the other) affects the 
probabilities of the unselected door which “takes over” the winning 
probabilities (1/3) o f the other un-selected door. The problem is highly 
counterintuitive as most people think that the probabilities of both doors (the
initially selected and the one remaining) will increase in the same measure 
after the host of the show opens the door with the goat behind it.
In writing our target story, we wanted to ensure that participants were not 
applying learning mechanically and without understanding. We therefore 
decided that a few changes would be made between learning and target so 
that a mindless application would lead to an incorrect solution. To begin 
with, we varied the number of items constituting the initial choice (learning 
stories had three and five choices while target story would have four). A 
more relevant change was to reverse the goal between learning and target 
i.e. if in the learning story the participant had to look for something, in the 
target she would have to avoid something.
Finally, to differentiate transfer levels, we decided to require participants 
to make two final decisions: the first choice was analogous to the learning 
story but with the goal reversed and number of choices changed. The second 
question was at the end of a shorter story, connected to the first one, in 
which the agent eliminating one o f the unselected options was not informed 
and thus could not make a constrained choice. The decision required was 
identical but the correct answer, in this case, was that it was indifferent to 
switch or keep the initial selection because probabilities changed in the 
same measure for all the choices. It should be noticed that applying Monty 
Hall logic to answering this second question constitutes negative transfer or 
over-application and that the second sub-task can be solved applying 
ordinary probabilistic reasoning because the choice is no longer constrained. 
We decided that transfer would be considered positive if at least one of the 
sub-tasks was answered correctly. It turned out that this choice had some 
shortcomings (mainly because the second task could be solved applying 
ordinary logic). Our lab experiments allowed us to better understand how to 
use the two sub-tasks to assess and grade transfer.
Simpson's Paradox is the paradoxical order reversal that can occur, due 
to a mix effect, when there are two or more activities which have different
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rates associated to them (e.g. success rates) and two or more entities which 
have different mixes o f these activities. If the mix of activities 
characterizing each entity is different, it is possible that the one with highest 
overall rate (resulting from the weighted average of activity rates) is the one 
with the lowest single activity rates. As an example, consider the two 
entities being two A&E Units, A&E Unit X and A&E Unit Y, both curing 
just two types of accidents, workplace and domestic. If domestic accidents 
are mild (i.e. easily cured with successful outcome) and workplace accidents 
are very severe (i.e. most often resulting in an unsuccessful outcome), and if 
one A&E Unit, let’s say X, cures prevalently domestic accidents and A&E 
Unit Y cures prevalently workplace accidents, we have the conditions for 
Simpson’s Paradox. Even if A&E Unit Y is better at curing both accidents 
(i.e. has more favourable outcomes on both), its overall outcome (i.e. the 
weighted average of the outcomes of the two diseases) may be much worse 
that A&E Unit X ’s due to the higher proportion of workplace accidents in 
the mix of diseases it cures. The reason this happens is that the different 
weights that the accidents have for the two A&E Unit affect the weighted 
average and may result in order reversal (i.e. the A&E Unit which has best 
outcomes curing both diseases has the worst overall outcome). Being a 
paradox, we felt that this problem was counterintuitive enough to satisfy our 
first criteria. Contrary to Monty Hall, however, it could be solved applying 
ordinary maths (although often people would not even bother to perform the 
calculation as the answer would appear obvious) and it required some basic 
calculation capabilities. As we had done for Monty Hall problem, we 
changed the numbers involved and reversed the goal (e.g. if  in the learning 
story the highest the percentage the better, in the target it was the contrary). 
Even for this type of target story we had two final questions. We were 
unable, however, due to the nature of the problem, to match the difficulty of 
our second question in the Monty Hall type target story. This resulted in two 
final questions more or less of the same level of difficulty. Like we did with
our Monty Hall type problem, we decided that transfer would be considered 
positive if at least one of the sub-tasks was answered correctly.
The other challenge we faced, rising immediately after the choice of the 
type of task, was how to distance learning and transfer tasks semantically. 
We wanted to make them distant enough that there would be no cues and 
also, in future experiments, we wanted to be able to vary the distance, so we 
could assess how this impacted transfer. The challenge here was that there 
was no metric that could help us perform this task objectively.
Since there was no objective or unproblematic way to measure semantic 
distance, at this stage we decided to rate it qualitatively. Clearly, when 
introducing another level of semantic distance (which will be done in the 
experiments to follow), we will need to make sure that at least the ordering 
attributed to the stories was correct. For the moment, we simply reasoned 
that the distance between a fairly recent TV show (our 3 balls story) and a 
story of poison and intrigue in the XVI century (our Lucrezia story) was 
probably rather high from a purely semantic point o f view (all the learning, 
target and distractor stories are reported in separate sections of Appendix I). 
Unfortunately, both stories were characterized by a choice o f the type 
switch-or-keep which, we thought, tended to shorten the distance between 
them. We were obviously careful to avoid cues in formulating the choices 
(e.g. if in the learning story the choice is described as follows “At this point, 
the host says to the contestant that s/he can, if s/he wishes, change ball, 
picking the remaining one, or stick to the original one. As statisticians can 
easily demonstrate, the best choice is to switch....” then in the target story it 
is: “ ...W hat he didn’t know was if he should pick one of the two plates 
remaining at the centre of the table or start eating from the one in front of 
him. What do you think he should do? Why?”). Nevertheless, we were 
aware that, despite our efforts, the stories both described a situation in 
which an initial choice could be changed after the removal of an option. We
decided to classify the distance between learning stories 3 balls and 
Videogame and target story Lucrezia as being medium.
By the same token, we thought that the distance between Factory is 
hiring and Call centres (the Simpson’s Paradox learning stories) and target 
story Competing A&E Units was also medium. In this case we did not move 
in time between learning and target, but in space (from developed to under­
developed countries, from call centres and factories to A&E Units). The 
final question was, again, made as different as possible (e.g. if in the 
learning story we wrote: “A federal Equal Employment enforcement 
official...noted that many more males were hired than females, and decided 
to investigate....In reality, the company didn’t discriminate. Here is what 
happened.”, then in the target story: “The Head of A&E Unit B argues that 
his A&E Unit has the best overall outcomes and claims that he should 
receive further funding. Do you think, based on outcomes, that the charity 
should endorse his request? Why?”). Similarly to what happened with 
Monty Hall learning and target stories, despite our care in eliminating cues, 
both stories compared percentages (overall versus single) which could have 
been a cue in itself.
In summary, we realized, but could not avoid, that the final decision in 
the learning and target stories could act as a cue to focus on some aspects o f 
the story and, in particular, to focus upon the structurally important aspects 
that are shared. This, we were aware, could potentially boost perceived 
similarity, recognition and transfer: although it did not reduce the semantic 
distance between the stories, it could “bridge” it. As will be explained in the 
further sections, our experiments highlighted clearly that the Monty Hall 
problem was a much stronger choice of task for the type of experiment we 
wished to run. Given this disparity, we dropped the initial idea to use both 
stories in our experiments and retained the Monty Hall problem analogs as 
our tasks. (1)
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3.2 Lab-based Experiments
Our lab experiments produced 193 valid cases and involved 133 
participants (in experiment 3 the same participants were used in 
experimental and in control condition with two different tasks). While the 
experiments will be described and discussed in detail in the next pages, table
3.1 highlights their key features and materials.
Table 3.1
Short description o f  Jab-based experiments
Exp.
No.
No. of valid 
participants
Main specific goal 
of the experiment
Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all materials are available in Annex 
No.1)
1 Total valid cases 
and participants: 
41
- condition 1:11
- condition 2: 6 
-control: 24
To compare 
different learning 
goals and methods 
from the point of 
view of transfer 
achieved
• Delay between learning and transfer: 
5-7 days.
Context sh ift: high (Learning and 
transfer parts presented as a separate 
experiments, different experimenter, 
different room, different typeface and 
name of experimenter).
• Semantic distance between learning 
and target: medium
Learning stories:
• Factory is hiring - Simpson’s paradox
• Lucrezia -  Monty Hall 
Distractor story:
Healing Nature 
Transfer story:
• Competing A&E Units - Simpson’s 
paradox
• 3 balls - Monty Hall
Questionnaire: Lab- based experiments 
questionnaire
Exp.
No.
No. of valid 
participants
Main specific goal 
of the experiment
Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all materials are available in Annex 
No.1)
2 Total valid cases 
and participants: 
29
-cond 1: 7 
-cond 2: 5 
-cond 3: 3 
-control: 14
To compare 
learning methods 
from the point of 
view of transfer 
achieved
• Delay between learning and transfer: 
5-7 days.
Context sh ift: high (Learning and 
transfer parts presented as a separate 
experiments, different experimenter, 
different room, different typeface and 
name of experimenter).
• Semantic distance between learning 
and target: medium
Learning stories:
• Factory is hiring and Call centers 
compared - Simpson’s paradox
• 3 balls and Videogame - Monty Hall
• Seat-belts -  non-analogous
Distractor story:
A cure for BTB
Transfer story:
• Competing A&E Units -  Simpson’s 
paradox
• Lucrezia -  Monty Hall
Questionnaire: Lab- based experiments 
questionnaire
Exp.
No.
No. of valid 
participants
Main specific goal 
of the experiment
Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all materials are available in Annex 
No.1)
3 Total valid cases: 
123
-cond 1: 25 
-cond 2: 20 
cond 3: 18 
-control: 60.
Total valid 
participants: 63.
To compare: 
-learning methods 
(summarization, 
generation of an 
analog and 
comparison) 
-number of analogs 
learned (1 vs 2) 
from the point of 
view of transfer 
achieved
• Delay between learning and transfer: 
20 minutes.
Context sh ift: low (Learning and 
transfer parts presented as a separate 
experiments, same experimenter, 
same room, different typeface and 
name of experimenter).
• Semantic distance between learning 
and target: Medium
Learning stories:
• Factory is hiring and Call centers 
compared - Simpson's paradox
• 3 balls and Videogame - Monty Hall
• Seatbelts 
Distractor stories:
• Transfer story: Competing A&E Units
(Simpson’s paradox type) for participants 
who had learned Monty Hall type stories
• Lucrezia ( Monty Hall type) for participants 
who had learned Simpson’s Paradox type 
stories
Transfer story:
• Competing A&E Units -  Simpson’s 
paradox
• Lucrezia -  Monty Hall
Questionnaire: Lab- based experiments 
questionnaire
EXPERIMENT 1
With the first experiment of our research we focused on binary decision­
making in a learning situation meant to be as realistic as possible. In order to 
create a situation not too distant from the ones that learners face in real-life 
learning (i.e. outside of training situations), we decided to provide just one 
analog in the learning phase, despite indications in analogical transfer 
literature that more analogs lead to higher transfer. In real life, when 
experiential learning takes place, analogical encoding of two or three 
analogs (i.e. learning by comparison of two or three different analogs) is 
very rarely possible. Moreover, since in real-life time-context shifts between 
learning and transfer are the norm, we chose to couple learning from just 
one analog with delayed and context-shifted transfer.
In particular, we were wondering if the effect o f time and context would 
be as strong as it was in open-ended problem solving. Both Spencer and 
Weisberg (1986) and Catrambone and Holyoak (1989) had documented 
important effects using an open-ended problem as a transfer task (Dunker’s 
famous Radiation problem). Binary decision-making, however, was less 
“open” than the type o f problems used in previous research and, although 
our stories were carefully formulated to avoid any cue between learning and 
transfer, as we already explained, it was almost impossible to eliminate 
similarity completely due to the fact that both learning and target stories led 
to final binary questions which had to be analogous. These reasons made us 
think that binary decision-making might be better placed in resisting time 
and context effects, probably thanks to higher recognition (explicit or 
implicit) of analogy. Connected to the previous goal, we wished to 
understand if manipulations o f learning (specifically, a type of learning 
centred on understanding deeply one analog) would be sufficient to counter 
the delay and contextual effects on transfer that we were expecting to see,
even if with lesser magnitude than had been documented in open-ended 
problem transfer.
Specifically, the purpose of our experiment 1 was to examine the effects 
of learning method on transfer and on explicit recognition o f analogy in the 
case of transfer separated from learning by a 5-7 days interval, a large 
context shift and just one analog provided for learning. In this experiment 
we also wanted to verify if, under our conditions, quality of learning output 
was a predictor of transfer. We also wished to begin testing possible 
learning and transfer stories as it was intuitively clear that we needed to 
carefully calibrate difficulty of the target task and distance between learning 
and transfer to avoid floor and ceiling effects.
Background
The starting point was the existing literature on learning methods and 
transfer. We found that learning with understanding (i.e. with explanation 
and understanding of underlying principle) is typically found to lead to 
higher transfer than simple memorization or simple practice (Sholckow and 
Judd 1908; Bransford and Stein, 1993; Wertheimer, 1959). Moreover, 
Needham and Begg’s 1991 research, had documented that problem- 
oriented training led to higher transfer than memory-oriented training, 
provided the experimenter gave an explanation of the principle involved. It 
should be noted that, in their experiments, memory-oriented training 
emphasized rote memorization while problem oriented training required 
trying to explain solutions or to solve problems.
The other background topic was time-context effects on transfer which 
had been mostly studied using open-ended problems (e.g. the Radiation 
problem). Spencer and Weisberg, in their 1986 article on context-dependent 
effects on analogical transfer, documented strong negative time-context 
effects on transfer: introducing a short time delay (6 minutes) coupled with
a context shift (shift from experiment to normal lecture by the class 
instructor), they reported that receiving one or even two analogs did not lead 
to significant differences versus the control group in non-hinted transfer. 
The result was interpreted as a mainly context-dependent effect, although 
there was interaction with delay. Catrambone and Holyoak, in their 1989 
experiments confirmed Spencer and Weisberg’s findings that, with a time 
and context shift, pre-hint transfer was eliminated or sharply reduced. To 
obtain pre-hint transfer at higher levels than control, Catrambone and 
Holyoak (1989) had to add a third analog, to reword the target problem to 
emphasize structural features shared with the learning stories and to make 
participants answer detailed questions which helped them focus on aspects 
relevant to the analogy. Even Needham and Begg (1991) had pointed out 
that after a week-long delay, the benefits of problem-oriented training 
appeared to be lost.
In conclusion, literature based on open-ended problem solving tasks 
indicated pretty clearly that context and time shifts had a strong negative 
impact on open ended problem-solving transfer and that this effect could be 
countered only with a combination of measures adopted together, i.e. that 
learning method alone was not enough.
Method
Participants. Participants were 41 undergraduates (first and second years 
mostly) at Warwick University. Seventeen participants were in the 
experimental conditions (condition 1 had 11 participants and condition 2 
had 6 participants), 24 were in the control group.
Participants were not informed that the experiment had two parts. Two 
different experiments (actually parts 1 and 2 of the our experiment) were 
advertised on campus, under different researcher and experiment names, and 
using different channels (for part 1, recruiting was done at the beginning of
a psychology lecture, asking participants to stay after the lesson if they 
wanted to participate. For part 2, the University Online Experiment 
Recruiting System was used).
Participants who chose to participate in both parts 1 and 2 (only 17) 
became our experimental condition participants, while participants who just 
enrolled in part 2 (25) were allocated to the control group (2). Participants 
who took part only in part 1 were discarded from the analysis.
Materials. Each participant in the experimental conditions received two 
booklets, one in the first part o f the experiment and another one in the 
second part, after 5-7 days. The booklets used different lay-outs and fonts in 
order to avoid possible cues. Booklet One was titled “Experiment on 
Learning”. Its content was in part differentiated by condition and included:
-a short story illustrating a situation, in which a binary decision 
needed to be made. The story ended by asking the participant to 
make and explain the decision.
-the same short story, with the correct solution (i.e. decision), 
preceded by learning instructions (differentiated by type of 
learning).
- a Task Sheet (differentiated by type of learning), consisting of 
three multiple choice questions.
-a questionnaire on the experiment, seeking to evaluate clarity, 
level of difficulty, adequacy of allotted time and, in general, to 
identify any issue around materials or procedure.
Booklet two was titled “Experiment on Decision-making” and 
had the same content for all conditions:
-a short story {Healing Nature) which participants had to read 
and summarize in a few sentences. This was the distractor task.
-a short story illustrating a situation in which two decisions 
needed to be made. The story, which was analogous, for
experimental conditions, to the learning story that the participant 
had received in the first session, ended by asking the participant 
to make the decisions and to explain them. Twenty three of the 
target stories were of the Simpson Paradox type and 18 of the 
Monty Hall type.
-a questionnaire on the experiment, asking if the participant was 
familiar with the type of stories he/she had just read, if  he/she 
thought that it might be connected to something done recently 
and if he/she had recognized the analogy.
Two different story types were used in the experiment: one set o f stories 
(learning and target) were based on Simpson’s Paradox and the other on the 
Monty Hall problem. Table 3.2 shows which stories were used in each 
condition. Materials are available in Appendix A l.
Table 3.2
Materials used per experimental condition -  Experiment 1
Learning stories Distractor Target story
Condition 1 -  Monty 
Hall (learning for recall)
Lucrezia Healing Nature 3 balls
Condition 1 -  
Simpson’s Paradox 
(learning for recall)
Factory is 
hiring
Heating Nature Competing 
A&E Units
Condition 2 -  Monty Hall 
(learning for meaning)
Lucrezia Healing Nature 3 balls
Condition 2 (learning 
for meaning) -  
Simpson’s Paradox
Factory is 
hiring
Healing Nature Competing 
A&E Units
Procedure. The experiment followed a between-subjects procedure where 
participants were divided in two conditions and were assigned, in a factorial
design, to either one of our story types {Monty Hall or Simpson’s Paradox). 
The manipulated variable in this experiment was learning method (learning 
for recall vs. learning for meaning). The conditions were differentiated as 
follows: condition 1 would be required to learn for recall and condition 2 to 
learn for meaning.
For the first task of part 1 o f the experiment (this part was presented as an 
experiment on learning), all participants were first required to read a story 
(either of Simpson’s Paradox or Monty Hall type) and to make and explain 
the required decision at the end of it. Ten minutes were allowed to perform 
this task. The objective of having participants try to make the decision was 
to make them think hard about the story (this method is a type of problem- 
oriented training). This was intended to counter the time and context effects 
which we were expecting would negatively affect transfer. It also allowed 
us to exclude participants who already knew the story or were able to solve 
it without previous learning.
For the second task of part 1, all participants were asked to review the 
same story they had just read and solved, this time containing the correct 
decision and explanation of why it was the best decision. The story was 
introduced by instructions, dependant on experimental condition:
• Condition 1 participants were required to review the story and 
read the correct decision in order to be able to recall its main 
events.
• Condition 2 participants were required to review the story and 
read the correct decision in order to understand its underlying 
principle.
Five minutes were given to complete the task, immediately after which, 
participants were asked to answer a multiple-choice questionnaire testing 
their recall or their understanding of the story (depending on the 
experimental condition). The goal of the multiple choice test, which lasted
another 5 minutes, was twofold. On the one hand, it was intended to 
reinforce the type of learning ensuring, as much as possible, that participants 
in the same condition learned in a similar way i.e. paying attention to the 
same aspects, factual or structural depending on the condition. On the other, 
it allowed to measure learning (percentage of correct answers on total 
possible answers). Finally, a questionnaire was administered asking if the 
participant was familiar with the stories and if he/she thought the tasks were 
clearly explained.
Part 2 of the experiment, which was identical for the two experimental 
conditions and for control, took place 5-7 days after, in a different room, 
was conducted by a different person and was presented as an experiment on 
decision-making. All participants were required, after a 5 minutes distractor 
task, to read a story (for experimental conditions the story was analogous to 
the one they had learned one week before) and make the decisions at the end 
of it. Time allowed was 10 minutes. At the end of task 2, all participants 
were asked to answer a questionnaire, seeking to identify invalid cases (e.g. 
participants who suspected a connection between the two experiments) and 
to record explicit recognition of analogy.
The variable we used as a proxy of transfer, as we already pointed out, 
was a dichotomous variable which was assigned value “yes” if at least one 
o f the sub-tasks was answered correctly and the answer was explained. 
Solutions were scored independently by two individuals, one of whom was 
uninformed on the condition (Cronbach’s Alpha = .9554). Cases in which 
rating was different were discussed and resolved.
Results and discussion
In order to to record and analyse the relationships between our key 
variables, we chose to represent the data using contingency tables and to 
test significance with Fisher’s exact test. The use of contingency tables is 
justified by the nature of our variables (dependent and independent) which 
were all categorical. We decided to use Fisher’s exact test to examine the 
significance of the association between variables because it is a non- 
parametric test (and thus makes no assumptions on frequency distributions 
o f the variables being assessed) which has less requirements regarding the 
population than other available significance tests. In particular, it does not 
require normal distribution of deviations (i.e. of observed minus expected 
values) and it allows for small sample sizes (i.e. expected values in any of 
the cells of the table can be below 10) as was often the case in our 
experiments. A more powerful statistical analysis, ANOVA, although 
possible, was considered less appropriate in our case due to the fact that our 
dependent variables were all categorical (ANOVA assumes normal 
distribution and homoschedasticy of errors). Moreover, ANOVA allows 
estimates below 0 and above 1 when the dependent variable is binary.
Fisher’s exact test was preferred to chi-square test, which can also be 
used with categorical data, because the latter requires large samples which 
we could not always guarantee. The p-value calculated using chi-square test 
is an approximation when the expected number of cases in each of the 
contingency table cells is smaller than 10. Fisher’s exact test, on the 
contrary, always provides an exact p-value.
Fisher’s exact test, although powerful, has two major down-sides: it can 
be computationally intensive and it provides only a p-value and nothing 
else. The latter shortcoming suggested that, at the end o f all our 
experiments, having achieved large sample sizes, we would want to run
more powerful analyses on aggregated data in order to obtain some measure 
of association of our variables.
As for significance, throughout this thesis we will use a significance level 
o f a = .05.
Although the experimental conditions performed better than control 
(65% correct vs. 42%), our results did not show a significant difference 
between control condition and experimental conditions when both types of 
stories were analysed together (p = .128, Fisher’s exact test, 1-sided) nor 
when they were analysed separately (p > .10). It should be noted that the 
solution rates were rather high, which can be explained by the fact that we 
were requiring at least one o f the subtasks to be correct and one of the two 
was rather easy. Frequencies are reported in table 3.3. This result is 
consistent with previous research in problem solving (Catrambone and 
Holyoak, 1989) which showed that time and context shifts eliminate transfer 
effects. However, given the very small numbers involved, the result could of 
course also be due to lack of power. It should be pointed out that our 
number of participants, 41, was much below the sample size 153, needed to 
ensure the necessary statistical power (0.8) for this analysis (3) given the 
Chi-Square value of 2.114 (Lenth, 2006).
Table 3.3
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task fo r  control group
versus conditions receiving one analog
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes no
Control group 10 14 24
1 analog 11 6 17
Total 21 20 41
We were also unable to observe any significant difference in transfer 
depending on learning method {p = .661, Fisher’s exact test, 1-sided), 
contrary to our hypothesis that learning for meaning would lead to higher 
transfer. Frequencies are reported in table 3.4. Even more so than in the 
case of the previous analysis, the result could be due to lack of power. 
Given the very small effect size, the ideal sample size for this analysis to 
have adequate statistical power (0.8), given the Chi-Square value of .016 
would have been 8425 participants (Lenth, 2006).
Table 3.4
Frequencies o f  Correct solution o f  at least one sub-task fo r  different types o f  
learning
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes no
condition recall 7 4 11
meaning 4 2 6
Total 11 6 17
Learning level achieved, was non-significant in its relationship with 
transfer {p = .095, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Once again, the finding 
needs to be confirmed as the sample size, at the Chi-square level of 6.783, 
should have been 31 to ensure .8 power level (Lenth, 2006). Frequencies 
are reported in table 3.5.
Table 3.5
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task by learning level
achieved
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes no
level of quality in
learning task (% 67,00 1 o Q
correct answers)
75,00 2 2 4
83,00 6 0 6
92,00 1 2 3
100,00 1 0 1
Total 11 6 17
Explicit recognition (self-reported in the final questionnaire) did not 
vary significantly between conditions {p = 1, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) 
nor between learning levels achieved (p = .276, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) 
and was, in general, very high (71%). This marked a difference with the 
open-ended problem solving transfer experiments where recognition was 
much lower, but it should be pointed out that in our case it was self- 
reported. Frequencies are reported in table tables 3.6 and 3.7.
Table 3.6
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition fo r  different types o f  learning
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
condition recall 8 3 11
meaning 4 2 6
Total 12 5 17
Table 3.7
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  learning achieved
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
quality in learning
task (% correct 
answers)
67,00 3 0 3
75,00 3 1 4
83,00 3 3 6
92,00 3 0 3
100,00 0 1 1
Total 12 5 17
More interestingly even, explicit recognition did not make a significant 
difference in terms of transfer {p = .600, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). 
Again, this differs from the results obtained in open-ended problem solving 
studies, but results need to be confirmed as the ideal sample size to achieve 
.8 statistical power would have been 184 for this analysis at the given Chi- 
square level of .726 (Lenth, 2006). Frequencies are reported table 3.8.
Table 3.8
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task depending on 
explicit recognition (Y/N)
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes no yes
explicit recognition yes 7 5 12
no 4 1 5
Total 11 6 17
In conclusion, one analog was not enough to support significant transfer 
and our initial expectations that learning fo r  meaning would achieve better
transfer results than learning fo r  recall (allowing significant transfer) were 
not confirmed. Possibly, the latter finding is to be interpreted as a very 
strong time-context effect on learning, to the point that the influence of 
learning method and level are neutralized. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that the nil results we found are due to lack of statistical power as 
our sample size was clearly below ideal due to the recruiting constraints 
and difficulties.
The finding that level of learning does not influence transfer when longer 
time and greater context shift separate learning from transfer is consistent 
with Spencer and Weisberg (1986) results. It should be pointed out, 
however, that, in the case of this experiment, we almost registered a ceiling 
effect in learning (the minimum value vas 67%).
Analogy recognition did not have a significant relationship with transfer. 
It must be underscored that the high levels of explicit recognition reached in 
the experiment (71% of the participants declared they had recognized the 
analogy when asked in the final questionnaire) were unexpected and made 
us think that they should be further verified. On the one hand, as we already 
pointed out, this value is much higher than the one obtained in the famous 
Gick and Holyoak experiments, in which only around 10-20% of the 
participants (depending on the stories) in the one analog condition 
(comparable to conditions in this experiment) spontaneously recognized the 
analogy. Possibly higher explicit recognition is justified by the more “cued” 
nature of our decision-making stories compared to the problem solving 
ones, which made recognition (or feeling of knowing) relatively more 
frequent. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that, in this phase, we 
were still testing our materials and that the final questionnaire, which 
proved one of the trickiest materials we had to deal with, surely still needed 
improvements. In fact, reading the questionnaires that participants filled in 
after having reviewed their transfer task, we were under the impression that,
in some cases, participants recognized the analogy in hindsight and not 
while doing the transfer task. It seemed that, when asked if they recognized 
the analogy (“Did you see an analogy between something that you recently 
learned and the decisions you were required to make?”), possibly because 
the question was not clear, some participants seemed to answer yes 
regardless of when they recognized the analogy (during the task or while 
answering the questionnaire). This might have inflated explicit recognition 
and blurred our results. Another possible element that might help explain 
the non-significant relationship between explicit recognition and transfer is 
that our task contained a goal reversal in the decision to make. 
Consequently, correct transfer was non-obvious even when the analogy had 
been recognized (differently from what happened in problem solving 
experiments where receiving a hint which highlighted the analogy boosted 
performance).
In sum, our first experiment’s results, to be taken with caution, had 
indicated that time-context effects could be very strong in binary-decision- 
making transfer as was the case in open-ended problem solving. Due to 
small numbers involved, we judged that all results should be verified with 
further experiments in which, however, we should plan to introduce changes 
in the learning method in order to hopefully counter time-context effects.
EXPERIMENT 2
In experiment 2 we continued pursuing the same goals we had in 
experiment 1 since we felt uncomfortable drawing conclusions from it alone 
due to scarcity of data. We thought that we needed to continue collecting 
data on binary decision-making transfer with long delay and large context 
shift and to keep testing our stories and our recruiting procedure.
We had, however, learned an important lesson in our first experiment on 
the strength of time-context effects which made us decide to introduce 
changes to provide stronger contrasts between them. We decided to add an 
analog and to use an analogical encoding method in our experiment 2 
because this measure had proven capable of raising transfer levels in 
immediate same context and in some delayed transfer situations (Gick and 
Holyoak, 1983 and Loewenstein, Thompson and Gentner, 1999 and 
Gentner, Lowenstein and Thompson, 2003).
In summary, we decided to insert conditions that received two analogs in 
the learning phase and to introduce analogical encoding as a learning 
method for one of these conditions in order to test if these measures were 
enough to obtain transfer under our conditions and with our type of task.
Background
In their research on analogical transfer in the same context and 
immediately following learning, Gick and Holyoak (1983) found that 
learning from one analog leads to transfer. Confirming these results, under 
the same conditions, Spencer and Weisberg (1986) were able to observe a 
significant difference between experimental conditions and control, with 
significant transfer being observed in participants who had received at least 
one analog.
Gick and Holyoak (experiment 4, 1983) had also found that two 
analogically encoded analogs (i.e. analogs learned by summarization and 
comparison in search o f similarities) lead to higher transfer than just one. 
The conditions under which two analogs proved better than one were where 
there was no shift in context and that transfer immediately followed 
learning. It should be pointed out, however, that in Gick and Holyoak’s 
experiment 4 (1983), in the one analog condition participants were also 
asked to draw similarities between the non-analogous stories received
(which, by the same experimenter’s admission, might have confused them). 
Perhaps also as a result of this, the one analog participants in this 
experiment underperformed compared to other one-analog condition 
participants in other experiments. It is therefore not impossible that the 
superiority of two analogs would have been less striking under different 
conditions.
In their 1989 paper, Catrambone and Holyoak found, confirming and 
extending previous results, that, in immediate and same context transfer, 
two analogs are more beneficial than just one, that analogical encoding 
promoted by comparison between exemplars leads to higher transfer levels 
than just summarization and that there is a positive correlation between 
schema abstraction and transfer. Catrambone and Holyoak, however, also 
found that even a 30 minute delay filled with an interpolated task was 
enough to stop analogical transfer, even if the physical aspects of context 
(room and person administering the experiment) were unchanged. This 
confirmed Spencer and Weisberg’s findings (1986) who had found that 
when they presented learning and target stories in different contexts (i.e. 
class demonstration by instructor vs. experiment by investigator) and 
separated by a 6 minutes interval, number of analogs was no longer making 
a significant difference in transfer (i.e. participants receiving zero, one or 
two analogs did not significantly differ in performance).
Trying to overcome the contextual limitations Catrambone and Holyoak 
(1989) added a third analog, reworded the target problem to emphasize 
structural features shared with the learning stories and made participants 
answer detailed questions which helped them focus on aspects relevant to 
the analogy. This procedure successfully led to un-hinted transfer even in 
the presence of context and time shifts.
Superiority of analogical encoding over other methods was confirmed, 
with a different task, by experiments using negotiation tasks (Loewenstein, 
Thompson and Gentner, 1999; Gentner, Lowenstein and Thompson, 2003)
which showed that the advantage observed by the two analog conditions 
was greater when the two analogs were compared (analogical encoding) 
rather than simply learned, even after a week’s delay. More generally, 
problem comparison has been found an effective method in supporting the 
application o f rules in problem solving studies (Ansburg and Schields, 
2003) and similarity judgements have been found to support generation of a 
complex and previously un-encountered solution procedure to solve a 
transfer problem more difficult than the training problems (Ryan, 2005).
In conclusion, existing research in analogical transfer, mostly based on 
open-ended problem solving tasks and on immediate and same- 
context.transfer supports a few claims. First it indicates that immediate 
same-context transfer can be induced by just one analog. It also indicates 
that, in open-ended problem solving, two compared analogs (i.e. 
analogically encoded) lead to higher transfer than one. Moreover, it 
indicates that transfer is higher if two analogs are analogically encoded 
rather than summarized. However, the findings also suggest that context 
shifts, even in immediate transfer, sharply reduce or eliminate transfer from 
one or two analogs, even when the two analogs were learned by analogical 
encoding. Analogical encoding, however, leads to better transfer even after 
a week delay with a negotiation task. In order to overcome contextual shifts, 
more analogy-oriented questions and an increase in number of analogs are 
necessary. Finally, existing research indicates that schema quality is a 
predictor of transfer in same context un-hinted transfer and in different 
context delayed hinted transfer.
Method
Participants. Participants were 29 undergraduates (first and second years 
mostly) at Warwick University. We achieved the following numbers of 
participants, once again short of our expectations: condition 1 (two analogs
and summarization) had 7 participants, condition 2 (one analog and analog 
generation) had 5, condition 3 (analogical encoding) had 3 and the control 
group 14 (these were participants who enrolled in the experiment containing 
the transfer task but had not done the learning task).
Like in experiment 1, participants were not informed that the experiment 
had two parts. Two different experiments (which were actually part 1 and 
part 2 of the our experiment 1) were advertised on campus, under different 
researcher and experiment names, and using different channels (for part 1 
recruiting was done at the beginning of a psychology lecture, asking 
participants to stay after the lesson if they wanted to participate, for part 2 
the University Online Experiment Recruiting System was used).
Participants who chose to participate in both parts 1 and 2 (only 15) were 
allocated to the experimental conditions, while participants who took part in 
part 2 only (14) were allocated to the control group. Participants who took 
part only in part 1 were discarded from analysis.
Materials. Each participant in the experimental conditions received two 
booklets, one on the first session of the experiment and another one on the 
second session, after 5-7 days.
The booklets, similar to experiment 1, used different lay-outs and fonts in 
order to avoid providing cues to the participants. Booklet one was titled 
“Experiment on Learning”. It was differentiated by condition and contained: 
-Two short stories illustrating a situation in which a binary decision was 
correctly made. The story explained why the decision was the correct 
one. Depending on the condition, one or two of the stories were 
analogous to the target story that the participant would receive in part 2. 
The booklet instructed participants, depending on the condition, to either 
summarize the stories in order to be able to recall them or to briefly 
outline two stories each one similar to the two stories that had been
provided or to outline similarities between the two stories highlighting 
the key parallels and learning points that the stories share.
-A questionnaire asking participants if the stories were written clearly 
and if tasks were explained adequately.
Booklet two was titled “Experiment on Decision-making”, was not 
differentiated by condition and contained:
-A distractor task consisting in a short story (A cure for BTB) ending 
with a decision to be made. Participants were required to read it and 
make the decision at the end of it. The time allocated was 5 minutes.
-A short story illustrating a situation, in which two decisions needed to 
be made. The story, which was analogous, for experimental conditions, 
to the learning story that the participant had received in the first session, 
ended by asking the participant to make the decisions and to explain 
them. The time allocated was 10 minutes.
-A final questionnaire asking if  the participant was familiar with the type 
of stories he/she had just read, if  he/she thought that it might be 
connected to something done recently and if he/she had recognized the 
analogy.
As in experiment 1, two different story types were used in the 
experiment, one set (learning and target) based on Simpson ’s Paradox and 
the other on the Monty Hall problem, in order to continue evaluation of 
which worked best.
Some changes were made from experiment 1, for example Lucrezia now 
became the target story (in experiment 1 it was a learning story) while 3 
Balls (former target story) was one o f the learning stories. The reason for 
the switch was that we wanted to differentiate transfer levels introducing a 
second question at the end o f the target story and this was more easily done 
with Lucrezia. We added Videogame as the second analog of the Monty Hall 
type. We retained our Factory is hiring as the learning story and our
Competing A&E Units as the target and added Call Centres Compared as a 
second analog. The non-analog story, used for the one-analog condition, 
was Car accident. The sets of stories per condition are reported in table 3.9. 
Materials are available in Appendix A l.
Table 3.9
Materials used per experimental condition -  Experiment 2
Learning stories Distractor Target story
Condition 1 -  Monty Halt 
(summarization)
• 3 balls
• Videogame
A cure for 
BTB
Lucrezia
Condition 1 -  Simpson’s 
Paradox (summarization)
• Factory is 
hiring
• Call centers 
compared
A cure for 
BTB
Competing 
A&E Units
Condition 2 - Monty Hall 
(analog generation)
• 3 balls
• Seatbelts
A cure for 
BTB
Lucrezia
Condition 2 (analog 
generation) 1 -  Simpson’s 
Paradox
• Factory is 
hiring
• Seatbelts
A cure for 
BTB
Competing 
A&E Units
Condition 3 -  Monty Hall 
(comparison)
• 3 balls
• Videogame
A cure for 
BTB
Lucrezia
Condition 3 -  Simpson’s 
Paradox (comparison)
• Factory is 
hiring
• Call centers 
compared
A cure for 
BTB
Competing 
A&E Units
Procedure. The experiment followed a between-subjects procedure where 
participants were divided in three conditions and were assigned, in a 
factorial design, to either one of our story types {Monty Hall or Simpson ’s 
Paradox).
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The difference between conditions concerned part 1 of the experiment (in 
order to manipulate number of analogs received and the type o f learning), 
while part 2 was the same across conditions. Control group participants did 
not participate in part 1. Part 1 of the experiment was presented as an 
experiment on learning and participants were required to learn 2 stories 
following a method which depended on their condition. The time allowed 
for the task was 15 minutes.
• Condition 1 participants were required to read two analoguous 
stories (both analogous to the story in part 2 o f the experiment) and 
to write a short summary of each story
• Condition 2 participants were required to read two stories (only one 
of which was analogous to the story in part 2 o f the experiment) and 
to write, for each one, an analogous story. We purposefully avoided 
having participants in this condition draw a comparison between the 
two stories. Comparison, of any type, can be confusing for 
participants when they are asked to search for nonexistent analogies. 
We were concerned that forcing participants to search for analogies 
between two non-analogous stories might actually interfere 
negatively with later retrieval of the analogy. This had, in fact, 
possibly been the case in earlier studies, as noted by Gick and 
Holyoak (1983): “The procedure encouraged analog-plus-control 
subjects to also abstract some sort of schema...For these subjects, 
the induced schema may have actually interfered with their ability to 
later retrieve and apply the actual analog during the transfer task” (p. 
25). On the other hand, we wanted to try a learning method that 
would make participants reflect on the structure o f the stories they 
read.
• Condition 3 participants were required to read two analoguous 
stories (both analogous to the story in part 2 of the experiment), to
identify structural similarities and draw the key shared principle that 
the two stories illustrate. This method is very similar to what Gick 
and Holyoak used in their experiment 4 and called analogical 
encoding.
Part 2 of the experiment, which was identical for the two experimental 
conditions and for the control, took place 5-7 days after, often in a different 
room, was conducted by a different person and was presented as an 
experiment on decision-making. All participants were required, after a 
distractor task, to read a story (for experimental conditions the story was 
analogous to the one they had learned one week before) and make the 
decisions at the end of it.
Finally, all participants were asked to answer a questionnaire, which had 
the goal of identifying invalid cases (participants familiar with the stories 
before starting the experiment or who suspected a connection between the 
two experiments) and of recording explicit recognition o f analogy.
Control group participants did not participate in part 1 (it was made of 
the participants who showed up for part 2 o f our experiment without having 
performed part 1).
We used the same proxy of transfer (at least one sub-task correct) as we 
had used in experiment 1. Solutions were scored independently by two 
individuals, one of whom was uninformed on the condition (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .9032). Cases in which rating was different were discussed and 
resolved.
Results and discussion
Comparing all experimental conditions (which received one or two 
analogs) versus control we did not find a significant difference in favour of
experimental conditions (p = .109, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). The nil 
result should however be taken with caution because, in the case of this 
analysis, the ideal sample size to reach .8 statistical power at the Chi-square 
level of 3.548 should have been of 65 (Lenth, 2006). Again, as in 
experiment 1, correct solution rates were high due to the choice of the 
proxy of transfer. Analyzing both types of target stories separately, 
however, the nil result was confirmed only for participants who had the 
Monty Hall type stories {p = 1, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) while 
participants who had the Simpson’s Paradox type story, there was 
significant difference (p = .031, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Frequency data 
is reported in tables 3.10-3.12 below.
Table 3.10
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task fo r  all experimental 
conditions vs. control
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
no yes no
Experimental condition
(1 or 2 analogs) 8 7 15
Control 12 2 14
Total 20 9 29
Table 3.11
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task fo r  experimental 
conditions vs. control -  Story type Monty Hall
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
no yes
Experimental condition
(1 or 2 analogs) 5 2 7
Control 6 2 8
Total 11 4 15
Table 3.12
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task fo r  experimental 
conditions vs. control -  Story type Simpson’s Paradox
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
no yes
Experimental condition
(1 or 2 analogs) 3 5 8
Control 6 0 6
Total 9 5 14
Even comparing just the two analogs conditions vs. control (i.e. 
participants who learned with two analogs vs. participants who had not 
received an analog), significance was not reached {p = .170, Fisher’s exact 
test, 2-sided). The same remark we made concerning the previous analysis 
applies: since the ideal sample size for adequate power, at the Chi-square 
level o f .2057, would have been 920 (Lenth, 2006), the nil result needs to be 
verified with further experiments. Frequency data is reported in table 3.13.
Table 3.13
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task fo r  experimental 
conditions receiving 2 analogs vs. control -  all story type
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
no yes
Experimental condition 
(receiving 2 analogs) 6 4 10
Control 12 2 14
Total 18 6 24
Moreover, comparing the conditions with two analogs to the one with 
one analog we did not find significant differences in transfer (p = .608, 
Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). This result could again be due to lack of power.
Table 3.14
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task fo r  experimental 
conditions receiving one vs. two analogs — all story types
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
no yes
Number of analogs 2 6 4 10
1 2 3 5
Total 8 7 15
Similar to the findings of experiment 1, again we were unable to observe 
any significant difference in transfer depending on learning method (p = 1, 
Fisher’s exact test, 1-sided), possibly due to lack of power as, once again, 
we were far from the ideal size of 237 participants which would have been 
needed at the Chi-square level of .612 (Lenth, 2006). Frequencies are 
reported in table 3.15.
Table 3.15
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task fo r  different types o f  
learning
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
no yes
condition Sumarization 4 3 7
Analog
generation 2 3 5
Analogic
encoding 2 1 3
Total 8 7 15
Learning level achieved did not seem to impact transfer significantly 
either {p = .730, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) and this time, contrary to what 
we had found in the previous experiment, significance levels were not 
encouraging. This result differs from what had been found by Gick and 
Holyoak in their 1983 experiments on immediate same context transfer 
(where schema quality was indeed a predictor of transfer), but is consistent 
with Catrambone and Holyoak’s findings (1989) that schema quality does 
not predict un-hinted transfer in context-time shifted situations. However, 
once again, ideal sample size would have been 75 at the 1.942 Chi-square 
level (Lenth, 2006), thus our analysis lacked adequate power. Coupled with 
the fact that the analogical encoding condition had only 3 participants, we 
felt that, at this stage, no conclusions could be drawn on the relationship 
between learning quality and transfer after a delay.
Table 3.16
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task by learning level 
achieve
Correct solution of at least one 
sub-task Total
no yes
level of quality 
in learning task no-very low quality 3 1 4
medium low quality 2 4 6
medium quality 1 1 2
maximum quality 1 2 3
Total 7 8 15
Confirming what we had found in experiment 1, explicit recognition, 
which, this time, was 47% overall, did not vary significantly between 
conditions (p = 1, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) nor between learning levels
achieved (p = 1, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies are reported in 
tables 3.17-3.18.
Table 3.17
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition fo r  different types o f  learning
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
condition Sumarization 3 4 7
Analog
generation 2 3 5
Analogic.
encoding 2 1 3
Total 7 8 15
Table 3.18
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  learning achieved
explicit recognition of analogy Total
------
yes no
level of quality
in learning task no-very low quality 2 2 4
medium low quality 3 3 6
medium quality 1 1 2
maximum quality 1 2 3
Total 7 8 15
Finally, like in experiment 1, explicit recognition did not make a 
significant difference in terms o f transfer (p = .132, Fisher’s exact test, 2- 
sided), possibly due to lack of power: the ideal sample size should have 
been 37 at the 3.233 Chi-square level to achieve adequate power (Lenth, 
2006).
I l l
Table 3.19
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task depending on
explicit recognition
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
no yes
explicit recognition
of analogy yes 2 5 7
no 6 2 8
Total 8 7 15
Experiment 2 confirms and expands most of the findings of experiment 
1, but suffers from the same problem, i.e. insufficient number of cases. Once 
again, power calculations to determine the ideal sample size which would 
ensure adequate power (.8) indicated that our sample size was always below 
ideal levels, sometimes very much below. Despite the necessary caveats, we 
think that these first two experiments confirm the interest o f studying 
transfer with a different type of problem and in trying to extend previous 
results.
Some findings from open-ended problem solving research had been 
confirmed, such as the strength of time-context effects, which appeared 
robust even with our more structured and possibly more cued transfer task. 
On the other hand, since in both our experiments time and context effects 
had been coupled, it was impossible to determine if the responsibility for 
failed transfer derived from both in the same measure.
We found that method of learning and number of analogs (one vs. two), 
did not seem to make a significant difference. We were not ready to draw 
conclusions, but we would certainly investigate these variables further as it 
appeared that they may play a different role.
Finally, the non significant relationship between analogy recognition and 
transfer, which we found in both experiments, and the higher percentage of
participants recognizing the analogy compared to the classic problem 
solving transfer experiments, suggested that recognition might not be as 
critical in the case of our task. This might be another difference with open- 
ended problem solving, to be further verified. At this stage many 
possibilities were still open as there was more than one explanations for our 
non-significant results i.e. for the fact that number of analogs, learning 
method, learning level achieved and explicit recognition did not seem to 
have a relationship with transfer and with explicit recognition. O f course, 
lack of power was one possibility. The other possible explanation was that 
number of analogs, learning method and learning level achieved played a 
different role in our type of task. Finally, it could be that time and context 
eliminated the effects of number of analogs, learning method and learning 
level achieved, rather than the effects being nonexistent.
The next logical step was, therefore, on the one hand, to increase 
participation in order to achieve greater statistical power and, on the other, 
to test if  a shorter time delay and a smaller context shift between learning 
and transfer would allow number of analogs, learning method and learning 
level achieved to manifest their effects on transfer and on explicit 
recognition. Increasing number of participants in this type of delayed 
experiment seemed almost impossible using the lab, so this goal was 
momentarily put aside. Fortunately, pursuing both the decrease o f delay and 
context shifts and the increase in participation at the same time seemed 
more doable. As a consequence of these reflections, we decided to launch an 
experiment with a much shorter delay between learning and transfer and a 
minor context shift so we could elude most of our recruiting and 
administering hurdles and reach greater numbers of participants.
EXPERIMENT 3
We set off to perform an experiment with “easier” transfer conditions 
(shorter time and smaller context shift) which, beyond making recruiting 
smoother (we could recruit participants once and make them perform 
learning and transfer tasks in the same session), would probably allow some 
transfer to take place and, thus, possibly, some effects to be detected.
We needed, however, to be cautious in relaxing transfer conditions as we 
did not want to risk a ceiling effect. We decided that a slightly changed 
context (we would keep participants in the same room and the experiment 
would be administered by the same researcher, but the experiment would be 
presented as separate from the previous, prepared by a different researcher 
and would have a different typeface and wording of the instructions) and a 
20 minute delay between learning and transfer was what we needed. We 
therefore decided to engage participants for “three separate experiments by 
the same research group” (in reality, parts 1 and 2 of our experiment, 
separated by a distractor task which we used to collect control group data).
Closely following experiment 2, experiment 3 examines the impact o f 
number of analogs received, learning method, level of learning achieved and 
explicit analogy recognition on transfer. The important differences (besides 
minor rephrasing in materials) were the shortened time interval between 
learning and transfer and the context shift, which was reduced.
Background
Background for this experiment is the same as for experiment 2. 
Although this experiment, compared to our experiment 2, reduces delay and 
context shift, there are still relevant procedural differences with Gick and 
Holyoak’s experiment 4 (in which transfer was immediate-same-context and 
learning was only analogical encoding) . The experiment procedure is in
fact similar to the 30 minute delay condition in Catrambone and Holyoak’s 
experiment 2 (1989) which, recall, had not registered significant un-hinted 
transfer.
Method
Participants. Participants belonged to two types: first year students 
participating in a subject panel for credit and paid participants 
(undergraduate and graduate students) recruited through the online 
university experiment recruiting system. The experimental results were very 
close for the two groups, so the data was pooled.
All participants participated in one of the experimental conditions (with 
one story type) and in the control condition with the other story type (which 
became the distractor task). Participants (3) who declared their familiarity 
with the tasks they were asked to perform (this was asked in the final 
questionnaire) were excluded.
Valid participants were
• 63 in the experimental conditions (26 for credit + 37 for pay)
• 60 in the control condition (24 for credit + 36 for p ay ).
Condition 1 had 25 participants, condition 2 had 20 and condition 3 had
18.
Materials. Each participant received a booklet containing three sections. 
The cover welcomed participants to “Three short experiments on learning 
and deciding” by a group of researchers. The three sections in the booklet 
each had a cover of its own, each with a different title (part 1 was titled 
“Experiment on learning”, part 2 “Experiment on decision-making” and part 
3 “Experiment on decisions” and the name of a different researcher 
(supposedly in charge of the experiment), using different language (as much 
as possible) and different type face.
Section one was titled “Experiment on Learning”. It was differentiated by 
condition and contained:
-Two short stories illustrating a situation in which a binary decision was 
correctly made. The story explained why the decision was the correct one. 
Depending on the condition, just one or both of the stories were analogous 
to the target story that the participant would receive in part 2. As in 
experiments 1 and 2, two different story types were used, one set based on 
Simpson’s Paradox and the other on the Monty Hall problem.
The text instructed participants, depending on the condition, to either 
summarize the stories in order to be able to recall them or to briefly outline 
two stories each one similar to the two stories that had been provided or to 
outline similarities between the two stories highlighting the key parallels 
and learning points that the stories share.
-A questionnaire asking participants if the stories were written 
clearly and if tasks were explained adequately.
Section two was titled “Experiment on Decisions”, was not 
differentiated by condition and contained:
- the target problem not analogous to the learning stories. In other 
words, for participants learning the Monty Hall problem, the distractor task 
was the target story assigned to participants who had learned the Simpson’s 
Paradox stories and vice-versa. This allowed us to use the distractor task as 
control group. The text instructed participants to make the decisions and to 
explain them.
-A questionnaire asking participants if they were previously familiar 
with the type of decisions they made.
Section three was titled “Experiment on Decision-making”, was not 
differentiated by condition and contained:
- A short story illustrating a situation, in which two decisions needed 
to be made. The story, which was analogous to the learning story that the
participant had received in the first session, ended by asking the participant 
to make the decisions and to explain them.
-A questionnaire on the experiment, asking if the participant was 
familiar with the type of stories he/she had just read, if  he/she thought that 
it might be connected to something done recently and if he/she had 
recognized the analogy.
Minor changes in the learning and transfer stories and in the 
questionnaires were made from the previous experiment following the 
indications that we had received in previous experiments through the final 
questionnaires.
Table 3.20 reports materials used for each condition. Materials are 
available in Appendix A1.
Table 3.20
Materials used per experimental condition — Experiment 3
Learning stories Distractor Target story
Condition 1 -  Monty Hall 
(summarization)
• 3 balls
• Videogame
Competing 
A&E Units
Lucrezia
Condition 1 -  Simpson’s 
Paradox (summarization)
• Factory is hiring
• Call centers 
compared
Lucrezia Competing 
A&E Units
Condition 2 -  Monty Hall 
(analog generation)
•  3 balls
• Seatbelts
Competing 
A&E Units
Lucrezia
Condition 2 (analog 
generation) 1 -  Simpson’s 
Paradox
•  Factory is hiring 
Seatbelts
Lucrezia Competing 
A&E Units
Condition 3 -  Monty Hall 
(comparison)
• 3 balls
•  Videogame
Competing 
A&E Units
Lucrezia
Condition 3 -  Simpson’s 
Paradox (comparison)
• Factory is hiring
• Call centers 
compared
Lucrezia Competing 
A&E Units
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Procedure. All participants were required to take part in what was 
presented to them as a battery o f 3 short experiments, the first on learning 
and the other two on decision-making. The first and the third o f the 
experiments were actually parts 1 and 2 of the experiment, while the second 
experiment, which had the function of distractor task, was used to collect 
control group data.
The experiment followed a between-subjects procedure where 
participants were divided in 6 groups resulting from the factorial design of 
three experimental conditions by two story types (Monty Hall or Sim pson’s 
Paradox). We also considered factoring the type of learning with the 
number of analogs but experience from previous experiments made us think 
that the best learning method to be applied in the one analog condition 
(which received an analogous and a non-analogous story) was 
summarization. Comparison, o f any type, as we explained, can be confusing 
and generation of another analog, which we had tried in experiment No.2, 
had proven quite difficult for some participants. In conclusion, we decided 
that the one analog condition would only learn by summarization.
Task differentiation between conditions, as in previous experiments, 
concerned only part 1 o f the experiment (in order to manipulate number of 
analogs received and learning method), while the distractor task and part 2 
were identical across conditions.
This experiment’s procedure is similar to the one employed in 
experiment 2, with the important difference that time between learning and 
transfer is reduced to 20 minutes, that the whole experiment takes place in 
the same room and is administered by the same researcher.
In part 1 o f the experiment, which had a duration of 15 minutes:
• Condition 1 participants were required to read two analog 
stories (both analogous to the story in part 2 of the experiment) and 
to write a short summary o f each story
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•  Condition 2 participants were required to read two stories 
(only one o f them analogous to the story in part 2 of the experiment) 
and to briefly outline two stories, each one similar to the two stories 
they received. It was explained that the similarity should concern the 
principle or learning point illustrated by the story but not superficial 
similarities (e.g. the context, the characters, etc.).
• Condition 3 participants were required to read two analog 
stories (both analogous to the story in part 2 o f the experiment), to 
identify structural similarities and draw the key shared principle that 
the two stories illustrated.
All participants answered a questionnaire after ending the task.
In part 2 o f the experiment, lasting 10 minutes, all conditions were 
required to read a story and make the two decisions at the end o f it. The 
story chosen was one o f the two target stories employed in the experiment 
(the one non analogous to the learning stories).
Again, all participants were required to fill in a questionnaire after ending 
the task.
In part 3 of the experiment, lasting 15 minutes, presented as a decision­
making experiment, all conditions were required to read a story (analogous 
to the one/ones they learned in part 1) and make two related decisions. After 
ending the task, the participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire.
We used the same proxy o f transfer (at least one sub-task correct) as we 
had used in previous experiments and had solutions scored independently by 
two individuals. Cases in which rating was different were discussed and 
resolved.
Results and discussion
Analyzing all participants together (i.e. participants in the Simpson’s 
Paradox and the Monty Hall groups) and comparing all experimental 
conditions (which received one or two analogs) versus control, this time we 
found a highly significant difference in favour of experimental conditions (p 
= .000 Fisher’s exact test, 1-sided). Frequency data is reported 3.21. It 
should be noted that Catrambone and Holyoak (1989) had not found un­
hinted transfer in similar conditions to ours (30 minute delay filled by an 
interpolated task).
Table 3.21
Frequencies of correct solution o f  at least one sub-task for experimental 
conditions v.v. control - all story types
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes no
Experimental condition
(1 or 2 analogs) 49 14 63
Control group 26 34 60
Total 75 48 123
Analyzing the two sets o f data separately (Monty Flail and Simpson’s) we 
found that the former story type allowed greater differentiation between 
control and experimental conditions {p = .000 Fisher’s exact test, 1-sided) 
than the latter (p = .163 Fisher’s exact test, 1-sided). In fact, Simpson's 
Paradox story ran into a ceiling effect: 70% of control group participants 
solved at least half correctly i.e. did what we required to assert that transfer 
was occurring (note that the corresponding figure for Monty Hall was 
17%). Sim pson’s Paradox story type didn’t seem counterintuitive enough to 
allow us to isolate transfer o f learning from cognitive capabilities. We took
this as an indication that Monty Hall story would work best to our ends. 
Frequency data is reported in the following tables.
Table 3.22
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task fo r  experimental 
conditions vs. control -  Story type Monty Hall
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes no
Experimental condition
(1 or 2 analogs) 23 9 32
Control group 5 25 30
Total 28 34 62
Table 3.23
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task fo r  experimental 
conditions vs. control -  Story type Simpson 's Paradox
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes no
Experimental condition
(1 or 2 analogs) 26 5 31
Control group 21 9 30
Total 47 14 61
In order to understand the relationship between learning method and 
transfer, we compared the transfer levels o f the two conditions (1 and 3) 
which learned with 2 analogs but different methods (summarization vs. 
comparison) to find, once again, no significant difference in transfer 
depending on learning method (p = .683, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). The 
result, which held true when considering the stories separately (p > .05), was 
surprising because analogical encoding (very similar to our comparison
learning) had led to superior transfer in the open-ended problem solving 
studies (except when no transfer had taken place due to floor effects). Since 
the effect size we observed was very small, we checked what sample size 
we would have needed for this analysis to have adequate power at the Chi- 
square level o f .19 and found it to be 1776 participants.
Table 3.24
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task fo r  different types o f  
learning -  all story types
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes no
Learning
method Summarization 22 3 25
Comparison 15 3 18
Total 37 6 43
In this experiment, the impact o f number o f analogs (one vs. two) on 
transfer is less clear. Considering all story types together, the difference in 
transfer is significant {p = .045, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided), however, 
considering just our Monty Hall type story, which we were beginning to 
think was more adequate to our experimental goals, it was not {p = .681, 
Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Considering just Sim pson’s paradox story type, 
the difference between one and two analogs was significant (p = .017, 
Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). It is possible that, since Sim pson’s Paradox 
story required some arithmetic, receiving two worked out examples was 
beneficial. It is also possible that, since Monty Hall stories are highly 
“unusual”, but also simple from a numeric point of view, one example was 
enough to be salient and to support transfer. In any case, these results made
us think that the research question needed further investigation and should 
be left open for now. Frequencies are reported in the following tables.
Table 3.25
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task by number o f  
analogs -  all story types
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes no
Number of 
analogs 2 37 6 43
1 12 8 20
Total 49 14 63
Table 3.26
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task by number o f  
analogs- Monty Hall story type
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes no
Number of 
analogs 2 16 5 21
1 7 4 11
Total 23 9 32
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Table 3.27
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task by number o f  
analogs- Simpson's Paradox story type
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes I no
|
Number of 
analogs 2 
1
Total
!
21 j 1 22
5 | 4 9 
26 5 31
I
Learning level achieved in this experiment impacted transfer 
significantly (p = .011, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). We interpreted this to 
mean that, when time and context don’t interfere, learning level achieved is 
a powerful predictor of transfer. It must be also pointed out that this time we 
did not run into floor effects in learning quality as we had in experiment 2 
where the analog generation and the comparison condition had achieved 
very low levels in their output quality. It should be pointed out, however, 
that several condition 2 participants, who were required to generate an 
analog of the stories mentioned (in their output or in the final questionnaire) 
found the learning task quite difficult and, in fact, performed less well than 
participants in the other two conditions. Although the numbers involved do 
not allow us to be conclusive on this learning method, we decided that we 
would not use it in future experiments.
Table 3.28
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task by learning level
achieved
Correct solution of at least one 
sub-task Total
yes no
quality reached 
in learning 
task? no-very low quality 6 7 13
medium low quality 12 5 17
medium quality 12 1 13
medium-high quality 17 1 18
maximum quality 2 0 2
Total 49 14 63
Not surprisingly, given the fact that it is more unusual, Monty Hall story 
had higher explicit recognition than Sim pson’s Paradox story (91% vs. 
45%). Confirming what we had found in previous experiments, explicit 
recognition, which was 69% considering both stories together, did not 
impact transfer significantly (p = .106, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Once 
more our sample size could have been responsible for the nil result: ideally, 
to reach .8 statistical power at the Chi-square level o f 3.011, we would have 
needed 199 participants. Moreover, the situation differed between our story 
types: for Monty Hall story type there was no significant impact of explicit 
recognition on transfer (p = .184, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided), while for 
Sim pson’s Paradox significance was reached {p = .045, Fisher’s exact test, 
2-sided). Finally, we thought our final questionnaire still needed 
improvement for the explicit recognition figures to be entirely reliable. As a 
consequence o f these limitations and mixed results, we were not yet ready 
to draw conclusions, although we were beginning to think explicit
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recognition might have a less pivotal role in transfer in the case of binary 
decision-making.
Table 3.29
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task depending on 
explicit recognition (Y/N) - all story types
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes no
explicit recognition yes
of analogy 35 7 42
no 12 7 19
Total (*) 47 14 61
(*) Note that two participants did not answer the question on explicit recognition and could 
not be included.
Table 3.30
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task depending on 
explicit recognition (Y/N) -  Monty Hall story type
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes no
explicit recognition
of analogy yes 22 7 29
no 1 2 3
Total 23 9 32
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Table 3.31
Frequencies o f  correct solution o f  at least one sub-task depending on 
explicit recognition (Y/N) -  Simpson's Paradox story type
Correct solution of at least one sub-task Total
yes no
explicit recognition 
of analogy yes 13 0 13
no 11 5 16
Total (*) 24 5 29
(*) Note that two participants did not answer the question on explicit recognition and could 
not be included.
As we had found in the previous experiments, level o f learning achieved 
did not have a significant relationship with explicit recognition considering 
the two story types together (p  = .413, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) as well as 
considering them separately {p > .05).
Table 3.32
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  learning achieved
analogy explicitly recognized Total
yes no
quality reached 
in learning 
task? no-very low quality 9 4 13
medium low quality 9 8 17
medium quality 11 2 13
medium-high 11 5 16
quality
maximum quality 2 0 2
Total (*) 42 19 61
(*) Note that two participants did not answer the question on explicit recognition and could 
not be included.
3.3 General Discussion on Lab Experiments
M ain experimental find ings and open issues. The lab phase of our 
experiments suggested some first answers to a few research questions and 
left several important issues open.
In both our pilot experiments with high context shifts and long time 
delays coupled together (1 and 2), we had not been able to see significant 
transfer take place. We had also found that, in the case o f high context and 
rather long time shifts coupled together, number of analogs (one or two), 
learning method applied and learning level achieved did not make a 
significant difference. Although these results confirm and extend to binary 
decision-making previous findings on strong time-context effects in transfer 
(Spencer and Weisberg, 1986 and Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989), we 
thought they needed to be verified through further experiments due to the 
small sample sizes on which they were based, clearly below what would be 
required to reach adequate power. Moreover, further experiments were 
needed to un-bundle time and context effects as much as possible, since our 
lab experiments had not been designed to distinguish them.
In experiment 3, shorter delay (20 minutes) between learning and transfer 
coupled with small context change, was instead found to allow significant 
transfer even from one analog. This result, which differs from Catrambone 
and Holyoak’s (1989) findings, suggests that shorter delays coupled with 
smaller context shifts (the room was the same and so was the researcher 
administering the experiment, but booklets were differentiated and the tasks 
were presented as originating from different investigators) are not sufficient 
to impair transfer o f binary decision problems.
Even in experiment 3, as had been the case in the previous two 
experiments, we were not able to detect significant differences between 
learning methods in terms o f transfer performance. This was a surprise, as 
we were expecting better performance from learning for meaning (in
experiment 1) and from analogical encoding (in experiments 2 and 3). 
Particularly in the case of experiment No.3, in which participants achieved 
transfer, we had predicted, based on previous findings in literature, that 
comparison learning would lead to higher transfer. Beyond the usual caveat 
on the limited number of cases, it should be pointed out that participants 
tend to learn “their way”, regardless of instructions. In fact, as we noticed 
reading their outputs, some fell back on some sort o f “modified 
summarization” when asked to generate an analog of a given story or to 
compare two stories in search o f similarities. This could help explain the 
absence o f significant differences in transfer rates particularly in experiment 
3 (in experiments I and 2, it could simply be that none of the methods 
proposed was powerful enough to overcome time-context effects). One way 
to clarify, with further experiments, if  learning method matters, would be to 
make comparison more “guided” (like answering specific questions on 
similarities) to ensure that the participant is indeed learning as required.
Again very consistently, in our three experiments, recognition of the 
analogy was in general high but did not lead to significant differences in 
transfer (i.e. participants who recognized the analogy did not perform better, 
except participants in the Simpson's Paradox story type group in experiment 
3). These findings are different from what had been found by Gick and 
Holyoak (recognition o f the analogy was generally lower than in our 
experiments, but it was key to finding the correct solution). The difference 
could be due to the different nature o f the tasks used in our experiments and 
in theirs but it should be pointed out that lack o f statistical power could also 
have been responsible for nil the result. Moreover, our final questionnaire, 
at this stage, still needed some rephrasing in order to ensure that it was 
answered accurately and that it was not suggestive in the questions asked. In 
the light o f this, we decided to continue fine-tuning the questionnaire and to 
hold conclusions till further experiments.
The relationship between learning level achieved during the learning 
phase and transfer was not clear in these experiments. In the first two 
experiments it was non-significant and in experiment 3 it was significant. 
We provisionally interpreted this to mean that that learning achieved is 
important but is “lost” through context and time shifts, knowing that the 
result needed to be supported by further data.
The relationship between number o f analogs learned (one vs. two) and 
transfer also produced mixed evidence and was thought to merit further 
investigation. In experiment 2 the relationship was non significant, while in 
experiment 3 it was. However, even in experiment 3, when examining only 
Monty Hall story type alone, significance was not reached. A possible 
explanation is that Monty Hall is a very unusual type o f story and its 
distinctiveness causes it to be more readily available even when it is learned 
just once (Eysenck, 1979; Eysenck and Eysenck, 1980). On the other hand, 
it is also a type o f story which does not require many worked examples to be 
understood, at least at an intuitive level. On the contrary, Simpson's paradox 
stories were more likely to remain undistinguished from “regular” 
percentage stories, but, for those who were not proficient in maths, might 
require more than one worked out example to be mastered. We were 
expecting from previous literature (Gick and Holyoak, 1983) that two 
analogs would be better than one, but, again, the different nature o f the tasks 
involved could explain the difference.
It was clear that the results that we had at this stage all needed to be 
probed by further experiments with higher numbers of participants. On the 
other hand, they were useful in providing indications o f where potential 
differences between open-ended problem solving and binary decision 
making might most likely be. The experiments that we ran to do this 
probing and their results will be illustrated and discussed in chapter 5.
Procedure and materials testing. As mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter, an important goal that we had was to assess our recruiting
procedure and, more specifically, find ways to make participants come back 
for the transfer task without explicitly asking them to. The experience with 
our three experiments made us conclude that recruiting through the online 
university recruiting system was a rather slow process and would never 
allow us to reach large numbers of participants due to the number 
competing experiments. Moreover, just a small percentage of participants 
who had done the learning part ended up enrolling for the transfer part of 
the experiment. On the other hand, to reach our research goals, running 
large numbers of participants and being able to introduce even a significant 
delay between learning and transfer was a must. At the end o f the pilot 
phase, based on these considerations, the decision was made to evaluate the 
web as means to run our next experiments. This would allow us to reach a 
much larger population (specialized web-sites give access to tens of 
thousands o f potential participants, while the university online experiment 
recruiting system only to hundreds) while also having the advantage of 
giving us access to a more diversified population sample. Finally, software 
could allow us to avoid waste i.e. to screen out participants that we did not 
need (e.g. those who enrolled for part 2 without having done part 1). In the 
next chapter we will discuss the choice o f online experimenting thoroughly 
and describe which measures we took to ensure validity o f results and their 
comparability results to previous, lab-based research.
Furthermore, during the three pilot experiments, we had an opportunity 
to test and fine-tune, following participant’s comments and our 
observations, the text o f all our stories, instructions and questionnaires. We 
also verified that allotted time was adequate and that the tasks, although 
demanding, were not too difficult.
Finally, one of the most important outcomes o f our pilot phase was that it 
allowed us to see how both types o f story sets worked towards our 
requirements and goals.
We found that the target stories based on Simpson’s Paradox worked less 
well than we hoped for a number of reasons. First o f all, the participants 
seemed good at solving the problem even without previous exposure to 
learning analogs: in experiment 3, 70% of the control group (vs. 83% of 
experimental condition participants) made one out o f two decisions 
correctly. This type o f ceiling effect is not ideal for clearly identifying 
transfer. Furthermore, individuals with a poor quantitative background, 
although a minority, seemed to have difficulties with this type of problem 
because it required some arithmetic calculations (we found misleading 
calculation mistakes as well as comments such as “I am no good at this type 
o f mathematical problem” embedded in the answers). Since we were 
planning to reach a wider population than just university students, the 
problem was likely to become more severe. This, potentially, would lead to 
a number of situations in which differentiation between failed transfer of 
learning and quantitative shortcomings which impaired transfer could be 
confused. As a further point, several participants declared in the final 
questionnaire that they were at least somewhat familiar with the underlying 
principle before the experiment because they had “studied math”. Most 
often we thought that they should not be excluded, as it seemed from their 
answers that they were simply familiar with mathematical reasoning and not 
with Simpson's Paradox, but this type of second guessing made us 
uncomfortable nevertheless. What was happening, we thought, was that the 
problem was not unusual enough that participants could clearly recognize if 
they had been exposed to it previously.
Monty Hall type stories (Three Balls, Videogame, Lucrezia), on the other 
hand, seemed to work well because only rarely had participants come across 
the underlying logic before, because without having been previously 
exposed to it the problem is very rarely solved correctly (thus a correct 
solution is a good proxy o f transfer) and because making the correct
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decision did not require quantitative skills ( the maths involved is very 
simple and the explanation o f the decision could be qualitative). Finally, in 
our Lucrezia story, the goal reversal seemed to work perfectly in screening 
out mechanic application o f the principle (“always switch choice”) but, at 
the same time, was not too difficult to overcome for participants who had 
understood the story.
It was decided, at the end o f our lab-phase, that we would use the Monty 
Hall set of stories in our further experiments. Learning stories would be 3 
balls and Videogame and our target story, with medium semantic distance 
from learning stories, would be Lucrezia.
The lab experiments also allowed us to better assess our two transfer sub­
tasks. The first sub-task was in all analogous to the learning story but with 
the goal reversed and number o f choices changed. Analysis of participants’ 
answers confirmed that, if  a participant made the correct choice, transfer had 
taken place. The second sub-task was apparently very similar to the first 
one, with the difference that this time the agent removing one of the choices 
was not informed, and thus made a random choice. Having changed the 
“constrained choice” into a random one, the probabilities change for all 
choices in the same way and the decision becomes one that can be correctly 
made using ordinary logic. After analyzing all the answers we thought that 
this sub-task alone did not ensure that transfer had taken place. We 
concluded that if  both questions were answered correctly, transfer could be 
considered complete and deep enough to distinguish the conditions of 
applicability o f Monty Hall, but if  just the second had been answered 
correctly we could not be sure that it was transfer. It must be said that only 
rarely (around 10% o f the cases) the two sub-tasks were answered correctly. 
Indeed, in hindsight, the time allocated to learning seemed insufficient to 
achieve the deeper learning that the second question required, while a longer 
allocated time and more examples /explanations, we thought, would have 
made the experiment too long. Although we suspected that we would
always have a floor effect on correctness of the two sub-tasks together 
without augmenting time and examples, we nevertheless decided to retain 
the second sub-task in further experiments as we were hoping to have an 
ordinal as well as a dichotomous variable transfer.
Finally, the lab experiments had made clear to us how difficult it would 
be to collect the data we needed on longer delay transfer and, more 
generally, what effort and time would be required to attain the number of 
cases necessary to ensure adequate statistical power. This very strongly 
oriented our preferences towards web-based experimenting. Before 
finalizing our choice, however, we wanted to evaluate carefully the pros and 
cons and to ensure that, by using the web, we would not loose comparability 
with previous findings based on lab-experimenting. The latter aspect was 
very important because one o f our research goals was to highlight 
similarities and differences with open-ended problem solving transfer. To 
make sure that the experimental mode was not acting as a confound, we 
decided to replicate the basic experiment on analogical transfer made by 
Gick and Holyoak in their 1983 article and check if we obtained the same 
results. This was also considered a useful interim step because the 
population we were planning to draw from was different and, beyond 
anything else, more than 20 years had passed since the publishing of those 
results. We wished to dispel in advance any doubt that differences in the 
two types o f transfer might derive not from the differences in tasks but from 
other differences.
In the next chapter, after an analysis of risks and benefits of web- 
experimenting, we will describe how we replicated Gick and Holyoak’s 
(1983) experiment 4 using the web and will discuss the results we obtained.
Chapter 3 Footnotes
(1) Selecting a representative sample of problems would have been the 
ideal choice to ensure that results would generalize. However, it is 
generally difficult to find stories which are apt to the task. In fact, 
what is typically done in this kind of research is to select one type of 
problem and to draw different analogs from it.
(2) Given the recruiting problems we encountered, we did not run two 
separate control groups (one performing the learning part of the 
experiment, with non-analogous stories, as well as the transfer part 
and the other just performing the transfer task) at this stage. We ran 
this type o f check at a later stage (once we had embraced web 
experimenting, which made recruiting easier) to find that there were 
no significant differences in transfer performance for the control 
group which did both parts o f the experiment and for the control 
group which just performed the transfer task.
(3) Ideally, power analyses should be conducted a priori, computing the 
required sample size from the expected effect size. In post-hoc 
power analyses, as conducted here, sample effect sizes found in 
experiments are treated as population values. Especially when 
sample size is small, these estimates of effect size can be unreliable, 
so that the computed "observed" power and required sample size are 
unreliable as well. As such, the results should be treated with some 
caution. We nevertheless report the estimated required sample size, 
because it might give some indication of status o f our conclusions in 
light o f the sample sizes o f the studies.
CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION AND 
VALIDATION OF WEB-BASED 
EXPERIMENTING
4. DISCUSSION AND VALIDATION OF WEB-BASED
EXPERIMENTING
In order to answer our research questions, particularly considering that 
we wanted to analyse transfer in several different conditions, including 
longer time delays, it was clear that a very large number of participants was 
required and that we would often need to double-recruit our participants 
(when learning and transfer parts of the experiment are separated by a over a 
few minutes delay, the same participant must be recruited twice) without 
letting them suspect any connection between the two recruiting events. On 
the other hand, the lab-based experiments had highlighted the difficulties in 
reaching adequate numbers o f participants, particularly in experiments 
which required double-recruiting. It was clear that web-based experimenting 
would ensure quicker recruiting and also help overcome the practical 
problems that our time delay/context shift design implied, such as selection 
o f participants to involve in the second part o f the experiment and discreet 
pursuit of participants who had performed the learning part o f our 
experiment but had not registered for the transfer part. Moreover, it would 
allow us to reach a more varied population.
Despite web-based experimenting appearing an obvious solution, before 
embracing it, we felt that two steps were necessary. The first was a complete 
analysis of the pros and cons o f our choice, supported by a review of 
existing literature on online experimenting. The second was an online 
replication o f Gick and Holyoak’s 1983 experiment 4. With this, we wanted 
to ensure that results were not dependent on experimental mode. Moreover, 
as we were going to use a more general type of population than the one used 
by Gick and Holyoak (participants o f any age above 18 with a high-school 
degree or higher vs. college students) and since over 20 years had gone by, 
we felt that some precautions were needed before we began making 
comparisons.
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The analysis o f existing literature and our own reflections on benefits and 
risks o f using the web strongly supported its use. Since even the replication 
of Gick and Holyoak’s experiment 4 was successful, we concluded that we 
could safely use use the web for further experiments and compare our 
results to previous findings.
This chapter starts by discussing, in section 1, advantages and 
disadvantages of web-based experimenting. Section 2 presents and discusses 
our experiment 4, which was the replication, with web-based experimenting 
and general population, o f Gick and Holyoak’s seminal experiment 4. This 
section also describes how we tackled the main practical aspects o f online 
experimenting.
4.1 Discussion of Web-based Experimenting
In recent years the web has been increasingly used to rapidly access large 
populations while containing costs. Market research and other types o f data 
collection (e.g. on behavioural data) have quite extensively adopted the web 
as a standard method to pursue their goals. Although online experimenting 
is also becoming widely accepted, we felt that, before adopting it, we should 
conduct a risk- benefits analysis with the support o f existing literature on the 
subject.
The evidence from literature reassured us on the critical point of 
convergence validity, particularly relevant in our case as we wished to make 
comparisons with previous results obtained in the lab. A high match has 
been found in results between lab and web versions o f surveys and 
experiments, even when participants were very different. Krantz, Scher and 
Ballard (1997) and Krantz and Dalai (2000) report that Internet psychology 
experiments produce results similar to laboratory findings. Bimbaum (2000) 
also documented high consistence between lab and web results with his
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decision making experiments replicated on the web also. It appears, in sum, 
that, possibly with the exception of experiments delivering stimuli for 
perceptual and sensory research, the web is reliable.
Existing literature also points out a number of advantages that the web 
has over the lab. To begin with, the confidence with which results can be 
generalized is considered higher since they are based on the general 
population (with a very wide range of ages, cultural, educational and racial 
background) rather than just on college students. Another element in support 
o f greater generalizability o f results is that the experiment can be undertaken 
at any hour of any day of the week.
Another important category o f advantages, which were crucial for us, are 
of practical nature. In online experiments, it is possible to attract large 
numbers of participants, thus to attain higher statistical power. Also, 
recruiting is quicker (due to a much larger number of potential participants) 
and administering easier (e.g. no need to book rooms nor register manually 
all participants and, in our case, no need to have different people 
administering parts 1 and 2, etc.). Moreover, in experiments, like ours, 
which required two parts to be completed, the “waste” of participants could 
be greatly reduced using the web because only participants who had 
completed part 1 could be emailed to enrol in part 2 without this becoming a 
cue because participants do not know who else is emailed (note that this 
screening is not possible in the lab: the experiment is publicly advertised 
and participants who show up for an experiment must be enrolled without 
discrimination). Furthermore, getting participants to complete both parts 1 
and 2 of the same experiment is easier over the web because they can be 
contacted more than once for the same experiment without this becoming a 
cue (participants receive an email that invites them to participate in an 
experiment, but those who do not click the link to start the experiment don’t 
know what experiment they were proposed, thus will not become suspicious 
if they receive the same invitation more than once). Additionally, two other
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tasks are made less burdensome: interpretation of results (online 
experimenting eliminates the “hand-writing problem” which, in output­
intensive experiments like ours, was time-consuming) and filing (which, in 
web-based experiments, just requires saving the results on a hard disk). 
Finally, all aspects which require control are automated, thus become 
effortless and more reliable (e.g. timing of tasks, screening out of 
participants who have taken part in similar experiments, etc.).
Another category o f advantages concerns the area o f experimenter bias 
and of the so called demand characteristics (i.e. subtle clues given by the 
researcher which influence behaviour by implicitly demanding certain 
reactions). Given that there is no interaction between experimenter and 
participant in online experimenting, these are expected to be reduced (note 
that demand characteristics can derive from written instructions as well, thus 
they are not eliminated by the web). In addition, social desirability is 
expected to be much lower. In the case o f our experiment, the area which 
was most exposed to this type o f problem was the final questionnaire in 
which we asked if the analogy had been recognized. The desire to “look 
good”, particularly in a college environment and, even more, using the 
subject panel o f year 1 psychology students, might have, for example, 
inflated our explicit recognition rate in the lab experiments. Although it is 
difficult to quantify the effect and how much it could be reduced using the 
web, we felt that the web would give an advantage from this point o f view.
Furthermore, it is known that, in lab experiments, participants stay on 
even if un-motivated by the task (thus the lower drop-out rates). Partly this 
is due to social desirability effects, partly (as is the case with subject panels) 
to earn needed credits and, finally, because, in the lab, payment occurs 
before the experimenter has had a chance to review the output (i.e. there is 
no monetary disincentive to “sitting-through” the experiment without really 
concentrating on it). However, this constraint or incentive to stay on the 
experiment makes motivational confounding between conditions more
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difficult to detect. Moreover, the lower degree of voluntariness which 
characterizes lab based experiments and its connected psychological 
reactance, may result in careless responding and, thus, in a higher number of 
very poor outputs. In online experiments, on the contrary, since it is stated 
very clearly that the task must be completed “seriously” to be remunerated 
and payment is deferred, participants drop-out if they don’t feel it is worth 
the effort. Beyond the fact that discarded outputs are a waste, the other, 
more serious, problem is that the choice of which cases to discard (because 
they are “below threshold”) is potentially controversial.
Finally, it has been found (Martin, 1996) that in highly controlled 
situations people might produce results that cannot be transferred to their 
behaviour in the real world. Although, given the type of experiments we 
were planning to run, this was not a big concern, it was nevertheless 
reassuring to think that ecological validity is higher in a web-setting (Reips, 
1995,1997) because the participant, most likely, remains in familiar 
surroundings (home, office or the usual internet cafe).
Naturally, potential risks and disadvantages are also present when 
running our experiments online and need to be examined one-by-one.
One preoccupation that we needed to discard right away was that of 
multiple submissions i.e. participants who log-on with a different name and 
do the same experiment more than once or more than one of our 
experiments (all would be using the same or similar materials). Beyond the 
fact that the event is reported to be rare (Reips, 1997), we thought it would 
be extremely unlikely in our specific case because Ipoints -  the organization 
through which we were planning to run the experiments- requires their 
members to register giving full details, thus double-registration is almost 
impossible.
Another possible danger which we analysed immediately concerned 
potential misunderstanding o f instructions in a situation in which there is no 
possible interaction with the researcher thus questions could not be asked.
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Since great care had been put in fine-tuning of all materials during the lab- 
experiment phase, we were reasonably sure that our instructions and 
materials were clear (with the only exception of the final questionnaire, as 
will be explained in the next chapter, which required some rephrasing for a 
another couple of experiments order to be made entirely clear).
An additional preoccupation could have been that, in theory, 
heterogeneity in population might introduce noise in the data. It seems, 
however, that this concern could be put aside since literature widely 
documents converging results between lab and web. To be even more 
certain about this issue, we were planning to start out with a comparison of 
web vs. lab results on our specific topic, and to proceed only if we found 
similar results.
Likewise, self-selection issues were analysed and dismissed as not 
relevant. On the one hand, demographics of the internet users is approaching 
similarity with demographics o f the general population (Graphics, 
Visualization & Usability Center, 1999). On the other, given that our 
experiments were going to be on learning and people should not vary very 
much on essential criteria, the problem should be very contained.
Furthermore, dependency on computers and networks needed to be 
analysed in terms o f its possible biases on experimental results. From a 
technical point of view, given the type o f experiment (essentially displaying 
pages and requiring the participant to input text), computer and network 
speed were practically irrelevant and the possible (rare) failures of the 
networks would occur randomly. Moreover, given the type o f experiment, 
the influences o f computer-mediated communication would not make a 
significant difference (e.g. the experiment did not require self-disclosure).
Another consideration we made was that, compared to the lab, web-based 
experimenting guarantees lower control o f experimental conditions. In this 
respect, however, it should be pointed out that, in between-subjects 
randomized design with large number o f participants, there is a random
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distribution o f un-controllable influences to the experimental conditions. 
Although this reassured us, we still had a pressing concern regarding 
context because it was going to be one of our manipulated variables and 
because the influence o f context on transfer is known to be relevant.
We knew that it would be impossible to ensure that all participants were 
performing the experiment in the same physical environment and at the 
same time o f the day. In web-based experimenting, moreover, investigators 
can’t guarantee the conditions necessary for concentration (e.g. silence, 
appropriate lighting, etc.) nor that the conditions remain the same during all 
the experiment, particularly when there is a delay between two parts of it 
(learning and transfer). We were expecting most subjects to do both parts o f 
the experiment from the same computer, since they would be registering 
with the same email, but there was no guarantee that this would be true (e.g. 
home or office computer could be used, a lap-top can be carried and used 
everywhere, younger users might be in an intemet-cafe or in a university 
computer room, etc.). Moreover, even in the same physical space, we could 
not be sure that environmental conditions would not vary (e.g. due to 
different times of the day or to external influences). Our thought was, 
however, that the look-and-feel of the web pages, the email sender (Ipoints) 
and the email text would be an important part o f context, possibly the most 
relevant, and those would definitely be under our control. In conclusion, 
despite the mentioned shortcomings in our ability to control context, we 
thought that we could limit the problem with a high enough number of 
participants and with control over the part of context that we could 
manipulate.
Another consequence o f performing the experiment outside of the lab is 
that continuity in performing tasks can’t be assured (e.g. the participant 
might get up for a cup of tea or answer the phone briefly during or between 
tasks). Once again, since experimental results obtained on the web seem to 
agree with the ones obtained in the lab, we take this to mean that these
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potential interferences are a contained phenomenon that, thanks to the much 
higher numbers of participants that online allows to enrol, have a negligible 
impact. Moreover, since the tasks we were planning to include in our 
experiments were rather brief (maximum of 35 minutes per experiment) and 
timed (the program terminated tasks when time was out and fired the 
following task), the opportunities for “checking-out” were limited. As a 
final point on context, it should be pointed out that participants’ “mental 
context” (e.g. mood) is also unknown to the experimenter in web-based 
experimenting, but this is also true for lab-based experiments (unless it is 
manipulated or recorded in the final questionnaire, o f course). We were not 
planning to include mental context in our analysis.
Another potential drawback we considered was that, in a web setting, 
external sources may be easily accessed during the experiment (e.g. 
participants might ask someone for help, search an information on the net, 
etc.). A few things should be said in this respect. To begin with, pressure to 
perform is greatly reduced by web-based experimenting, so we didn’t really 
expect people to want to “cheat” in order to give the correct answer. The 
experiments would also be timed, decreasing even further the incentive to 
search and ask. Moreover, it should be underscored that, since Monty Hall 
problem was never mentioned under its name nor in its original format (i.e. 
with goats and doors), its retrieval from search engines was impossible with 
the available information. It should finally be noted that, since it is not a 
widely known problem outside o f academia, the probability o f getting the 
correct answer by asking someone is, in any case, low. As a last point, 
thanks to high numbers, once again any potential impact o f the issue should 
be neutralized.
Lastly, it is a known fact that drop-out rates are higher for online 
experimenting. This is the reverse o f the advantage that we mentioned 
earlier o f having more motivated participants. The higher-drop-out is not a 
problem in itself (higher numbers o f participants outweigh largely this
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problem), but some checks should be performed (i.e. that drop-out is not 
correlated to gender, age, or experimental condition) to ensure that self­
selection is not an issue and that there are no confounds (e.g. motivation of 
one condition might be higher). The issue of potential self-selection is not at 
all peculiar to web-based experimenting and not easily avoidable even in 
lab-based experimenting, making ex post checks good practice.
In conclusion, we thought that web-based experimenting gave clear 
advantages which were particularly relevant for the type o f experiments we 
were going to run, while implying limited risks and disadvantages. The next 
step would be to validate results o f a specific experiment (Gick and 
Holyoak’s 1983 experiment 4), which was pivotal to our comparisons with 
analogical transfer in problem solving.
4.2 Validation of Online Experimenting in Analogical Transfer
The analysis that we performed suggests that experimental results should 
not differ significantly if  the experiment is conducted in the lab or over the 
web. However, to be confident that these general observation apply to the 
specific case of open-ended problem solving transfer, we decided that we 
should attempt to replicate a classic lab-based analogical transfer 
experiment using the web.
We selected for replication Gick and Holyoak’s experiment 4 (1983) for 
three reasons: this was their key experiment, it had been successfully 
replicated many times and it contained a couple o f findings which we were 
not able to confirm in our pilot experiments (two analogs better than one, 
analogical encoding better than summarization and significant relationship 
between learning and transfer and between explicit recognition and 
transfer).
EXPERIMENT 4
Our experiment 4 was therefore a high fidelity replication over the web, 
with Ipoints members, o f Gick and Holyoak’s 1983 experiment 4. The goal 
was to verify possible differences in terms o f experimental results that might 
arise using online versus lab based experimenting and a more general 
population (the one recruited by Ipoints) versus college students.
Method
Participants. To recruit and remunerate participants, we decided to use 
Ipoints, a UK direct-marketing-rewards program company with over 1.4 
million members mostly based around the London area. There are several 
advantages in using an organization to carry out these tasks rather than 
doing them directly. One obvious benefit is that it is easier to reach high 
numbers o f participants. Another, not less important in our case, was that 
the organization functioned as a screen, allowing us to propose the two parts 
o f our experiments under different names (in order to avoid giving cues 
regarding the connection between the two).
Recruiting through Ipoints works as follows. Members are proactively 
contacted through email by Ipoints, on average once or twice a week and 
offered to participate in what are generically defined surveys. The e-mail 
contains the link to the survey, so all the member has to do to activate 
participation is to click the link. Members who complete the activities are 
rewarded with ipoints which can be exchanged with a number of goods on 
the Ipoints web-site (number o f ipoints awarded is usually a function of the 
estimated time required to complete). Ipoints clients (i.e. the originators of 
the surveys) are, most often, consumer or durable goods companies running 
marketing surveys (e.g. surveys to better understand their potential clients’ 
preferences, the type o f use of certain products/services, etc.) More rarely, 
clients are Psychology Departments running experiments.
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There were 121 valid participants in experimental conditions and 33 in 
the control group, all Ipoints members (1). Participants in experimental 
conditions were paid 30 ipoints for experiment completion, while the 
control group participants (which just had the transfer task to perform) were 
paid 15 ipoints each.
Materials. We used the same materials used by Gick and Holyoak in their 
experiment. The target story was Duncker’s Radiation Problem. We 
employed five learning stories, all identical to those used by Gick and 
Holyoak. Four of the stories were analogous to the target story {The 
General, The Commander, Red Adair, the Fire-chief) and one was not 
analogous {The Identical Twins). The analogous learning stories were 
superficially similar between each other in pairs {The General and The 
Commander were both about a military situation and Red Adair and the 
Fire-chief were about a fire). All materials are available in Annex 1. Since 
the experiment was online, instead o f booklets we had a series of timed 
screens on which the relevant text was displayed.
Procedure and design. In order to run an experiment online, we had to 
set-up the necessary organization (recruiting, administering, checking and 
remunerating) of which this experiment would be the test-bed.
Recruiting, as we explained in the section above, was done by email. 
Ipoints is always the sender o f the email that members receive, while the 
text introducing the survey contains its goal and the name of the client 
(unless it prefers to remain anonymous).
The materials used in the online experiments are in the form of html 
pages, programmed by the client and hosted on the client’s web-space. For 
our experiment 4 we used Warwick University’s web-space.
A program runs the experiment performing the usual checks that are 
normally done by the investigator in a lab setting. In the case of experiment 
4, the program counted participants in each condition who had completed 
the experiment and allocated the participants logging on next to the
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condition with less completed cases. We made the choice o f counting the 
completed and not the initiated cases for condition allocation because we 
were expecting high drop-out rates during the experiment (marketing 
surveys are usually less demanding). The program also managed time 
terminating tasks (after automatically saving all the input) when the 
allocated time was over and firing the following task. Moreover, the system 
displayed timed warnings during the experiment to help participants pace 
their work. The only un-timed tasks were registration and the 
questionnaires. Participants could, at their will, go forward and backwards 
within the task they were doing, but not move to the next task or go back to 
the previous.
In experiment 4, participants started the experiment, as is normal 
procedure, by clicking on the link contained in the email they received from 
Ipoints. The link took participants to a welcome screen in which the task 
was very concisely introduced, in which they had to enter their email, their 
age and gender. Once log-on was successfully completed (i.e. all required 
data had been entered), the system, which was designed to balance 
conditions, assigned participants randomly to a condition.
The procedure we adopted was identical to the one followed by Gick and 
Holyoak except that the experiment was administered online: participants 
were not in the lab while doing the experiment and they read the instructions 
and performed the required tasks through the computer.
There were three experimental conditions: the two-similar-analogs 
condition (38 participants) which received a pair of analogous stories which 
were superficially similar (The General and The Commander or Red Adair 
and the Fire-chief), the two-dissimilar-analogs condition (43 participants) 
which had a pair o f dissimilar stories (The General and the Fire-chief or 
Red Adair and The Commander) and the analog-plus condition (40 
participants) which was given an analogous story plus a non analogous one. 
The order o f the stories was counterbalanced.
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After logging on, participants in experimental conditions read in the 
welcome screen that they would take part in two separate experiments: the 
first on story comprehension and the second on problem solving. In the 
same screen they were asked for their email (in order to credit the points 
they would earn) and their gender and age.
In the instructions, presented on the following screen, participants were 
asked to read the stories in the given order, to summarize them while 
having them available for reference and to rate their comprehensibility. 
Then participants were asked to describe in writing, as clearly as possible, 
ways in which the stories were similar and to rate their similarity in a 7 
point scale. A total of 15 minutes were allowed for these tasks, after which 
the system automatically moved the participant forward to the transfer task, 
presented as a problem solving exercise with no connection to what was 
done previously. Participants were given 5 minutes to list all possible 
solutions to Duncker’s Radiation problem that they could think of. Analysis 
o f their solutions would provide the data on un-hinted transfer
When the five minutes expired, participants were asked to fill in a 
questionnaire checking if they were familiar with Duncker’s problem prior 
to starting the experiment and asking them to write down a solution to the 
problem suggested by the story/stories they had just read. The analysis of 
these answers provide the data on hinted transfer.
Control condition participants, whose welcome screen was identical to 
the one used for experimental conditions but reflected the fact that they 
were only asked to carry out the problem solving experiment, were 
presented with Duncker’s problem as their first and only task, followed by 
the questionnaire which just checked previous familiarity with the problem.
Results and discussion
Following Gick and Holyoak, the effectiveness o f analogy in promoting 
transfer was assessed by probing the extent to which conversion solution 
frequency was dependent on the number of analogous stories that the 
participants had learned and schema quality was assessed according to how 
well it captured the analogical relationship between the stories.
Table 4.1 reports the frequencies of un-hinted solution of the target task 
by experimental conditions (exposed to at least one analog) and control 
group, which are significantly different (p = .009, Fisher’s exact test, 2- 
sided). As found by Gick and Holyoak, exposure to even one analog leads to 
transfer. In our experiment, 27% of the participants in experimental 
conditions suggested the convergence solution, while only 6% of the control 
group participants did.
Table 4.1
Frequencies o f  transfer -  experimental conditions before hint v.v. control 
group
solves correctly without hint Total
yes no
Exper. cond. 33 88 121
Control 2 31 33
Total 35 119 154
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the frequencies o f correct solution, before and 
after receiving a hint, o f participants exposed to two analogs vs. those 
exposed to just one. It is clearly the case that two analogs are better than one 
both in un-hinted transfer (p = .010, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) and in 
hinted transfer {p = .015, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Once again, although 
our transfer percentages are somewhat lower than the ones found by Gick
and Holyoak (13% vs. 21% in the one analog condition and 35% vs. 45% in 
the two analog condition), their findings are confirmed.
Table 4.2
Frequencies o f  transfer before hint — experimental conditions only
solves correctly without hint Total
yes no
Number of analogs 2 28 53 81
1 5 35 40
Total 33 88 121
Table 4.3
Frequencies o f  transfer after hint — experimental conditions only
solves correctly after hint Total
yes no
Solved without 
hint
Number of analogs 2 22 31 28 81
1 10 25 5 40
Total 32 56 33 121
As found by Gick and Holyoak, our results also indicate that similarity of 
analogs learned does not have significant influence over un-hinted (p = 
.645, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) nor over hinted transfer (p = .817, Fisher’s 
exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies o f participants solutions are reported in 
tables 4.4- 4.5.
Table 4.4
Frequencies o f  transfer before hint — similar analogs vs. dissimilar analogs 
conditions
solves correctly without hint Total
yes no
Similar analogs 12 26 38
Dissimilar
analogs 16 27 43
Total 28 53 81
Table 4.5
Frequencies o j transfer after hint — similar analogs vs. dissimilar analogs 
conditions
solves correctly after hint Total
yes no DNA
Similar
analogs 10 16 12 38
Dissimilar 12 15 16 43analogs
Total 22 31 28 81
Quality of schema, which was analysed only for conditions receiving two 
analogs, was not particularly high (20% only produced a good schema, 22% 
an intermediate one and 58% a poor one). These results are very similar 
results to those found by Gick and Holyoak. As far as the relationship 
between quality of schema and transfer is concerned, it is significant both 
for un-hinted ip = .047, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) and for hinted transfer 
ip — .056, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). These results confirm Gick and 
Holyoak’s even if  our significance level was lower than theirs. Frequencies 
are reported in tables 4.6 and 4.7.
Table 4.6
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  different levels o f  quality o f  schema achieved -
un-hinted transfer, experimental conditions only
solves correcltly without hint Total
yes no
quality of
schema poor 11 36 47
intermediate 9 9 18
good 8 8 16
Total 28 53 81
Table 4.7
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  different levels o f  quality o f  schema achieved —
hinted transfer, experimental conditions only
solves correctly after hint Total
yes no Solved without hint
quality of 
schema poor 12 24 11 47
intermediate 5 4 9 18
good 5 3 8 16
Total 22 31 28 81
Explicit recognition o f the analogy, as found by Gick and Holyoak, has a 
significant relationship with un-hinted transfer {p = .000, Fisher’s exact test, 
2-sided). Clearly Duncker’s problem is of the insight open-ended type: once 
a participant recognizes that it is analogous to the ones she just read, the 
correct solution becomes much easier to reach than would otherwise be.
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Table 4.8
Frequencies o f  un-hinted transfer fo r  participants who recognized the 
analogy vs. participants who did no t- experimental conditions only
was analogy explicitly 
recognizd? Total
yes no
solves correctly without hint yes 30 3 33
no 27 61 88
Total 57 64 121
Since our results provide a good replication of the qualitative outcomes 
of Gick and Holyoak’s experiment and our risk benefit analysis supported 
the case, we definitely decided to adopt the web for our future experiments 
on transfer of binary decision making. We were planning to test the main 
findings from open-ended problem solving transfer experiments using our 
binary decision-making problem, to compare results and to try to explain 
differences that we might find. We also wished to explore the time delay 
dimension in more depth (thanks to web-based experimenting which makes 
it less difficult), to understand more about the relative importance of context 
and time and to explore the effects of semantic distance. The next chapters 
presents a full review o f our web experiments which will allow us to start 
answering many o f our research questions. To draw conclusions from web 
experiments, however, we will need to present the results o f our aggregated 
data analyses on all experimental data in chapter 7.
Chapter footnotes
(1) In experimental conditions 85% of participants were male, ranging 
in age from 16 to 66 years. One participant was excluded because 
previously familiar with Duncker’s Radiation Problem. The control 
group was composed o f participants 36% of which males, ranging 
in age from 16 to 66 years. It was verified that neither gender nor 
age group had a significant relationship with transfer for both groups
(p>.10).
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CHAPTER 5 
WEB-BASED EXPERIMENTS 
ON NUMBER AND DIVERSITY 
OF ANALOGS
5. WEB-BASED EXPERIMENTS ON NUMBER AND DIVERSITY
OF ANALOGS
Our first three experiments on transfer had confirmed the interest of 
studying analogical transfer with a different task from the one used in the 
seminal Gick and Holyoak experiments (1980, 1983) and allowed us to test 
and select materials and to finalize procedures. Although they suggested 
some preliminary answers to a few research questions, these first 
experiments also left several important issues open, in part due to the fact 
that we were unable to reach the necessary levels of participation. The first 
phase of our research had clearly highlighted the difficulties o f running non- 
immediate transfer experiments in the lab. Since we definitely wanted to be 
able to study time and context shifts, we resolved to consider the web for 
conducting further experiments. Before doing so, however, we needed to 
verify that our results would still be comparable to the ones by Gick and 
Holyoak (1980, 1983). Both the analysis of the potential issues involved in 
web-based experimenting and the successful replication o f Gick and 
Holyoak’s 1983 experiment 4 (finding the same results they had obtained in 
the lab more than 20 years before) were reassuring in this respect and we 
decide to embrace the web as a means for conducting further experiments.
Our expectations that using the web would make recruiting easier and 
administration more efficient were correct: adopting web-based
experimenting allowed us to process a large number of participants (936 in 
total, of which 416 performed the transfer task after a delay between 1 and 
28 days), which we would have not attained using the lab. Increased 
participation enabled us to run a higher number of experiments and to gain 
increased statistical power in each experiment. In some cases, even web 
recruiting did not allow us to reach the ideal number of participants at the 
experiment level (1) , although we were always able, at least, to avoid the 
minimal numbers we had experienced in the lab phase o f our work. Having
lfewer cases in a single experiment, which occurred when there were several 
concurrent Ipoints surveys in the same period, was not considered a problem 
as we were planning to run aggregated data analyses once we had all our 
data. Solution of issues left open, due to scarcity of cases, at a single 
experiment level were therefore expected to be solved in the aggregated data 
analyses phase.
The analysis o f the experimental results one-by-one, which we will 
present in this chapter and in the following, provides only a partial view of 
the leaming-transfer process and should be considered an intermediate step. 
Only in our aggregated data analyses, which will count on a very large 
number of cases, will all relevant variables will be considered together and 
their interactions analysed. Despite the intrinsic limitation of analyzing one 
experiment at a time, in more than one case converging results will allow us 
to provide strong indications regarding the answer to our research question. 
However, the results obtained from the single experiment analysis will 
allow us only to cautiously hypothesize the existence of interactions 
between variables.
The goal of our research, as already explained, was to understand if 
transfer obeyed the same laws in binary decision making that had been 
observed in problem solving transfer and to extend the investigation, 
particularly as time delays were concerned (the majority of experiments 
have been conducted in immediate or short delay transfer conditions). 
Moreover, we wanted to collect data on various different delays, which is 
very complicated to do with lab-experimenting (in fact, most lab 
experiments in non-immediate transfer conditions have just one or two 
different delays). Using the web would allow us to overcome these 
obstacles, at least in part, and base our analyses on a more complete picture.
One of the main findings from open-ended problem solving was the 
importance o f schema formation in transfer (Gick and Holyoak, 1983). In 
order to form a schema, Gick and Holyoak had found, two analogs must be
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compared in search for analogies. Providing just one analog and augmenting 
it with a principle or with a diagram does not promote transfer as well, 
because, they claimed, a general problem schema cannot be induced. One of 
the questions we wanted to address was if schema had the same pivotal role 
in binary decision making transfer that had been found in open-ended 
problem solving. It would not be inconceivable, we thought, that schemata 
could play a lesser role in binary decision making transfer, given that the 
type of task is different. If  we found, as our pilot experiments had hinted, 
that one analog was as good as two in terms of transfer, perhaps this might 
mean that schemata were not as important in binary decision making 
transfer since it is known that schema formation with just one analog is rare. 
If we could also show that learning just one analog by summarizing it was 
not significantly different from learning two with comparison instructions, 
which are known to foster schema formation, we would take this to mean 
that the role of schema was definitely less relevant.
This would not be such a surprising result since in Gick and Holyoak’s 
experiments the main difficulty was to notice that a simple strategy useful in 
a distant domain could be successfully applied to a superficially different 
problem, while in our tasks this seemed easier, as our provisional lab results 
had also indicated. Binary decision making and open ended problem solving 
are at opposite ends o f the spectrum in terms of the degree of openness of 
the solution. Binary decision making offers a clearly defined alternative to 
select the correct answer from (e.g. “would you keep or switch door?”), 
while open ended problem solving just poses the problem and its constraints 
with no indications o f which space must be searched to find a solution 
(“What type o f procedure must be used to destroy the tumour?”). In Gick 
and Holyoak’s experiments, the learning problem had to be understood at a 
sufficiently abstract level (such as in schemata) for it to be recognized in the 
transfer task. In binary decision problems, insight might play a less relevant 
role if the similarity o f the problem facilitated recognition. Possibly,
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recalling a similar example could be enough, thus “by-passing” the need to 
elaborate a schema.
The previous issue introduces the other question that we wanted to 
tackle, regarding the role o f explicit recognition. In open ended problem 
solving, recognition of the structural analogy between learned exemplars 
and target (thanks to the schema) was the pathway to the correct solution 
(providing a hint boosted transfer). We were expecting explicit recognition 
to be higher in our case because the tasks were more similar and because we 
had seen this in our lab experiments. We were wondering if explicit 
recognition would be as important in binary decision making as it was in 
open ended problem solving and if it would be key for transfer.
Another finding from analogical problem solving was that quality of the 
schema is predictive of transfer, i.e. the higher quality o f the schema 
produced implied the higher transfer rate (although exceptions were pointed 
out by Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989, in contextually shifted and time 
delayed un-hinted transfer experiments). We wanted to understand if quality 
of learning was predictive o f transfer in decision making tasks and under 
which conditions. Moreover, we wanted to verify if quality o f learning had 
the same role in transfer even when the learning output was not a schema 
(as would be the case when just one analog was provided or when two 
analogs were provided simply with instructions to summarize).
Studying time-context effects on transfer was one o f our primary 
motivations because we had found relatively few experimental studies on 
the subject in the literature. A few studies (Spencer and Weisberg, 1986; 
Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989) had investigated how time delays and 
context shifts affect transfer in open-ended problems, finding them to be 
very strong and mainly due to context change. We had found similar results 
in our first two lab experiments, with high context shifts and long delays, 
but, instead, had obtained more optimistic results in our experiment 3 where 
context and time shifts were reduced. We knew that the cases were too few
to draw conclusions and wished to test these findings with a much larger 
number of cases and various different time delays and context shifts.
Moreover we wanted to uncover what role semantic distance had in 
transfer. We were clearly expecting transfer to decrease with increase of 
semantic distance, but how strong would the effect be? And, also, would 
increase in semantic distance also change relationships between the other 
key variables and transfer?
Finally, diversity o f learned analogs had been shown (Gick and 
Holyoak, 1983) to have a non-significant relationship with transfer. We 
wished to find if this held true in binary decision making transfer. We were 
interested in verifying this because it related to the first question we 
mentioned, i.e. the role o f schema (formed by mapping two analogs) in 
transfer. If two analogs yielded the same transfer as one, we wanted to 
ensure that this was true even if  the two were very diverse. In other words, 
we wanted to rule out the possibility that semantic distance between the 
learned analogs could affect the way the schema was formed and its role in 
transfer.
Our 13 online experiments investigated the relationships between 
transfer and eight key variables of the leaming-transfer process, six of 
which were external (i.e. independent variables manipulated by us) and two 
internal (i.e. not manipulated by us). The external variables were: number o f  
analogs learned (the number o f analogs that were provided in the learning 
phase: zero, one or two), learning method (the method used for learning: 
summarization, comparison guided by analogy-oriented questions or un­
guided comparison), semantic distance (distance in content between 
learning analogs and target), level o f  context shift (degree o f change in 
context between learning and target phase), delay (delay between learning 
and transfer expressed in logarithmic hours) and diversity o f  analogs 
learned (level of superficial/semantic diversity between the analogs 
learned). The internal variables were quality o f  learning (quality level of the
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output required in the learning phase) and explicit recognition (a binary 
variable indicating if the analogy had been recognized explicitly while 
making the decisions in the target problem). We could not manipulate these 
variables due to their endogenous nature in the process, but we nevertheless 
studied their relationship with transfer in order to better understand if they 
had a mediating role and o f which entity in the process.
The experiments have been divided in two clusters, which will be 
discussed separately in chapters 5 and 6, following the main goal of the 
experiment. In this chapter, we report, one-by-one, the results o f seven 
experiments (No. 5,7,9,11,13,15,17) which we ran mainly to investigate the 
impact of number and diversity of analogs on transfer, explicit recognition 
of analogy and quality of learning. Chapter 6 presents, one-by-one, the 
results o f six experiments (No. 6,8,10,12,14,16) mainly targeted at 
analyzing the impact of learning method on transfer and explicit 
recognition. Chapter 6 also discusses the role of schema in transfer o f binary 
decisions. Since all 13 online experiments also analysed relationships 
between quality o f learning and transfer, between explicit recognition and 
transfer and between quality o f learning and explicit recognition, the results 
of these analyses are reported, experiment-by-experiment, in both chapters.
The present chapter will start with an introduction and overview of all 
13 web-based experiments, will then discuss the seven experiments 
focussed on number and diversity o f analogs and will conclude indicating 
preliminary findings and open issues.
5.1 Overview of Web-based Experiments
The 13 experiments presented in this and in the following chapter (see 
Table 5.3 for a high-level description) were run online with 936 paid adult 
participants o f both genders ranging in age from 16 to 85 years (see Annex 
2 for gender and age distributions). We only required that participants be
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adults with a high-school or higher level education. Participants were 
recruited through Ipoints, a UK direct-marketing-rewards program 
company, following the same procedure as experiment 4.
Not unexpectedly, many of those who enrolled in one of our
experiments dropped the task almost immediately. This reflects high drop­
out rates o f online experiments and the fact that our task was more 
demanding than what is usually requested by Ipoints surveys which usually 
simply require answering some questions on products, preferences and
habits. Drop-out rates, in the order of 60% of total logons, were not
significantly different between conditions, gender, age group and
experiments (p > .10).
Overall, approximately 3% of total participants who proceeded in the 
experiment reported in their answers or in the final questionnaire that they 
had been previously exposed to the Monty Hall problem in its various forms 
(the classic textbook version, the one featured on the BBC, the one given 
during a Derren Brown TV show and the one mentioned in the book The 
curious incident o f  the dog in the night-time by Mark Haddon). These 
participants were considered invalid and discarded from analysis.
We did not record nationality nor area o f residency, but we know that 
Ipoints members cover several nationalities but are mostly UK residents 
based around the London area. Biographical data (gender and age) was 
collected only in some o f the experiments, which accounted for 
approximately 62% of the total participant population (580 participants). 
The overall distribution o f our experiments’ population, reported in Annex 
2, was well balanced between genders (54% women and 46% men) and 
between ages (approximately 50% of the participants between 25 and 40 
years of age).
We verified ex-post on the entire population for which biographical data 
was available that no significant differences in transfer derived from gender
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(p = . 177, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) nor age (B = -0.276; SE = -0,283; p  = 
.331). Furthermore, in all analyses on transfer performed in this research, 
the possible effects o f age and gender on transfer were always checked, 
finding no significant relationship with transfer performance {p > . 10). 
Since the relationship was non-significant, we decided to report all the 
analyses without separating participants based on biographical data.(2)
Table 5.1
Short description o f  online experiments
Exp.
No.
Number of 
participants
Main specific goal of 
the experiment
Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all 
materials are in 
Annex No. 1)
5 Cond 1 (2 analogs) = 15 
Cond 2 (1 analog) = 17
To compare number of 
analogs learned (1 vs. 2) 
from the point of view of 
transfer achieved in 5 
minutes delay transfer
• Delay between learning and transfer: 5 
minutes
• Context shift: medium-low
• Both Darts presented as experiments with 
one welcome screen. Each exp then has 
its own introduction and instructions. Part 
1 presented as reading and 
comprehension, part 2 as decision 
making. The experiments both have 
Warwick loao. but different tvpefaces.
The phrasing of instructions is very 
similar between experiments.
• Semantic distance of target: medium
Learning stories:
• 3 ball
• Videogame
• Seatbelts
Distractor: 
Creativity riddle
Transfer story: 
Lucrezia
Questionnaire: A
Exp. Number of Main specific goal of Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all
No. participants the experiment materials are in 
Annex No.1)
6 Cond 1 (guided To compare learning • Delay between learning and transfer: 5 Learning stories:
comparison)= 15 methods from the point of minutes • 3 ball
view of transfer achieved • Context shift: medium-low • Videogame
Cond 2 (free in 5 minutes delay • Both parts presented as experiments with
comparison^ 16 transfer one welcome screen. Each exp then has 
its own introduction and instructions. Part
Distractor: 
Creativity riddle
Cond 3 (summarization) 1 presented as reading and
= 15 n comprehension, part 2 as decision 
making. The experiments both have
Transfer story: 
Lucrezia
(*) these participants Warwick loao. but different tvDefaces.
come from exp. 5 The phrasing of instructions is very 
similar between experiments.
• Semantic distance of target: medium
Questionnaire: A
Exp.
No.
Number of 
participants
Main specific goal of 
the experiment
Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all 
materials are in 
Annex No.1)
7 Cond 1 (2 analogs) = 63 
Cond 2 (1 analog) = 62
• To compare number 
of analogs learned (1 vs. 
2) from the point of view 
of transfer achieved after 
a delay
• To understand if 
presentation of task 
impacts transfer
• Delay between learning and transfer: 
between 1 and 21 days
• Context shift: medium
• Part 1: college testing 
materials/experiment by Warwick
• Part 2: experiment by Warwick/ college 
testing materials
• Different typefaces and look-and-feel, no 
logo on part 1, Warwick logo on part 2, 
different phrasing, different display of time 
going by.
• Semantic distance of target: medium
Learning stories:
• 3 ball
• Videogame
• Seatbelts
Transfer story: 
Lucrezia
Questionnaire: B
Exp.
No.
Number of 
participants
Main specific goal of 
the experiment
Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all 
materials are in 
Annex No.1)
8 Cond 1 (guided 
comparison)= 36 
Cond 2 (free 
comparison^ 32
Cond 3 (summarization) 
= 63 O
(*) these participants 
come from exp. 7
To compare learning 
methods from the point of 
view of transfer achieved 
in delayed transfer
• Delay between learning and transfer: 
between 1 and 20 days
• Context shift: medium
• Part 1: college testing materials
• Part 2: experiment
• Different typefaces, no logo on part 1, 
different phrasing, different display of time 
going by.
• Semantic distance of target: medium
Learning stories:
• 3 ball
• Videogame
Transfer story: 
Luc re zia
Questionnaire: B
9 Cond 1 (2 analogs) = 32 
Cond 2 (1 analog) = 24
To compare number of 
analogs learned (1 vs. 2) 
from the point of view of 
transfer achieved in 5 
minutes delay transfer
• Delay between learning and transfer: 
between 1 and 28 days
• Context shift: low
• Both parts presented as college testing 
materials with own welcome screen.
• Identical typefaces and phrasing.
• Semantic distance of target: medium
Learning stories:
• 3 ball
• Videogame
• Seatbelts
Transfer story: 
Lucrezia
Questionnaire: B
Exp. Number of Main specific goal of Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all
No. participants the experiment materials are in 
Annex No.1)
10 Cond 1 (guided To compare learning • Delay between learning and transfer: Learning stories:
comparison^ 31 methods from the point of between 1 and 21 days • 3 ball
Cond 2 (free view of transfer achieved • Videogame
comparison )= 22 in delayed transfer • Context shift: low
Transfer story:
Cond 3 (summarization) • Both parts presented as college testing Lucrezia
*C
M
C
OII
•
materials with own welcome screen. 
Identical typefaces and phrasing. Questionnaire: B
(*) these participants
come from exp. 9 • Semantic distance of target: medium
Exp.
No.
Number of 
participants
Main specific goal of 
the experiment
Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all 
materials are in 
Annex No.1)
11 Cond 1 (2 analogs) = 
13
Cond 2 (1 analog) = 20
To compare number of 
analogs learned (1 vs. 2) 
from the point of view of 
transfer achieved in 5 
minutes delay transfer
• Delay between learning and transfer: 5 
minutes
• Context shift: low
• Part 1 and 2 : college testing materials. 
One welcome screen. Identical typefaces 
and phrasing.
• Semantic distance of target: medium
Learning stories:
• 3 ball
• Videogame
• Seatbelts
Distractor: 
Creativity riddle
T ransfer story: 
Lucrezia
Questionnaire: B
Exp.
No.
Number of 
participants
Main specific goal of 
the experiment
Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all 
materials are in 
Annex No.1)
12 Cond 1 (guided 
comparison )= 21 
Cond 2 (free 
comparison^ 17
Cond 3 (summarization)
= 13 n
(*)these participants 
come from exp. 11
To compare learning 
methods from the point of 
view of transfer achieved 
in 5 minutes delay 
transfer
• Delay between learning and transfer: 5 
minutes
• Context shift: low
• Part 1 and 2 : college testing materials. 
One welcome screen. Identical typefaces 
and phrasing
• Semantic distance of target: medium
Learning stories:
• 3 ball
• Videogame
Distractor: 
Creativity riddle
Transfer story: 
Lucrezia
Questionnaire: B
13 Cond 1 (2 analogs) = 13 
Cond 2 (1 analog) = 23
To compare number of 
analogs learned (1 vs. 2) 
from the point of view of 
transfer achieved after a 
delay
• Delay between learning and transfer: 
between 1 and 14 days
• Context shift:
• Both parts presented as college testing 
materials with own welcome screen
• Identical typefaces and phrasing
• Semantic distance of target: high
Learning stories:
• 3 ball
• Vieogame
• Seatbelts
Transfer story: 
Prisoners
Questionnaire: B
Exp.
No.
Number of 
participants
Main specific goal of 
the experiment
Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all 
materials are in 
Annex No.1)
14 Cond 1 (guided 
comparison)= 65 
Cond 2 (free 
comparison^ 13
Cond 3 (summarization) 
= 13 (*)
(*) this these 
participants come from 
exp. 13
To compare learning 
methods from the point of 
view of transfer achieved 
in delayed transfer
• Delay between learning and transfer: 
between 1 and 26 days
• Context shift: low
• Both parts presented as college testing 
materials with own welcome screen
• Identical typefaces and phrasing
• Semantic distance of target: high
Learning stories:
• 3 ball
• Vieogame
Transfer story: 
Prisoners
Questionnaire: B
Exp.
No.
Number of 
participants
Main specific goal of 
the experiment
Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all 
materials are in 
Annex No. 1)
15 Cond 1 (2 analogs) = 41 To compare number of • Delay between learning and transfer: 5 Learning stories:
analogs learned (1 vs. 2) minutes • 3 ball
Cond 2 (1 analog) = 40 from the point of view of • Context shift: low • Vieogame
transfer achieved in 5 • Part 1 and 2 : college testing materials. • Seatbelts
minutes delay transfer One welcome screen. Identical typefaces
and phrasing. Distractor:
• Semantic distance of target: high Creativity riddle
Transfer story:
Prisoners
Questionnaire: B
Exp.
No.
Number of 
participants
Main specific goal of 
the experiment
Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all 
materials are in 
Annex No.1)
16 Cond 1 (guided To compare learning • Delay between learning and transfer: 5 Learning stories:
comparison^ 34 methods from the point of min • 3 ball
view of transfer achieved • Context shift: low • Vieogame
Cond 2 (free in 5 minutes delay • Part 1 and 2 : college testing materials.
comparison^ 37 transfer One welcome screen. Identical typefaces Distractor:
and phrasing. Creativity riddle
Cond 3 (summarization) • Semantic distance of target: high
= 41 (*) T ransfer story:
Prisoners
(*) these participants
come from exp. 15 Questionnaire: B
Exp.
No.
Number of 
participants
Main specific goal of 
the experiment
Learning - Transfer situation Materials (all 
materials are in 
Annex No. 1)
17 Cond 1 ( low diversity)= 
76
Cond 2 (high diversity)= 
71
To evaluate impact of 
exemplar diversity on 
achieved in 5 minutes 
delay transfer
• Delay between learning and transfer: 5 
min
• Context shift: low
• Both parts presented as college testing 
materials with own welcome screen
• Identical typefaces and phrasing
• Semantic distance of target: high
Learning stories:
• 4 boxes
• 3 balls
• Anastasia
• Lucrezia vers. 2
Transfer story: 
Prisoners
Questionnaire: B
5.2 Experiments on Number and Diversity of Analogs
This section presents and discusses experiments mainly aimed at 
analyzing the relationships between number and diversity of analogs and 
transfer. The experiments also analyse the relationships between delay and 
transfer, quality o f learning and transfer, explicit recognition and transfer 
and quality of learning and explicit recognition.
EXPERIMENT 5
Having verified that we could compare web-based results to Gick and 
Holyoak’s lab-based ones, we set off to investigate if  their main findings 
still held true using our type of decision problem. Our previous experiments, 
in the lab, seemed to indicate that differences might exist, but we had not 
wanted to draw hasty conclusions due to the small number o f cases 
available. The web promised to draw much larger numbers of participants, 
which would allow us to found our conclusions on firmer grounds.
We designed experiment 5 to be very similar to our experiment 3, the 
main difference being that this time the time interval between learning and 
transfer was brought down to 5 minutes and filled by an unrelated distractor 
task (in experiment 3 the distractor was a decision problem). The other 
difference with experiment 3 was that this time we focused on the number 
of analogs, zero, one or two, using just summarization as learning method. 
This choice was made because we wanted to separate effects due to number 
of analogs from those due to learning method. Since we were reluctant to 
use analogical encoding as a learning method (it could confuse participants 
in the one analog condition, as Gick and Holyoak had pointed out), we 
decided to use summarization in this experiment and analogical encoding in
experiment 6 (which will be discussed in chapter 6, together with other 
experiments on learning method and transfer).
The question of whether two analogs are better than one is key to 
understanding the role o f schemata in transfer. However, if summarizing 
one analog does not lead to different transfer rates than summarizing two, 
this can’t be taken to mean that, in binary decision making, schema does not 
mediate the transfer process because two analogs may not be enough to 
draw a schema. In fact, without any comparison instructions, usually outputs 
do not support the hypothesis that a schema has been formed. Therefore, 
this is just the first step o f an analysis which must be completed by 
comparing transfer in participants who received one analog and in those 
who received two with comparison instructions. This analysis will be 
performed in the following section.
Moreover, with this experiment we wanted to understand if quality of 
learning, as reflected in the learning phase output, was a predictor of 
transfer. This issue had been left open from the lab experiments where we 
had found mixed evidence. Gick and Holyoak (1983) had found quality of 
schemata to be a predictor of un-hinted transfer in immediate and same 
context conditions. However, delayed and contextually shifted transfer 
studies (Spencer and Weisberg, 1986; Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989), had 
confirmed schema quality as a predictor of hinted, but not always of un­
hinted transfer. We wondered what the role o f schema and, more generally, 
of quality of learning (i.e. even when a schema was not the output, as in the 
case of summarization learning) would be using our transfer task under the 
various conditions we planned to test.
As for the relationships between explicit recognition and transfer and 
between quality of learning and explicit recognition, the study of which 
were also goals o f our research, we decided that we would perform the 
analysis only if the quality o f data collected on explicit recognition was 
adequate (we were still testing our final questionnaire in this experiment).
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As mentioned earlier, we were planning, over various experiments, to 
vary both the level o f context shift (as much as it was under our control) and 
of semantic distance in order to analyse their role in transfer. In this case, 
we decided to start “in the middle” and selected a medium-low context shift 
(just the graphical presentation and the language used in learning and 
transfer would be different) and a medium semantic distance between 
learning transfer task (our Lucrezia story). Further similar experiments were 
already planned in which context and semantic distance would take different 
values.
In this experiment, we were expecting to see one analog leading to 
transfer, as we had in our experiment 3 (in which a 20 minute delay between 
learning and transfer had been introduced). On the other hand, experiment 3 
had provided mixed evidence regarding the superiority of two analogs 
versus just one and the relationship between quality of learning and transfer. 
We were not sure, at this stage, whether this difference with Gick and 
Holyoak’s results had to do with the delay and context shifts that our 
experiment introduced, with the different nature of the tasks and/or of the 
type of learning involved, or simply with lack o f statistical power due to 
small numbers. To make a step towards clarifying the issue, in this 
experiment we reduced as much as possible the time shift and used 
summarization as the sole learning method.
Background
Our reference background was the same as for our lab-based experiments 
2 and 3.
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Method
Participants. There were 32 valid participants (those who, in the final 
questionnaire, declared they were familiar with the Monty Hall problem 
were discarded from analysis) in two experimental conditions: condition 
1 (15 participants) receiving two analogs in the learning phase and 
condition 2 ( 1 7  participants), receiving just one. All participants were 
recruited through Ipoints, as we had done in experiment 4 and paid 40 
ipoints for completion o f the experiment.
The control group was made o f a total of 60 participants and divided 
in two subgroups. The first set of participants (which we will call 
Control group with learning stories) included 25 participants who were 
required to read and summarize two non-analogous learning stories and 
to perform a distractor task before tackling the target task. This group 
followed a procedure identical to the one followed by experimental 
conditions, with the difference that the stories they received were non- 
analogous (Factory is hiring and Seatbelts). The second set of 
participants (which we will call Control group without learning stories) 
included 35 participants and was only required to perform the target 
task and to answer the questionnaire. We ran two control groups because 
we wanted to understand if it was necessary to have control participants 
do the learning part o f the experiment before the control task (it was 
conceivable that, due to a number of effects, e.g. fatigue, the 
performance of the two groups could differ). If we did not find 
significant differences, we would compile the data and use the same 
control group for all experiments using Lucrezia as the target task. We 
found that participants belonging to the two control groups did not have 
a significantly different transfer performance {p = .259, Fisher’s exact 
test 2-sided) and we therefore collapsed results together in order to use 
them as control for all experiments using Lucrezia as target story.
Table 5.2
Frequencies o f  transfer in control group participants exposed to non- 
analogous learning stories prior to transfer vs. control group participants 
not exposed to learning stories — Lucrezia target story
Incorrect
decision
Correct
decision Total
Type With learning stories
Without learning stories
Total
20 5 25
32 3 35
52 8 60
Materials. The materials used in this experiment were of four types: 
learning stories, target story, questionnaires and emails. All of them are 
available in Annexes 1 and 3. The materials used in the learning phase of 
the experiment were, in content, the same Monty Hall type stories we had 
used in our experiment No.3 ( Videogame, Three balls) and the same non- 
analogous story ( Seatbelts). Note that Videogame and Three balls have a -  
qualitatively measured - medium degree o f superficial similarity between 
them (i.e. they share only few superficial features: both are modem time 
games, one a TV show, the other a videogame). We employed our Monty 
Hall type transfer story, Lucrezia, in the same version we had used in 
experiment No.3, with the two sub-tasks. As already explained, the first sub­
task, which we used as a proxy for transfer, had an adequate level of 
difficulty (a mechanical application o f learning was not sufficient because 
the goal was reversed and number o f options changed from 3 to 4, but it was 
in all other respects analogous to the learning task). The second sub-task 
required a deeper understanding o f the applicability conditions of the 
learning problems (the agent removing one of the options did not act under 
constraint, therefore usual probabilistic reasoning was correct).
We qualitatively attributed a value medium to semantic distance between 
learning stories and target because, although the context was very different 
between learning and target, the decisions to be made were, in both cases, 
presented as switching-or-keeping o f  a previous choice.
The distractor task, which we used in this experiment for the first time, 
was a 5 minutes easy riddle-type exercise (derived from creativity courses) 
aimed at changing mental context as much as possible. The riddle asked to 
identify three mistakes in a sentence. Since two mistakes were very obvious 
spelling mistakes, most participants tend to struggle searching for a third 
mistake of the same type or of a formal type. In reality, the third mistake is 
that there are only two mistakes in the sentence. The task was non-obvious 
and required thinking-out-of-the-box, but was not too demanding.
The final questionnaire used for the experimental conditions 
(Questionnaire A) was very similar, with just minor rephrasing, to the one 
previously used in experiment 3. The questionnaire had the goals of 
identifying participants who were previously familiar with the Monty Hall 
problem, collecting data on explicit recognition o f analogy in the transfer 
task and understanding if participants had thought there was an 
interconnection between the three tasks presented before starting the set of 
experiments.
The most elusive of the final questionnaire goals proved to be 
identification of explicit recognition o f the analogy (i.e. separating explicit 
from implicit recognition). The questionnaire asked the participant if  she/he 
was familiar with the type o f decisions required by the third experiment they 
had done (which was our target task, presented as a third experiment 
independent from the others) before starting that experiment and, if so, 
where the familiarity came from (“Were you familiar with the type of 
decision you were required to make in Experiment 3 -the last one- before 
starting the experiment? If  the answer is yes, when have you learned about
these or similar types o f decisions?”). We were trying, in one question, to 
record if the participant knew the Monty Hall problem before starting the 
experiments and if she/he recognized the analogy with the learning stories. 
Analyzing the answers, we regretfully understood that, despite our
rephrasing, the question was sometimes still incorrectly understood by
participants, who simply took it to mean “were you familiar with the 
decisions before starting the entire set o f experiments?” (i.e. some 
participants answered “no” but referred to the learning story principle while 
answering the questions in the target task). Clearly, when reference to the 
learning stories was explicit in the answer given to the transfer task 
questions, we recorded explicit recognition regardless of what the
participant had declared in the questionnaire. We were, however, left
wondering if others had fallen into the same misunderstanding. In other 
cases, participants answered “yes” to our explicit recognition question but, 
reading their output, it seemed that they had not seen any analogy. In this 
case, although doubtful, we had to take their answer at face-value. These 
types of situations left us unsatisfied with our questionnaire and made us 
decide two things. First, we could not trust completely the data on explicit 
recognition coming from this experiment. Second, we determined that in the 
coming experiments we would adopt a different type o f questionnaire in 
order to overcome the difficulties we were encountering.
The Control group questionnaire (used with control group participants) 
had as sole goal to identify invalid participants (i.e. the ones who were 
familiar with the Monty Hall problem before starting the experiment) and 
thus was a very simple questionnaire asking if the participant was 
previously familiar with the principle illustrated in the learning stories and, 
if yes, where from.
We only used one email (all tasks were in sequence) which invited 
recipients to participate in a group of experiments by Warwick University
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by clicking the link contained in it. The email was of the standard type that 
Ipoints sends to its members to propose participation in a survey: it 
explained who the client was (Warwick University), what goal it was 
pursuing (running three experiments) and how many ipoints would be 
credited to participants (40). Ipoints members who wanted to participate 
were instructed to click on the link contained in the email, as is always the 
case with Ipoints surveys.
The web pages containing the learning stories, the distractor and the 
transfer task were all differentiated in terms of typeface. In the transfer task, 
the background colour was changed from white to light blue and the 
message displaying the time warnings was phrased differently and placed in 
a different part of the screen. All web-pages relative to this experiment are 
available in Annex 3.
Procedure. The experiment followed a between-subjects procedure. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of our three conditions (condition 
1, condition 2 and control) as they logged-on to the experiment (at each new 
log-on, the system counted participants in each condition who had 
completed the experiment and allocated the participant logging on to the 
condition with fewer completed cases).
All experimental tasks were timed and the system terminated the task 
(automatically saving all the input) when the allocated time was over. The 
system also displayed two timed warnings during the experiment to help 
participants pace their work: one when half of the time had been used and 
another when time was about to expire. The only un-timed tasks were 
registration and the questionnaire. Participants could, at their will, go 
forward and backwards within the task they were doing, but not move to the 
next task or go back to the previous.
Participants started the experiment by clicking on the link contained in 
the email they received from Ipoints. The link took participants to a 
welcome screen with Warwick University’s logo on it, where they were
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introduced to the tasks they were required to complete (the tasks were 
presented as separate experiments on different research topics). The same 
screen asked participants to enter their email (in order to credit the points 
they would earn). Once log-on was successfully completed (i.e. required 
data had been entered), the system assigned participants randomly to a 
condition.
Participants were moved on to the following screen, titled Experiment 
No. 1 on reading and comprehension, containing instructions on the first 
task (learning part). The instructions were the same for all conditions (only 
the stories varied) and requested participants to read the stories and to 
summarize them while having them available for reference. Participants 
were given 15 minutes for this task.
When the time expired, the system moved the participants to a new 
screen, titled Experiment No. 2 on creativity, requiring participants to solve 
a creativity type riddle. The typeface o f this screen was different from the 
one used in the previous task. Participants were allowed 5 minutes for the 
task and then were moved to the third task.
The third task, our transfer task, was presented on a screen titled 
Experiment No. 3 on decision making. The screen instructed participants to 
read two short stories and to make the decision at the end of each, 
supporting it with an explanation. Time allowed for the task was 15 
minutes. Typeface, background colour and display o f time warnings was 
changed again. We thought that by differentiating look-and-feel of the 
learning and transfer parts o f the experiment we would obtain a medium- 
low level of context shift ( identical presentation would be the case of low 
context shift) because the different appearance of the web-pages was 
intended to reinforce the idea that the two parts were separate and to 
eliminate visual cues.
When the time allocated to the transfer task was completed, the system 
displayed the questionnaire, (Questionnaire A). The participant then
184
submitted her answers to the questionnaire and the system ended the 
experiment thanking for participation. Total duration was approximately 35 
minutes (35 minutes for the tasks, plus a few minutes for reading the 
welcome screen, registering and filling the questionnaire).
The variable, named transfer, that we used as a proxy of transfer was, for 
the reasons explained in chapter 3, was a dichotomous variable recording 
the correctness of transfer sub-task 1 (the first question). Our variable was 
assigned value “yes” if sub-task 1 was answered correctly and the answer 
was explained thoroughly (we needed proof that the participant was 
applying- implicitly or explicitly- the same reasoning that he/she was 
exposed to in the learning phase and not guessing, which in binary choices 
is very easy). Transfer was set to value “no” if, regardless of the type of 
error, the answer was incorrect or if no explanation was given or if  the 
wrong explanation was given. There was no need to differentiate responses 
in terms of quality: what interested us, in the end, was not the elegance of 
the explanation given (which is often correlated to the level o f instruction) 
but a clear indication that the participant was applying correctly what they 
had just learned. As long as the participant mentioned that the originally 
selected option did not change its probabilities while the originally 
unselected ones did, we were sure that transfer was taking place.
Although we were hoping to use the answers to sub-task 2 (which 
required a deeper understanding o f the logic behind the Monty Hall 
problem) to differentiate level o f transfer, we were anticipating that this 
might not be the case based on the experience with experiment No. 3.
Quality of learning was measured on a three point scale: the lowest 
category being No learning/poor learning, the intermediate being Medium 
learning and the highest High learning. We decided that three categories 
were enough and more practical than the five in our previous experiments. 
Two independent raters read the outputs and gave an evaluation using the
scale. Discrepancies were solved by discussion and the agreed upon 
evaluation was retained.
The No learning/poor learning category included two types of 
participants. The first ones were those who “missed the point” that was 
being made or, at least, did not mention it in their outputs. For example, in 
summarizing the Three Ball story they would emphasize details (the fact 
that one ball was gold, weight o f the balls, etc.), while ignoring the story 
structure and underlying principle. The second type of participants were 
those who produced very short outputs in which the structure o f the story 
was vaguely mentioned, but not the underlying principle (e.g. “It’s the story 
of a TV program with three balls where the presenter eliminates one ball to 
help the participant win.”). This type o f output did not allow us to form an 
opinion on what, if  anything, had been learned. The participants in our no 
learning/poor learning category were not discarded from the experiment 
because, despite demonstrating a very low level o f learning, we thought they 
simply could have been lazy writers who had learned but weren’t motivated 
to show it. In fact, we were to find out that, in some cases, they did achieve 
transfer (i.e. solved correctly, mentioning the learning stories).
The Medium learning category included outputs which showed 
understanding of the basic point made by the learning story/ies, but just at a 
superficial level. In summarizing the 3 Ball story, this type o f participant 
would clearly state the various passages but not explain the underlying 
reasons leading to a change in probability (e.g. “The host knows which ball 
is gold and by taking another one increases the odds o f the other unselected 
ball”). Again, we cannot exclude the possibility that the principle was in fact 
understood at a deeper level than reflected in the output.
The High learning category included outputs which showed deeper 
understanding of the basic point made by the learning story/ies (“Since the 
host knowingly avoids choosing the gold ball, which he can’t pick because 
it would end the game, the other unselected ball takes on its probability of
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being the winning one, while the one originally chosen by the contestant 
maintains its probability”).
Results and discussion
Confirming Gick and Holyoak’s results, we found that receiving one 
analog makes a significant positive difference in transfer (p = .000, Fisher’s 
exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies of transfer for the condition receiving one 
analog vs. control are reported in the table below.
Table 5.3
Frequencies o f  transfer — condition receiving one analog versus control
T ransfer Total
no yes
number of analogs 
participant learned 0 52 8 60
1 7 10 17
Total 59 18 77
On the other hand, we found that receiving one analog versus two 
analogs makes a significant difference in correctly solving the transfer task, 
but in favour of the condition receiving one analog (p = .036, Fisher’s exact 
test, 2-sided). This is a counterintuitive result and, given the small number 
of participants involved, it seems most likely to be a statistical coincidence. 
However, it should be pointed out that no advantage seemed to derive from 
learning two analogs versus one. Given the low number of cases, we 
thought it was best to suspend any conclusion till more data became 
available with the further experiments. Frequencies o f transfer for the 
condition receiving one analog vs. the condition receiving two are reported 
in table 5.4.
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Table 5.4
Frequencies o f  transfer  —  condition receiving one analog versus condition
receiving two analogs
Transfer Total
yes no
Number of analogs 15
2 3 12
1 10 7 17
Total 13 19 32
Moreover, examining explicit recognition rates, we found no significant 
difference between conditions receiving one or two analogs (p = 1, Fisher’s 
exact test, 2-sided). As mentioned earlier, our final questionnaire was still 
not in its definitive version at this stage (we were still using Questionnaire 
A) and we don’t consider these results to be totally trustworthy, to the point 
that we will not compile them with the ones obtained using the definitive 
version of the questionnaire (Questionnaire B) in our aggregated data 
analyses (reported in chapter 7 ).
Table 5.5
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition -  condition receiving one analog versus 
condition receiving two analogs
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
number of analogs 1 4 13 17
2 4 11 15
Total 8 24 32
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We were also not able to find a significant relationship between quality 
of learning (measured on 3 categories) and transfer (p = .622, Fisher’s exact 
test, 2-sided) nor between quality o f learning and explicit recognition {p = 
.250, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Gick and Holyoak, as well as Catrambone 
and Holyoak, in the experiments cited earlier, had found a correlation 
between schema quality (of participants in comparison condition, i.e. who 
were instructed to compare the learning stories) and transfer. Two elements 
should be pointed out. The first is that our participants did not draw a 
schema but simply summarized the analogs, so our results were not directly 
comparable to the ones from seminal studies. Second, the numbers involved 
were very small, making it difficult to reach significance. It was clear that 
further experiments and the aggregated data analyses were needed to clarify 
the issue. Frequencies o f transfer per level of quality reached are reported in 
the tables below.
Table 5.6
Frequencies o f  transfer per level o f  quality reached in learning task
T ransfer Total
no yes
level of quality in 
learning task
no or very low 
learning 8 3 11
medium learning 10 9 19
high learning 1 1 2
Total 19 13 32
Table 5.7
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition per level o f  quality reached in learning 
task
explicit recognition Total
yes no
level of quality reached 
in learning task (on 3 no or very low 1 10 11
categories) learning
medium learning 6 13 19
high learning 1 1 2
Total 8 24 32
On the other hand, the relationship between explicit recognition and 
transfer approached significance (p = . 101, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 5.8
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  explicit recognition (Y/N)
transfer Total
yes no
explicit recognition
yes 1 7 8
no 12 12 24
Total 13 19 32
In summary, we had found once again that exposure to one analog is 
enough to lead to transfer, as was the case in problem solving transfer and in 
our experiment 3. More interestingly, we found, as we had in experiment 
No.3 with the Monty Hall problem as transfer task, that two analogs do not 
lead to higher transfer than one. We were also not able to see a relationship 
between quality o f learning and transfer, as we had expected based on Gick
and Holyoak’s results. Clearly, more experimental data would be needed to 
confirm these findings, so we planned to launch an experiment exploring the 
same issue and introducing longer delays between learning and transfer.
EXPERIMENT 7
From the outset, one of the aspects we were more curious about was the 
effect of time and context on transfer. The reason is twofold. On the one 
hand, there is very little on the topic in literature (which, at least in part, can 
be explained by the logistic difficulties o f experimenting in the lab with 
time shifts between learning and transfer). On the other, in real life 
situations it is often the case that we encounter an analogous situation after a 
significant delay and in a different context.
Results from seminal experiments conducted on open ended problem 
solving transfer indicated that time-context effects were strong and that the 
strongest influence was context. We had found similar effects with binary 
decision-making tasks, in our lab experiments, but could not draw 
conclusions due to insufficient number of cases. Web-based experimenting 
should finally allow us to increase number o f participants and to understand 
how time and context shifts affected binary decision- making transfer.
Experiment 7 is the first o f a series of experiments through which we 
wanted to investigate boundary conditions of binary decision-making 
transfer. In this experiment, learning and transfer were separated by one to 
21 days and presented as different types of tasks (testing of college 
materials and an experiment on decision making) in web-pages with 
different look-and-feel.
This experiment, which is very similar to experiment 5, was specifically 
aimed at assessing the effect o f learning an analog versus control and at 
comparing transfer levels in the case of one versus two analogs under the
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following conditions: delayed transfer, medium context shift and medium 
semantic distance between learning and transfer. In other words, experiment 
7 studies the same relationships as experiment 5, but under potentially more 
challenging conditions: increased delay and greater context shift.
Since delay of transfer was manipulated in this experiment, we also 
wanted to begin to study the relationship between delay and transfer. To 
attain this goal, however, aggregated data analyses including all 
experimental data are clearly best suited. This analysis will be presented in 
chapter 7.
Background
Our reference background was the same as for our lab-based experiments 
2 and 3.
Method
Participants. There were 125 valid participants in two experimental 
conditions. Condition 1, with 63 participants, received two analogs which 
had to be summarized, and condition 2 , with 62 participants, received one 
analog and a non-analogous story which also had to be summarized. The 
control group, the same for all experiments using Lncrezia as transfer task 
(i.e. the transfer story with medium semantic distance to the learning 
stories), comprised 60 valid participants. Participants were paid 15 ipoints 
for part 1 and 30 ipoints for part 2 of the experiment. All participants were 
recruited through Ipoints as usual. Gender and age group were collected 
only for 87 o f the 125 participants. Our participants were 29% males and 
71 % females with the ages ranging from 16 to 67 years. Age distribution is 
reported in Annex 2.
Materials. We employed the same three learning stories used in 
experiment 5 (Three balls, and Videogame, which were analogous to the 
target and Seatbelts which not analogous). The target story, Lucrezia, with a 
medium-semantic distance from the learning stories, was also same we used 
in our previous experiments.
It is important to mention that typeface and look-and-feel of the web 
pages (all available in Annex 3) containing the learning stories and the 
target were further differentiated in this experiment. While in experiment 5 
the differences were limited to graphical appearance and type of language 
used, in this experiment the tasks were also presented as belonging to 
different surveys/clients. This resulted in very different welcome pages 
between the two parts o f the experiment.
The learning task, in 63 of the cases, displayed a very anonymous and 
essential web-page with few words of introduction (consistently with the 
claim that the client was a college who wished to remain anonymous) while 
the transfer task displayed the Warwick University logo very visibly 
together with all the typical length introductory text to an experiment. The 
pages of each task were in a similar style to the welcome page. In the other 
62 cases, the type o f presentation was reversed. The learning task displayed 
the Warwick University page and the typical introduction to a psychology 
experiment, while the transfer task was the essential web-page by the 
anonymous college. Notice that the materials were identical, by condition, 
in all of our 125 cases (i.e. learning and transfer stories were the same), just 
the presentation changed.
In this experiment, in order to overcome the shortcomings of our 
previous questionnaire, we created a new questionnaire (Questionnaire B), 
which was divided in two parts. The first part o f the questionnaire asked 
about previous familiarity with the decisions made in the last task (question 
number 1) and if the participant was “reminded of similar stories” by the 
decisions made (question number 2). Then, on a subsequent screen which
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was fired only after the first one was submitted, in order to rule out any 
possibility o f misunderstanding, the questionnaire stated straightforwardly 
that the decisions in the last task were actually analogous to the ones 
contained in the first stories and we needed to know if the participant had 
explicitly recognized that the decision was analogous to the one in the 
learning story. The motivation for this dual pass was that it is very difficult 
to get a sure answer regarding explicit recognition without influencing the 
participant in his response. On the one hand, the only way to make sure the 
participant understands the question completely is to ask it in a very
straightforward manner (“ ...did you explicitly realize the decision was
similar to the one you had read about previously?”). On the other, doing so 
from the beginning risks pressuring some participants to answer yes, in 
hindsight, or to avoid seeming un-clever or un-concentrated. A sequence of 
two questions allowed the question to be answered first without any
indication of what might be the “correct” answer (so to minimize
participants’ tendency to “fake good”), while ensuring, with the second 
question, that there was no misunderstandings and that it was interpreted 
correctly .
We are conscious of the fact that, since explicit recognition was self- 
reported by participants and since the last question contained a bias in 
favour of answering “yes”, our figures on explicit recognition might slightly 
over-estimate it. However, by reading the answers to the final questionnaire 
in this version, we were relieved by the absence of some obvious 
inconsistencies which we had encountered when using the previous version. 
Since this version seemed to capture what was actually happening with 
explicit recognition, we decided to retain this as our final questionnaire, to 
be employed in further experiments.
In our first questionnaire, Questionnaire A, we also asked participants if, 
before starting the three experiments, they thought there was an 
interconnection between the three tasks presented. This question was
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dropped from the new questionnaire for two reasons. Firstly, we wanted 
participants to concentrate on the explicit recognition question. Secondly, on 
analyzing responses to the questionnaire we found that participants only 
very rarely thought that there might be a connection between experiments 
(contrary to psychology students, the majority o f our participants probably 
had no/little familiarity with how psychology experiments work). Moreover, 
even the few participants who thought there might be some connection 
between tasks, did not seem to have any idea of what it might be (when 
requested what the connection might be they either did not answer or gave 
very generic answers). Finally, probably because the participants we were 
dealing with were “naive” from a psychology point o f view (contrary to 
many subject panels drawing on psychology students), they did not seem to 
act on their intuition that the two tasks might be linked. Following these 
considerations, we thought that the question was not very useful and 
eliminated it.
We created four types of emails for this experiment because participants 
needed to be contacted twice, once for learning and the other for transfer 
and we were planning to counterbalance the presentation of our tasks (this 
implied two different mails connecting to the learning task and two 
connecting to the transfer task). Both were in the typical format that Ipoints 
uses with its members. The first email explained who the client was (either a 
“a college wishing to remain anonymous” or “Warwick University 
Department o f Psychology”), what goal it was pursuing (either pre-testing 
of some of the materials that are used in its admission procedure or running 
an experiment) and how many ipoints would be credited to participants (15). 
Ipoints members who wanted to participate were instructed to click on the 
link contained in the email. The second email, sent to participants who had 
completed part 1 o f the experiment, again explained who the client was (this 
time it was Warwick University Department o f Psychology for those who
had received the first email from the anonymous college and vice-versa), 
what goal it was pursuing (running an experiment on decision making) and 
how many ipoints would be credited for participation (30).
Procedure. In this experiment we started collecting biographical data 
from our participants (but managed to do so only for roughly 70% of them). 
As mentioned previously, we analysed ex-post the relationship between 
gender/age and transfer. We verified that there was no significant 
relationship between them (p > . 10).
In this experiment, we were also, for the first time, presenting the two 
parts of our experiment in a different way (pre-testing of college materials 
vs. psychology experiment). Our approach was to counterbalance the type 
of presentation and to check ex-post if  there were differences in the two 
groups (those receiving the pre-testing presentation followed by the 
experiment presentation and the reversed order group). If no significant 
differences were found, we could avoid counterbalancing type of 
presentation in the experiments which required two different presentations 
and we could pretty safely use any of the two in the other experiments.
Half of the participants were presented the learning task as the pre-testing 
o f college materials by an anonymous college and the transfer task as an 
experiment by Warwick University, while the other half received the 
reversed type o f presentation. We verified how order of presentation 
affected our transfer and found no significantly different results, concluding 
that order o f presentation did not appear to be essential (3).
Participants were randomly assigned to one o f two conditions in which, 
as explained, presentation type was counterbalanced. The conditions 
differed by the number of analogous stories (1 or 2) they were given in the 
learning phase of the experiment.
In this experiment, transfer (experiment part 2) followed learning 
(experiment part 1) after a delay between 1 and 21 days (average delay was 
9.6 days). Frequencies o f the delays are reported in Annex 2.
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Context, as much as it was under our control, was manipulated to achieve 
a medium context shift: by presenting learning and transfer tasks differently 
in terms of goal (experiment vs. pre-test of materials) and of client 
(Warwick University vs. anonymous college), and by changing type-face, 
colours and the way time was displayed between tasks (this resulted in 
markedly differentiated look-and-feel of the web pages). We were working 
on the assumption that the screen displayed on the computer monitor would 
be an essential driver o f perceived context i.e. would constitute the context 
within which the task was to be performed and that external context (e.g. the 
room in which the participant was) and the internal context (e.g.. 
participant’s mood) would play a less important role in defining the overall 
context.
It must be said that the problem of context control, which is typical of 
web-based experiments (because there are many sources of contextual 
variation that can’t be controlled), becomes even greater when an 
experiment is divided in two parts which are non sequential (as was the case 
of this experiment). When there is a delay between two parts of an 
experiment, not only are all participants in a different context while doing 
the experiment (which is always the case with online experiments), but also 
the context is more likely to change randomly between the two parts of the 
experiment for each participant. However, with a sufficient number of 
participants (which is more true at aggregated data analyses level), these 
variations (which are expected to occur randomly) should become 
uncorrelated with the variations that we can control.
One point which merits a few comments is possible co-variation of time 
and context shifts i.e. the fact that longer delay between learning and 
transfer is more likely to go along with higher level changes in external and 
mental context than shorter ones (particularly than the 5 minutes ones). The 
participant transferring after only 5 minutes from learning, with all 
likelihood, will be in an unchanged external context (i.e. in the same room,
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using the same computer and at the same time of the day) and in the same 
mood. The participant who performs the two parts o f the experiment at a 
different time (this data is available because the log-on time is recorded and 
most of the times it differed), on the other hand, is more likely to be in a 
distinct context (e.g. home vs. office) and in diverse moods. However, since, 
with the exception o f time o f the day, we have no record o f what happened 
to context between parts 1 and 2, it was impossible to measure actual 
context shift or even to estimate it. It is perfectly conceivable that 
participants performed the tasks from the same room, for example, even at a 
distance o f several days. Equally, we can’t assert that, when tasks are 
separated by just 5 minutes, context does not change (e.g. the participant 
could have been interrupted by a pleasant/unpleasant phone call, someone 
could have entered the room where she was doing the experiment or he 
could have left the room a few minutes to get something, music could have 
been turned on or off, etc.).
Considering that in both immediate and delayed transfer it is impossible 
to know what in fact happened to external context thus if and to what extent 
passage of time had influenced it, we decided to treat these two variables as 
independent i.e. we did not attribute a higher level of context shift to the 
cases in which transfer was delayed. Once again, as stated above, these 
variations should, with sufficiently high numbers, tend to be fairly evenly 
distributed and thus not act as a confound of the independent variables we 
are studying. On the other hand, clearly, when we attempt to draw 
conclusions separating time and context effects we will need to be very 
cautious.
Part 1 of the experiment was identical to part 1 o f experiment 5, with the 
difference that, in this case, the client was in half of the cases an anonymous 
college testing some reading and comprehension materials to be used in its 
admission process and in the other half Warwick University running a 
psychology experiment. The participant subscribed just to a 15 minutes task
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and was not informed, for obvious reasons, that anything connected to the 
task would follow. As in experiment 5, participants who decided to take 
part, clicked on a link which brought them to the welcome page. As for 
experiment 5, after the participant input the required data correctly, they 
were allowed to move on to the following screen containing instructions on 
the first task (learning part). The instructions requested them to read and to 
summarize the stories while having them available for reference. They were 
allowed 15 minutes for this task. When the time expired, the system 
interrupted the task, displayed a message saying that time had expired and 
thanked participants.
Participants who had completed the learning part o f the experiment were 
sent a second email by Ipoints (at the time interval that we wanted to record) 
asking them to participate in another survey. The fact that both emails were 
from Ipoints could have been a cue for some participants, but we believe 
that it could only have been a very weak one because Ipoints members 
receive 1 -2 surveys per week.
Participants whose learning task had been presented as pre-testing of 
materials, now were asked to participate in an experiment and vice-versa. 
The email contained the link to the second part o f the experiment (the URL 
was differentiated between the two parts of the experiment so that it would 
not provide a cue). Clearly, the hope was that part 1 participants would also 
participate in part 2, but this was not guaranteed as we could not openly 
require it. We offered a slightly higher than usual ipoints/rmmxtQ rate, but 
could not over-pay participation because that would could have distorted 
results. Approximately 40-50% of the participants who had completed part 1 
also participated in part 2, and this required multiple mailings.
A couple of points regarding the consequences o f running web-based 
experiments should be mentioned. Firstly, it should be clarified that, since 
Ipoints has its own survey scheduling, rules and priorities, we were not free
of constraints in choosing when to send out our batches of emails nor in 
who to include in the batch (i.e. in some cases, only a subset of our 
participants were emailed as the others had been allotted to other surveys 
where their type of profile was needed). Moreover, in delayed experiments, 
variability was even greater. The consequences o f our “participant chase”, 
coupled with constraints on Ipoints’ side and with the fact that participants 
could perform the experiment immediately upon receiving the email or after 
several days (although we kindly required to reply in 24 hours, some 
participants responded after a few days), was that frequencies o f delays 
were not always the ones we had planned. Moreover, allocation to 
conditions was balanced (by the system) only in the learning phase (we had 
no control over who would decide to do part 2). These combined effects can 
lead, and sometimes led, to an uneven distribution of conditions in the delay 
categories, with the risk of delay acting as a confound. We decided to follow 
a practical approach in dealing with this undesired effect. Firstly, we always 
verified ex-post if there was a significant relationship between delay and 
condition (p > .10). If we found a significant relationship, we would limit 
our analyses at the infra-delay-category level, while if  we did not find 
significance, we could also perform them on all the cases. Secondly, 
regardless o f the type o f relationship we found, we always double-checked 
the analyses using only cases belonging to the same delay category. The 
problem with performing analyses at a single experiment level using one 
delay category at a time was that the number of cases was sometimes very 
low, thus diminishing power. This is one o f the reasons why we believe the 
analyses are more robust if  performed at aggregated data analyses level. 
Although we will draw some tentative conclusions in this chapter, the more 
solid conclusions regarding delayed transfer are to be found in chapter 7 .
Another possible consequence o f chasing participants with more than one 
email was that we could run into some self-selection effect with the risk of 
bringing confound variables into our analyses. In other words, it was not
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impossible that participants responding more promptly would somehow 
differ from the ones responding after one or two emails. In order to check if  
some characteristic connected to promptness in responding acted as a 
confound, we compared transfer rates of participants who responded at 
different times finding no significant differences {p > . 10).
Part 2 of the experiment, reached as usual by clicking on the link in the 
email, opened with a welcome screen where the participant registered 
entering her email- then our usual transfer task (Lucrezia story) was fired. 
Notice that we did not insert a distractor task before the transfer task as we 
had learned in or lab experiments No.l and 2 that this is not necessary as 
many natural distractors occur before transfer anyway.
Once completed, the system displayed our Questionnaire B. When the 
participant finished answering , the system ended the experiment thanking 
for participation.
Total duration (part 1 and part 2) was approximately 30 minutes (30 
minutes for the tasks, plus a few minutes for reading the welcome screen, 
registering and filling the questionnaires).
Results and discussion
Extending Gick and Holyoak’s results, in this experiment we found that- 
even after a delay - receiving one analog makes a significant positive 
difference in correctly solving the transfer task {p = .029, Fisher’s exact test, 
2-sided).
It should be underscored that even increasing the delay and context shift 
between learning and transfer, the advantage of receiving one analog is not 
lost. Considering only participants who transferred after 15 days, the 
difference in transfer levels with control group is still significant (p = .023, 
Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies of transfer are reported in the 
tables below.
Table 5.9
Frequencies o f  transfer — condition receiving one analog versus control -  
All cases
transfer of learning Total
yes no
number of analogs
participant learned 1 19 43 62
0 8 52 60
Total 27 95 122
Table 5.10
Frequencies o j transfer -  condition receiving one analog versus control - 
Delays over 15 days
transfer Total
yes no
number of analogs 
participant learned 1 10 19 29
0 8 52 60
Total 18 71 89
Once again, with an analysis on all cases in the experiment, we found, 
confirming our previous results, that receiving one analog versus two 
analogs did not make a significant positive difference in correctly solving 
the transfer task {p = .453, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies of 
transfer are reported in the table below.
Table 5.11
Frequencies o f  transfer  -  condition receiving one analog versus condition
receiving two analogs  —  all cases
transfer Total
yes no
number of analogs
learned 1 19 43 62
2 24 39 63
Total 43 82 125
We created four time categories (4) to be used, also in further 
experiments with time delays. The main reason to create these time intervals 
was to be able to perform analyses on more homogenous cases while 
analyzing the experiments one-by-one.
The delay categories are the following:
• transfer after less than 2 days from learning
• transfer after between 2 days and 8 days from learning
• transfer after between over 8 days and 15 days from learning
• transfer over 15 days from learning.
Considering cases belonging to each delay interval, we confirmed what 
we had found analyzing all cases together: differences in transfer between 
one and two analogs conditions were non-soignificant. Examining only one 
experiment and one delay interval at a time, non-significance can be due to 
the relatively low number o f cases in each cell. In chapter 7, through 
aggregated data analyses on all our cases and variables, we will be able to 
draw more robust conclusions. In any case, it should be underscored that 
the relationship between number o f analogs and transfer, even in the case of 
longer delays, was non-significant. This seems to indicate that the second
analog does not become critical to the transfer process even in presence of 
longer delays coupled with context shift between learning and transfer.
Analyzing all the cases, regardless of delay, number of analogs, one vs. 
two, does instead appear to have a significant relationship with explicit 
recognition {p = .004, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). If the same analysis is 
conducted per delay category, levels remain below p  < .10 for all categories 
of delay except the one between 8 and 15 days which had very small cell 
size and thus should be disregarded. With this data alone it is not possible to 
draw conclusions, but it could be that transfer is more implicit, in presence 
of a delay and a context shift, if  the learning is based on just one analog.
Table 5.12
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by number o f  analogs participant 
learned (one vs. two)
explicit recognition Total
yes no yes
number of analogs 
learned 1 25 37 62
2 42 21 63
Total 67 58 125
To start studying the impact of delay on transfer (this analysis will be 
performed on all experimental data considering interaction with other 
variables in chapter 7), we ran a binary logistic regression for our 
dichotomous dependent variable, transfer, using delay (expressed as 
logarithm of delay in hours) as our independent continuous variable. We 
chose to use logarithm of delay between learning and transfer because we 
expected time to have a logarithmic effect on transfer due to the nature of 
forgetting and because we found that log time was a better predictor than
linear time (i.e. the model with log time provided a better fit to the data than 
the model with linear time). We found that delay does not have a significant 
impact on transfer (B = -.229; SE = .795; p  = .191). We double checked 
transfer performance by delay category and again found no significant 
difference (p = .249, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). All the reported results 
were confirmed by analyses on cases belonging to the same condition. 
Although we had 125 cases in this experiment, we nevertheless thought that 
non-significance needed to be verified with the aggregated data analyses.
Logarithmic delay does, however, appear to have a significant 
relationship with explicit recognition for both the one analog (B  = -.568; SE 
= .250; p  = .023) and the two analogs conditions (B = -.615; SE -  .276; p  = 
.026). The result was confirmed performing the analysis on delay categories 
{p = .009, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Confirming Gick and Holyoak’s results, we found a significant 
relationship between quality of learning (measured on 3 categories) and 
transfer (p = .011, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 5.13
Frequencies o f  transfer by level o f  quality reached in learning task
transfer Total
yes no
level of quality 
reached in 
learning task no or very low learning 10 40 50
medium learning 26 37 63
high learning 7 5 12
Total 43 82 125
On the other hand, quality reached in the learning task does not show a 
significant relationship with explicit recognition (p -  .138, Fisher’s exact 
test, 2-sided). Frequencies o f explicit recognition are in the table below.
Table 5.14
Explicit recognition by level o f  quality reached in learning task
Explicit recognition Total
yes no
level of quality
reached in learning no or very low
task learning 22 28 50
medium
learning
36 7 63
high learning 9 3 12
Total 67 58 125
Recognition of analogy does not reache significance levels in its 
relationship with transfer (p = .089, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided), differently 
from what was found by Gick and Holyoak.
Table 5.15
Frequencies o f  transfer by explicit recognition o f  analogy (yes/no)
Transfer Total
yes no
explicit recognition yes 28 39 67
no 15 43 58
Total 43 82 125
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In this experiment, consistently with what we had found in experiment 5, 
number of analogs (one vs. two) did not have a significant relationship with 
transfer. In both cases, however, there had been a context shift, although of 
different entity, between learning and transfer. We thought it would be 
necessary at this point to verify what happened in the case o f low context 
shift.
EXPERIMENT 9
Although separating time and context effects is never completely 
possible, even in the lab where external context can be recreated almost 
perfectly, we wanted to un-bundle the two effects as much as we could. To 
achieve this, we needed to collect data on transfer with low context shift i.e. 
in which the presentation o f learning and transfer tasks would be identical. 
These cases would provide the “lower end” of our context shift scale. Our 
final aggregated data analyses would allow us to compare what effect 
different context shifts would bear on transfer.
We planned four experiments, o f which experiment 9 would be the first 
one, in which the usual relationships that we had studied with medium-low 
and medium context shift would be analysed under low-context shift 
conditions.
This experiment is in most respects identical to experiment 7, with the 
only difference that context shift between learning and transfer was in this 
case low (i.e. presentation of the learning and transfer tasks was identical in 
terms of emails received and o f screenshots). In other words, in experiments 
7 and 9, time delay was, on average, very close (9.6 versus 10.3 days) 
between the two experiments and so was the balance between conditions. 
This time, however, the context presented by the experiment was identical 
between parts 1 and 2.
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This experiment’s main specific objectives were to assess the effect of 
learned story analog versus control and to compare transfer levels in the 
case of one versus two analogs learned in delayed transfer conditions, with a 
low context shift and with a medium semantic distance between learning 
and transfer. As mentioned above, we were interested in highlighting 
possible differences with the similar situation, but with greater context shift.
Furthermore, we also wanted to continue to collect data on all the other 
relationships we were studying.
Background
Our reference background was the same as for our lab-based experiments 
2 and 3.
Method
Participants. There were 56 valid participants in two experimental 
conditions. Condition 1, with 32 participants, received two analogs which 
had to be summarized, and condition 2 , with 24 participants, received one 
analog and a non-analogous story which also had to be summarized. The 
control group, the same for all experiments using Lucrezia as transfer task 
(i.e. the transfer story with medium semantic distance to the learning 
stories), comprised 60 valid participants. All participants were recruited 
through Ipoints. In this experiment, participants’ gender and age were not 
collected.
Materials. We employed the same three learning stories that were used in 
experiment 5 (Three balls, Videogame, Seatbelts). The target story, as usual, 
was Lucrezia.
However, since in this experiment we were trying to create a low context 
shift, we presented both parts of the experiment in exactly the same way
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(i.e. a college pre-testing its admission materials) with identical looking 
emails and welcome screens. The typeface and look-and-feel of the web 
pages containing the learning stories and the target were also the identical. 
The questionnaire used was Questionnaire B.
In this experiment, the type of email used for both parts of the 
experiment was the one saying that a college who wished to remain 
anonymous was pre-testing some admission materials.
The number of ipoints credited to participants were 15 for part 1 and 30 
for part 2, exactly like in experiment 7.
Procedure. Transfer (experiment part 2) followed learning (experiment 
part 1) after a delay between 2 and 28 days (average delay was 10.3 days). 
Frequencies of the delays are reported in Annex 2. As in experiment 7, the 
variety and distribution of delays was not entirely under our control and we 
had to send two batches in order to get a reasonable number o f completed 
cases. Although we verified that there was no significant relationship 
between delay and condition (p > . 10), we will be cautious as usual drawing 
conclusions from the analysis we perform at the level o f this experiment. 
With aggregated data analyses we will be able to overcome this problem.
As in experiment 7, we had to send out two batches o f emails for part 2 
of the experiment adapting our schedule to Ipoints other mailings and 
participants did not all reply promptly.
Results and discussion
Extending Gick and Holyoak’s results, we found that - even after a delay- 
receiving one analog makes a significant positive difference in correctly 
solving the transfer task (p = .007, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies 
of transfer are reported in table 5.16. This marks a difference with Spencer 
and Weisberg’s (1986) and Catrambone and Holyoak’s (1989) results where 
delay and context shift impaired transfer even from two analogs.
Table 5.16
Frequencies o f  transfer by number o f  analogs (one or none)
transfer Total
yes no
1 analog 10 14 24
Control 8 52 60
Total 18 66 84
The advantage of receiving one analog, as in experiment 7, remains 
significant {p = .028, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) even considering just the 
cases in which transfer happened over 8 days after learning (the average 
delay for this category was 13.6 days).
Once again, we found no significant difference between receiving one or 
two analogs {p = .418, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies are reported 
in the table below. It should be noted that the relationship does not become 
significant even when just considering longer delays and that these results 
were verified at the delay-category level to ensure that delay was not acting 
as a confound.
Table 5.17
Frequencies o f  transfer by number o f  analogs (one or two) - all cases
transfer Total
yes no
number of
analogs 1 10 14 24
2 18 14 32
Total 28 28 56
We analysed the impact o f delay by performing the simple logistic 
regression already used in all the other delayed experiments, which resulted
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in a non-significant relationship for both the one analog condition (B = .050; 
SE = .466; p  = .914) and the two analogs condition {B = .520; SE = .508; p  
= .306). Although we verified our results using Fisher’s exact test obtaining 
the same non-significant results, we are aware that examining only one 
experiment, non-significance can be due to the relatively low number of 
cases in each cell. As we said commenting on this same analysis in previous 
time-delayed experiments, the relationship between delay and transfer is 
best understood through aggregated data analyses.
Performing the same type o f analysis, unfortunately with the same 
limitations, to investigate the relationship between explicit recognition and 
transfer, again it was found non-significant for both one analog condition (B 
= -.016; SE =.493; p  = .975). and two analog condition (B = .390; SE  = 
.467; p  = .403).
Confirming our previous results, learning quality was found to have a 
significant relationship with transfer even in presence of delay in transfer ip 
= .016, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 5.18
Frequencies o f  transfer by level o f  quality reached in learning
transfer Total
no yes
level of quality in 
learning task
no or very low 
learning
15 8 23
medium learning 13 14 27
high learning 0 6 6
Total 28 28 56
Quality o f learning does not have a significant relationship with explicit 
recognition, although levels are close (p = . 146, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 5.19
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  quality reached in learning
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
level of quality in no or very low 
learning task learning
10 13 23
medium learning 18 9 27
high.leaming 5 1 6
Total 33 23 56
In this experiment, explicit recognition was found to have a significant 
relationship with transfer (p = .029, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 5.20
Frequencies o f  transfer in participants who explicitly recognize, or do not 
explicitly recognize the analogy
transfer Total
no yes
explicit recogniti
on of analogy yes 12 21 33
no 16 7 23
Total 28 28 56
EXPERIMENT 11
Continuing our investigation o f transfer o f binary decision making in low 
context shift situations, we launched experiment 11. This experiment was to 
provide us with data at the lower end o f all our scales because, besides 
context-shift being low, transfer would follow learning with a short delay (5
minutes) and semantic distance between learning and transfer would be 
medium.
This experiment’s main specific objectives were to assess the effect of a 
prior story analog learned versus control and to compare transfer levels in 
the case of one versus two analogs learned. Furthermore, we also wanted to 
continue to collect data on all the other relationships we were studying.
Background
Our reference background was the same as for our lab-based experiments 
2 and 3
Method
Participants. There were 33 valid participants in two experimental 
conditions. Condition 1, with 13 participants, received two analogs and 
condition 2 , with 20 participants, received one analog and a non-analogous 
story. Learning method was summarization in both conditions. The control 
group, the same for all experiments using Lucrezia as transfer task (i.e. the 
transfer story with medium semantic distance to the learning stories), 
comprised 60 valid participants. Gender and age group of participants were 
not collected in this experiment. All participants were paid 40 ipoints and 
recruited through Ipoints.
Materials. We employed the same materials used in experiments 5 and 
10: the three learning stories (Three balls, Videogame and Seatbelts) and  the 
target story {Lucrezia). Web-pages were exactly the same as those used in 
experiment 10 because, in the case of this experiment as in 10, we wanted to 
achieve to achieve a low level o f context shift (typeface and look-and-feel of 
the web pages containing the learning stories and the target were made to 
look the same). The distractor task was the one we used in previous almost-
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immediate transfer experiments (the participant had to identify a certain 
number of errors in a sentence) and was presented as a task on creativity. In 
this experiment we used our Questionnaire B and, in sequence, our Second 
questionnaire fo r  experimental conditions. Participants received just one 
email explaining who the client was (“a college wishing to remain 
anonymous”), what goal it was pursuing (pre-testing of some of the 
materials that are used in its admission procedure) how many ipoints would 
be credited for participation (40) and the link to the experiment.
Procedure. Procedure was exactly the same as experiment 5. The only 
difference was that this time learning and transfer tasks were presented 
identically, as pre-testing o f college admission materials, i.e. the web-pages 
would be in all similar. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions, distinguished by the number of analoguous stories (1 or 2) they 
were given in the learning phase of the experiment. Like in experiment 5, in 
this experiment transfer (experiment part 2) followed learning (experiment 
part I) after 5 minutes filled with the creativity distractor task. Total 
duration was approximately 35 minutes (35 minutes for the tasks, plus a few 
minutes for reading the welcome screen, registering and filling the 
questionnaire).
Results and discussion
Once again we were able to confirm the impact on transfer o f receiving a 
prior analog. Transfer levels of the condition receiving one analog were 
significantly higher than those of the condition receiving none (p ~ .002, 
Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 5.21
Frequencies o f  transfer by number o f  analogs received (one or two)
transfer Total
no yes
number of analogs
participant learned 0 52 8 60
1 10 10 20
Total 62 18 80
Again we did not find significantly different transfer levels between 
conditions receiving one or two analogs (p = .722, Fisher’s exact test, 2- 
sided). It should be pointed out that, although non significant, the difference 
was in favour of the one-analog condition.
Table 5.22
Frequencies o f  transfer by number o f  analogs received (one or none)
transfer Total
no yes
number of analogs
participant learned 1 10 10 20
2 8 5 13
Total 18 15 33
Furthermore, number o f analogs (one vs. two) does not seem to have a 
significant relationship with explicit recognition (p = .039, Fisher’s exact 
test, 2-sided).
Table 5.23
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by number o f  analogs (one or two)
learned
explicit recognition Total
yes no
number of analogs
1 16 4 20
2 10 3 13
Total 26 7 33
Possibly due to the small numbers involved, in this experiment we did 
not find significance in the relationship between quality and transfer {p = 
.277, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) nor in the one between explicit recognition 
and transfer (p = 1, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 5.24
Frequencies o f  transfer by level o f  quality reached
transfer Total
no yes
level of quality in
learning task no or very low
learning 5 2 7
medium
learning
12 9 21
high learning 1 4 5
Total 18 15 33
The relationship between quality reached in the learning task and explicit 
recognition is significant (p = .039, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
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Table 5.25
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  quality reached in the
learning task
Explicit recognition Total
yes no
level of quality in no or very low
learning task learning 3 4 7
medium learning 18 3 21
high learning 5 0 5
Total 26 7 33
The relationship between explicit recognition and transfer was non 
significant {p = 1, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 5.26
Frequencies o f  transfer per explicit recognition (Y/N)
.......
transfer Total
yes no
explicit recognition yes 12 14 26
no 3 4 7
Total 15 18 33
So far, number o f analogs (one vs. two) had not proven to make a 
significant difference in transfer rates. The results, however, had been 
obtained using a transfer story which had only a medium semantic distance 
with the learning story. Results needed to be verified increasing semantic 
distance.
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EXPERIMENT 13
In the experiments so far, we had analysed time and context effects and 
collected the data that, through aggregated data analyses of variance would 
answer even more questions on the relationships between time, context and 
transfer. The key dimension which we hadn’t touched yet and that we 
wanted to investigate with the experiments to come was semantic distance.
We were expecting that increasing semantic distance would decrease 
transfer significantly, but would this be enough to impair transfer from one 
analog? Would two analogs now lead to higher levels of transfer than just 
one? Would schema, which did not appear to play a role in binary decision 
making transfer with a medium semantic distance between learning and 
target, now become relevant? We decided to launch some experiments in 
which semantic distance was high in order to see what would happen to 
transfer and explicit recognition o f analogy under this new condition and to 
collect data for our aggregated data analyses which would investigate 
interactions between our variables. We decided to keep context shift low in 
experiments with high semantic distance fearing a floor effect.
This experiment is identical in procedure to experiment 9 and it’s main 
focus was also the same: to investigate the relationship between number of 
analogs and transfer. The only difference was that semantic distance 
between learning and transfer was high in this experiment Furthermore, we 
also wanted to continue to collect data on all the other relationships we were 
studying.
Background
As in previous (experiments on context and time effects, our references 
were Gick and Holyoak (1983), Catrambone and Holyoak’s (1989) and 
Spencer and W eisberg’s (1986) experiments. This time, since we were using
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a more semantically distant story than in previous experiments, we thought 
that the situation we were creating was a bit closer to the ones in the cited 
experiments (cues between learning and transfer were greatly reduced).
In literature, semantic distance is reported to influence transfer 
negatively. Gick and Holyoak (1980 and 1983) found higher un-hinted 
transfer rates in the case of semantically closer stories, such as the Birthday 
Party and M aier’s Cord Problem , than in the case of the General and 
Dunker’s Tumour Problem. They attributed this to the higher number of 
potential cues between the analog and the target, due to higher similarity, 
which increases the probability o f noticing the analogy without a hint.
Method
Participants. There were 56 valid participants in two experimental 
conditions. Condition 1, with 13 participants, received two analogs which 
had to be summarized, and condition 2 , with 23 participants, received one 
analog and a non-analogous story which also had to be summarized. In this 
experiment, 33% o f participants’ were male and 67% female. Age was 
distributed between age groups as shown in Annex 2.
The control group comprised 26 valid participants. We checked as usual 
that gender and age did not have a significant relationship with transfer. All 
participants were recruited through Ipoints and paid the usual rate of 15 
ipoints for part 1 and 30 ipoints for part 2 o f the experiment.
Materials. We employed the same three learning stories that were used in 
our previous experiments ( Three balls, Videogame and Seatbelts). The 
target story, on the contrary, was a new one, called The Prisoners which we 
adapted from Krauss and Wang (2003) and which we report in Annex 1. We 
chose this story because, although perfectly isomorphic with our Three ball 
story, its content is very distant (prisoners sentenced to death, but with a
possibility of being saved ) and the binary decision to be made at the end of 
it is not a switch-or-keep decision but a different-or-equal-chances decision.
Our learning stories were the usual ones about a choice initially made 
(e.g. ball selected), a loosing option being physically removed by a 
knowing agent (e.g. a ball discarded by the host) and the possibility of 
changing one’s selection (e.g. choosing another ball). However, this time, 
our target story was about initial probabilities (survival o f each prisoner), a 
loosing option being logically eliminated (e.g. the warden saying to one of 
the prisoners who will not be graced out o f the remaining prisoners) and the 
question, this time, was if, after the warden’s answer, the chances of 
survival of the remaining two prisoners were the same. Analogously to what 
happens in the learning story, since the warden’s answer is constrained (in 
this case by the fact he cannot reveal who will be graced), the probabilities 
change. Apart from the fact that both the learning and the target stories 
contained elements o f probability (which is probably not a rare enough 
feature to link them very closely), this time there were only structural 
analogies between learning and target. We thought this target story was as 
cue-free as we could possibly make it and decided that it was the best 
candidate for becoming our high semantic distance target story. Since, 
however, a proper metric o f semantic distance does not exist, we wished to 
double-check that, in fact, people perceived The Prisoners as a more distant 
story than Lucrezia and, if so, how much more distant. We therefore asked a 
group of 13 adults to read our learning stories first and our two target stories 
(Lucrezia and The Prisoners) immediately after and answer two questions. 
The first was simply to indicate if  they thought one o f the two stories was 
more similar to the learning stories they had just read (in which case, they 
were to say which), or if  they found no difference. The second task was to 
rate the difference they perceived between the learning stories and each of 
the two target stories on a three value scale (low, medium and high 
distance). We briefly gave examples o f what low, medium and high would
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mean (using as examples some o f the stories used by Gick and Holyoak). 
We told participants that they could rate both stories the same, even if they 
had indicated one o f the two to be more distant than the other in the 
previous question. We would take that to mean that they did not find there 
was a big difference, but still one o f the two was slightly more distant.
On the first question, we had total consensus, with all participants 
indicating The Prisoners as the most distant o f the two. On the second, 10 
of our 13 participants rated Lucrezia “medium” and The Prisoners “high” in 
terms o f  semantic distance. One participant rated Lucrezia “low” and The 
Prisoners “medium”, another rated both “medium” and another both “high”. 
We concluded that our intuitive rating was acceptable and confirmed the 
stories’ rating in terms o f semantic distance.
As in experiment 9, in this experiment context shift was low: we 
presented both parts of the experiment exactly in the same way with 
identical looking emails and welcome screens. The typeface and look-and- 
feel of the web pages (in Annex 3) were also identical in both parts of the 
experiment.
The questionnaires used were the Questionnaire B.
In this experiment, the two emails used (containing the links to part 1 or 
2) were the same used in experiments 11 and 12. Both emails were in the 
exact same format, mentioning the same client and goal.
Procedure. This experiment followed the exact same procedure followed 
by experiment 9.
In this experiment, transfer (experiment part 2) followed learning 
(experiment part 1) after a delay between 1 and 14 days. Frequencies o f the 
delays are reported in Annex 2. We verified that there was no significant 
relationship between delay and condition (/?>.10).
In this experiment, we had to send out two batches o f emails for both 
parts 1 and 2 o f the experiment adapting our schedule to Ipoints’ other 
mailings and participants did not all reply promptly.
Results and discussion
As expected, transfer levels were lower in this experiment than in its twin 
experiment (experiment 9) with a lower semantic distance between learning 
analogs and transfer.
Transfer levels were down to 15.4% for participants receiving two 
analogs (in experiment 10 this condition transferred in 56.3% of the cases) 
and to 21.7% (vs. 41.7% in experiment 10) for participants receiving one. It 
was indeed the case that semantic distance was impairing transfer.
Despite this decrease in transfer and the fact that there was a delay 
between learning and transfer, we found that - even with a semantically 
distant target- the condition receiving one analog performed significantly 
above control group levels {p = .018, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). 
Frequencies o f transfer are reported in the table below.
Table 5.27
Frequencies o f  transfer by number o f  analogs (one or none)
transfer Total
yes no
Number of analogs 1 5 18 23
0 0 26 26
Total 5 44 49
Once again, despite the increased semantic distance, we found no 
significant difference in transfer levels between participants receiving one or 
two analogs (p = .1, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) on all cases. Non-
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significance was confirmed at a single delay-category level. At this point we 
were beginning to think that, in binary decision making problems, the 
second analog was really not adding much in terms o f transfer potential.
Table 5.28
Frequencies o f transfer by number o f  analogs (one or two)
transfer of learning Total
yes no
number of analogs 
learned 1 5 18 23
2 2 11 13
Total 7 29 36
In this experiment we had less variety in delays than in the others 
(approximately 75% of the participants transferred at similar delays: up to 2 
days between learning and transfer, with a mean of 1.4 days). Nevertheless, 
we performed our usual logistic regression to find that significance was 
never reached, neither considering all the cases together (B = 1.729; SE = 
1.094; /? = . 114), nor considering the two analogs condition (B = .351; SE = 
1.329; p  = .792) nor the one analog condition (B = 2.668; SE =1.575; p  = 
.090).
As for the relationship between delay and explicit recognition, it was also 
not found significant for all the data considered together (B = .487; SE  = 
.462; p  = .292), for the two analogs (B -  1.043; SE = .975; p  = .285) and for 
the one analog condition (B = 311; SE  = .582; p  -  .593)
In this experiment the relationship between quality of learning and 
transfer did not reach significance levels but approached them closely (p = 
.109, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
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Table 5.29
Frequencies o f  transfer by level o f  quality reached in learning task
transfer of learning Total
yes no
level of quality 
in learning task
no or very low 
learning 1 16 17
medium learning 5 10 15
high learning 1 3 4
Total 7 29 36
In this experiment the relationship between quality o f learning and 
explicit recognition was not significant {p = .155, Fisher’s exact test, 2- 
sided). Once again it should be noted that the number of cases is very small.
Table 5.30
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  quality reached in the 
learning task
explicit recognition of analogy
yes no
Total
level of quality 
in learning task
no or very low 
learning
medium learning 
high learning 
Total
11
12
3
26
6
3
1
10
17
15
4
36
Considering the level o f semantic distance separating learning and 
transfer, the explicit recognition rate (72% overall) was high. While transfer 
rates decrease as semantic distance increases, this does not seem to be the 
case for explicit recognition. It is possible that the way our questionnaire 
was formulated it still inflated the figures o f explicit recognition, but even
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discounting it, the result is strikingly high. We were curious to see if it 
would stay at the same levels in our next experiments with our high 
semantic distance story.
As for the relationship between explicit recognition and transfer, it was 
non-significant (p = .155, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies o f 
transfer are reported in the tables below.
Table 5.31
Frequencies o f  transfer per explicit recognition (Y/N)
transfer of learning Total
yes no
Explicit recognition yes 7 19 26
no 0 10 10
Total 7 29 36
EXPERIMENT 15
At this point, to complete our exploration on high semantic distance 
transfer, we needed to understand what happened when transfer followed 
learning very shortly - our 5 minutes interval. We tried this in our 
experiment 15, in most respects similar to experiment 11, with the only 
difference that semantic distance between learning and transfer was high in 
this case.
This experiment’s main specific objectives were to assess the effect o f a 
prior story analog learned versus no-analog learning and to compare transfer 
levels in the case o f one versus two analogs learned under the following 
conditions: almost-immediate transfer (5 minutes), low context shift and 
high semantic distance between learning and transfer. Furthermore, we also
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wanted to continue to collect data on all the other relationships we were 
studying.
Background
Our reference background was the same as for our lab-based experiments 2 
and 3.
Method
Participants. There were 81 valid participants in two experimental 
conditions all recruited through Ipoints as usual. Condition 1, with 41 
participants, received two analogs which had to be summarized, and 
condition 2, with 40 participants, received one analog and a non-analogous 
story which also had to be summarized. In this experiment, participants’ 
were 43% male and 57% female. Age was distributed between age groups 
as shown in Annex 2.
The control group, the same for all experiments using The Prisoners as 
transfer task (i.e. the transfer story with medium high distance to the 
learning stories), comprised 26 valid participants. The number o f ipoints 
credited to participants were 40, as in all similar experiments. All 
participants were recruited through Ipoints.
Materials. We employed the same materials used in all experiments with 
the same goals (three learning stories Three balls, Videogame and 
Seatbelts). The target story, with high semantic distance from the learning 
stories, was The Prisoners. Web-pages are exactly the same as those used 
in experiment 10 and 12 because we wanted to achieve to achieve a low 
level of context shift (typeface and look-and-feel o f the web pages 
containing the learning stories and the target were made to look the same). 
The distractor task was the one we used in all previous almost-immediate
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transfer experiments (the participant had to identify a certain number of 
errors in a sentence) and was presented as task on creativity. The 
questionnaires used were as usual the Questionnaire B and, in sequence, our 
Second questionnaire fo r  experimental conditions. In this experiment only 
one type o f email (the one saying that a college who wished to remain 
anonymous was pre-testing some admission materials) was sent to 
participants. The number o f ipoints credited to participants was the usual 40.
Procedure. Procedure in this experiment is identical to experiment 11 
with only a difference in the material used for the target story which, in this 
experiment, was The Prisoners. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions, distinguished by the number o f analoguous stories (1 or 
2) they were given in the learning phase of the experiment. Like in 
experiment 12, in this experiment transfer (experiment part 2) followed 
learning (experiment part 1) after 5 minutes filled with the creativity 
distractor task. Total duration o f the experiment was approximately 35 
minutes (35 minutes for the tasks, plus a few minutes for reading the 
welcome screen, registering and filling the questionnaire).
Results and discussion
Overall, transfer rates in this experiment were lower than the ones 
registered in the identical experiment (11) which used a target story with 
medium semantic distance from the learning ones. The change in semantic 
distance had a clear impact on transfer which, on average, went down from 
44% to 23%.
Once again we were able to confirm the impact on transfer of receiving a 
prior analog, even in the case o f a target with high semantic distance from 
the learning stories. Transfer levels o f the condition receiving one analog 
were significantly higher than those o f the condition receiving none {p = 
.005, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
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Table 5.32
Frequencies o f  transfer by number o f  analogs (one vs. none)
transfer Total
yes no
number of analogs
learned 1 10 30 40
0 0 26 26
Total 10 56 66
As in most previous experiments we did not find significantly different 
transfer levels between conditions receiving one or two analogs (p = .798, 
Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 5.33
Frequencies o f  transfer by number o f  analogs (one vs. two)
transfer of learning Total
yes no
number of analogs
learned
1 10 30 40
2 9 32 41
Total 19 62 81
In this experiment we did not find significance in the relationship 
between quality and transfer (p = .353, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Number 
of analogs learned (one vs. two) does not have a significant relationship 
with explicit recognition (p = 1, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 5.34
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by number o f  analogs (one vs. two)
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
number of analogs learned
1 30 10 40
2 30 11 41
Total 60 21 81
Table 5.35
Frequencies o f  transfer by level o f  quality reached in learning
transfer of learning Total
yes no
level of quality in 
learning task
no or very low 
learning
medium learning
4
13
24
31
28
44
high learning 2 7 9
Total 19 62 81
The relationship between quality reached in the learning task and explicit 
recognition is non significant (p = .667, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 5.36
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  quality reached in learning
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
level of quality in no or very low
learning task learning 19 9 28
medium learning 34 10 44
high learning 7 2 9
Total 60 21 81
Recognition levels were quite high (74% overall) considering the 
semantic distance between learning and target. Not surprisingly, since 
transfer rates were, instead, quite low in this experiment as in the others 
using our high semantic distance target story, explicit recognition was not 
found to have a significant relationship with transfer (p = .372, Fisher’s 
exact test, 2-sided).
Table 5.37
Frequencies o f  transfer in participants who explicitly recognize/ do not 
recognize the analogy
transfer of learning Total
yes no
Explicit recognition yes 16 44 60
no 3 18 21
Total 19 62 81
EXPERIMENT 17
Our hypothesis concerning diversity of exemplars was that it didn’t make 
a difference in transfer because Gick and Holyoak (1983) had found no 
impact of exemplar diversity and we had found that the second analog did 
not make a difference. We also thought, however, that learning from two 
very different exemplars could implicitly teach participants that analogs 
may take very distant forms. We wondered if, perhaps, by increasing the 
distance between the learned exemplars, the second analog might become 
more relevant. If not on transfer, we wondered if, at least, it would increase 
explicit recognition.
We decided to perform the experiment with our high semantic distance 
target story because we thought that a more challenging situation might
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provide more opportunity to differentiate results. The effects of exemplar 
diversity were tested under the following conditions: short delay (5 minutes) 
transfer conditions, low context shift and high semantic distance between 
learning and transfer. The learning method used was summarization. As for 
all other experiments, the experiment was also aimed at understanding the 
relationship between quality of learning and transfer, between explicit 
recognition and transfer and between quality of learning and explicit 
recognition.
Background
Although literature on learning seems to indicate that more diversity is 
better for transfer, this was not confirmed by analogical transfer studies. 
Studies o f perceptual category learning (Posner and Keele, 1968; Fried and 
Holyoak) have shown superiority in transfer performance when learning is 
supported by diverse exemplars. On the other hand, it is also known that 
perceptual categories are learned more slowly with highly variable training 
exemplars (Fried and Holyoak). In the specific domain of analogical 
transfer, however, Gick and Holyock (1983, experiment 4) did not find 
significant differences in between participants who had learned with analogs 
from different or similar domains. Similarly, they found no impact o f 
exemplar diversity on schema quality.
Method
Participants. There were 148 valid participants in two experimental 
conditions: condition 1, for which diversity of learning stories was low, with 
76 participants and condition 2 , for which diversity of learning stories was 
high, with 71 participants. O f the participants, 40% were male and 60% 
were female. Their distribution by age group is reported in Annex 2. As
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usual it was verified that gender and age group did not have significant 
relationships with transfer (p>.10).
Materials. We used four learning stories (Three balls, Four boxes, 
Anastasia, Lucrezia 2) which differed in their degree of diversity i.e. 
superficial similarity to each other. Three Balls was the same story used in 
our previous experiments while the others were new. Two pairs of stories 
(Three balls and Four boxes and the Anastasia and Lucrezia 2) shared many 
superficial features, while the other two pairs (Four boxes and Anastasia, 
Three balls and Lucrezia) shared none and were more diverse -qualitatively 
speaking- than our previous learning stories (Three balls and Videogame) 
had been. The target story was The Prisoners, with a high distance from the 
learning stories. Since we were trying to create just a low context shift in 
this experiment, typeface and look-and-feel of the web pages containing the 
learning stories and the target were the same. The questionnaire used was 
the same used in previous experiments (Questionnaire B) and so was the 
email, (identical to the one used in our short- transfer and low context shift 
experiments).
Procedure. This experiment follows the same procedure of our short- 
delay transfer experiments, from which it differs only in materials. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 2 experimental conditions 
characterized by the level of superficial similarity of the learning stories. 
Participants in the low diversity condition received 2 superficially similar 
learning stories (either 3 balls and 4 boxes or Anastasia and Lucrezia 2). 
Participants in the high diversity condition received 2 superficially 
dissimilar learning stories (either Three balls and Lucrezia or Anastasia and  
4 boxes). Order o f presentation o f the stories was counterbalanced. In part 1 
of the experiment, similarly to what we had done in our previous 
experiments all participants were given 15 minutes to write a detailed 
summary of each story, after which they were moved on to our usual 
creativity distractor task which lasted 5 minutes. Part 2 of the experiment
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was identical to part 2 o f experiments 12 and 13: participants were 
presented the transfer task and were allowed 15 minutes to make the two 
decisions and to explain them. The experiment was ended by the usual 
questionnaire.
Results and discussion
Consistent with all the other experiments employing our high semantic 
distance story, we found transfer levels to be lower than in experiments 
using the medium semantic distance story. In the case of this experiment, 
transfer levels were on average 20%. Confirming Gick and Holyoak’s 
results (1983), we did not find significant differences in transfer (p = .535, 
Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) nor in explicit recognition (p = 1, Fisher’s exact 
test, 2-sided) depending on diversity of learning stories
Table 5.38
Frequencies o f  transfer by diversity o f  learning analogs
transfer of learning Total
yes no
diversity of learning stories low 13 63 76
high 16 56 72
Total 29 119 148
Table 5.39
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by diversity o f  learning analogs
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
diversity of learning stories low 58 18 76
high 54 18 72
Total 112 36 148
In this experiment we found a significant relationship between quality 
reached in the learning task and transfer (p = .001, Fisher’s exact test, 2- 
sided). It would appear from this experiment that quality of learning -  and 
not just quality o f schema -  can be a driver of transfer since the participants 
in this experiment were simply summarizing and not comparing analogs.
Table 5.40
Frequencies o f  transfer by level o f  quality reached in the learning task
transfer Total
yes no
level of quality 
in learning task
no or very low 
learning
10 81 91
medium learning 13 32 45
high learning 6 6 12
Total 29 119 148
On the other hand, the relationship between quality of learning and 
explicit recognition was not significant (p = .497, Fisher’s exact test, 2- 
sided).
Table 5.41
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  quality reached in the 
learning task
Explicit recognition Total
yes no
level of quality 
in learning task
no or very low 
learning 67 24 91
medium learning 34 11 45
high learning 11 1 12
Total 112 36 148
Recognition o f analogy was again high (76% on average) in this 
experiment and it had a significant relationship with transfer (p = .003, 
Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 5.42
Frequencies o f  transfer per explicit recognition (Y/N)
transfer Total
yes no
explicit recognition of analogy yes 28 84 112
no 1 35 36
Total 29 119 148
5.3 General Discussion of Experiments on Number and Diversity of 
Analogs
In this section we wish to summarize and comment the results presented 
analytically so far. A high-level view o f experimental results will be 
reported in tables preceded by a few lines of commentary.
Transfer with one analog learned versus control
Examining all the experiments which compared solution rates of 
participants learning from one analog to control group, it is clearly the case 
that one analog leads to transfer. The result holds true even in the more 
“extreme” conditions which we tested i.e. presence of long delays coupled 
with medium level context shift or with high semantic distance of target 
story. This marks a difference with the results obtained in open-ended 
problem solving studies where contextual shifts and time delays impaired 
transfer from one and even from two analogs.
Table 5.43
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between number o f  analogs 
(one vs. no analog) and transfer
Experiment
number
Number of cases (*) Significance level of 
relationship 
(Fisher’s exact test, 
2-sided)
Significant
relationship
(Y/N)
5 77 p = .000 Y
7 122 p = .029 Y
9 84 p = .007 Y
11 80 p = .002 Y
13 49 p = .018 Y
15 66 p = .005 Y
(*) condition 2 o f  the listed experiments vs. control groups. Experiments 5-11 use Lucrezia  
story control group, experiments 13-15 Prisoners  control group.
Relationship between number o f analogs learned (one vs. two) and 
transfer
Examining all the experiments which compared transfer rates of 
participants learning from one vs. two analogs, it seems that there is no 
significant difference in terms o f transfer. As always, however, non­
significance could be due to lack of statistical power and the result should 
be verified with aggregated data analyses.
Catrambone and Holyoak (1989) had found that two analogs led to 
higher transfer than one, even if simply summarized, in conditions of 
immediate transfer. Spencer and Weisberg (1986), on the other hand, had 
shown that introducing contextual shifts and time delays eliminated un­
hinted transfer, even from two analogs. They concluded that finding the 
convergence solution in the Radiation problem without a hint was 
independent o f the number o f analogs received (0,1 or 2). However, given 
that the obtained a floor effect in un-hinted transfer, caution should be used 
in interpreting the result. As for hinted transfer, they confirmed Gick and
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Holyoak’s (1983) results finding that two analogs lead to higher transfer 
than just one.
Table 5.44
Summary> o f experimental results. Relationship between number o f  analogs 
(one vs. two) and transfer
Experiment
number
Number of cases Significance lerel of 
relationship (Fisher’s exact 
test, 2-sided)
Significant!
relationship
(Y/N)
5 32 p = .036 Y (*)
7 125 p =. 798 N
9 56 p = .418 N
11 33 p = .722 N
13 36 p =  1 N
15 81 p = .798 N
(*) In favour o f  one analog condition
Relationship between number o f  analogs learned (one vs. two) and explicit 
recognition
Since significance was reached only in one out of 6 experiments, 
evidence seems to indicate that number of analogs does not harve a 
significant relationship with explicit recognition. As always, however, non­
significance could be due to lack of statistical power and the result should 
be verified with aggregated data analyses.
Table 5.45
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between number o f  analogs
learned and explicit recognition
Experiment
number
Number of 
cases
Significance level of 
relationship (Fisher’s 
exact test, 2-sided)
Significant
relationship
(Y/N)
Notes
5 32 p = 1 N
7 125 p = .004 Y
9 56 p  = .105 N p>.10 even within 
category 2-8 days (38 
cases)
11 33 p  = 1 N
13 36 p  = 1 N
15 81 p  = 1 N
Relationship between delay and transfer
The relationship between delay and transfer appears non-significant, but 
could be significant in interaction with other variables. Moreover, non­
significance could be due to lack o f statistical power and the result should 
be verified with aggregated data analyses. In open ended problem-solving 
transfer studies (Spencer and Weisberg, 1986; Catrambone and Holyoak, 
1989), the simple interposition o f a short delay between learning and 
transfer (6 or 30 minutes) filled with an unrelated activity or task eliminated 
un-hinted transfer, while, with our task, this did not happen.
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Table 5.46
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between delay and transfe.
Experiment
number
Number of 
cases
Significance level of relationship 
(binary logistic regression)
Significant 
relationship (Y/N)
7 125 p = .191 N
9 56 p = .914 (one analog) 
p = .306 (two analogs)
N
13 36 p = .090 (one analog) 
p = .792 (two analogs)
N
Relationship between delay and explicit recognition
The relationship between explicit recognition and transfer provides 
mixed evidence and must be checked for interaction effects between 
variables. In open ended problem-solving transfer studies (Spencer and 
Weisberg, 1986; Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989), the simple interposition 
of a short delay between learning and transfer (6 or 30 minutes) filled with 
an unrelated activity or task eliminated un-hinted transfer (based on analogy 
recognition), while, with our task, this did not happen.
Table 5.47
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between delay and explicit 
recognition
Experiment
number
Number of 
cases
Significance level of relationship 
(binary logistic regression)
Significant
relationship
(Y/N)
7 125 p = .023 (one analog) 
p = .026 (two analog)
Y
9 56 p = .975 (one analog) 
p = .403 (two analog)
N
13 36 p = .285 (one analog) 
p = .593 (two analogs)
N
Relationship between quality o f  learning and transfer
The relationship between quality o f learning and transfer provides mixed 
evidence and should be explored further. In open ended problem-solving 
immediate same-context transfer studies, schema quality was a predictor of 
transfer (Gick and Holyoak, 1983). In delayed and contextually shifted 
open ended problem-solving transfer studies (Spencer and Weisberg, 1986; 
Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989), schema quality was a predictor of hinted, 
but not o f un-hinted transfer.
Table 5.48
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between quality o f  learning 
and transfer
Experiment
number
Number of 
cases
Significance level of relationship 
(Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided)
Significant 
relationship (Y/N)
5 32 p = .622 N
7 125 p = .011 Y
9 56 p = .016 Y
11 33 p = .277 N
13 36 p = .109 N
15 81 p = .353 N
17 148 p = .001 Y
Relationship between quality o f  learning and explicit recognition
The relationship between quality o f learning and explicit recognition 
provides mixed evidence which does not support any strong hypothesis 
concerning the nature o f the relationship.
Table 5.49
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between quality o f  learning 
and explicit recognition
Experiment
number
Number of 
cases
Significance level of relationship 
(Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided)
Significant 
relationship (Y/N)
5 32 P = .250 N
7 125 p = .138 N
9 56 p = .146 N
11 33 P = .039 Y
13 36 p = .155 N
15 81 p = .667 N
17 148 p = .497 N
Relationship between explicit recognition and transfer
The relationship between explicit recognition and transfer provides 
mixed evidence which does not allow to formulate a strong hypothesis 
concerning the nature o f the relationship. In open ended problem solving 
studies, noticing the analogy was a crucial enabling factor o f transfer.
Table 5.50
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between explicit recognition 
and transfer
Experiment
number
Number of
cases
Significance level of relationship 
(Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided)
Significant relationship 
(Y/N)
5 32 P = .10l N
7 125 ii oc N
9 56 p = .029 Y
II 33 p = . 1 N
13 36 p = .155 N
15 81 p = .372 N
17 148 p = .003 Y
5.4 Initial Conclusions and Open Issues
The experiments reported in this chapter were mainly aimed at 
investigating the relationship between number and diversity o f analogs and 
transfer but also enabled to analyse the relationships between delay and 
transfer, quality o f learning and transfer, explicit recognition and transfer 
and quality of learning and explicit recognition.
One analog surely proved to be enough to trigger transfer even in 
presence of long delays (over 15 days), with a medium context shift and 
with high distance between learning analogs and transfer. This confirms 
Gick and Holyoak’s (1983) results which, however, were based on 
immediate transfer and no context shift between learning and transfer. It 
differs, however, from Spencer and Weisberg’s (1986) and Catrambone and 
Holyoak’s (1989) results, in which transfer from one or even two analogs 
was impaired by context and time shifts.
In all our experiments comparing one versus two analogs, we never 
found that two analogs lead to higher transfer than one. It must be pointed 
out that this was true under very varied conditions: with very short (5 
minutes) as well as several days delay, with low to medium context shift 
and with medium to high semantic distance. Catrambone and Holyoak’s 
(1989) results, it must be underscored, showed that two analogs were better 
than one in immediate un-hinted transfer and no context shift as well as in 
hinted transfer with delays and context shifts. However, they had also found 
that introducing delays and context shift impaired un-hinted transfer even 
from two compared analogs, thus making transfer independent from the 
number o f analogs.
Evidence concerning the relationships between delay and transfer and 
between delay and explicit recognition seem to indicate that there is no 
relationship, but the issue requires further data and analysis.
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The relationship between quality of learning and transfer and between 
explicit recognition and transfer presented very mixed evidence and, again, 
we decided to postpone the answer to this question until we performed our 
aggregated data analyses.
Chapter 5 footnotes
(1) Some of the experiments were run in busy periods for Ipoints, with 
many surveys being launched simultaneously. This reduced the number 
of emails sent for those experiments, resulting in lower response rates.
(2) We had considered routinely balancing age and gender within 
conditions, but chose, instead, to perform a check on gender differences 
in transfer rates ex-post. The check would allow us to intervene (adding 
cases in order to counter-balance them within conditions) if  we found 
that gender and age made a difference. This decision was based on the 
following considerations. Firstly, since our primary goal was to perform 
aggregated data analyses across experiments, proper balancing of 
biographical-characteristics would have required to balance gender and 
age not only within experiments, but also across experiments (thus 
within conditions, delay categories, context shifts and levels o f semantic 
distance) which would have greatly complicated the overall design and 
required sophisticated programming. Balancing ex-ante would have also 
potentially led to a high number of rejected logons (preferably to be 
avoided) after the participant had input his/her biographical data, 
particularly after the various conditions began to “fill-up”. Secondly, 
since biographical data was never reported in the classic studies on 
transfer nor are counterbalancing measures, we concluded that gender 
and age were probably not a critical participant variables for this type of 
experiment.
(3)
Even in this case, we focussed on simplicity, after verifying that the 
different order of presentation did not affect transfer significantly. 
Counterbalancing would have implied a more complicated management 
of emails in the delayed-transfer experiments. In practice, we would 
have had to keep track o f which participants had received what type of 
presentation in part 1 and make sure they received the other type of 
presentation for part 2, thus creating two lists of participants each time 
we sent out a batch of emails. As our email batches were already much 
below the typical size that Ipoints was used to handling and required 
more attention (i.e. had to be sent out on specific days) we decided to 
avoid making it more demanding for them and riskier for us (the 
possibility o f Ipoints sending the wrong email would increase as the 
scheme got more complicated).
(4)
In deciding cut-offs between categories our primary goal was to cover a 
similar number o f days in each category, which we balanced with the
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fact that we needed a significant number of cases in each. Making the 
necessary compromises (this was done after the data was collected) we 
chose to create categories of 7 days each, with the exception of the first 
category which had to include only the cases up to a maximum of less 
than 2 days from learning otherwise it would have had too many cases 
(note that, due to the shape of the forgetting curve making the interval 
shorter is not wrong). The last category includes, in theory all delays 
over 15 days. In practice, we have no delays over 22 days, so it is de 
facto  a category made of 7 days like the previous two. Although our 
control over time delays is not complete, we were planning to restrict 
this category to up to 22 days also in the experiments to come (and, in 
fact, we had just 3 cases above 22 days).
CHAPTER 6 
WEB-BASED EXPERIMENTS ON 
LEARNING METHODS
6. WEB-BASED EXPERIMENTS ON LEARNING METHODS
This chapter reports the six web-based experiments which were mainly 
aimed at analyzing the impact of learning method on transfer under various 
conditions o f context shift, delay and semantic distance. Moreover, the 
experiments also compare learning by analogical encoding (i.e. a learning 
method based on comparison) to learning of just one analog (by 
summarization) to draw implications on schema mediation in transfer of 
binary decisions. In the following section the experiments are presented 
one-by-one. In section 6.2 we will summarize and discuss the results of the 
experiments presented in the chapter. In section 6.3 we will conclude the 
one-by-one experiment analysis summarizing what had been learned from it 
and what needed to be clarified by further analysis
6.1 Experiments on Learning Method and Schema
This section presents and discusses experiments mainly aimed at 
analyzing the relationships between learning method and transfer and 
between schema induction and transfer. The experiments also analyse the 
relationships between delay and transfer, quality of learning and transfer, 
explicit recognition and transfer and quality of learning and explicit 
recognition.
EXPERIMENT 6
According to Gick and Holyoak (1983) and Catrambone and Holyoak 
(1989), analogical encoding (i.e. learning two analogs by comparison) 
supports schema formation and leads to higher transfer than simple 
summarization o f two analogs in immediate and same context transfer
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conditions o f open ended problems. Catrambone and Holyoak (1989) also 
found, however, that the advantage of analogical encoding can be nullified 
by strong time-context effects. Studies in negotiation skills transfer, on the 
other hand, confirmed that analogical encoding leads to superior transfer, 
even after a delay (Loewenstein, Thompson and Gentner, 1999 and Gentner, 
Lowenstein and Thompson, 2003).
In our lab experiments, we had not found significant superiority (i.e. 
higher transfer) o f learning through comparison o f analogs versus learning 
through their simple summarization. If experiment 2, with its long delay and 
high context shift, might not have provided the ideal conditions for any 
difference in learning to affect transfer, experiment 3 had allowed 
significant transfer to take place, but still failed to reveal any difference 
between analogical encoding and summarization.
With this experiment we wanted to test transfer in a situation similar to 
the ones in the experiments we were comparing our results to. We therefore 
created the same situation used in experiment 5, in which learning was 
separated from transfer by just 5 minutes delay, in which context shift was 
medium-low and semantic distance between learning and transfer was 
medium. We also wanted to introduce what seemed to be an even more 
promising learning method, guided-comparison (i.e. a list o f detailed 
schema-oriented questions). The three learning methods we planned to 
compare in this experiment were: summarization ("writing a brief summary 
of each of the analogs), guided comparison (answering a set o f questions 
highlighting structural analogies between the two analogs) and free  
comparison (comparing the two analogs and identifying analogies).
We thought that, if differences in learning methods mattered, we should 
start seeing their effects because the methods were quite different and the 
procedure would surely allow full transfer effects.
In experiment 6 we also wanted to understand if schemata were as 
critical as they had proven to be in open ended problem solving. To do so,
248
we planned to confront the two comparison-based methods with simple 
summarization o f just one analog (using the cases from experiment 5). If 
one analog was found to produce as much transfer as comparison o f two 
analogs, then schema formation must not be key to transfer.
As in all other experiments, experiment 6 was also aimed at 
understanding the relationship between quality of learning and transfer. As 
for the relationships between explicit recognition and transfer and between 
quality of learning and explicit recognition, we decided to analyse them but 
not to use the data in our aggregated data analyses (presented in chapter 7 ) 
because, as was the case in experiment 5, we did not trust entirely the 
quality o f data collected on explicit recognition using our Questionnaire A.
Background
Our reference background was the same as for our lab-based experiments 
2 and 3. In summary, research in the domain o f problem solving and in 
negotiation skills indicate that comparison of two analogs leads to higher 
transfer than simple exposure to two analogs or to one in immediate and 
same-context type o f transfer. Research has however shown that context 
shifts, even when transfer follows learning shortly, sharply reduce or 
eliminate transfer from one or two analogs, even when the two analogs were 
learned by analogical encoding. In order to overcome contextual shifts, 
more analogy-oriented questions and an increase in number of analogs are 
necessary. Finally, existing research indicates that schema quality is a 
predictor o f transfer.
Method
Participants. There were 46 valid participants in three experimental 
conditions, 15 o f which were experiment 5 participants who had
249
summarized two analogs. We had 15 participants in condition 1 (learning by 
guided comparison), 16 participants in condition 2 (learning by free- 
comparison) and 15 condition 3 participants (learning by summarization), 
taken from experiment 5. The control group was the same we had used for 
experiment 5. Participants were paid 40 ipoints, as in experiment 5, for 
completion of the experiment and recruited, as usual, by Ipoints amongst its 
members.
Materials. We employed the same two learning stories, analogous to the 
target story, that we used in experiment 5 (Three balls, and Videogame, with 
a medium degree o f superficial similarity between each other). The target 
story, with a medium-semantic distance from the learning stories, was also 
the same we used in experiment 5 (Lucrezia) as were the distractor task (a 
creativity task) and the email (explaining that the task consisted in three 
experiments by Warwick University). In this experiment the final 
questionnaire was still the Questionnaire A. The web pages containing the 
learning stories, the distractor and the transfer task were all differentiated 
like we had done in experiment 5. All web-pages relevant to this experiment 
are available in Annex 1.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions, distinguished by the type of learning they were instructed to 
undertake: one was our guided comparison condition and the other our free- 
comparison one. For the summarization condition we used participants from 
experiment 5 who had received two analogs and summarized them.
The system was programmed to exclude participants who had taken part 
in our previous experiments and did so by denying enrolment (a message 
saying that enrolment was complete was displayed). This was a fail-safe 
mechanism we introduced, because, in principle, members who had been 
contacted previously should not have been emailed for participation.
The three learning methods were characterized by differing instructions 
on the learning method participants should follow and the learning output
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they should produce. Participants who were in the summarization condition 
were simply asked to write a brief summary for each of the two learning 
stories that would help them remember their key elements. Although 
participants were not instructed to look for analogies, searching for key 
elements should have helped finding them. Participants in guided  
comparison condition were required to answer a list o f seven analogy- 
oriented questions. With this method, participants were guided in their 
discovery of the analogies. Participants in free comparison condition 
(equivalent to Gick and Holyoak’s analogical encoding), were requested to 
briefly outline in which ways the learning stories were similar, to identify 
the key elements that they shared and to describe shortly the key learning 
point or principle that the stories had in common. In this case, participants 
were encouraged to look for similarities and analogies, but not explicitly 
instructed as to where these might be. It should be pointed out that this type 
o f learning is not as widely used as summarization or answering questions, 
which resulted in some participants partly “falling back” on summarization 
(i.e. de facto adopting a method which was half-way between 
summarization and comparison). Even participants who somewhat departed 
from the suggested learning method were retained in the experiment and in 
the condition they were assigned to, as long as they produced a learning 
output which contained some degree of comparison.
The experiment follows the exact same procedure as experiment 5, from 
which it differs only for the type o f learning task required and because all 
participants learned with two analogs. As was the case in experiment 5, 
participants who clicked on the link contained in the email sent by Ipoints 
were connected to a welcome screen, with Warwick University’s logo on it, 
where they were introduced to the tasks they were required to complete (the 
tasks were presented as separate experiments on different research topics) 
and asked for their email (in order to credit the points they would earn).
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As in experiment 5, participants’ first task was the learning task, for 
which they were allowed 15 minutes. The task itself w as differentiated 
between conditions: participants had to answer questions on the stories’ 
analogies or to compare them searching for analogies.
When the time expired, as in experiment 5, the system  moved the 
participant to a new screen, with different typeface, titled Experiment 2 on 
creativity, which gave participants 5 minutes to solve a creativity type 
riddle. Participants were allowed 5 minutes for the task and then moved to 
the last task.
The transfer task was presented as an experiment on decision making. 
The screen instructed participants to read two short stories and to make the 
decision at the end o f each, explaining why they made it. A s in experiment 
5, the typeface and the background colour was changed as well as the 
message displaying the time warnings, which was phrased differently and 
placed in a different part o f the screen.
When the time allocated to the transfer task was completed, the system 
displayed the questionnaire (Questionnaire A). The participant then 
submitted her answers to the questionnaire and the system  ended the 
experiment thanking them for participation. Total duration was 
approximately 35 minutes (35 minutes for the tasks, plus a few minutes for 
reading the welcome screen, registering and filling the questionnaire).
Results and discussion
Under our conditions (decision making, 5 minute delay, medium-low 
context shift and medium semantic distance) we found no significant 
difference in transfer between the learning methods we com pared {p = .125, 
Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). We could not confirm what had  been found in 
analogical transfer using open ended problems (Gick and Holyoak, 1983; 
Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989), i.e. that analogical encoding (similar to
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what we called free  comparison) leads to higher transfer than 
summarization nor that more directive comparison instructions (similar to 
what we called guided comparison) leads to significantly better transfer 
results (although this condition performed better than the others with a 50% 
vs. 20% transfer rate). Once again, these results were put “on hold”, waiting 
for the aggregated data analyses on all our data, due to the low number of 
cases in each condition.
Table 6.1
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  different types o f  learning
T ransfer Total
no yes
type of
learning Summarization (*) 12 3 15
guided comparison 8 8 16
free-style comparison 12 3 15
Total 32 14 46
(*) this these participants come from exp. 5
Moreover, confronting one analog condition (using experiment 5 
participants) vs. comparison-based learning conditions (guided and free 
comparison), we did not find significant differences ip -  .140, Fisher’s 
exact test, 2-sided) in transfer (Table 6.2). Since, with only one analog, no 
schema can be drawn, whereas with comparison learning it is likely to form, 
this could indicate that schemata play a lesser role in transfer. To ensure that 
results were not confounded by quality o f learning, we performed the same 
analysis on the higher quality o f learning cases (those falling in the medium 
and high learning categories), but still did not find significance.
Table 6.2
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  one analog condition vs. comparison-based
learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)
transfer of learning Total
yes no
Learning by comparison of 2
analogs
one analog only (*)
11 20 31
10 7 17
Total 21 27 48
(*) this these participants come from exp. 5
Furthermore, learning method does not seem to have a relationship with 
explicit recognition (p = .570, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Clearly the very 
low number o f cases make it difficult to detect significance and thus further 
experiments were planned to collect more data. Further, comparison 
between the one analog condition (from experiment 5) and the comparison 
conditions yielded no significant differences (p -  1, Fisher’s exact test, 2- 
sided), which we interpret to mean that schema formation is less relevant to 
explicit recognition than it was in open-ended studies. Frequencies are 
reported in the tables that follow.
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Table 6.3
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition fo r  different types o f  learning
Explicit recognition Total
yes no
type of 
learning Summarization (*) 4 11 15
guided comparison 5 11 16
free-style comparison 2 13 15
Total 11 35 46
(*) these participants come from exp. 5
Table 6.4
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition fo r  one analog condition vs. 
comparison-based learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
Comparison of 2 analogs 
one analog only (*) 7 24 31
4 13 17
Total 11 37 48
(*) these participants come from exp. 5
Before conducting the analysis o f the relationships between quality of 
learning and other variables, it was verified that type o f learning did not 
significantly impact on quality o f learning in this experiment, although 
levels were close with the comparison condition performing better than the 
other two conditions (p = .103, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). In this 
experiment, despite the extremely small numbers involved, we found a 
significant relationship between quality o f learning measured on 3 
categories and explicit recognition (p = .019, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided),
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and between quality o f learning and transfer (p = .030, Fisher’s exact test, 
2-sided), confirming Gick and Holyoak’s findings. Frequencies are reported 
in the tables below.
Table 6.5
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition per level o f  quality reached in learning 
task
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
level of quality in no or very low
learning task learning 0 12 12
medium learning 5 11 16
high learning 2 1 3
Total 7 24 31
Table 6.6
Frequencies o f  transfer per level o f  quality reached in learning task
transfer Total
yes no
level of quality in 
learning task
no or very low 
learning 1 11 12
medium learning 8 8 16
high learning 2 1 3
Total 11 20 31
Finally, we did not find a relationship between explicit recognition and 
transfer {p = .210, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided), but as already mentioned, 
the data on explicit recognition in this experiment might not be adequate.
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Table 6.7
Frequencies o f  transfer per explicit recognition (Y/N)
transfer Total
yes no
explicit recognition of analogy yes 4 3 7
no 7 17 24
Total 11 20 31
In conclusion, despite having reduced the interval between learning and 
transfer, we were not able to see any significant difference in transfer nor in 
explicit recognition o f participants according to learning methods. Schema 
also appeared to play a less relevant role. We were beginning to think that, 
in fact, binary decision making transfer might function differently than 
open-ended problem solving one. On the other hand, this time, we had 
found significant relationships between quality of learning and explicit 
recognition and between quality o f learning and transfer, so, there were 
clearly also similarities in the two types of transfer. We decided to continue 
our search for similarities and differences tackling another key issue, which 
we had left open in our lab experiments due to scarcity o f cases, the role of 
time-context effects on transfer.
EXPERIMENT 8
In our experiment 6 we analysed the relationship between number of 
analogs and transfer in immediate and same-context transfer. With this 
experiment, we wanted to complete our analysis focusing on the relationship 
between type o f learning {summarization, guided comparison and free  
comparison ) and transfer under time and context shifted conditions. From 
the problem solving transfer experiments we knew that, when open-ended 
problem solving transfer is context-shifted and delayed the benefit of
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comparison learning from two analogs may no longer be sufficient to 
produce transfer. As usual, we wanted to understand if time-context effects 
had the same effects in binary decision making transfer.
The experiment is similar to experiment 6, with the major difference that 
learning and transfer are separated by one to 21 days and the two are 
presented as different types o f tasks (testing o f college materials and 
experiment on decision making). With this experiment we wanted to 
“stretch” delay and context conditions o f a previous similar experiment in 
order to analyse the impact on the relationship we were studying.
Since delay o f transfer was manipulated in this experiment, we also 
wanted to begin to study the relationship between delay and transfer. To 
attain this goal, however, aggregated data analyses including all 
experimental data are best suited (this analysis is presented in chapter 7 ).
As in all other experiments, this experiment was also aimed at 
understanding the relationship between quality o f learning and transfer, 
between explicit recognition and transfer and between quality o f learning 
and explicit recognition.
Background
Our reference background was the same as for our lab-based experiments 
2 and 3
Method
Participants. There were 98 valid participants (o f which 30 were taken 
from experiment 7) in three experimental conditions: condition 1, learning 
by guided comparison, with 36 participants, condition 2, learning by free- 
comparison, with 32 participants and condition 3, learning by 
summarization, with 30 participants (these were condition 1 participants
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from experiment 7). Gender and age group was available only for 10 
participants. For these, we verified that there was no significant relationship 
between age/gender and transfer (^>.10). As usual, participants were paid 
15 ipoints for part 1 and 30 ipoints for part 2 o f the experiment and were 
recruited through Ipoints as described in chapter 5.
Materials. We employed the same two learning stories used in 
experiment 6 (3 balls and Videogame) and the same target story used in all 
previous experiments (Lucrezia). As in experiment 7, in order to create a 
high context shift between learning and transfer, typeface and look-and-feel 
o f the web pages as well as presentation o f the survey were differentiated. 
This time we did not counterbalance presentation of the two parts o f the 
experiment (the first part was always presented as pre-testing o f college 
materials, the second as an experiment), so we only had one set of learning 
task web-pages and one for the transfer task.
The learning task pages displayed a very anonymous and essential screen 
with a few words of introduction (consistent with the claim that the client 
was a college who wished to remain anonymous) while the transfer task 
pages displayed the Warwick University logo very visibly together with all 
the typical and lengthy introductory text to an experiment. The pages o f 
each task were in a similar style to the welcome page. Examples o f the web­
pages are reported in Annex 3.
In this experiment we used our Questionnaire B. Two types of emails 
were used to contact participants. These were the same two we used in 
experiment 7 for the group doing part 1 as pre-testing o f materials and part 2 
as an experiment. The first email explained who the client was (“a college 
wishing to remain anonymous”), what goal it was pursuing (pre-testing of 
some o f the materials that are used in its admission procedure) and how 
many ipoints would be credited to participants (15). Ipoints members who 
wanted to participate were instructed to click on the link contained in the 
email. The second email, sent to participants who had completed part 1 o f
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the experiment, explained who the client was (Warwick University 
Department o f Psychology), what goal it was pursuing (running an 
experiment on decision making) and how many ipoints would be credited to 
participants (30).
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one o f two 
conditions, distinguished by the type o f learning they were required to use in 
part 1 of the experiment, exactly like in experiment 6. The third condition 
was made o f participants in the two analogs summarization condition o f 
experiment 7, belonging to the group who had done learning presented as 
pre-testing of college materials and transfer presented as an experiment.
In this experiment, transfer (experiment part 2) followed learning 
(experiment part 1) after a delay between 1 and 20 days. Frequencies o f the 
delays are reported in Annex 2. We were not able, in this experiment, to 
distribute delays evenly amongst different conditions (i.e. learning 
methods). For this reason, when we analyse the relationships between 
learning methods and transfer/explicit recognition in this experiment, we 
will do so within delay categories and not on all the experiment’s data 
together.
Part 1 o f the experiment was identical to part 1 o f experiment 6, with the 
only difference that, in this case, the client was an anonymous college 
testing some reading and comprehension materials to be used in its 
admission process and that the participant subscribed just to a 15 minutes 
task. They were not informed, for obvious reasons, that anything connected 
to the task would follow.
As usual, participants received an email from Ipoints inviting them to 
participate in a survey. Those who decided to take part, clicked on a link 
which brought them to the welcome page. After the participant input the 
required data correctly, they were allowed to move on to the following 
screen containing instructions on the first task (learning part). The 
instructions requested them to read the stories and perform a learning task
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(different depending on condition) while having them available for 
reference. They were allowed 15 minutes for this task. When the time 
expired, the system interrupted the task, displayed a message saying that 
time had expired and thanked participants.
After one day (first email batch) participants who had completed part 1 
received an email containing a link to part 2. Those who did not participate 
at this point received another identical email 7 days after (second email 
batch). Again, those who had not participated in the first two rounds 
received an email 17 days after (third email batch). As already explained, 
the email containing the link to part 2 o f the experiment mentioned a 
different client and a different goal from the email that started part 1.
Part 2 o f the experiment- reached by clicking on the link in the email 
(note that the URL was also different so it would not provide a cue) - was 
presented as an experiment on decision making run by the Department of 
Psychology o f Warwick University. The first screen- presented after the 
participant registered entering her email- instructed participants to read two 
short stories and to make the decision at the end o f each, providing an 
explanation o f their choice. As mentioned in the materials section, the 
typeface was different from part 1, the background colour was changed 
from white to light blue and the message displaying the time warnings was 
phrased differently. These changes were done to eliminate possible cues 
between parts 1 and 2. Once the transfer task was completed, the system 
displayed the Questionnaire B  When the participant finished answering the 
last question, the system ended the experiment thanking them for 
participation.
Total duration (part 1 and part 2) was approximately 30 minutes (30 
minutes for the tasks, plus a few minutes for reading the welcome screen, 
registering and filling the questionnaires).
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Results and discussion
Analyses were performed only on cases belonging to the same delay 
interval due to an unequal distribution of delays (not always under our 
control) within conditions (i.e. conditions ended up with a different mix of 
delays).
As far as the relationship between learning method and transfer, we 
found contrasting results. In the category up to two days delay, we found 
significance (p = .004, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) while in the category 
between 2 and 8 days from learning we did not (p = .451, Fisher’s exact 
test, 2-sided). Other categories o f delay did not have enough cases or had 
cases concentrated in one condition.
Comparing transfer rates o f participants (from experiment 6) who had 
learned with just one analog and participants in comparison conditions with 
a delay between 2 and 8 days (this was the category in which we had most 
cases), again we found no significant relationship ip = .412, Fisher’s exact 
test, 2-sided). The analysis was performed on all other delay categories, 
never resulting in a significant relationship. Even in this experiment, we 
were not able to see any advantage of comparison learning conditions.
Table 6.8
Frequencies transfer by type o f  learning 
Delay category < 2 days
transfer of learning Total
yes no
Type of
learning summarization 3 11 14
guided comparison 7 9 16
free-style
6 0 6
comparison
Total 16 20 36
262
Table 6.9
Frequencies transfer by type o f  learning 
Delay category between 2 and 8 days
transfer of learning Total
yes no
type of
learning summarization 2 3 5
guided comparison 10 9 19
free-style comparison 8 16 24
Total 20 28 48
Table 6.10
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  one analog condition v.v. comparison-based 
learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)- delay between 2 and 8 
days
transfer of learning Total
yes no
Comparison learning (guided or
free) 18 25 43
One analog (*)
6 15 21
Total 24 40 64
(*) from experiment 6
Comparing explicit recognition o f participants who had learned with our 
three learning methods, 2 analogs and with a delay between 2 and 8 days 
(this was the delay category in which we had most cases), we found a non 
significant relationship {p = .731, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 6.11
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition fo r  different learning methods- delay
between 2 and 8 days
Explicit recognition Total
yes no
type of
learning summarization 3 2 5
guided comparison 13 6 19
free-style comparison 18 6 24
Total 34 14 48
Comparing explicit recognition o f participants (from experiment 6) who 
had learned with just one analog and participants in comparison conditions 
with a delay between 2 and 8 days (this was the category in which we had 
most cases), this time we found a significant relationship (p = .014, Fisher’s 
exact test, 2-sided). Clearly the result could be spurious. Frequencies are 
reported in the table that follows.
Table 6.12
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition o f  one analog condition vs. comparison- 
based learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)- delay between 2 
and 8 days
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
Comparison learning (guided or 
free) 31 12 43
One analog (*) 8 13 21
Total 39 25 64
(*) from experiment 6
In order to study the relationship between delay and transfer, we 
compared transfer results o f participants in the same learning condition who 
transferred at different time delays after learning (due to the mentioned issue 
of unequal distribution of delays and conditions, it did not make sense to 
perform the analysis across conditions). We ran a binary regression for our 
dichotomous dependent variable, transfer, using delay (expressed as 
logarithm of delay in hours) as our independent continuous variable, exactly 
as we had done in experiment 7. We found a significant relationship 
between delay and transfer rate in the case of participants learning by free- 
comparison (B = 0.16; SE = .007; p  = .013). This result could be taken (and, 
in fact, turned out to be) an interaction effect between learning method free- 
comparison and delay. These results were confirmed performing Fisher’s 
exact test on the same data in which cases had been allocated to delay 
categories (p = .008, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). On the other hand, we did 
not find a significant relationship between delay and transfer for participants 
in the guided-comparison condition (B  = -.105; SE  = .337; p  = .755). These 
results were once again double checked performing Fisher’s exact test on 
the same data (p = .862, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided) and will be again 
checked with the planned aggregated data analyses.
The impact o f delay on explicit recognition was analysed using a simple 
logistic regression on cases belonging to each condition. In this experiment, 
delay does not appear to have a significant relationship with explicit 
recognition neither in the free-learning condition (B = .914; SE = .750; p  = 
.223) nor in the guided comparison condition (B = .451; SE = .400; p  = 
.259). Results were confirmed with Fisher’s exact test as usual (p > 1) and 
will again be checked at a global level with the aggregated data analyses.
As was the case in experiment 7, we found a significant relationship 
between quality o f learning (measured on 3 categories) and transfer (p = 
.039, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). The result confirms what Gick and
Holyoak (1983) had found in immediate same context open ended problem 
solving.
Table 6.13
Frequencies o f  transfer per level o f  quality reached in learning task
transfer Total
yes no
level of quality reached
in learning task (on 3
categories) no or very low learning 10 20 30
medium learning 18 16 34
high learning 4 0 4
Total 32 36 68
Quality o f learning also reaches close-to-significance levels in its 
relationship with explicit recognition (p = .096, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 6.14
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  quality reached in learning 
task
explicit
recognition Total
yes no
level of quality reached no or very low
in learning task (on 3 learning 19 11 30
categories)
medium learning 28 6 34
high learning 4 0 4
Total 51 17 68
As we had found in experiment 7, with less data, explicit recognition was 
non-significant {p = .160, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies of 
transfer are reported in the table below.
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Table 6.15
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  explicit recognition (Y/N)
transfer Total
yes no
Explicit recognition yes 27 24 51
no 5 12 17
Total 32 36 68
EXPERIMENT 10
With this experiment we wanted to continue the collection of data on 
transfer in a delayed situation with low context shift focussing on the 
different learning methods (summarization, guided comparison and free  
comparison).
The experiment is identical to experiment 8, with the only difference that 
context shift between learning and transfer was in this case low (i.e. 
presentation o f the learning and transfer tasks was identical in terms of 
email received and o f screenshots). We wanted to find out if the 
relationships we found in experiment 8 were the same with a lower level of 
context shift in order to draw some preliminary conclusions on the role of 
context in binary-decision making transfer. The data were very important 
for the aggregated data analyses we were planning to do on time-context 
effects.
As in all other experiments, experiment 10 was also aimed at collecting 
data for the analysis o f the other relationships we were studying.
Background
Our reference background was the same as for our lab-based experiments 
2 and 3.
Method
Participants. There were 85 valid participants, recruited through Ipoints, 
in three experimental conditions: condition 1, learning by guided 
comparison, with 31 participants, condition 2, learning by free-comparison, 
with 22 participants and condition 3, learning by summarization, with 32 
participants (these were condition 1 participants from experiment 9).
O f the participants, 81% were male and 19% were female. Their 
distribution by age group is reported in Annex 2. As usual it was verified 
that gender and age group did not have significant relationships with 
transfer (p > .10).
Materials. We employed the same two learning stories that were used in 
previous experiments (3 balls and Videogame) and the same target story 
(Lucrezia). However, since we were trying to create just a low context shift 
in this experiment, typeface and look-and-feel of the web pages containing 
the learning stories and the target were the same. All materials and web­
pages are available in Annex 1. The questionnaire used was the 
Questionnaire B. In this experiment only one type of email (the one saying 
that a college who wished to remain anonymous was pre-testing some 
admission materials) was sent to participants. The number of ipoints 
credited to participants were 15 for part 1 and 30 for part 2, exactly like in 
our other time-delayed experiments.
Procedure. This experiment followed the same procedure of experiment 
8. In this experiment, transfer (experiment part 2) followed learning 
(experiment part 1) after a delay between 1 and 21 days. Frequencies o f the
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delays are reported in Annex 2. We were not able, for the reasons which we 
already explained, to distribute delays evenly amongst different conditions 
(i.e. learning methods), which will limit us in our analysis at the level o f this 
experiment.
In this experiment we had to send out three batches o f emails for part 2 of 
the experiment, as usual adapting our schedule to Ipoints’ other mailings. 
Again, participants did not all reply promptly resulting in various different 
delays. The number of ipoints credited to participants were 15 for part 1 and 
30 for part 2.
Results and discussion. In this experiment we found that after a delay 
and with a low, rather than medium-low and medium context shift, learning 
method has a significant relationship with transfer (p =.038, Fisher’s exact 
test, 2-sided). Frequencies o f transfer are reported in the table below. 
However, this result should be taken with extreme caution because, 
unfortunately, the distribution o f delays was found, ex-post, to have a 
relationship with experimental conditions. In order to, at least in part, verify 
the results we found, we performed an analysis on data belonging to a same 
delay category (between 2 and 8 days) which had the greatest number of 
cases (42). This analysis confirmed what he had found (p -  .046, Fisher’s 
exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies o f transfer are reported in the table below.
Table 6.16
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  different learning methods-all cases
transfer
yes
Total
-----
no
type of
learning summarization 14 18 32
guided comparison 12 19 31
free-style comparison 16 6 22
Total 42 43 85
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Table 6.17
Frequencies o f transfer for different learning methods - delays between 2 
and 8 days
transfer Total
no yes
type of
learning summarization 2 5 7
guided comparison 7 13 20
free-style comparison 11 4 15
Total 20 22 42
As usual, to assess the importance o f schema in binary decision making 
transfer, we compared transfer rates of participants (from experiment No. 9) 
who had learned just with one analog to participants who had learned with 
comparison methods. Again, both using all cases and performing the 
analysis only with cases belonging to the same delay category, we did not 
approach significance (p > .50). A similar situation was found examining 
the relationship with explicit recognition: one analog condition participants 
did not perform significantly differently from comparison condition 
participants (p > .10). As an example, frequencies of delay category 2-8 
days (which had the highest number o f cases) are reported below.
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Table 6.18
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  one analog condition vs. comparison-based
learning conditions (guided and free comparison)- delay category 2-8 days
transfer Total
yes no
Learning by comparison of
2 analogs
one analog only (*) yes 17 18 35
no 4 5 9
Total 21 23 44
(*) this these participants come from exp. 8
Table 6.19
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition fo r  one analog condition v.v. 
comparison-based learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)- delay 
category 2-8 days____________________________________________________
explicit recognition Total
yes no
Learning by comparison 
of 2 analogs
one analog only (*) yes 25 10 35
no 5 4 9
Total 30 14 44
(*) this these participants come from exp. 8
As in the previous delayed transfer experiments, we performed a logistic 
regression to analyse the impact on transfer o f different time delays. In spite 
o f the fact that again the differences in delay were quite marked, we did not 
find a significant relationship between delay and transfer neither for guided- 
comparison condition (B = -.309; SE  = .601; p  = .734) nor for free- 
comparison condition (B = .400; SE  = .557; p  = .473). It should be noted
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that, for the latter, we had found a significant relationship in the medium 
context shift experiment (8). This could be taken as a signal of a three-way 
interaction between delay, learning method free-comparison and context 
shift, which in fact we found performing the aggregated data analyses. We 
performed the usual check with Fisher’s exact test on delay categories {p > 
. 1 ).
Confirming our previous results, quality o f learning was found to have a 
significant relationship with transfer {p = .003, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 6.20
Frequencies o f  trans fer by quality reached in learning
transfer Total
yes no
level of quality
reached in learning
task (on 3 categories) no or very low Q 91 9Q
learning
medium learning 16 7 23
high learning 1 0 1
Total 25 28 53
The relationship between quality o f learning and explicit recognition was 
significant {p = .008, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
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Table 6.21
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  quality reached in the
learning task
explicit recognition Total
yes no
level of quality reached in
learning task (on 3 no or very low
categories) learning 14 15 29
medium learning 20 3 23
high learning 1 0 1
Total 35 18 53
Also confirming our previous results, explicit recognition was found to 
have a significant relationship with transfer {p = .000, Fisher’s exact test, 2- 
sided).
Table 6.22
Frequencies o f  transfer in participants who explicitly recognize/ do not 
recognize the analogy
transfer Total
yes no
Explicit recognition yes 23 12 35
no 2 16 18
Total 25 28 53
EXPERIMENT 12
Completing what we had started in experiment 11, with this experiment 
we wanted to test the relationship o f learning method and transfer with a 5 
minutes delay, low context shift and medium semantic distance between
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learning and transfer. The results, beyond being analysed in a stand-alone 
fashion, would also be fed in our aggregated data analyses on time-context 
effects.
This experiment is similar to our experiment 6, but this time look-and- 
feel o f the learning and transfer phase web pages was identical.
The experiment’s main specific objectives were to assess the relationship 
between learning method (,summarization, guided comparison and free  
comparison) and transfer under the following conditions: almost-immediate 
transfer, low context shift and medium semantic distance between learning 
and transfer. Again, we wanted to compare participants learning with one 
analog (from the previous experiment 11, with same conditions) with those 
who learned with comparison methods in this experiment in order to infer 
the importance o f schema in this type of transfer.
As in all other experiments, it was also aimed at understanding the 
relationship between quality o f learning and transfer, between explicit 
recognition and transfer and between quality of learning and explicit 
recognition.
Background
Our reference background was the same as for our lab-based experiments 
2 and 3.
Method
Participants. There were 51 valid participants in three experimental 
conditions: condition 1, learning by guided comparison, with 21
participants, condition 2, learning by free-comparison, with 17 participants 
and condition 3, learning by summarization, with 13 participants (these
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were condition 1 participants from experiment 10). Gender and age were 
not collected in this experiment.
Materials. We employed the same learning stories that were used in all 
previous web-based experiments (Three balls and Videogame) and the same 
target story (Lucrezia). In contrast with experiments 6 and 9, since we were 
trying to create just a low context shift in this experiment, this time typeface 
and look-and-feel o f the web pages containing the learning stories and the 
target were identical. The questionnaire used was the Questionnaire B. In 
this experiment only one type of email identical to the one used for 
experiment 11 was sent to participants. The number o f ipoints credited to 
participants was 40, like in previous experiments consisting o f three 
sequential parts (learning task, distractor and transfer task).
Procedure. Procedure in this experiment is exactly the same as 
experiment 6.
Results and discussion
In this experiment we found that, in almost immediate transfer and with 
a low-context shift, learning method has a significant relationship with 
transfer {p = .041, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). It should be pointed out, 
however, that in this experiment, summarization o f two analogs condition 
had an unusually low level o f performance (34% of correct solution), lower 
than the one-analog condition. Also due to the small number of cases in the 
two analogs summarization condition, we think the result should be taken 
with caution. Frequencies o f transfer 1 are reported in the table below.
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Table 6.23
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  different learning methods
transfer Total
no yes
type of learning summarization 8 5 13
guided comparison 8 13 21
free-style
comparison 4 13 17
Total 20 31 51
Comparing the one analog condition (from experiment 11) to the 
comparison learning methods, however, we found no significant difference 
in transfer (p = .255, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 6.24
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  one analog condition v.v. comparison-based 
learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)
transfer of learning Total
yes no
Comparison learning (free and 
guided comparison) 26 12 38
one analog (*)
10 10 20
Total 36 22 58
(*) this these participants come from exp. 11
The relationship between type o f learning and explicit recognition was 
non significant (p = .143, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
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Table 6.25
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition fo r  different learning methods
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
type of
learning summarization 10 3 13
guided comparison 20 1 21
free-style comparison 12 5 17
Total 42 9 51
Comparing one analog condition (from experiment 11) to the comparison 
learning methods, again we found no significant difference in explicit 
recognition (p =.724, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 6.26
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition fo r  one analog condition vs. 
comparison-based learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
Comparison learning (free and
guided comparison) 32 6 38
one analog (*) 16 4 20
Total 48 10 58
(*) this these participants come from exp. 11
As in experiment 11, quality was not found to have a significant 
relationship with transfer {p = .880, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). 
Relationship between explicit recognition and transfer was instead 
significant (p -  .053, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
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Table 6.27
Frequencies o f  transfer by quality reached in learning
transfer Total
yes no
level of quality reached
in learning task (on 3 no or very low
categories) learning 12 7 19
medium learning 11 4 15
high learning 3 1 4
Total 26 12 38
Table 6.28
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition per level o f  quality reached in learning 
task
explicit recognition Total
yes no
level of quality reached
in learning task (on 3 no or very low
categories) learning 14 5 19
medium learning 15 0 15
high learning 3 1 4
Total 32 6 38
Table 6.29
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  quality reached in the 
learning task
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
level of quality in
learning task no or very low learning 14 6 20
medium learning 22 2 24
high learning 6 1 7
Total 42 9 51
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In this experiment, we did not find a significant relationship between 
explicit recognition and transfer {p = 1, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 6.30
Frequencies o f  transfer per explicit recognition (Y/N)
transfer Total
yes no
explicit recognition yes 22 10 32
no 4 2 6
Total 26 12 38
EXPERIMENT 14
Experiment 14 continues our investigation of transfer in conditions o f 
high semantic distance that we had started with experiment 13. This time, 
the focus would be learning methods, comparing our usual summarization , 
guided comparison and free  comparison. Would our comparison methods 
finally prove their superiority over mere summarization?
The experiment is in most respects similar to experiment 10, with the 
only difference being that semantic distance between learning and transfer 
was high in this case.
The experiment’s main specific objectives were to assess the effect o f 
learning method on transfer in delayed transfer conditions, with a low 
context shift and with a high semantic distance between learning and 
transfer.
As all other delayed-transfer experiments, it was also aimed at 
understanding the relationship between delay and transfer, quality o f
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learning and transfer, between explicit recognition and transfer and between 
quality o f learning and explicit recognition.
Background
Our reference background was the same as for our lab-based experiments 
2 and 3.
Method
Participants. There were 91 valid participants in three experimental 
conditions: condition 1, learning by summarization, with 13 participants 
(these were condition 1 participants from experiment 14), condition 2 , 
learning by guided comparison, with 65 participants and condition 3, 
learning by free-comparison, with 13 participants.
O f the participants, 50% were male and 50% were female. Their 
distribution by age group is reported in Annex 2. As usual it was verified 
that gender and age group did not have significant relationships with 
transfer (p>.10).
The number o f ipoints credited to participants, all recruited by Ipoints, 
were 15 for part 1 and 30 for part 2, exactly like in other delayed transfer 
experiments.
Materials. We employed the same learning stories that we always used in 
all previous experiments (Three balls and Videogame) and our high 
semantic distance target story The Prisoners. As in experiment 10, the level 
o f context shift was low: typeface and look-and-feel o f the web pages 
containing the learning stories and the target were the same. The 
questionnaire used was Questionnaire B. In this experiment, the two emails 
used (containing the links to part 1 or 2) were the same used in experiments
11 and 12. Both emails were in the same format, mentioning the same client 
and goal.
Procedure. This experiment followed the exact same procedure of 
experiment 10. In this experiment, transfer (experiment part 2) followed 
learning (experiment part 1) after a delay between 1 and 26 days. 
Frequencies o f the delays are reported in Annex 2. In this experiment we 
had to send out three batches o f emails for both parts o f the experiment, as 
usual adapting our schedule to Ipoints’ other mailings. Again, participants 
did not all reply promptly so we ended up with various different delays. As 
a consequence, we were not able to distribute delays evenly amongst 
different conditions (i.e. learning methods). We checked and found that, 
fortunately, this did not result in any significant relationship between 
condition and delay. However, as a precaution, we always double checked 
that our analysis held true at a delay-category level.
Results and discussion
We did not find superiority, in terms of transfer, o f learning by 
comparison versus simple summarization: after a delay, with a low context 
shift, and high semantic distance between learning and target, learning 
method does not have a significant relationship with transfer {p = .646, 
Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies o f transfer are reported in the table 
below.
In order to verify the results we found, we performed an analysis on data 
belonging to a same delay category (when the category contained enough 
cases). These analyses confirmed what we had just found (p > .10).
Table 6.31
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  different learning methods
transfer of learning Total
yes no
type of learning summarization 2 11 13
guided comparison 17 48 65
free-style comparison 4 9 13
Total 23 68 91
We compared transfer levels and explicit recognition levels of 
participants who had learned with just one analog and those who had 
learned comparing two analogs, finding no significant differences (p > .10). 
This was true both analyzing all cases together and at a single delay- 
category level. It seems that, even with high semantic distance, schemata 
have a less important role in this type o f transfer. Tables with frequencies 
are reported below.
Table 6.32
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  one analog condition vs. comparison-based 
learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)
transfer Total
yes no
Comparison of 2 analogs one
analog only (*) yes 21 57 78
no 5 18 23
Total 26 75 101
(*) these participants come from exp. 13
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Table 6.33
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition fo r  one analog condition vs.
comparison-based learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)
explicit recognition Total
yes no
Comparison of 2 analogs
one analog only (*) yes 60 18 78
no 17 6 23
Total
77 24 101
(*) these participants come from exp. 13
As in the previous delayed transfer experiments, we compared transfer 
results of participants who transferred at different time delays after learning. 
Again in this experiment, in spite of the fact that the differences in delay 
were quite marked (from 1 to 26 days) , we did not find a significant 
relationship between delay and transfer neither analyzing all the cases 
together (B = -.021; SE  = .242; p  = .979) nor analyzing the one guided 
comparison (B  = .144; SE = .287; p  =. 616) and the free-comparison 
condition (B = -.523; SE = .554; p  =. 345) separately. It should be noted 
that, for the latter, we had found a significant relationship in the medium 
semantic distance experiment. This could suggest (and was confirmed to be 
the case in the aggregated data analyses) a three-way interaction between 
semantic distance and delay, in the case o f free-comparison learning, which 
offsets the previous negative effect. This could be taken as a signal o f a 
three-way interaction between delay, learning method free-comparison and 
semantic distance. We performed the usual check with Fisher’s exact test on 
delay categories {p > . 1).
The same situation was found analyzing the relationship between delay 
and explicit recognition. Significance was not reached neither analyzing all
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the cases together {B = 044; SE  = .255; p  = .863) nor analyzing the one 
guided comparison (B= -.012; SE = .499; p  = .981) and the free-comparison 
condition {B = .028; SE  = .299; p  =. 924) separately. The usual check with 
Fisher’s exact test on delay categories confirmed all results.
In this experiment, quality was found to have a significant relationship 
with transfer {p = .002, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies o f transfer 
are reported in the table below.
Table 6.34
Frequencies o f  transfer by level o f  quality reached in learning
transfer Total
yes no
level of quality reached 
in learning task (on 3 
categories) no or very low learning 2 25 27
medium learning 14 30 44
high learning 5 2 7
Total 21 57 78
We found, moreover, that the relationship between quality of learning 
and explicit recognition was significant {p -  .030, Fisher’s exact test, 2- 
sided). Frequencies o f explicit recognition are reported in the table below.
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Table 6.35
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  quality reached in the
learning task
explicit recognition Total
yes no
level of quality reached
in learning task (on 3
categories) no or very low learning 16 11 27
medium learning 38 6 44
high learning 6 1 7
Total 60 18 78
Recognition levels were quite high (77% overall) considering the 
semantic distance between learning and target. This time, however, explicit 
recognition was not found to have a significant relationship with transfer (p 
= .766, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies o f transfer are reported in 
table 6.36
Table 6.36
Frequencies o f  transfer per explicit recognition (Y/N)
transfer Total
yes relevant part 
right
no relevant part 
wrong
explicit recognition yes 17 43 60
no 4 14 18
Total 21 57 78
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EXPERIMENT 16
To complete our examination o f the relationship between semantic 
distance and transfer, we needed to examine the impact o f different learning 
methods when transfer followed learning very shortly and semantic distance 
was high.
We did this in experiment 16, which is in all respects similar to 
experiment 11 with the only difference that semantic distance between 
learning and transfer was high rather than medium.
The experiment’s main specific objectives were to assess the effect of 
learning method on transfer in almost-immediate transfer conditions, with a 
low context shift and with a high semantic distance between learning and 
transfer. The three learning methods compared were: summarization, guided  
comparison and free  comparison.
As with all other experiments, it was also aimed at understanding the 
relationship between quality o f learning and transfer, between explicit 
recognition and transfer and between quality o f learning and explicit 
recognition.
Background
Our reference background was the same as for our lab-based experiments 
2 and 3.
Method
Participants. There were 112 valid participants in three experimental 
conditions: condition 1, learning by summarization, with 41 participants 
(these were condition 1 participants from experiment 10), condition 2 , 
learning by guided comparison, with 34 participants and condition 3,
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learning by free-comparison, with 37 participants. O f the participants, 48% 
were male and 52% were female. Their distribution by age group is reported 
in Annex 2. As usual it was verified that gender and age group did not have 
significant relationships with transfer (p > . 10).
Materials. We employed the same learning stories that were used in the 
similar experiments ( Three balls and Videogame). The target story was The 
Prisoners, with a high distance from the learning stories. Since we were 
trying to create just a low context shift in this experiment, typeface and 
look-and-feel o f the web pages containing the learning stories and the target 
were the same. The questionnaire used was the Questionnaire B. In this 
experiment only one type o f email (the one saying that a college who 
wished to remain anonymous was pre-testing some admission materials) 
was sent to participants. The number o f ipoints credited to participants was 
the usual 40.
Procedure. This experiment is in identical in procedure to experiment 13, 
from which it differs only in the target story employed which was The 
Prisoners. Participants were randomly assigned to one o f two conditions, 
distinguished by the type o f learning they were required to use in learning 
the analogous stories in part 1 o f the experiment, exactly like in experiment 
13. Learning and transfer were separated by the usual 5 minute distractor 
task.
Results and discussion
As in the other experiments employing our high semantic distance story, 
we found transfer levels to be significantly lower than in the corresponding 
experiment using the medium semantic distance story. In the case o f this 
experiment, transfer levels were down, compared to the same experiment 
with medium semantic distance, from 68% to 20% overall.
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In this experiment we found that in almost immediate transfer, with a 
low context shift and high semantic distance, learning method does not have 
a significant relationship with transfer {p = .374, Fisher’s exact test, 2- 
sided). Frequencies o f correct solution of transfer sub-task 1 are reported in 
the following table.
Table 6.37
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  different learning methods
transfer of learning Total
yes no
type of learning summarization 9 32 41
guided comparison 9 25 34
free-style
comparison
5 32 37
Total 23 89 112
Comparing one analog condition (from experiment 11) to the comparison 
learning methods, again we found no significant difference in transfer (p = 
.632, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 6.38
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  one analog condition v.v. comparison-based 
learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)
transfer of learning
-------
Total
yes no
Comparison learning (guided
and free) 14 57 71
One analog (*)
10 30 40
Total 24 87 111
(*) this these participants come from exp. 15
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Learning method did not have a significant relationship with explicit 
recognition, but significance was close (p = .093, Fisher’s exact test, 2- 
sided).
Table 6.39
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by learning method
explicit recognition Total
yes no
type of learning summarization 60 21 81
guided comparison 28 6 34
free-style
22 15 37
comparison
Total 110 42 152
Comparing one analog condition (from experiment 11) to the comparison 
learning methods, however, again we found no significant difference in 
explicit recognition {p = .664, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 6.40
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition fo r  one analog condition vs. 
comparison-based learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)
explicit recognition Total
yes no
Comparison learning (guided and
free) 50 21 71
One analog
30 10 40
Total 80 31 111
(*) this these participants come from exp. 15
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In this experiment we did not find a significant relationship between 
quality reached in the learning task and transfer {p = .366, Fisher’s exact 
test, 2-sided). On the other hand, quality of learning was found to have a 
significant relationship with explicit recognition (p = .041, Fisher’s exact 
test, 2-sided).
Table 6.41
Frequencies o f  transfer by level o f  quality reached in learning
transfer Total
yes no
level of quality
reached in learning no or very low 4 22 26
task (on 3 categories) learning
medium learning 8 32 40
high learning 2 3 5
Total 14 57 71
The relationship between quality of learning and explicit recognition was 
almost significant ip = .066, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 6.42
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  quality reached in learning
explicit recognition Total
yes no
level of quality reached
in learning task (on 3
categories) no or very low learning 14 12 26
medium learning 32 8 40
high learning 4 1 5
Total 50 21 71
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Recognition o f analogy was again high (70% on average) in this 
experiment . The relationship between explicit recognition and transfer was 
significant (p = .007, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided).
Table 6.43
Frequencies o f  transfer per explicit recognition (Y/N)
transfer Total
yes no
explicit recognition yes 14 36 50
no 0 21 21
Total 14 57 71
6.2 General Discussion of Experiments on Learning Method and 
Schema
In this section, as in chapter 5, we wish to summarize the results of the 
experiments presented in this chapter by relevant research question (i.e. by 
relationship).
Relationship between learning method (summarization, guided 
comparison and free-comparison) and transfer
The relationship between learning method and transfer is significant in 
two out o f six experiments, which could indicate that learning method 
becomes significant in interaction with other variables. The different results 
do not appear to be related to delay and context shift. Given the mixed 
evidence, the issue must be put on hold and re-analysed through aggregated 
data analyses.
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Table 6.44
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between learning method
(summarization, guided comparison andfree-comparison) and transfer
Exp.
nr
Nr of
cases
Significance level 
of relationship 
(Fisher’s exact 
test, 2-sided)
Significant
relationship
(Y/N)
Notes
6 31 p=.125 N
8 98 p=. 625 N/Y P=.003 for category of delay up to 
2 days; p=.451 for category of 
delay between 2 and 8 days
10 85 p=0.38 Y P<.10 also within delay category 
2-8 days. Other delay categories 
had too few cases.
12 51 p=.041 Y
14 91 p=. 646 N P>.10 also when calculated within 
delay categories.
16 112 p=.374 N
Relationship between schema based-learning and transfer
No experiment showed a significant difference between conditions learning 
by comparison o f two analogs, thus presumably elaborating a schema, and 
conditions learning from one analog only, thus most probably not drawing a 
schema. It may be inferred from these results that the role of schemata in 
transfer o f binary decision making is less important than in open ended 
problem solving.
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Table 6.45
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between schema based-
learning and transfer
Exp.
Nr.
Nr. of
cases
n
Significance level of 
relationship (Fisher’s 
exact test, 2-sided)
Significant
relationship
(Y/N)
Notes
6 48 p=.140 N
8 64 P=.412 N
10 44 p>. 5 N Due to colliniarity between delay 
and condition analyses 
performed at delay category level
12 58 p=. 255 N
14 10
1
p>. 10 N Due to colliniarity between delay 
and condition analyses 
performed at delay category level
16 11
1
p= 632 N
(*) comparison conditions o f the listed experiments vs. one-analog condition of experiments 
5,7,9,11,13,15
Relationship between learning method and explicit recognition
Learning method does not appear to have a relationship with explicit 
recognition.
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Table 6.46
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between learning method
and explicit recognition
Experiment
number
Number of 
cases
Significance level of relationship 
(Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided)
Significant 
relationship (Y/N)
6 31 p=.570 N
8 98 p=.731 N
10 85 p=. 123 N
12 51 p=. 143 N
14 91 p=. 107 N
16 111 p= 093 N
Relationship between schema based-learning and explicit recognition 
Explicit recognition is not significantly different between one analog 
condition and comparison conditions in 5 out of 6 experiments.
Table 6.47
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between schema based-
learning and explicit recognition
Exp. Nr. Number 
of cases
n
Significance level of 
relationship (Fisher’s 
exact test, 2-sided)
Significant
relationship
(Y/N)
Notes
6 48 p=1 N
8 64 p=.014 Y Due to coilliniarity 
between delay and 
condition, analyses 
performed at level of 2-8 
days delay category only
10 44 p>. 1 N Due to coilliniarity 
between delay and condition 
analyses performed at delay 
category level
12 58 p=. 724 N
14 101 p > . 1 N Due to colliniarity 
between delay and condition 
analyses performed at delay 
category level
16 111 p=.  664 N
(*) comparison conditions o f the listed experiments vs. one-analog condition of 
experiments 5,7,9,11,13,15
Relationship between delay and transfer
The relationship between delay and transfer appears non-significant, in 
all three experiments, with the exception of free-comparison learning in 
experiment 8. This suggests a possible significant interaction with learning 
method, to be verified.
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Table 6.48
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between delay and transfer
Experiment
number
Number 
of cases (*)
Significance level of 
relationship (binary logistic 
regression)
Significant 
relationship (Y/N)
8 48 p=.013 (free-comparison) 
p=.755 (guided-comparison)
Y/N
10 44 p=.473 (free-comparison) 
p=.734 (guided-comparison)
N
14 101 p= 345 (free-comparison) 
p=.616 (guided-comparison)
N
(*) In experiments 8, 10 and 14 summarization condition cases are taken from experiments 
7,9, 13 respectively.
Relationship between delay and explicit recognition
The relationship between explicit recognition and transfer appears non­
significant in all experiments except one. Possible interaction effects with 
other variables have not been analysed.
Table 6.49
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between delay and explicit 
recognition
Experiment
number
Number of 
cases (*)
Significance level of relationship 
(binary logistic regression)
Significant 
relationship (Y/N)
8 48 p=.223 (free-comparison) 
p=.259 (guided-comparison)
N
10 44 p=.473 (free-comparison) 
p=.734 (guided-comparison)
N
14 101 p=.345 (free-comparison) 
p=.616 (guided-comparison)
N
(*) In experiments 8, 10 and 14 summarization condition cases are taken from experiments 
7,9, 13 respectively.
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Relationship between quality o f  learning and transfer
The relationship between quality of learning and transfer provides mixed 
evidence with two non-significant results out of six experiments. It should 
be pointed out that non-significance could be due to lack of power and 
therefore should be explored further.
Table 6.50
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between quality o f  learning 
and transfer
Experimen 
t number
Number of cases Significance level of relationship 
(Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided)
Significant 
relationship (Y/N)
6 31 p=. 030 Y
8 68 p=.039 Y
10 53 P=. 003 Y
12 38 P= 880 N
14 78 p=. 002 Y
16 71 p=. 366 N
Relationship between quality o f learning and explicit recognition
The relationship between quality o f learning and explicit recognition is 
significant in 3 out of 5 experiments, which does not help us formulate a 
strong hypothesis concerning the nature o f the relationship
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Table 6.51
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between quality o f  learning
and explicit recognition
Experiment
number
Number of 
cases
Significance level of relationship 
(Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided)
Significant 
relationship (Y/N)
6 31 P=. 019 Y
8 68 P=. 096 N
10 53 p=.008 Y
12 38 p=.053 Y
14 78 p=. 030 Y
16 71 p=.066 N
Relationship between explicit recognition and transfer
The relationship between explicit recognition and transfer provides 
mixed evidence which does not help us formulate a strong hypothesis 
concerning the nature o f the relationship.
Table 6.52
Summary o f  experimental results. Relationship between explicit recognition 
and transfer
Experiment
number
Number of 
cases
Significance level of relationship 
(Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided)
Significant 
relationship (Y/N)
6 31 P=. 210 N
8 68 P= 160 N
10 53 p=.000 Y
12 38 p=. 100 N
14 78 p=. 766 N
16 71 p=.007 Y
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6.3 First Conclusions and Open Issues from Web-based Experiments 
Single Analyses
In this section we wish to briefly wrap-up the one-by-one experiment 
analysis and to create the setting for the aggregated data analyses. To do 
this, we will distinguish the research questions regarding which we had 
pretty clear answers at the end o f our 13 experimental analyses from the 
ones which were still open.
On several issues, we still had mixed evidence which, on the one hand, 
meant that we could not provide an answer yet, and on the other suggested 
that the differences may be due to interactions between variables which our 
analysis had not been able to capture.
Preliminary findings
At the end o f our single experiments’ analysis we had some preliminary 
findings on the impact of number of analogs, o f delay between learning and 
transfer and on the role o f schemata in mediating transfer o f which we were 
reasonably sure because all or most experiments had given consistent 
results.
To begin with, we confirmed our optimism on transfer from binary 
decisions. In similar or more challenging situations than the ones which 
impaired open ended problem solving transfer, we were able to see 
significant transfer happen.
We never found that two analogs lead to higher transfer than one, not 
even if the two are learned by comparison (guided-comparison and free- 
comparison). This result seems to cast doubt on the importance o f schema in 
mediating transfer with our particular problem type since it is commonly 
thought that two analogs are required to draw a schema.
Although, as usual, the results are inevitably not completely definitive 
and further analysis (reported in chapter 7) is needed before drawing 
conclusions, delay between learning and transfer did not seem to affect
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transfer significantly. Some exceptions, due possibly to interactions with 
other variables, might exist, as hinted by some results we found, but were 
beyond the reach of the single experiment analysis.
Open issues
Differently from what had been found studying open-ended problem 
solving, there was not much evidence in support of learning method having 
a significant relationship with transfer or explicit recognition. However, we 
thought the issue should be resolved with the aggregated data analyses, 
which would also help us understand if the different results were due to 
interactions between learning method and other variables, such as delay, 
semantic distance and context.
The relationship between quality o f learning and transfer and between 
explicit recognition and transfer presented even more mixed evidence and, 
again, we decided to postpone the answer to this question till we performed 
our aggregated data analyses.
Furthermore, the relationship between delay and explicit recognition was 
found non-significant in most experiments. Although we needed to better 
verify the result and to check it for interactions, it seemed that delay (up to 
over 20 days) did not matter much in our type of transfer.
Finally, some o f the relationships (between semantic distance and 
transfer and between context and transfer) could be studied only across 
experiments (these variables were not varied within the single experiments), 
thus the impact o f these variables on transfer was entirely open at this stage.
In sum, at the end o f our single-experiment analysis we were able to 
draw some initial conclusions on transfer o f binary decision making, but 
had to leave several questions open due to mixed evidence and to the fact 
that interactions between variables had not been analysed. The next step 
needed to be aggregated data analyses, in order to confirm what we had 
found, to clarify the open issues and to uncover possible interactions which, 
from preliminary evidence, we thought might exist. The results reported in
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this final section provide the background for the aggregated data analyses of 
our web-based experimental results that is presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 7 
AGGREGATED DATA 
ANALYSES OF 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
KEY VARIABLES OF THE 
LEARNING AND TRANSFER
PROCESS
7. AG G REG A TED  DATA ANALYSES OF RELATIO N SH IPS 
BETW EEN KEY VARIABLES OF THE LEARNING AND 
TRA N SFER PROCESS
Our analyses so far, described in chapters 3 to 6, have shown some 
interesting differences and some similarities between transfer o f binary 
decision making, which we investigated, and transfer of open-ended 
problems, which had been studied in previous experiments by Gick and 
Holyoak (1980, 1983) and others.
Some findings were very consistent in all our experiments while on 
others evidence was mixed. The analyses we had performed, however, had 
intrinsic limitations because they were based on a single-experiment view, 
because the number of cases was sometimes small (with consequent lack of 
power o f the examined relationships) and because all relationships were 
investigated on a stand-alone basis. We were at risk o f not seeing the “big 
picture” of what was happening, of running into type II errors and of 
missing interaction effects o f our transfer variables. Furthermore, some 
variables (semantic distance and context) had been varied only across 
experiments, thus could be studied only by comparing results o f different 
experiments. Other variables, such as delay, had been varied even within 
experiments, but were perhaps better studied by aggregated data analyses 
because by putting all our data together we could achieve more powerful 
tests. All these reasons called for aggregated data analyses o f our variables 
which would allow us to answer, with some degree o f certitude, the open 
issues from our previous analyses and uncover interactions between the 
effects we were studying.
One o f the results we had found consistently analyzing the experiments 
one by one was that the role o f time delays (from 5 minutes to over 20 days) 
between learning and transfer did not appear to impact transfer significantly. 
We had shown, in our lab experiments (which had a high shift in context 
and a week delay between learning and transfer) that time-context effects
303
could inhibit transfer completely, even when two analogs had been learned 
through comparison. Although we were comforted by these findings being 
consistent with the ones coming form seminal studies on open-ended 
problem solving transfer, we had two issues. Firstly, the number of cases, at 
a single experiment level, was rather small (only rarely over 30 
participants), making it difficult to reach significance. Moreover, since each 
experiment was characterized by a single context shift, the single­
experiment analysis did not allow us to separate time and context impacts 
on transfer. In the online experiments we had attempted to separate the two. 
We were pretty sure that delay alone was not enough to impair transfer 
because we were able to observe significant transfer even from one analog 
alone and even when we introduced a medium context shift coupled with 
long delays (up to over 20 days). This seemed to indicate that what impaired 
transfer in our lab experiments had been context change and not time, which 
is consistent with previous findings in literature (Spencer and Weisberg, 
1986 and Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989). If  drawing conclusions on the 
role of context required caution because it was the variable over which we 
had less control in our online experiments, we wanted to be more conclusive 
on the role o f time delays. Most o f the evidence we had seemed to indicate 
that, alone, time delays were not a significant obstacle to transfer. However, 
only aggregated data analyses comparing transfer across experiments with 
different context/delay characteristics could confirm this finding and further 
qualify it, identifying possible interactions with other variables.
Another result which we had found relatively consistently in our 
experiments was that learning method did not make a significant difference 
in transfer. Comparing summarization, guided comparison and free- 
comparison, we had rarely (in 2 out o f 8 experiments, o f which 6 online 
and 2 lab based) been able to detect any significant advantage in transfer of 
either one over the others.
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Moreover, in all our online experiments, there was no advantage in 
transfer of two over one analogs learned. Even more strikingly, one analog 
(summarized) did not lead to significantly higher transfer than two 
compared analogs (i.e. two analogs learned through guided- comparison or 
free-comparison). Gick and Holyoak claimed, in their studies (1980 and 
1983) on schema induction, that a schema can be defined by the 
correspondences between two analogs i.e. that a mapping process cannot 
operate on a single analog to derive a schema. Moreover, they had found 
that a schema mediates transfer. Our finding that one analog does not lead to 
significantly lower transfer than two analogs learned by analogical encoding 
can be interpreted to mean that schemata have a different, less pivotal, role 
in binary decision making transfer. Although the evidence was rather 
unequivocal, we wanted to verify our results using all the data we had. 
Furthermore, we wanted to check for interactions between learning method 
and other variables which would allow us to detect possible exceptions, i.e. 
cases in which learning method impacted transfer significantly.
Moreover, number o f analogs and learning method also seemed, from our 
single experiments’ results, not to have a significant impact on explicit 
recognition. Even comparing the two analogs comparison-based learning 
conditions with the one analog condition, explicit recognition was not 
significantly different in five out o f six experiments. Again, even if  the 
evidence was practically univocal, we wished to verify this finding using all 
our data together, to make sure that lack o f statistical power was not the 
problem.
As for the impact o f on explicit recognition o f analogy on transfer, it had 
been left entirely open, due to mixed evidence. In open ended problem 
solving, noticing the analogy was central to the transfer process. Participants 
who failed to recognize the analogy managed to transfer in high numbers 
when they were hinted to refer to the learning stories for a solution (around 
60-70% if two analogs had been compared). This suggests that noticing was
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a key obstacle to transfer. Admittedly, our experiments’ design was 
different: we did not have a dual-pass (thus we only investigated un-hinted 
transfer) and explicit recognition was much higher, even with high-semantic 
distance between learning and transfer. However, as far as we witnessed, 
explicit recognition had a less clear relationship with transfer. In our cases, 
self-reported spontaneous noticing (which might have been higher than 
observed spontaneous noticing) did not lead to transfer in such high 
numbers (in our comparison conditions approximately 45% of those who 
recognized managed to transfer), suggesting that other obstacles might play 
a more important role. In over half o f our experiments explicit recognition 
did not have a significant relationship with transfer, but this could be also 
due to lack o f power. Clearly we needed to perform aggregated data 
analyses to make a step further in understanding its role in binary decision 
making transfer.
Finally, we had not been able to draw firm conclusions on the 
relationship between quality o f learning (as reflected in quality o f the 
learning output produced) and transfer. Quality o f learning had been found 
by Gick and Holyoak (1983) to be a strong predictor o f un-hinted transfer in 
open-ended problem solving in immediate and same context transfer. 
However, the relationship had been found non significant in some delayed 
and context shifted situations. We were not able, analyzing our data at the 
single experiment level, to obtain univocal results on the relationship 
between quality o f learning and transfer: it was significant in only seven out 
of our thirteen online experiments and the different results appeared to be 
independent of delay and context shifts. It should be pointed out, however, 
that our analyses were not all comparable to theirs as they regarded not only 
schema quality but also quality o f summaries drawn from one or two 
analogs (seven out o f thirteen o f our experiments required summarization 
learning from one or two analogs). From our data we were not sure that 
quality of learning, as captured in the schema produced by participants, had
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a significant relationship with transfer, let alone that quality of learning in 
general (as reflected in all types o f learning outputs) could be a predictor of 
transfer. This would, however, be an interesting finding as it would extend 
what had been found by Gick and Holyoak. A similar situation was also 
true for the relationship between quality of learning and explicit recognition, 
which did not bear, at a single experiment level, univocal evidence. In both 
cases, analyzing all the data together would increase power, increasing the 
probability o f detecting significant relationships.
This chapter will start by discussing benefits and risks o f performing 
aggregated data analyses (section 7.1), will proceed explaining how we 
structured the aggregated data analyses o f all our online cases (section 7.2) 
and then present and discuss its results. Specifically, sections 7.3 and 7.4 
will analyse the impact on transfer o f exogenous and endogenous variables 
of the process. Section 7.5 will briefly discuss the relationship between our 
two endogenous variables, quality o f learning and explicit recognition. 
Section 7.6 will examine the relationship between the exogenous variables 
of the process and the endogenous ones. The chapter will conclude (Section 
7.7) with a summary o f our findings and a general discussion.
7.1 Benefits and Risks of Aggregated Data Analyses
Aggregated data analyses are used to integrate different experiments in 
order to obtain a clearer picture and to acquire higher precision in empirical 
statements. Differently from meta-analyses (i.e. aggregated data analyses 
across different studies), which are based on experiments performed in 
different labs, by different investigators and in different moments in time, 
our aggregated data analyses were derived from a single research 
programme. It was intended, from the outset that this series of experiments 
would be analysed together, because it was clear that certain effects could
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only be studied across experiments. The population from which 
experimental participants were drawn in these experiments (experiments 5- 
17) was the same (Ipoints members) and the experiments took place over a 
relatively short period of time (less than a year). The variable constructs 
were identical in the experiments, procedures and materials were the same 
(e.g. we did not include in the present analysis data on explicit recognition 
deriving from the first experiments for which we had used a slightly 
different questionnaire) and the raters who read the cases and assigned an 
ordinal or binary value to outputs were the same. Consequently, we 
minimized the risk of combining together heterogeneous data which, if it is 
not performed with extreme caution, can actually decreases, rather than 
increase, the validity of the findings.
Moreover, our aggregated data analyses were performed on all and only 
our own results, so we did not need to make any choices as to which 
experiments to aggregate (aside from the limits mentioned above), thus 
avoiding the risk o f elaborating just the data with large size-effects (this 
criticism can apply to meta-analysis of published studies, where effect sizes 
may be spuriously enhanced, because null-results are typically not 
publishable, and hence not included in the meta-analysis),.
The main benefits of aggregated data analyses derive from the fact that 
they allow to detect patterns across experiments and, due to higher statistical 
power brought by a higher number of cases, to bring to light and to more 
precisely estimate small or moderate relationships. This was the motivation 
for performing aggregated data analyses here: we needed to compare 
transfer across experiments to understand the impact o f some o f our 
variables (e.g. semantic distance, context shift, time delay) and we needed 
many cases to make sure that we weren’t dismissing a relationship as non­
significant simply due to lack o f power.
In sum, after examining our specific circumstances, we are able to 
conclude that aggregated data analyses would allow us better understand the 
relationships we were studying without incurring in any specific risk.
7.2 Organization of the Aggregated data analyses
In order to move one step further in our analysis of transfer in binary 
decision making, we will analyse the direct and indirect (i.e. mediated by 
other variables) relationships between some key variables and transfer. 
Variables have been grouped, and will be discussed, depending on their 
being exogenous or endogenous in the transfer process. As already 
explained, exogenous variables (number o f analogs learned, learning 
method, diversity of analogs learned, semantic distance, level of context 
shift and delay between learning and transfer) are the ones that were 
manipulated in the experiments, while endogenous variables (quality of 
learning and explicit recognition) are internal to the process and were not 
directly manipulated.
It should be noted that the exogenous variables characterizing the 
learning phase o f the process (number o f analogs learned, learning method 
and diversity of analogs learned) can be manipulated in real life (particularly 
in training) situations, while the ones belonging to the transfer phase 
(semantic distance, level o f context shift and delay between learning and 
transfer) cannot. We will call the former variables controllable and the latter 
non-controllable and will comment on them separately, in our final 
discussion, because, from a practical point o f view, controllability has 
relevant implications. Controllable variables are a natural target for 
teaching and learning strategies while the non-controllable ones, by 
definition, cannot be influenced directly.
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In order to investigate the relationships between our manipulated 
variables and transfer, taking into account all relevant two and three-way 
interactions with the other variables, we performed a logistic regression 
using all relevant online experimental data except control group 
(Experiments 5-17). We will call this Exogenous variables regression and 
make it the base of our aggregated data analyses on the relationships 
between the exogenous variables o f our model and transfer.
The reason for excluding data from control groups (comparison with 
control group was performed separately) from the regression was that most 
of the independent variables were not varied within the control group. 
Diversity of exemplars was excluded from the regression model because its 
relationship with transfer was tested under specific conditions (only with 2 
analogs, with one type of learning- summarization- and with one type of 
target story) thus making this variable perfectly correlated to type of 
learning, number o f exemplars and semantic distance. This relationship was 
analysed separately with chi-square analysis (section 7.3.3).
Endogenous variables (quality o f learning and explicit recognition) were 
left out of the main logistic regression model predicting transfer and 
analysed separately using another logistic regression (which we will refer to 
as our Endogenous variables regression) and chi-square analysis in section 
7.4.
The relationship between the exogenous variables of the process and 
explicit recognition was analysed with another regression which we will call 
Exogenous variables regression 2 because it is identical to our main 
regression except that the dependent variable was explicit recognition. The 
relationship between variables o f the learning phase and quality was 
analysed with chi-square analysis.
Data from lab-based experiments was not compiled in the logistic 
regression nor in the other analyses because the experimental procedure and 
the materials were in part different. All the conclusions we will draw in this
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chapter, therefore, will be based on the web-based experiments, which 
accounted for the majority of participants and the final materials and 
procedures. In the final discussion of this research, reported in chapter 7, we 
will bring into the picture evidence from our lab experiments to confirm 
findings, raise questions and indicate directions for future research.
Given the complexity o f the relationships examined and the number o f 
questions that we were trying to answer, we thought it would be useful to 
provide the reader with a “map”. Figure 7.1 is intended to be the macro­
level map: it shows the web o f relationships that were examined, providing 
an indication o f which statistical analysis was used. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 go to 
higher level o f detail listing the research questions which we investigated 
when analyzing each relationship and indicating where the experimental 
findings and discussion can be found in this chapter.
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Table 7.1
Relationships and research questions - Relationships involving exogenous variables
Relationship Dependent
variable
Independent variable Interactions with other 
independent variables
Research questions Section
Controllable variables
Number of analogs (0 vs. 
1) and transfer
Transfer Number of analogs (0 
vs. 1)
• Is one analog enough to induce 
transfer?
7.3.1
Number of analogs (0 vs. 
1), delay, context shift, 
semantic distance and 
transfer
Transfer Number of analogs (0 
vs. 1)
• Delay
• Context shift
• Semantic distance
• Are there limits in transfer from 
one analog? i.e. when is one analog 
not enough to induce transfer?
7.3.1
Number of analogs (1 vs. 
2) and transfer
Transfer Number of analogs (1 
vs. 2)
• Do two analogs lead to higher 
transfer than one?
7.3.1
Number of analogs (1 vs. 
2) and transfer
T ransfer Number of analogs (1 
vs. 2)
• Delay
• Context shift
• Semantic distance
• Are there variables (e.g. learning 
method) which, in combination with 
variations in number of analogs, 
have an effect on transfer?
7.3.1
Learning method and 
transfer
Transfer Learning method • Does learning method affect 
transfer?
7.3.2
Relationship Dependent
variable
Independent variable Interactions with other 
independent variables
Research questions Section
Learning method and 
transfer
Transfer Learning method • Number of analogs
• Delay
• Context shift
• Sem antic distance
• Are there variables (e.g. number 
of analogs increase from 1 to 2) 
which, in combination with
variations in learning method, have
an effect on transfer?
7.3.2
Schema formation and 
transfer
Transfer Learning method 
(comparison-based 
learning) and number of 
analogs
• Does schema formation (inferred 
by learning method and number of 
analogs) have an effect on 
transfer?
7.3.2
Diversity of exemplars 
and transfer
Transfer Diversity of exemplars • Does learning more diverse (i.e. 
superficially dissimilar) analogs lead 
to higher transfer?
•
7.3.3
Relationship Dependent
variable
Independent variable Interactions with other 
independent variables
Research questions Section
Non-controllable variables and transfer
Semantic distance and 
transfer
Transfer Semantic distance • Does increasing semantic 
distance between learning 
exemplars and target decrease 
transfer?
7.3.4
Semantic distance and 
transfer
Transfer Semantic distance • Number of analogs
• Delay
• Learning method
• Are there variables (e.g. number 
of analog increase from 1 to 2) 
which, in combination with 
variations in semantic distance, 
have an effect on transfer?
7.3.4
Context shift between 
learning and transfer
Transfer Context shift • Does context shift between 
learning and transfer affect transfer?
7.3.5
Context shift between 
learning and transfer
T ransfer Context shift • Number of analogs
• Delay
• Semantic distance
• Learning method
• Are there variables (e.g. number 
of analog increase from 1 to 2) 
which, in combination with 
variations in context shift, have an 
effect on transfer?
7.3.5
Delay between learning 
and transfer
T ransfer Logarithm of delay in 
hours
• Does delay between learning 
and transfer reduce transfer?
7.3.6
Relationship Dependent
variable
Independent variable Interactions with other 
independent variables
Research questions Section
Delay between learning 
and transfer
T ransfer Logarithm of delay in 
hours
• Number of analogs
• Context shift
• Semantic distance
• Learning method
• Are there variables (e.g. number 
of analog increase from 1 to 2) 
which, in combination with 
variations in delay, have an effect 
on transfer?
7.3.6
Table 7.2
Relationships and research questions -  Relationships involving endogenous variables
Relationship Dependent
variable
Independent variable Interactions with other 
independent variables
Research questions Section
Endogenous variables of the process and transfer
Quality of learning and 
transfer
Transfer Quality of learning • Explicit recognition • Is quality of learning a predictor 
of transfer? Does it interact with 
explicit recognition?
7.4.1
Explicit recognition and 
transfer
Transfer Explicit recognition • Quality of learning • Is explicit recognition of analogy 
a predictor of transfer?
• How crucial is explicit recognition 
for transfer?
• Can transfer be implicit?
Does explicit recognition interact 
with quality of learning?
7.4.2
Relationship Dependent
variable
Independent variable Interactions with other 
independent variables
Research questions Section
Quality of learning and explicit recognition
Quality of learning and 
explicit recognition
Explicit
recognition
Quality of learning • Does a higher quality achieved in 
the learning phase of the process 
lead to higher explicit recognition?
7.5
Exogenous and endogenous variables
Number of analogs (1 vs. 
2) and quality of learning
Quality of 
learning
Number of analogs • Does number of analogs have a 
significant relationship with quality 
of learning? I.e. does learning from 
two analogs lead two higher quality 
of learning?
7.7.1
Learning method and 
quality of learning
Quality of 
learning
Learning method • Does learning method have a 
significant relationship with quality 
of learning? I.e. do some learning 
methods lead to higher quality?
7.6.1
Diversity of learning 
exemplars
Quality of 
learning
Diversity of exemplars • Does diversity of analogs 
learned have a significant 
relationship with quality of learning?
7.6.1
Relationship Dependent
variable
Independent variable Interactions with other 
independent variables
Research questions Section
Number of analogs (1 vs. 
2) and explicit 
recognition
Explicit 
recognition of 
analogy
Number of analogs (1 
vs. 2)
• Do two analogs lead to higher 
explicit recognition than one?
7.6.2
Number of analogs (1 vs. 
2) and transfer
Explicit 
recognition of 
analogy
Number of analogs (1 
vs. 2)
• Delay
• Context shift
• Semantic distance
• Learning method
• Are there variables which, in 
combination with variations in 
number of analogs, have an effect 
on explicit recognition?
7.7.2
Learning method and 
explicit recognition
Explicit
recognition
Learning method • Does learning method affect 
explicit recognition?
7.6.2
Learning method and 
explicit recognition
Explicit
recognition
Learning method • Number of analogs
• Delay
• Context shift
• Semantic distance
• Are there variables (e.g. context 
shifts or semantic distance 
increase) which make the 
relationship between learning 
method and explicit recognition 
significant/more significant?
7.6.2
Semantic distance 
between learning and 
explicit recognition
Transfer Semantic distance • Does increasing semantic 
distance between learning 
exemplars and target decrease 
explicit recognition?
7.6.2
Relationship Dependent
variable
Independent variable Interactions with other 
independent variables
Research question
Semantic distance 
between learning and 
explicit recognition
Transfer Semantic distance • Number of analogs
• Delay
• Learning method
• Are there variabl 
of analog increase f 
which, in combinatic 
variations in semanl 
have an effect on e 
recognition?
Context shift between 
learning and explicit 
recognition
Transfer Context shift • Does context shi 
learning and transfe
Context shift between 
learning and explicit 
recognition
Transfer Context shift • Number of analogs
• Delay
• Semantic distance
• Learning method
• Are there variabl* 
of analog increase fi 
which, in combinatic 
variations in context 
effect on explicit rec
Delay between learning 
and explicit recognition
Explicit 
recognition of 
analogy
Logarithm of delay in 
hours
• Does delay betw  ^
and transfer reduce 
recognition?
7.3 Relationship Between Exogenous Variables of the Learning-
Transfer Process and Transfer
In this section we will report and discuss findings on the relationship 
between our manipulated (exogenous) variables (number of learning 
analogs, learning method, diversity o f exemplars, context, delay and 
semantic distance) and transfer.
We will discuss the relationships one-by-one, starting with learning phase 
variables (controllable variables) and then proceeding with the transfer 
phase variables (non-controllable variables). As our conclusions will be 
largely based on the logistic regression model which we used to estimate the 
effects of the variables (alone and in interaction with each other) on transfer, 
we will first briefly justify the choice o f such a model.
The effect o f experimental variables is usually investigated by means of 
analysis o f variance (ANOVA) or linear regression. However, when the 
dependent variable is binary (e.g. transfer of learning or explicit recognition 
of the analogy), these methods have specific shortcomings. To begin, the 
assumptions o f normality and homoscedasticity o f error terms are both 
violated. This has two undesirable implications. Firstly, standard error 
estimates are no longer consistent with the true standard errors and, thus, the 
test statistics may be invalid. Secondly, the coefficient estimates are no 
longer efficient. Moreover, ANOVA or linear regression will allow the 
dependent variable to have values below 0 and above 1. In conclusion, 
linear regression and ANOVA with a binary dependent variable, although 
feasible, are not recommended.
As an alternative to linear models, we used logistic regression to 
investigate the effect o f the independent variables on transfer. Logistic 
regression, a generalized linear model, maintains the useful features of 
linear models, while allowing the dependent variable to have a non-normal 
distribution. It can be used when there is a mixture of numerical and
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categorical regressors. At the same time, it is statistically robust, even 
though, compared to linear regression, it allows more type II errors to occur 
and requires a higher number o f cases per independent variables. Finally, 
although most statistical analysis tools do not provide beta coefficients 
automatically for logistic regression, thus not allowing an immediate 
comparison o f the relative influence o f the predictors, it is however possible 
to obtain standardized logit coefficients with different approaches (Menard, 
2004).
We used logistic regression for similar purposes as standard ANOVA, 
thus incorporating simple main effects, as well as interactions. To assess if 
adding two and three way interactions between variables to the model would 
improve it, we opted for block entry o f variables using three blocks: the first 
one with our independent variables, the second with the two-way 
interactions and the third with the three-way interactions between variables 
and used a chi-square difference test procedure at each step to assess if the 
incorporation o f the additional (higher order) effects was justified. Entering 
subsequently the three blocks o f variables has the advantage of creating 
three nested models which can be analyzed in terms of incremental 
improvements. Given a previous model, chi-square difference procedure 
tests whether additional variables significantly increase the model’s fit to 
the data. To be more precise, a model with just main effects can be seen as a 
model with main effects and two-way interactions, but in which the 
coefficients o f the interactions are fixed at 0. By fitting a model in which the 
effects of the two-way interactions are estimated (and thus allowed to have 
values other than 0), and comparing this model to the one with just main 
effects, we can test the null hypothesis that the interactions are 0.
Concerning the variables included in the logistic regression model, the 
dependent variable, named transfer, was dichotomous and could take “yes” 
or “no” as values. As explained previously, value “yes” was assigned when 
of sub-task 1 was solved and explained correctly. We did not require a deep
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explanation and, in fact, the answer could also be qualitative (i.e. we did not 
require the arithmetic calculation o f probabilities), but the answer had to 
clearly indicate that the problem was being solved applying the logic 
learned in the learning task. Value “no” was assigned when the answer was 
incorrect (typically because the analogy had been recognized but the logic 
had not been reversed or because the analogy had not been recognized and 
“ordinary” probabilistic reasoning was applied to make the decision) or not 
explained or explained incorrectly.
The following independent variables were inserted in the regression 
model:
• Logarithmic delay in hours between learning and transfer. This 
continuous variable (named logaritm icjiourjdelay) is the logarithm of 
delay between learning and transfer expressed in hours. Delay in our 
experiments went from 5 minutes to over 20 days. We chose to use 
logarithm of delay because time was expected to have a logarithmic effect 
on transfer due to the nature o f forgetting and because we found that log 
time was a better predictor than linear time (i.e. the model with log time 
provided a better fit to the data than the model with linear time).
• Context shift. This ordinal variable (named context) could take three 
values in our web-based experiments: low (L), medium-low (M-L) and 
medium (M). Change from L to M-L context shift was coded context (1) and 
change from L to M context shift was coded context(2). A low context shift 
was created by presenting the two parts o f the experiment (learning and 
transfer) in the same way (both experiments by Warwick University or both 
pre-testing o f college admissions materials by an anonymous college) and 
by using web-pages with identical look-and-feel for both parts o f them. A 
medium-low  shift was produced by presenting the two parts of the 
experiment (learning and transfer) in the same way (both experiments by 
Warwick University or both pre-testing o f college admissions materials by
an anonymous college) but by displaying web-pages with different look- 
and-feel for the two parts o f the experiment. A medium context shift was 
obtained by presenting the two parts of the experiment (learning and 
transfer) in different ways (learning as an experiment by Warwick 
University and transfer as pre-testing o f college admissions materials by an 
anonymous college or vice-versa) and by using web-pages with very 
different look-and-feel for the two parts.
• Number o f analogs. This ordinal variable (named number_analogs) 
could take values 1 or 2 (control group data was not included in these 
analyses).
• Semantic distance. This ordinal variable (named semantic dist) 
could take two values: medium  (M) or high (H). Medium value was assigned 
when the target story (Lucrezia) was from a distant domain, but the final 
decision was o f the switch-or-keep  type, exactly like in the learning story. 
We assigned value high to semantic distance when the target story (The 
Prisoners) was from a distant domain and the final decision was of the 
different-or-equal-chances type (this, in our view, eliminated any possible 
superficial cue).
• Learning method. This categorical variable (named 
learning method) could take three values: summarization (when one or two 
analogs were summarized), guided  comparison (when two analogs were 
learned through comparison guided by a list o f analogy-oriented questions ) 
and free  comparison (when two analogs were learned through a comparison, 
receiving the only indication to look for analogies between the stories). 
Change from summarization to guided comparison was coded 
learning_method (1) and change from summarization to free comparison 
was coded learning_method (2).
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In order to capture possible interaction effects of our independent 
variables, the following two-way interactions between variables were 
inserted in the in the second block o f the model:
•  Logarithmic delay and context shift (named logaritmic_hourjdelay 
*context)
•  Logarithmic delay and number of analogs (named 
logaritmic _hour_delay by number_analogs)
•  Logarithmic delay and semantic distance (named logaritmic_hour_de1ay 
by nsemdist)
•  Logarithmic delay and learning method (named logaritmic_hour_delay 
by learningm ethod)
•  Context shift and number o f analogs (named context by 
number_analogs)
• Context shift and learning method (named context by learningjnethod)
•  Semantic distance and number o f analogs (semdist by number_analogs)
• Semantic distance and learning method (nsemdist by 1earning_method) 
Note that the following interactions were not included because of
collinearity:
• context and semantic distance. High semantic distance was only 
examined with low context shift
• number o f analogs and learning method. Both guided comparison and 
free-comparison could only take place with two analogs.
Moreover, in order to detect possible three-way interaction effects 
between independent variables we inserted in the third block of the model 
the following three-way interactions between variables:
• Logarithmic delay, context shift and number o f  analogs (named 
logaritmic_hour_delay by context by number o f  analogs)
• Logarithmic delay, context shift and learning method (named 
logaritmic_hour_delay by context by learning jn e th o d )
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• Logarithmic delay, semantic distance and learning method (named 
logaritmic_hour delay by nsemdist by learning_method).
The model was run on all 850 cases (i.e. excluding only the control 
group). Performing at each step a chi-square difference analysis (i.e. testing 
the null hypothesis that the step is justified), we found it significant at the 
first step (%2 (7) = 64.248, p = .000) with just the main effects, not 
significant at the second, in which we added 2 way interactions (y2 (14) =
15.673, p = .334), and significant at the third step in which we added three- 
way interactions {y2 (6) = 18.993, p = .004). Since a model with main 
effects and three-way interactions is very difficult to interpret, and since the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test confirmed that the complete 
model (with main effects, two and three ways interactions) fit the data well 
(y l  (7) = 1.214, p = .991), we retained it.
The regression coefficients o f the model (with variables, two-ways and 
three-ways interactions) are reported in Table 7.4 where significant effects 
are highlighted in grey. The table also reports beta coefficients (p), i.e. the 
standardized regression coefficients, calculated from the corresponding 
unstandardized coefficients (B) using the following equation (Menard, 
2004):
P = (B)(Sx)(R)lskenii,
where sX is the standard deviation of the relevant variable, R is the
s
multiple correlation coefficient (for the whole model), and is the
standard deviation o f the logit transformed model predictions.
The beta coefficients obtained can be described as fully standardized 
logistic regression coefficients (i.e. standardizing both dependent and 
independent variables, Menard, 2004) and may be used as a “scale-free” 
measure o f effect size i.e. for comparison of relative influence of the 
different predictors, similarly to what is done in ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression analysis.
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Table 7.3
Logistic regression fo r  exogenous transfer variables
B S.E. (B) Sig. Exp(B) P
Logarithmic delay 
[logaritmic_hour_delay] 
Context shift (context)
.072 .083 .382
.189
1.075 0.208
Context shift from L to M-L
[context(1)j
Context shift from L to M
[context(2) ]
Number of analogs 
[number_anaiogs]
Semantic distance [semantic_dist
-1.022
-2.035
.070
-1.339
.853
1.287
.516
.519
.231
.114
.892
.010
.360
.131
1.072
.262
-0.209
-0.664
0.022
-0.521
Learning method summ arization
[learning_method] **
Learning method guided  
com parison  [learning_method(1) 
Learning method free com parison
[learning_method(2)]
.664
.580
.511
.564
.400
.193
.304
1.943
1.786
0.221
0.166
| logaritmic_hour_delay * context .270
logaritmic_hour_delay by context(2) .281 .255 .270 1.325 0.453
logaritmic_hour_delay by 
num beranalogs 
logaritmic_hour_delay by 
semantic_dist 
logaritmic_hour_delay * 
learning_method 
logaritmic_hour_delay by 
learning_method(1) 
logaritmic_hour_delay by 
learning_method(2) 
context * number_analogs
-.117
-.128
-.079
-.354
.115
.153
.114
.130
.307
.400
.021
.486
.007
.438
.890
.879
.924
.702
-0.172
-0.217
-0.116
-0.418
context(1) by number analogs 1.378 1.080 .202 3.967 0.150
context(2) by number_analogs .693 1.917 .718 2.000 .140
semantic_dist by number_analogs .270 .683 .693 1.309 0.055
context * learning_method .022
context( 1) by learning_method( 1) .522 1.085 .630 1.685 0.055
context(1) by learning_method(2) -1.473 1.206 .222 .229 -0.151
context(2) by learning_method(1) .989 1.992 .619 2.688 0.155
context(2) by learning_method(2) 8.532 3.206 .008 5075.942 1.265
semantic_dist * leam ingm ethod .745
semantic_dist by learning_method(1) -.156 .665 .814 .856 -0.039
semantic_dist by learning_method(2) -.563 .758 .458 .570 -0.103
logaritmic_hour_delay * context * 
number_analogs .765
logaritmic_hour_delay by context(2) 
by number_analogs -.112 .375 .765 .894 -0.118
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B S.E. (B) Sig. Exp(B) P
logaritmic_hour_delay by 
semantic_dist by number_analogs .117 .198 .555 1.124 0.078
logaritmic_hour_delay * context * 
learning_method
logaritmic_hour_delay by context(2) 
by learning_method(1) -.169 .430
.075
.695 .845 -0.117
logaritmic_hour_delay by context(2) 
by learning_method(2) -1.496 .658 .023 .224 -1.045
logaritmic_hour_delay * semantic_dist 
* learning_method .013
logaritmic_hour_delay by 
semantic_dist by learning_method(1) .125 .184 .498 1.133 0.128
logaritmic_hour_delay by 
semantic_dist by learning_method(2) .566 .209 .007 1.761 0.355
Constant -.182 .398 .648 .834
* reference category for context was low, context (1) is shift to medium-low and context (2) 
is shift to medium
** reference learning method was summarization, leaming method (1) was guided 
comparison and leaming method (2) was free-comparison
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7.3.1 Number o f analogs
The study o f the relationships between number of learning analogs (0, 1, 
2) and transfer, based on the analysis o f all the cases of experiments 5-17, 
addressed the following questions:
• if  learning from one analog is enough to trigger significant transfer
• if  two analogs lead to significantly higher levels o f transfer than one. 
The relationships were tested under different conditions (type of learning,
delay, context shift and semantic distance between learning and transfer) in 
order to highlight possible interactions and exceptions and to test 
boundaries.
Background research
Background reference for this analysis is the same we quoted for 
previous experiments: Gick and Holyoak (1983), Spencer and Weisberg 
(1986) and Catrambone and Holyoak (1989) experiments.
Gick and Holyoak (1983) had observed transfer from even one analog, 
but the result was not confirmed when time and context shifts were 
introduced (Catrambone and Holyoak, 1989).
Gick and Holyoak (1983) had also shown that two analogs led to higher 
transfer than one, but it must be underscored that the analogs were 
compared and transfer was immediate and same context. Spencer and 
Weisberg (1986), in their experiments on transfer with context shifts and 
delay between learning and transfer, found un-hinted transfer to be 
independent o f number o f analogs, although the result was possibly due to a 
floor effect. Catrambone and Holyoak (1989) confirmed that two analogs 
were better than one, even with a delay and context shift, only for hinted 
transfer.
Experimental results
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One analog vs. control
Participants learning with one analog were compared to the control 
group, showing a significant relationship between number of analogs (1 vs. 
0) learned and transfer (coefficients are reported in Table 7.4). Chi-square 
was also performed on the same data, to confirm significant differences {p = 
.000, 1-sided, F-exact test) between the one-analog condition and the control 
group (see Table 7.5).
These results confirm what we had found analyzing the single 
experiments one-by-one in chapter 5.
Table 7.4
Logistic regression fo r  number o f  analogs (one vs. control)
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step ana numb 
1(a)
Constant
1.632 .402 
-2.277 .371
16.480 1 
37.628 1
.000 5.115 
.000 .103
a Variable(s) entered on step 1: ananum b.
Table 7.5
Frequencies o f  transfer - one analog v.v. control
transfer Total
no yes
number of analogs learned 0 78 8 86
1 122 64 186
Total 200 72 272
Our results indicate clearly that, in general, learning binary decision 
making from one analog is sufficient to generate un-hinted transfer even 
after long (up to 20 days) delays between learning and target coupled with 
up to medium level context shift.
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In order to ensure that the advantage o f previous learning through an 
analog held true even under tighter conditions, further analysis was 
performed comparing just the cases in which learning occurred several days 
before transfer and/or the transfer story was semantically more distant. Our 
findings always confirmed that learning a previous analog leads to 
significant advantages in transfer compared to control, with just one 
exception.
The only situation in which we found one analog insufficient for transfer 
was characterized by high semantic distance coupled with a delay of 2 days 
or higher. In this class o f cases (which, unfortunately, only had 7 
participants) the average delay between learning and transfer was 6.8 days. 
In this situation, not surprisingly, given the very small number of cases, we 
were not able to detect significant differences between control group and the 
experimental condition exposed to one analog {p = 1, 2-sided, F-exact test, 
7 participants). There are many possible explanations for this result. The 
first is that it is a spurious effect. The second is that it is caused by the 
interaction effect o f semantic distance and delay. Delay seems unlikely to be 
the main cause because we did not find it to reduce transfer significantly 
when analysed alone. It is worth mentioning that, in the case at hand, the 
main obstacles to transfer that we identified, through careful analysis of 
participant’s answers, were non-recognition of the analogy (4 out o f 7 cases) 
and difficulty in recalling the necessary operations at an adequate level for 
transfer (3 out o f 7 cases). This rather high proportion o f cases in which 
transfer was impaired by inability to retrieve the correct operations and/or 
translate them appropriately can be interpreted as confirming that, in our 
task, recognition was not the only driver o f transfer.
Unfortunately, the low number o f cases does not allow us to draw any 
conclusions from this case o f failed transfer, but we think it suggests that 
more investigation is needed to clarify the issue. A further experiment could 
be run in which two levels o f semantic distance (medium and high) and
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three levels o f delay (one day, two days and three days, chosen around the 
discontinuity point o f 2 days) would be manipulated in a factorial design. If 
the experiment were to confirm that semantic distance and time interact to 
hinder transfer, it would be interesting to add a 2 analogs condition to the 
experiment in order to understand if  the increase in number of analogs is 
enough to combat the distance-time effect. Quality o f the learning output 
and explicit recognition o f the analogy should also be analysed seeking 
correlation with successful transfer in the various combinations of semantic 
distance, delay and number o f analogs.
Table 7.6
Frequencies o f  transfer one analog vs. control- high semantic distance and 
delays o f  2 or more days
transfer Total
yes no
number of analogs
8 78 86
participant learned 0
1 0 7 7
Total 8 85 93
In conclusion, since results of analysis performed on all data together 
converge with what we had found at a single experiment level, we can 
confirm that significant transfer can take place even from one analog, even 
after long delays, in presence of context shifts and with a high semantic 
distance between learning and transfer.
Our results, obtained in transfer of binary decision making problems, 
confirm Gick and Holyoak’s (1983) finding that one analog is enough to 
trigger un-hinted transfer. Differently from what was found by Catrambone 
and Holyoak (1989), however, in our experiments delay and context shifts
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alone did not inhibit un-hinted transfer, not even from just one analog. In 
this sense, our results would indicate that, in binary decision making, 
transfer from one analog is possible even under more challenging conditions 
o f delay and context shift. A possible explanation for this difference is the 
already mentioned higher degree o f similarity between learning and target 
tasks, which could serve as a cue. It should be pointed out, however, that we 
were able to obtain transfer from one analog with our high-semantic 
distance story which we think had almost no similarity with the learning 
stories.
Future research should explore the limits of transfer from one analog in 
order to understand what can impair it (context, semantic distance, delay or 
an interaction between them). In particular, it would be interesting to run 
experiments with a high context shift (with and without delay and with 
different levels o f semantic distance between learning and transfer) as it 
seems the most likely cause o f no-transfer results reported in existing 
literature on open-ended problem solving transfer.
Moreover, if future experiments identify no-transfer situations, they 
should also confirm that the counter-measures that were found effective in 
open-ended problem solving transfer (i.e. adding a third analog and more 
extensive comparison instructions), are also useful with binary-decision 
making tasks.
One vs. two analogs.
As shown in Table 7.3, logistic regression on all experimental data 
resulted in a non-significant relationship between number o f analogs learned 
(1 vs. 2) and transfer. It should be noted that the b is very small (.070) and 
not significant.
These results are consistent with what we had found analyzing 
experiments separately. Further analyses were conducted on the data,
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compiling experiments to create clusters of homogeneous data (e.g. all cases 
with low context shift and transfer after 5 minutes, with a medium semantic 
distance). We were never able to detect a significant difference between 
learning with one or with two analogs. Moreover, no interaction effects 
between number of analogs and other variables emerged in our regression 
analysis, as can be seen in Table 7.3.
All this evidence indicates that the number o f analogs learned is not 
significant within the conditions that we tested, which were rather wide 
(context shift up to medium, delays up to over 20 days, semantic distance up 
to high).
It must be pointed out, however, to better qualify these results that we 
have few cases in the boundary conditions (e.g. high semantic distance 
coupled with delays of 2 days and higher only had three participants 
learning with one analog) and no cases in extreme conditions such as high 
semantic distance, medium context shift and long delays. In Catrambone 
and Holyoak’s experiments (1989), augmenting the number of analogs 
(from 2 to 3 in their case) and supporting comparison with detailed 
instructions made a significant difference enabling transfer for the 3 analog 
participants in challenging transfer situations. It is therefore possible that in 
challenging situations o f binary decision making transfer the difference 
between one and two would become significant in terms of transfer i.e. that 
under some o f the conditions which we haven’t tested increasing from one 
analog to two would impact transfer significantly. We can, however, state 
that in a wide range o f transfer conditions, some of which seem rather 
challenging, adding a second analog in the learning phase does not 
significantly affect transfer rates.
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Table 7.7
Frequencies o f  transfer — one analog vs. two - Medium context shift and
delay over 15 days
transfer Total
no yes
number of analogs 
participant learned 1
19 10 29
2 8 11 19
Total 27 21 48
In sum, the conditions under which we examined the relationship were 
more varied than the ones adopted by Gick and Holyoak (1983) and 
somewhat similar to the ones tested by Spencer and Weisberg (1986) and by 
Catrambone and Holyoak (1989) since we adopted different levels of 
context shifts and delays. Two analogs never seemed to lead to higher 
transfer than one in our experiments and in our aggregated data analyses, 
but, as we pointed out, we have insufficient cases in the very extreme 
transfer conditions (i.e. high semantic distance coupled with long delays 
and/or high context shifts) which, potentially, could benefit from the second 
analog being added. As already mentioned, further experiments in binary 
decision making transfer should seek to collect more o f these cases to test if, 
in very challenging transfer conditions, number of analogs might become 
relevant.
7.3.2 Learning method
The study o f the relationship between learning method and transfer, 
based on the analysis o f all the cases o f experiments 5-17 , addressed the
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main question o f whether learning methods have, alone and/or in interaction 
with other variables, an impact on transfer.
The relationship was tested under different conditions (number of 
analogs, delay, context shift and semantic distance between learning and 
transfer) in order to highlight possible exceptions to general findings and to 
test boundaries.
Background research
Background reference for this analysis is the same we quoted previously. 
In essence, Gick and Holyoak (1983) showed that analogical encoding 
supported schema formation and, thus, immediate same-context transfer 
better than other types of learning. In their 1989 experiments, Catrambone 
and Holyoak took the research one step further, showing that analogical 
encoding leads to higher pre-hint transfer levels than just summarization in a 
situation, again, o f immediate and not context-shifted transfer. Superiority 
o f analogical encoding over other methods was also confirmed by further 
experiments in the domain o f transfer of negotiation skills (Loewenstein, 
Thompson and Gentner, 1999 and Gentner, Lowenstein and Thompson, 
2003). It was also found (Spencer and Weisberg, 1986 and Catrambone 
and Holyoak, 1989), however, that context shifts coupled with time delays 
eliminate the advantage o f analogical encoding o f two analogs in un-hinted 
transfer.
Experimental results
The three learning methods that were compared in the online experiments 
were: summarization, guided comparison (participants had to answer a 
series o f questions conceived to highlight analogy between the two) and free  
comparison (participants were simply instructed to compare the two stories
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searching for common features between the two). Free comparison is Gick 
and Holyoak’s analogical encoding, while guided comparison is somewhat 
similar to the more directive comparison instructions used by Catrambone 
and Holyoak (1989) in experiments 4 and 5, with the main difference that 
we did not provide the ideal answers to those questions before transfer.
As shown in Table 7.3, logistic regression on all experimental data (850 
cases) resulted in a non-significant main effect o f learning method on 
transfer. Chi-square was also performed on homogenous clusters of the 
same data, showing non significant differences in transfer rates {p > .1) 
between the three learning conditions.
If learning method alone doesn’t have a significant effect on transfer, it 
does however interact with other variables of the process to produce 
significant two and three-way effects.
There are 2 two-way interactions which pass the significance threshold 
(see Table 7.3).
The first is the interaction between delay and learning method free- 
comparison which bears a significantly negative effect on transfer: the 
probability o f transfer decreases with time only for learning method free- 
comparison.
The second two-way interaction is between learning method and context 
shift: in the case o f learning method free  comparison, context shifts from 
low to medium have a strong and significant positive effect on transfer. In 
other words, while a change from low to medium context shift tends to 
decrease transfer, although non-significantly, in the case o f free-comparison 
learning it increases it significantly (in fact, as can be seen in Table 7.3, 
adding the interaction effect to the main effect, the net effect is positive). 
This effect is difficult to explain with theory and the number o f cases on 
which the result is based are probably not enough to draw firm conclusions. 
It is difficult to say if  this is spurious or real without analyzing more cases 
and, possibly, launching a more targeted experiment which would vary
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context shifts and learning methods in a factorial design to investigate the 
possible interaction effect o f the two.
Moreover, there is a significant negative 3-way interaction effect 
between context shift, type o f learning free-comparison and delay. The 
interpretation to be given, since the main effect is zero, is that participants 
who have learned with type of learning free-comparison and must transfer 
in a situation o f medium context shift have an initial advantage over 
participants who learned with summarization and transfer with a low 
context shift. As indicated by the coefficient that characterizes the three way 
interaction between learning type free  comparison, context shift and time, 
this initial advantage becomes less and is eventually nullified as time 
elapses, (see figure 7.2 for a graphical representation o f this effect). The 
same comment as we made regarding the previous interaction effect applies: 
the result should be verified with a targeted experiment.
Finally, semantic distance interacts with delay in the case o f learning 
type free  comparison. This interaction, significantly positive, means that the 
negative impact o f high semantic distance, in learning type free comparison, 
is lessened by delay, i.e. that high semantic distance combined with learning 
method free  comparison has a negative effect on transfer, but this appears to 
be reduced by time (see Figure 7.3 for graphical representation of the 
effect). In sum, it seems that the effect o f delay, with learning type free- 
comparison, is different depending on semantic distance being medium or 
high. This result should be investigated further because number of cases in 
this condition were rather limited (50).
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Figure 7.2
P red ic ted  p ro b a b ility  o f  transfer as a fu n c tio n  o f  logarithm ic delay in 
hours in the case o f  low  (default) vs. m edium  context sh ift -  free -  
com parison  learning. Predictions were derived  fro m  the logistic  
regression m odel, using  only the significant effects
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Figure 7.3.
P red ic ted  p ro b a b ility  o f  transfer as a func tion  o f  logarithm ic delay in 
hours in the case o f  m edium  sem antic distance (default) and  high  
sem antic  d istance - learning  m ethod free-com parison. Predictions  
w ere d erived  fr o m  the logistic regression model, using only the 
sign ifican t effects.
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Having found that learning method alone does not have a significant 
relationship with transfer, we wanted to investigate the other issue which 
we had left open in the one-by-one analysis of experiments, namely if 
comparison based learning is related to higher transfer rates than one-analog 
learning. This is interesting, as we pointed out, because it has implications 
for the mediating role o f schemata in transfer. In order to gain statistical 
power, we compiled together all cases in which transfer had followed 
learning after 5 minutes and all cases in which delay was over one day. In 
the group o f cases in which learning and transfer were separated by 5 
minutes, the evidence from our single-experiment analyses was confirmed: 
we found no significant difference between transfer rates o f participants 
learning by analog comparison and participants learning from one analog ip 
= .770, 2-sided; F-exact test). Since, however, quality o f learning was in 
general quite low (39% o f participants who learned by comparison fell in
341
the no/little learning category) and we wanted to make sure we were 
considering cases in which a schema had in fact been induced, we 
performed the analysis again using only the cases over the “little/no 
learning” threshold (participants who received medium or high quality 
rating). Even performing the analysis just for participants who learned 
above the no/little learning threshold, levels were non-significant ip = .586, 
2-sided; F-exact test). Frequencies are reported in Table 7.8 and 7.9. To be 
even more sure that we were in fact comparing cases in which a schema was 
presumably formed to those in which it had not, we performed another 
analysis considering just the guided comparison learning cases versus the 
single analog cases. Again we found no significant difference in transfer 
rates (p =.866, 2-sided; F-exact test).
We then performed the same analysis on our over-one-day delay transfer 
cases, to ensure that comparison-based learning (free-learning and guided 
comparison) did not differ from one-analog learning when transfer was after 
a longer delay. We first compared all the available cases in over-one-day 
delay transfer condition. Although this type of analysis is very rough 
because the comparison cases and the one analog cases did not have exactly 
the same delay mix nor average (average was 6 days for comparison 
learning and 8.4 for one-analog learning), it had the advantage of counting 
on a high number of cases. We found no significant difference in transfer 
rates between the two groups ip  = .215, 2-sided; F-exact test). Even in this 
group, quality o f learning was rather low (44% of participants were 
qualified as no/little learning), so we again selected just the cases over the 
“little/no learning” to try, as much as possible, to avoid distortion of results. 
Once again, no significant difference were found ip = .335, 2-sided; F-exact 
test). Frequencies are reported in tables 7.10 and 7.11. We performed the 
same analyses on sub-sets o f cases belonging to the same delay category to 
find, again, no significant differences ip > .1) between comparison-based 
learning and one-analog learning. Finally, we compared, as we had done for
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the 5 minutes delay group, just guided- comparison learning with one- 
analog learning, to find no significant differences in transfer (p = .178, 2- 
sided; F-exact test).
It clearly seems to be the case that comparison-based learning is not 
superior to one-analog summarization. Since we infer that, in comparison 
based learning, a schema is formed (in particular if learning quality has been 
rated medium or high or if  guided-comparison have been considered), we 
can cautiously conclude that a schema is not very relevant in binary decision 
making transfer.
Table 7.8
Frequencies o f  transfer for one analog condition vs. comparison-based 
learning conditions (guided and free  comparison) - transfer delay = 5 
minutes
transfer Total
yes no
Learning by comparison of 2
analogs (*)
one analog only (*)
51 89 140
30 47 77
Total 81 136 217
(*) Comparison conditions from experiments 6, 12, 16; one-analog conditions from 
experiments 5, 11,15
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Table 7.9
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  one analog condition vs. comparison-based 
learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)- transfer delay = 5 
minutes — quality o f  learning medium and high
transfer Total
yes no
Learning by comparison of 2
analogs (*) 
one analog only (*)
34 49 83
23 26 49
Total 57 75 132
(*) Comparison conditions from experiments 6, 12, 16; one-analog conditions from 
experiments 5, 11,15
Table 7.10
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  one analog condition vs. comparison-based 
learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)- transfer delay > 1 day
transfer Total
yes no
Learning by comparison of 
2 analogs (*)
one analog only (*)
78 121 199
Total
34
112
74
195
108
307
(*) Comparison conditions from experiments 8, 10, 14; one-analog conditions from 
experiments 7 , 9 ,  13
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Table 7.11
Frequencies o f  transfer fo r  one analog condition vs. comparison-based 
learning conditions (guided and free  comparison)- transfer delay > 1 day -  
quality o f  learning medium and high
transfer Total
yes no
Learning by comparison of 2
analogs (*) 
one analog only (*)
58 55 113
25 33 58
Total 83 88 171
(*) Comparison conditions from experiments 8, 10, 14; one-analog conditions from 
experiments 7, 9, 13
From our analyses on learning method and transfer, we may conclude 
that learning method does not have a significant main effect on transfer, but 
that the free-comparison method has a few significant effects in interaction 
with other variables. Learning method free-comparison had a total o f only 
136 cases, spread across all our experiments, thus each subset of data on 
which interaction effects were estimated was rather small and, in some 
cases, very small (e.g. just 32 cases in medium shift context). All the 
suggestions from our regression should therefore be taken with caution and 
verified with more cases and ad hoc experiments. If learning by free- 
comparison were really to prove “different” in terms o f transfer, then further 
experiments, perhaps with think-aloud protocols, might be needed to explain 
the differences.
Moreover, we found that comparison-based learning (which presumably 
induces learners to form a schema), does not lead to higher transfer than 
summarization o f one analog. This result can’t be attributed to low quality
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of schemas induced because it held true considering just the case of 
medium/high learning. This leads us to think that the role o f schema in 
mediating transfer is less relevant in binary decision making than it was in 
open-ended problem solving. Possibly this is due to the more circumscribed 
type o f question that our transfer problems require answers to. It should be 
pointed out that Gick and Holyoak (1983) had participants in both the one 
analog and the two analogs condition compare two stories, only one of 
which was analogous. Note that they commented that looking for analogies 
where there were none might have resulted in confusion, therefore we 
slightly modified the procedure. This difference in procedure might also in 
part explain the difference in results.
7.3.3 Diversity o f learning exemplars
The analysis o f the relationship between diversity of analogs and transfer 
is based on results from our online experiment No. 17 (this was the specific 
experiment that analysed the relationship) and No. 15, not from our logistic 
regression of all external variables due to the fact that diversity was tested 
only under specific conditions (5 minute delay, low context shift and high 
semantic distance). This is somewhat limiting, since it is possible that 
diversity interacts with other variables bringing significant effects on 
transfer. Since the results o f our experiment No. 17 were quite clear, based 
on a sufficient number o f cases (148) and consistent with previous findings, 
we decided not to invest further in investigating this relationship.
Nevertheless, we decided to compile data from these two experiments as, 
in both cases, learning was by summarization of two analogs and transfer 
was in conditions o f 5 minute transfer, low context shift and high semantic 
distance. This increased the number o f cases to include in the analysis, 
although not greatly, thus augmenting the chances that a possible
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relationship could be detected. It must be pointed out however that the cases 
included were “in between” the two levels o f diversity tested in experiment 
No. 17.
Background research
The background research is the same as for experiment 17. In essence, 
Gick and Holyoak’s findings (1983) indicated that level of diversity of 
learned analogs does not affect transfer.
Experimental results
Confirming previous research (Gick and Holyock , 1983) and our 
experimental results (experiment No. 17), our data shows that diversity of 
exemplars does not have a relationship with transfer (p = .712, 2-sided; F- 
exact test). Frequencies are reported in the table below
Table 7.12
Frequencies o f  transfer by diversity o f  learning analogs - Three-way 
comparison
transfer Total
yes no
diversity of learning stories low 13 63 76
medium 9 32 41
high 16 56 72
Total 38 151 189
We conclude by saying that, although no main effect o f diversity was 
found, we did not check for interaction with other variables. Possible
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interaction effects with other variables (e.g. learning method) should be 
explored with future experiments.
7.3.4 Semantic Distance
Semantic distance is the first o f the external non-controllable variables 
that we will discuss. The study o f the relationship between semantic 
distance and transfer, based on the analysis of all the cases of experiments 
5-17 , addressed the main question of whether semantic distance has, alone 
and/or in interaction with other variables, an impact on transfer.
The relationship was tested under different conditions (number of 
analogs, learning method, delay) in order to highlight possible exceptions to 
general findings and to test boundaries.
It should be underscored that experiments on the relationship between 
semantic distance separating learning and transfer tasks only took place in 
situations in which context shift was low so the interaction between 
semantic distance and context shift was not studied.
Background research
The background is the same as the one indicated in experiment 13. In 
essence, Gick and Holyoak (1983) had found that increased semantic 
distance reduces transfer. However, this variable had not been studied by 
them or others in interaction with other variables such as delay.
Experimental results
As shown in Table 7.3, semantic distance was the only variable having a 
significant main effect (which was negative) on transfer. For this variable 
we have no prior analysis o f the impact on transfer because it varied only
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between experiments. In order to have another analysis to support our 
regression, Fisher’s exact-test was performed on clusters of experimental 
data grouped to include similar cases confirmed the results of the regression 
analysis.
Moreover, as reported discussing the relationship between type of 
learning and transfer, there is a significant interaction effect of semantic 
distance and delay in the case of learning type free  comparison. This 
positive interaction, adds to the negative impact o f high semantic distance 
in combination with learning type free comparison, thus reducing the 
negative effect as delay from learning increases (see figure 7.3 for graphical 
representation). Therefore, time delay between learning and transfer, in the 
case o f learning type free-comparison, has a different effect depending on 
semantic distance being medium or high. It appears that the effect of high 
semantic distance on transfer is different depending on the moment in time 
i.e. that it is more negative right away and then, as time goes by, it is 
reduced.
In conclusion, semantic distance has a significant negative effect on 
transfer. In the case o f learning type free  comparison the negative impact of 
high semantic distance is reduced by an increase in delay from learning.
As mentioned earlier, we studied semantic distance shift only in a low 
context shift situation, thus we do not know anything about its interaction 
effects with context. Further experiments should vary semantic distance and 
context in a factorial type design to study possible interactions between 
semantic distance and context shift. Furthermore, it would be interesting to 
run experiments aimed at understanding what can be done to counter the 
negative effect o f an increase in semantic distance. Increasing the number of 
analogs from 2 to 3 does not seem promising (given that we found no 
difference between two and one) nor does using a higher number and/or 
more detailed analogy-oriented questions to lead the comparison (guided- 
comparison was not significantly better than the other learning methods),
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but nevertheless should be tried. Other possible approaches could be to give 
some participants a short training on how to encode learning in a way that 
helps analogy recognition (more abstract level) and on how to improve 
recognition.
7.3.5 Context shift
The study o f the relationship between context shift and transfer, based on 
the analysis o f all the cases o f experiments 5-17, addressed the main 
question if semantic distance has, alone and/or in interaction with other 
variables, an impact on transfer.
The relationship was tested under different conditions (number of 
analogs, learning method, delay and semantic distance) in order to highlight 
possible exceptions to general findings and to test boundaries.
Background research
The background reference is the same as for experiments 2 and 3. In 
essence, both Spencer and Weisberg (1986) and Catrambone and Holyoak 
(1989) experiments on time and context limitations in problem solving 
transfer have shown that these effects can be very powerful on un-hinted 
transfer, to the point that three analogs and detailed comparison instructions 
become necessary to obtain it. Although separating time and context effects 
is not easy* it seemed that context played the greatest role in impairing 
transfer.
Experimental results
As shown in Table 7.3, logistic regression on all online experimental data 
(which included three types o f context shift: low, medium-low and medium)
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resulted in a non-significant relationship between context and transfer. 
Fisher’s exact test on homogeneous clusters of data was performed to 
identify possible exceptions. The only ones (i.e. significant relationships 
between context shift and transfer) that we found occurred in the cases of 
medium semantic distance, 5 minute transfer (p = .018, 2-sided, F-exact 
test, 134 cases) where the context differences compared were low and 
medium-low and in the case o f medium semantic distance, summarization 
and delay o f over one day (p = .042, 2-sided, F-exact test, 246 cases) where 
the context shift compared were low and medium. We don’t attribute much 
importance to these exceptions, which look like spurious effects, but 
nevertheless suggest that further research, based on more cases, re-examines 
the issue.
Table 7.3 also shows that context however has significant impact in 
interaction with other variables (learning method, delay, semantic distance) 
as already pointed out. There is a two-way interaction between learning 
method and context shift: in the case o f learning method free  comparison, 
context shifts from low to medium have a strong and significant positive 
effect on transfer. Moreover, there is a significant negative 3-way 
interaction effect between this context shift, type of learning free- 
comparison and delay which, as we commented, means that participants 
learning with free-comparison in a situation o f medium context shift 
initially learn better than participants who learned with summarization and 
transfer with a low context shift but, with time, this initial advantage 
becomes less and is eventually nullified as time elapses.
7.3.6 Time delay between learning and transfer
The study o f the relationship between time delay (from 5 minutes to over 
20 days) and transfer, based on the analysis o f all the cases o f experiments
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5-17, addressed the main question if time delay has, alone and/or in 
interaction with other variables, an impact on transfer.
The relationship was tested under different conditions (number of 
analogs, learning method, context shift and semantic distance) in order to 
highlight possible exceptions to general findings and to test boundaries.
Background research
The background for this experiment is the same as for experiments 2 and 
3. In essence, research in the domain o f open-ended problem solving 
(Spencer and Weisberg, 1986) showed that introducing even a short time 
delay (6 minutes) between analogical encoding learning (i.e. learning by 
comparing two analogs in search o f similarities) and transfer can reduce 
and even eliminate un-hinted transfer if coupled with a context shift 
(learning part presented as an experiment vs. transfer part presented as class 
demonstration by different investigator but all in same room). According to 
this research, context appears to be the main driver o f transfer, with transfer, 
although weak, observed in the same-context condition and no transfer 
being observed in the different-context condition. Catrambone and Holyoak 
(1989) confirmed time-context effects in their experiments and attributed 
them mainly to context.
Experimental results
As shown in Table 7.3, the logistic regression on all experimental data 
resulted in a non-significant relationship between time delay and transfer. 
The table also shows that time delay significantly interacts with learning 
method.
In conclusion, evidence from our experiments indicates that delay 
(between 5 minutes and one day up to around 20 days) does not have a
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significant impact on transfer except in limited cases, occurring in 
interaction with other variables (semantic distance and context shift) in the 
case of learning by free comparison. To confirm significance and to better 
understand these effects, targeted experiments should be performed. These 
experiments should adopt free-comparison as a learning method and vary in 
a factorial design the variables whose interaction effects are to be 
investigated.
The fact that, except in the above mentioned cases, delay does not 
appear to impact binary decision making transfer can be interpreted simply 
as a finding consistent with the shape of the memory curve, which continues 
decreasing, but much less steeply. However, the phenomenon could also be 
explained by at least two effects acting in opposite directions. It is possible, 
for example, that forgetting is compensated by decay of superficial features. 
This elimination o f superficial features, in fact, can help to identify the 
analogy from a semantically different domain without being confused by it 
being superficially dissimilar. Further research should investigate this 
through specific experiments in which both quantity o f data (i.e. available 
cases) and richness of information that the data contains are increased. 
Specific experiments could test if  transfer from superficially similar stories 
decreases more through time than transfer from semantically more distant 
stories. We think it will be necessary to collect more cases with different 
delays because, although we had a respectable number of cases, they were 
unevenly distributed between different learning methods, context shifts and 
semantic distances. To increase quality o f data, a few things can be done, 
for example devising a categorization o f mistakes to allow an in-depth 
analysis o f missed transfer as well as using think aloud protocols and more 
detailed final questionnaires.
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7.4 Relationship Between Endogenous Variables of the Learning-
transfer Process and Transfer
The internal variables o f the leaming-transfer process which will be 
considered are quality o f learning and explicit recognition. Although these 
variables cannot be directly manipulated in real life, they can be influenced, 
to some degree, by appropriate strategies. If a significant relationship 
between these variables and transfer is found, it would encourage the search 
for and fine-tuning of strategies that influence them in order to enhance 
transfer. Beyond practical motivations, analyzing these variables helps to 
better understand the underlying mechanisms o f transfer. Finally, these 
variables have been studied previously in transfer of problem solving, 
making it worthwhile to compare results and explain possible differences.
The goal o f the analysis presented in the following sub-sections was to 
determine how quality of learning and explicit recognition relate to transfer 
and to each other.
In order to study the relationships between our internal variables and 
transfer, we ran a regression {Internal variables regression) on all online 
cases (787 cases) excluding only the first ones (experiments 5 and 6) for 
which explicit recognition data was not considered reliable enough (the final 
questionnaire used was not in its definitive version). We used the same 
method (i.e. block entry o f variables with chi-square difference test 
procedure at each step) used in our Exogenous variables regression i.e. we 
entered just the independent variables in the first block and two-way 
interactions in the second one. Our independent variables were explicit 
recognition and level o f quality in learning and our dependent variable was 
transfer.
Before proceeding in the discussion of results, it is necessary that we will 
briefly introduce the regression model that we used.
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Our dependent variable, named transfer, was the same we used in the 
Exogenous variables regression: it was dichotomous and could take “yes” 
or “no” as values. Value “yes” was assigned when of sub-task 1 was solved 
and explained correctly.
The independent variables were:
• explicit recognition (named: explicit recognition). This variable 
could assume two values. Value “yes” was assigned when, in the final 
questionnaire, participant self-reported that she had recognized the analogy 
explicitly. Value “No” was assigned in the opposite case.
• quality of learning reached in the learning task (named: quality). 
This variable could take three values. Low quality meant that very little 
learning was shown in the output either because it was too short, too 
focused on superficial details o f the stories or simply because it completely 
missed the main learning point. The value Medium was assigned if the main 
point made by the learning story/ies had been understood, but seemingly 
just at a superficial level. Finally, high was assigned when the output 
showed deeper understanding o f the basic point made by the learning 
story/ies.
In order to capture possible interaction effects o f our independent 
variables, the two-way interaction between quality and explicit recognition 
was inserted in the model.
Performing the chi-square difference test at each step we found that, 
while including the main effects o f the independent variables resulted in a 
significant chi-square difference {yl (3) = 74.497, p = .000), adding two- 
way interactions did not (yl{2) = . 110, p = .947). We therefore retained the 
model with just the main effects o f the independent variables. The model 
had good predictive capability, as shown by the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
Goodness-of-Fit Test in block 1 (yl{4) = .110, p = .999).
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7.4.1 Quality o f learning
The analysis o f the relationship between quality o f learning and transfer 
is based on results from our online experiments 5-17. It addressed the main 
question if higher levels o f quality of learning lead to higher levels of 
transfer (i.e. is quality of learning predictive of transfer) and under which 
conditions.
The relationship was tested under different conditions (number o f 
analogs, learning method, diversity of exemplars, context shift, semantic 
distance and delay between learning and transfer) in order to highlight 
possible exceptions to the general findings and to test boundaries.
Background research
Since the majority of open-ended problem solving studies required 
participants to compare two or more analogs and produce a schema in the 
learning part o f the experiment (i.e. to learn by analogical encoding), quality 
of learning has mainly been analysed as reflected in the quality of the 
schema produced.
Gick and Holyoak were the first (1983) to study the relationship between 
schema quality and transfer, finding that it was significant in immediate 
same context transfer.
Spencer and W eisberg’s (1986) extended the conditions under which the 
relationship was tested by introducing a context shift (tasks presented as 
different) and a 6 minutes interval. They found that, while in the same 
context schema quality was highly predictive of transfer, when the context 
situation was different it was predictive only of hinted transfer. The result, 
however, should be interpreted taking into account that they ran into a floor 
effect (few non-hint participants solved the target story).
Spencer and W eisberg’s results were replicated by Catrambone and 
Holyoak (1989) who confirmed that good quality of schemata, without a 
hint, is not predictive of transfer in the presence of context shift and delay. 
Introducing more extensive comparison instructions and adding an analog, 
however, resulted in higher level schemas which were, this time, predictive 
o f both hinted and un-hinted transfer.
In conclusion, the possession of a good schema appeared crucial for 
immediate same-context problem solving transfer as well as for delayed 
different context hinted transfer, but insufficient in the case o f context and 
time shifted transfer unless a third analog and comparison instructions are 
provided in learning phase.
Experimental results
Our results confirm and extend the importance of quality of learning as a 
predictor o f transfer. As shown in Table 7.13, which also reports beta 
coefficients ((3), i.e. the standardized regression coefficients calculated with 
method discussed previously, the effect o f shift from low to medium and 
from low to high quality on transfer is significant, and the latter has a 
slightly greater effect. Note that the results have been checked with binary 
regression performed on sub-sets of data (just one analog, all learning 
methods separately) to always find significant levels for the relationship 
between quality of learning and transfer with the exception of free- 
comparison. Fisher’s exact test was also performed on the same data, 
confirming that quality o f learning is highly predictive of transfer (p =
0.000, Fisher’s exact test, 2-sided ). There are no significant interaction 
effects between quality and explicit recognition.
As we mentioned, the conditions under which quality of learning is 
significant are wider than those found in problem solving transfer studies 
because the cases we examined include learning from summarization and
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not only from comparison-based learning, long term as well as 5 minute 
delay, different levels o f contextual shift and of semantic distance. The fact 
that, at a single experiment level we had found mixed results, can probably 
be interpreted as a lack o f power of the relationship due to smaller number 
o f cases. It is also possible, however, that there are conditions in which 
quality o f learning looses significance: having found a main effect of quality 
o f learning does not mean that it has the same effect in each possible 
condition. Further experiments might explore this aspect varying the 
conditions in which transfer occurs.
Table 7.13
Logistic regression o f  internal (endogenous) transfer process variables 
predicting transfer
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) P
Explicit recognition 
of analogy 
[nexp_rec( 1)]
Quality of learning 
change from L-M 
[quality3(1) ]
Quality of iearning 
change from L-H 
[quality3(2)]
Constant
.845
.830
1.593
-1.917
.194
.173
.283
.194
18.924
39.893
22.917
31.619
97.456
1
2
1
1
1
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
2.327
2.292
4.916
.147
.304
.325
.354
a Variable(s) entered on step 1: nexp_rec, quality3.
7.4.2 Explicit recognition o f analogy
The analysis o f the relationship between explicit recognition and transfer 
is based on results from our online experiments 5-17. Our analysis 
addressed the question if higher levels of explicit recognition lead to higher 
levels o f transfer (i.e. is explicit recognition predictive of transfer) and under 
which conditions. From a theoretical point of view, the question is of 
interest because it allows us to understand if transfer is an implicit or
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explicit process. From a practical point of view it is also o f interest because 
a possible strategy for increasing transfer could be to increase explicit 
recognition (e.g. teaching people how to search their memories for analogies 
or how to encode new learning so it’s more recognizable).
It should be underscored that in our experiments we investigated only un­
hinted transfer, therefore explicit recognition was never a manipulated 
variable. Moreover, explicit recognition was self-reported by participants.
Background research
Literature on problem solving analogical transfer indicates failure to 
notice the analogy as a major block to transfer. In experiments on transfer of 
problem solving explicit recognition was often a manipulated variable: 
participants were first asked to solve the problem without a hint and then 
with a hint (for those who had not solved it).
Gick and Holyoak’s (1980, 1983) found that when participants who had 
failed to find the convergence solution to the Radiation problem 
spontaneously were given a hint to use the prior analog, they succeed in 
high proportions, thus demonstrating that the obstacle to transfer was not 
faulty encoding but recognition. Moreover, spontaneous noticing proved to 
be a problem even when memory was not involved: many subjects failed to 
notice the analogy even when they were memorizing and recalling after 
beginning to solve the target problem.
Experimental results
The relationship was tested using our logistic regression for internal 
variables and chi-square analysis. Both analyses indicate that explicit 
recognition has a significant relationship with transfer (p = 0.000, Fisher’s
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exact test, 2-sided). See Table 7.13 for regression coefficients and 
significance levels and Table 7.14 for frequencies.
Table 7.14
Frequencies o f  correct transfer fo r  explicit recognition (Y/N)
transfer Total
no yes
explicit recognition of 
analogy yes 337 215 552
no 191 44 235
Total 528 259 787
In conclusion, from our aggregated data analyses it seems that explicit 
recognition (for which we had mixed evidence at a single experiment level) 
has a significant relationship with transfer, but is not enough to ensure it 
since the probability o f transfer, given explicit recognition, is much less than 
1 (only 39% o f those who recognize explicitly manage to transfer 
successfully). It also appears that it does not have an interaction with quality
i.e. that quality and recognition affect transfer independently. As usual when 
results are based on self-reported measures, there may be some bias (e.g. it 
is possible that the percentage o f participants who say they recognized the 
analogy is inflated).
7.5 Relationship Between Quality of Learning and Explicit Recognition
The relationship between quality o f learning and explicit recognition was 
analysed on all online cases using the new questionnaire (i.e. all cases in 
experiments 7-17, 787 in total). Both Chi-square analysis (p = .000, F-exact
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test, 1-sided, frequencies reported in Table 7.15) and regression found high 
significance in the relationship (see Table 7.16). In order to test the 
relationship further, Fisher’s exact test was also run on clusters of data to 
check for possible exceptions to the rule. The exceptions i.e. the cases in 
which the relationship is non-significant, occur when the learning method is 
free-comparison and in longer delay situations (more than 8 days), when 
there is a medium level context shift and only one learning analog.
Further experiments might be aimed at exploring the exceptions we 
found, checking if  in “stretched” transfer conditions (i.e. when longer delays 
are coupled with higher context shifts and just one analog) might reduce the 
strength o f the relationship.
Table 7.15
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition fo r  each level o f  quality reached in 
learning task
explicit recognition of 
analogy Total
yes no
level of quality
reached in learning
task (on 3 no or very low 209 138 347
categories) learning
medium learning 285 86 371
high learning 58 11 69
Total 552 235 787
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Table 7.16
Logistic regression o f  quality o f  learning fo r  explicit recognition
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) P
Low quality 29.634 2 000
Change from
low to medium 783 .165 22.570 1 .000 2.188 .391
quality
Change from
low to medium 1.247 .347 12.949 1 .000 3.482 .353
quality
Constant .415 .110 14.321 1 .000 1.514
7.6 Relationship Between Exogenous and Endogenous Variables of the 
Learning-transfer Process
In this section we will analyse the relationship between our usual 
exogenous variables (number o f analogs, learning method and diversity of 
learned exemplars, semantic distance, context shift, time delay) and the two 
endogenous ones (quality o f learning and explicit recognition). The results 
we report are based on the analysis of our online experiments (5-17) on 
which all previous analyses were based.
We will firstly (section 7.6.1) analyse the relationships between all the 
variables (of both learning and transfer phase) and explicit recognition to 
better understand the role explicit recognition plays as a mediating variable 
between our manipulated variables and transfer. We will compare the results 
to those reported in the previous sections on the relationships between our 
variables and transfer and between explicit recognition and transfer.
In section 7.6.2 we will discuss the relationship between variables of the 
learning phase (number o f analogs, learning method and diversity o f learned 
exemplars) and quality o f learning with the same finality as the one 
expressed above. Once again we will comment the results found in the light
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o f those reported in the previous sections on the relationships between 
learning phase variables and transfer and between quality of learning and 
transfer.
The study o f the relationships between exogenous and endogenous 
variables has the objective o f shedding light on the mechanisms of the 
transfer process.
7.6.1 Relationship between learning and transfer phase variables and 
explicit recognition
In order to assess the impact of our exogenous variables (with the only 
exclusion o f diversity o f exemplars, for reasons already discussed) on 
explicit recognition and to be able to compare results with those regarding 
the relationship with transfer, we used the same logistic regression that we 
had used to predict transfer and the same method (i.e. block entry of 
variables with chi-square difference test procedure at each step to assess if 
the step was justified). As we had done in the logistic regression for transfer, 
we entered just the independent variables in the first block, two-way 
interactions in the second and three-way interactions in the third. The 
regression was run on all online experimental cases for which we had 
reliable explicit recognition data (i.e. cases from experiments 7-17, 784 
cases in total, in which we used the final version o f our questionnaire) and 
will use the same coding o f variables, with one small difference. The 
exclusion o f experiments 5 and 6 (which did not use the questionnaire in its 
final form) implies that we only have 2 types of context shifts in this 
experiment, thus context(l) is now the change from low (L) to medium (M) 
context shift. Note that, in the previous regression, the change from L to M 
context shift was coded context(2).
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Our dependent dichotomous variable was explicit recognition of the 
analogy (named: explicit recognition), which could take values “yes” if, in 
the final questionnaire, participant declared that she had recognized the 
analogy explicitly and value “no” in the opposite case.
The independent variables were exactly the same as we used in our 
Exogenous variable regression (see section 7.3). Performing a chi-square 
difference test at each step, we found a significant chi-square difference 
when introducing the independent variables {y2 (6) = 31.716, p = .000) and 
the two-way interactions in the model {y2 (11) = 26.616, p = .003), but 
adding three-way interactions did not reach significance (%! (6) = 11.673, p 
= .070). We therefore retained the model with the main effects and the two- 
way interactions, which had an acceptable predictive capability as shown by 
the Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test in block 2 {yl (7) = 7.402, 
p = .388).
The logistic regression coefficients are reported in Table 7.17 where 
significant effects have been highlighted. The table also reports beta 
coefficients (p), i.e. the standardized regression coefficients, calculated from 
the corresponding unstandardized coefficients (B) using the same equation 
previously used.
This section will present and discuss experimental results variable by 
variable in the following pages.
Table 7.17
Logistic regression fo r  key explicit recognition variables
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) P
Step
1(a)
Logarithmic 
delay [log hour] 
Context shift
-.109 .080 1.863 1 .172 .897 -.332
medium -2.244 .851 6.954 1 .008 .106 -.797
[context(1)]
Number of
analogs [n ana] 
Semantic -.479 .560 .732 1 .392 .620 -.162
distance
[nsemdist] -.084 .575 .022 1 .883 .919 -.035
Learning 
method [typej] 8.620 .013
Learning
method guided 
comparison 1.092 .644 2.876 1 .090 2.979 .383
[ty p e j( i)  ]
Learning
method free- 
comparison -.683 .563 1.470 1 .225 .505 -.203
[type_l(2)]
log_hour by 
context(1) .457 .159 8.225 1 .004 1.580 .802
log_hour by 
n ana -.065 .095 .471 1 .493 .937 -.103
log_hour by 
nsemdist .158 .070 5.098 1 .024 1.171 .294
log_hour * ty p e j 1.735 .420
log J io u r by 
typ e j(1 ) -.123 .102 1.457 1 .227 .885 -.192
log hour by 
ty p e j (2) -.022 .097 .049 1 .825 .979 -.027
context(1) by 
n_ana -.397 .634 .392 1 .531 .672 .088
nsemdist by 
n_ana .363 .734 .244 1 .621 1.437 .081
context * ty p e j 4.935 .085
context(1) by 
typ e j(1 ) -.124 .702 .031 1 .860 .883 -.021
context(1) by 
typej(2) 1.428 .721 3.927 1 .048 4.172 .233
nsemdist * ty p e j 1.374 .503 -.204
nsemdist by 
ty p e j( i) -.744 .775 .921 1 .337 .475 -.204
nsemdist by 
typ e j(2 ) -.001 .745 .000 1 .999 .999 -.000
Constant 1.276 .449 8.059 1 .005 3.581 3.581
a Variable(s) entered on step 1: log_hour * context, log_hour * n_ana , log_hour * nsemdist
, log_hour * ty p e j , context * n_ana , nsemdist * n_ana , context * ty p e j , nsemdist * ty p e j
Number o f analogs and explicit recognition
The regression results, reported in Table 7.17, show a non-significant 
relationship between number o f analogs and explicit recognition. This 
further supports the finding that number of analogs is not a key variable in 
binary decision making transfer. Although collecting more data always adds 
to the degree of certitude o f the conclusions that are drawn, in this case 
evidence from all analyses is very consistent.
It should be noted that this finding differs from Gick and Holyoak’s 
results (two analogs were better than one for explicit recognition in their 
experiments) but we must underscore that our results (based also on 
summarization cases and delayed different context transfer) are not entirely 
comparable to theirs. Nevertheless, our interpretation of the difference is 
that transfer of binary decisions probably originates in the different 
mechanisms than transfer of open ended problems. More specifically, we 
hypothesize that the role of schema is less important in binary decision 
making recognition and this makes one or two analogs a non-significant 
factor for explicit recognition and of transfer. Further research is of course 
needed to clarify the reasons for the different role of explicit recognition.
Learning method and explicit recognition
As shown in Table 7.17, learning method has a significant main effect on 
explicit recognition, {p = .013). Table 7.17 also shows that significance 
levels are reached for a change in context from low to medium-low in 
learning type free-comparison participants. The mentioned change in 
context shift seems to have a positive effect on explicit recognition. In other 
words, participants who learned by free-comparison have a significantly 
higher explicit recognition in medium-low than in the low context shift 
condition. The result is difficult to explain, also because there was no 
significant effect in the change from low to medium context shift for this 
type o f learning. Given that the cases o f free-comparison in medium-low
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context shift were only 15, the most likely explanation is that it is a spurious 
effect. We suggest that in further experiments collect more cases and re- 
analyse the interaction.
As far as the chain o f relationships from learning method to explicit 
recognition to transfer is concerned, further data is needed to better 
understand it. A non-significant impact o f learning method on explicit 
recognition is consistent with what we found analyzing the relationship 
between learning method and transfer, i.e. that learning method has no 
significant impact on transfer. On the other hand, since we do not have 
many cases (for free-comparison only 136 spread over several different 
combinations o f context shift, delay and semantic distance), we think that no 
firm conclusion can be drawn.
Diversity o f exemplars and explicit recognition
The relationship between diversity o f learning exemplars and explicit 
recognition, which was analysed with chi-square on the cases of 
experiments 9 only, was non-significant (p -  1, F-exact test, 2 sided). 
Frequencies are shown in Table 7.18.
Table 7.18
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition fo r  different levels o f  diversity o f  
learning stories
explicit recognition of analogy Total
yes no
diversity of learning
stories low 58 18 76
high 54 18 72
Total 112 36 148
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The result is consistent with what we found analyzing the relationship 
with transfer. Although the results are based on limited cases, given that 
they are consistent and confirm previous findings, we conclude that most 
probably diversity o f exemplars does not impact on transfer nor explicit 
recognition.
Semantic distance and explicit recognition
As shown in Table 7.17, semantic distance does not have a significant 
main effect on explicit recognition, nor interaction effects with other 
variables. Significance levels are not reached.
This finding is interesting because semantic distance had a significant 
main effect on transfer, as well as interaction effects in combination with 
learning method free-comparison and context shift. This result would seem 
to indicate that semantic distance does not affect the recognition part o f the 
transfer process, but some later stage, for example retrieval or mapping. In 
order to bring our understanding a step further, we conducted an analysis of 
participants’ answers (and thus also o f their mistakes) on over 70% of the 
available cases o f high semantic distance transfer (i.e. 300 out of 414) to 
find that the most common mistake (72% of the mistake cases analysed) 
was to apply usual logic in making the decision. This would suggest that 
what participants in high semantic distance transfer report as explicit 
recognition is actually a feeling  o f  knowing i.e. that they recognize 
familiarity with the problem, but that they can’t recall the exact logic that 
they were exposed to. This also invites a reflection on the “generosity” with 
which participants assess their own explicit recognition, which would imply 
that the explicit recognition data overestimates true analogy recognition. 
We also counted the number o f mistakes due to misapplication of what was 
learned (typically failure to reverse and mistakes in calculation of 
probabilities which led to the wrong answer) and found them to be only 
approximately 6%. This would mean that mapping is not a huge problem
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(although, amongst those who applied ordinary logic, some might have 
given up the application o f the new logic because mapping seemed 
difficult). It seems, in conclusion, that explicit recognition might in some 
cases be a feeling  o f  knowing, which would explain why, from our results, 
semantic distance does not impair explicit recognition but does reduce 
transfer significantly. This finding needs to be confirmed by more cases in 
which mistakes are analysed in detail (maybe with some interviews and 
detailed questionnaires after the experiment or with think-aloud protocols). 
O f course, as usual, it is also possible that further data would allow 
detection o f significance in the relationship.
On the other hand, semantic distance becomes significant in interaction with 
logarithmic time, with a positive effect on explicit recognition. In other 
words, the effect o f time is different for different levels of semantic 
distance (high vs. medium), bringing an advantage only to learners who 
transferred in conditions o f high semantic distance. This could be due to the 
fact that certain semantic features of the learning stories, but not the key 
structural similarities, are lost through the passage of time and this allows 
better recognition. It should be noted that we obtained a similar result in our 
transfer regression, but just for learning type free-comparison (we found a 
significant three-way interaction between semantic distance, delay and 
learning type free comparison). It would be, in the light of both these 
results, interesting to study further the impact o f delay and semantic 
distance on learning, recognition and transfer.
Context shift
Experimental results and discussion
As shown in Table 7.17 context has a significant main effect on explicit 
recognition and two significant interaction effects: one with delay and one 
with type o f learning free-comparison.
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The main effect on explicit recognition of context shift from low to medium 
is negative (B = -2,244). This result is consistent with the fact that memory 
uses context cues as aids in accessing memories.
The interaction effect between context shift from low to medium and 
elapsed time is positive (B = ,457), meaning that a context shift from low to 
medium leads to higher explicit recognition as delay increases.
The interaction effect between context shift from low to medium and 
learning type free-comparison is positive (B = 1,428) meaning that, while 
normally the increase in context shift (from low to medium), decreases 
explicit recognition, in the case o f learning type free-comparison it increases 
it. To better understand this counterintuitive effect, we verified the number 
o f cases available (see Table 7.19) finding that some of the cells have in fact 
few cases. This leaves the question open if the results that were found are 
spurious (due to small numbers) or genuine. It should nevertheless be 
pointed out that we had found a similar interaction effect between learning 
method free-comparison and transfer in our Exogenous regression. Since 
the two results seem to reinforce each other, this is certainly an aspect worth 
investigating further.
Table 7.19
Frequencies o f  explicit recognition by level o f  context shift (medium and 
low) in free-comparison learning
explicit recognition of analogy
yes no
level of context shift low
medium
54
25
35
7
In conclusion, it seems that context shift, which did not play a significant 
role in transfer, if  not in interaction with other variables, is the main driver
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of explicit recognition. The fact that, despite the significant relationship 
between context and explicit recognition, context does not significantly 
impact transfer could be due to the fact that recognition is not enough to 
trigger transfer, to error building in the relationship as well as to lack of 
power.
Time delay between learning and transfer
As shown in Table 7.16 delay between learning and transfer does not 
have a significant main effect on explicit recognition. This is consistent with 
our finding on transfer. Indeed it seems that delay (5 minutes to over 20 
days) alone does not have a significant effect on explicit recognition nor on 
transfer.
Delay, however, has two significant interactions, both positive, with 
other variables: one with context (the negative effect on explicit recognition 
due to increase in the level of context change is less strong as time goes by) 
and one with semantic distance (similarly, the negative effect on explicit 
recognition due to due to increase in the level of semantic distance is less 
strong as time goes by). So not only does delay not have a negative effect, 
but it can even, under certain circumstances, have a positive one. Again, it 
should be said that since these types o f interaction effects are found on 
subsets o f the total participant population (thus rely on limited number of 
cases), they should be verified further.
7.6.2 Relationship Between Learning Phase Variables and Quality of 
Learning
Learning methods and quality o f learning
From our analyses, the relationship between learning method and quality 
o f learning is significant (p = .000, F-exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies are 
reported in Table 7.20. The relationship remains significant (p = .000, F-
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exact test, 2-sided) even comparing just summarization versus guided- 
comparison, excluding the free-comparison participant data (we wanted to 
ensure that the free-comparison learning data was not distorting results).
Table 7.20
Frequencies o f  level o f  quality reached by type o f  learning
level of quality reached in learning task Total
no or very low medium high
learning learning learning
type of
learning summarization 227 234 50 511
guided comparison 56 128 19 203
free-style comparison 87 44 5 136
Total 370 406 74 850
The three learning methods yield markedly different quality results with 
guided comparison method leading to the highest quality and free 
comparison to the lowest, as shown in table.
Both summarization and guided comparison are well defined and 
methodologically familiar (most people will have performed them in 
school). Free comparison required a more undefined and unfamiliar task to 
be performed, such as comparing in search of analogies. As far as ranking in 
terms o f quality achieved, our results (Table 7.21) were not surprising. 
Since we measured quality o f learning through the output produced by the 
participant, we expected that free-comparison could lead to worst outputs, 
simply because participants had less or no experience with that task. On the 
contrary, guided comparison consisted o f questions which related to the 
analogy, thus bringing the participant’s attention to the right elements. 
Clearly this method could yield better outputs. Finally, participants who 
were in the summarization condition had no clue as to what they were
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supposed to highlight in the summary, resulting in a number of summaries 
which captured aspects irrelevant to the analogy and received a low score. 
This too was not unexpected.
Table 7.21
Percentage o f  participants learning with different methods in each quality 
o f  learning category
level of quality reached in learning task
no or very low medium high
learning learning learning
% % %
type of
learning summarization 44,4% 45,8% 9,8%
guided comparison 27,6% 63,1% 9,4%
free-style comparison 64,0% 32,4% 3,7%
The comparison with our previously presented results may surprise as we 
had found that learning method alone did not impact significantly on 
transfer and that the quality o f learning was impacted significantly by 
learning method (see Table 7.17 for a graphical representation). The results 
are open to many interpretations. One of them is simply that the mediating 
variables add error to the learning method-quality of leaming-transfer 
relationship. Another possibility is that more data is needed to detect 
significant impact at a learning method level. Finally, there could be a 
measurement problem. It should be remembered, in this respect, that we 
were not measuring the actual quality of learning, but the quality of the 
output. Due to different levels o f familiarity with the required task, we think 
rating outputs is not a precise measure o f actual learning. Consequently, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that in free-comparison learning, just the 
output was worst, not the actual quality o f learning and that in
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summarization, despite what ended up in the summaries, the analogies had 
actually been identified and learned.
Figure 7.4 illustrates graphically the type of relationships. Beta 
coefficients ((3) derived from the regression analyses discussed in previous 
sections are reported. Lines in bold represent significant relationships, while 
dotted lines represent non-significant relationships.
F igure 7.4
G raph ica l represen ta tion  o f  significance o f  relationships between  
learn ing  m e th o d  a n d  other variables o f  the process.
Explicit
recogn.
{5 (guided compar.) «=>.383 
3  (free-compar.) **-.203
p  ( m e d . ) =  .3 2 5 ;  
P  (h ig h  ) =  .3 5 3<p = .2 3 5 TransferLearning
method
Quality of 
learning
P  (guided compar.) —.221 
P  (free-compar.) -.166
Endogenous variables 
regression
Exogenous variables 
regression
Chi-square
Exogenous variab. 
Regression 2
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In conclusion, learning method has a significant impact on quality of 
learning as measured by the outputs we rated. Quality of learning, in turn, 
significantly impacts transfer. Further and more targeted experiments should 
explore the chain from exogenous variables to quality of learning and to 
transfer, understanding why learning method does not manage to impact 
transfer directly. The assumption is that this is simply due to some artefact 
o f the regression, since lack o f data is not likely to be the problem (850 
cases). However, since our experiments were not designed to understand 
the internal mechanisms o f the learning transfer process, any definitive 
conclusion is beyond the reach o f our data.
Number o f analogs and quality of learning
The data we used to perform this analysis included only cases in which 
summarization was the learning method because this is the only method 
used by participants learning with one analog. We found that number of 
analogs (1 vs. 2) impacts significantly on quality o f learning (p = .003 F- 
exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies are reported in Table 7.22.
Table 7.22
Frequencies o f  level o f  quality reached in learning task (on 3 categories) fo r  
number o f  analogs participant learned
level of quality reached in learning task Total
no or very low medium high
learning learning learning
number of analogs 
participant learned 1
78 99 9 186
2 149 135 41 325
Total 227 234 50 511
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Once again, this significant relationship does not translate into higher 
levels o f transfer, despite the significant relationship between quality and 
transfer. As usual, this could be due to lack of data or to some artefact of the 
regression or to the fact that the two analogs condition (which had two 
summaries rated) had a higher possibility of “getting something right”. 
Moreover, the fact that the second story was analogous to the first, probably 
helped some participants focus on the right aspects in their second 
summary. Again, nothing more can be concluded with the present data. 
Figure 7.5 illustrates graphically the type of relationships, with lines in bold 
representing significant relationships and dotted lines representing non­
significant relationships.
Figure 7.5
G raph ica l representa tion  o f  significance o f  relationships between  
num ber o f  analogs a n d  o ther variables o f  the process.
Explicit
recogn.
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Chi-square
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Bold line= significant 
relationship
Dotted line = non-significant 
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Diversity o f learning exemplars and quality o f learning
Since we had varied level o f diversity only in experiment No. 17 which 
used summarization as learning method and two analogs, for this analysis 
we considered only cases in which summarization was the learning method 
and two analogs had been provided to avoid confounds. Our results show a 
significant relationship between diversity o f learning exemplars and quality 
o f learning {p = .000, F-exact test, 2-sided). Frequencies are reported in
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Table 7.23. As can be easily seen, the best performing group is the one 
receiving medium level diversity o f exemplars.
Table 7.23
Frequencies level o f  quality reached in learning task (on 3 categories) by 
diversity o f  learning stories
level of quality reached in learning task (on 3
categories) Total
no or very low medium
learning learning high learning
diversity of 
learning stories low
48 22 6 76
medium 58 90 29 177
high 43 23 6 72
Total 149 135 41 325
The fact that participants in the medium-diversity group achieved higher 
levels o f learning than the other two groups (which achieved very close 
results) could be explained as follows. The group receiving stories which 
were very similar in terms o f superficial features was “distracted” (in the 
summarization activity, but does not necessarily in the actual learning) by 
them and tended to mention them in both their summaries (e.g. summaries 
highlighted the fact that the character was a princess or that the story 
revolved around a TV show). This went against underscoring structural 
similarities, but does not necessarily imply that they were not understood 
correctly. Participants who learned from very distant stories, on the other 
hand, probably had some difficulties identifying the common structural 
features explicitly enough to put them in the summary (but might have 
implicitly learned them).
As in the previous cases, however, this significant relationship does not 
translate into higher levels o f transfer, despite the significant relationship
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between quality and transfer. Figure 7.6 illustrates graphically the type of 
relationships, with lines in bold representing significant relationships and 
dotted lines representing non-significant relationships.
Figure 7.6
G raphica l represen ta tion  o f  significance o f  relationships between  
d iversity  o f  learn ing  exem plars a n d  o ther variables o f  the process.
Explicit
recog.
Diversity Quality of
o f exempl. learning Transfer
Endogenous variables  
regression
Chi-square
Bold line= significant 
relationship
Dotted line = non­
significant relationship
Chi-square
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7.7 General discussion
The intent in launching aggregated data analyses was to be able to 
answer some o f our research questions on firmer grounds and to begin to 
shed light on some mechanisms o f binary decision making transfer.
In some cases, the results o f aggregated data analyses actually allow us to 
give answers to our questions with some certitude. It clearly emerges, for 
example, that number o f analogs (1 vs. 2) and diversity o f analogs do not 
impact transfer significantly (by the way, the two results reinforce each 
other: the second analog does not make a difference, regardless o f how 
distant semantically it is from the first). These two variables also do not 
impact explicit recognition o f the analogy. In sum, both seem to have a very 
limited role to play in binary decision making transfer.
It also appears that learning method does not have a main significant effect 
on transfer, although it does have a significant effect on explicit recognition. 
Moreover, learning method has significant interactions (two and three ways) 
with other variables ( delay, context shift and semantic distance) which 
impact transfer. We are cautious about interaction effects because the 
numbers on which they rely are smaller (subsets of the overall cases) and 
because they are not completely explainable with what we know. 
Understanding what happens in these interactions would require more data 
and more targeted experiments. Comparing transfer rates of participants 
learning from two analogs with comparison based methods (free and guided 
comparison) to those o f participants learning with just one analog (by 
summarization), we found no significant difference. The interesting 
implication o f this finding is that schema might have a lesser role in binary 
decision making transfer than it did in open ended problem solving (it 
usually requires two analogs to draw a schema and comparison instructions 
foster schema formation).
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Delay between learning and transfer is another case in which evidence is 
consistent. Both relationships with transfer and with explicit recognition are 
non significant. There are, on the other hand, significant interaction effects 
with learning type free-comparison which require further investigation.
As for the relationships between explicit recognition and transfer, 
between quality of learning and explicit recognition and between quality of 
learning and transfer, they are all significant.
In other cases, the outcome o f our research is more an indication of 
where further experiments should investigate effects. For example, semantic 
distance, not surprisingly, was found to have a significantly negative effect 
on transfer but does not seem to have a main effect on explicit recognition. 
However, it interacts with delay to affect positively explicit recognition.This 
situation is potentially interesting to study, in particular in relation to what 
inhibits transfer. If explicit recognition data is reasonably accurate (although 
a bit inflated), it would mean that something else gets in the way o f transfer 
or that recognition was more feeling-of-knowing  than actual recognition and 
thus not powerful enough to lead to transfer. Answering these questions is 
beyond the reach o f our data because the experiments were not designed to 
investigate these mechanisms.
Context shift represents the reverse case and also calls for more research 
to be done. It is not significant (alone) in its relationship to transfer, but it is 
significant in relation to explicit recognition (negative effect). Context also 
interacts with other variables to give significant effects which should be 
verified. This variable was, by the way, not entirely under our control, so it 
is not to be excluded that some artefact or spurious effect is interfering with 
results. Further experiments on the topic are necessary to give definitive 
answers.
Table 7.24 provides a summary o f our findings from the online 
experiments. The table quickly identifies the relationships for which all
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results are very consistent and those for which further research is needed 
because there are several possible interpretations o f the obtained results.
Some comments and suggestions for further research on critical aspects 
which remain unanswered have been provided as we were discussing 
results. Chapter 8, which will wrap-up all our research, including the very 
first lab-based experiments, will further comment on what might be done in 
further research on the topic.
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Table 7.24
Summary o f findings on relationships analysed by the research
RELATIONSHIP WITH 
QUALITY OF LEARNING
RELATIONSHIP WITH EXPLICIT 
RECOGNITION
RELATIONSHIP V
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
N. ANALOGS (1 VS. 2) significant Non-significant Non-significant
LEARNING METHOD significant Significant
main effect
interaction effect between learning 
method free-comparison and context 
shift from low to medium
Non-significant mat 
Significant interacti 
learning n 
delay 
learning n 
context sh 
learning n 
semantic 
high) and
DIVERSITY OF
LEARNING
EXEMPLARS
significant Non-significant Non-significant
SEMANTIC DISTANCE D.N.A. Non-significant main effect 
Significant interaction of shift (medium 
to high) with delay
Significant negative 
Interaction effect w 
free-comparison
CONTEXT SHIFT D.N.A. Significant negative main effect and significant 
interaction effect between:
learning method free-comparison - 
positive
delay -  moderately positive
Non-significant mai 
Significant interacti 
learning n 
context sh
RELATIONSHIP WITH 
QUALITY OF LEARNING
RELATIONSHIP WITH EXPLICIT 
RECOGNITION
RELATIONSHIP WITH TRANSFER
DELAY D.N.A. Non-significant main effect 
Significant interaction effect between:
learning method free-comparison and 
delay
semantic distance shift (medium to high) 
and delay
Non-significant main effect 
Significant interaction effect between: 
learning method free-comparison and delay
ENDOGENOUS V ARIABLES
QUALITY OF 
LEARNING
D.N.A. significant Significant main effect, no interaction effect with 
explicit recognition
EXPLICIT
RECOGNITION
D.N.A. - Significant main effect, no interaction effect with 
quality
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8. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
As described in the opening chapter of this thesis, the primary goal of our 
research was to bring a contribution to understanding obstacles to and 
facilitators of decision making transfer. Moreover, we wished to compare 
our findings with the ones related to open-ended problem solving transfer in 
order to understand if they applied to a different type o f problem, thus to 
what extent they could be generalized. Furthermore, from a practical point 
of view, the research was intended to provide some tentative indications that 
could be applied in real-life learning environments in order to support 
transfer. Finally, although it was not one of the goals o f the research but 
rather a by-product, we were nevertheless able to better understand the 
working o f web-based experimenting.
This chapter will bring together experimental results discussed 
throughout the thesis (in chapters 3-7) and discuss them trying to answer the 
research questions that we had raised in the beginning. We will pin-point 
our findings on binary decision making transfer and underscore differences 
and similarities with open-ended problem solving transfer, identifying, 
where necessary, the limits of the research. We will be able to provide 
answers to research questions and to draw implications regarding what 
might support transfer in training, but we will, in some cases, also explain 
why we think the finding requires further investigation. We will however, at 
our best, try to circumscribe the open-issues and suggest what type of 
analysis would help in resolving them.
Before discussing the results o f our research, since we chose to compare 
them with the ones from open-ended problem solving, and, in particular, 
with those from Gick and Holyoak’s (1980, 1983) experiments, it is 
important to underscore a few differences between the types of tasks 
involved and how they were conducted. Disagreements between our results 
and the ones from open-ended problem solving transfer experiments should
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be interpreted in the light o f these differences, which may also help explain 
them.
To begin with, in Gick and Holyoak’s 1983 problem solving experiments 
on analogical transfer, the target task was to find possible solutions for an 
open-ended problem (the most frequently used was Duncker’s Radiation 
Problem) after reading one or two analogous stories drawn from different 
domains. The only link between learning problems and targets was their 
structural analogy since they were from distant domains and there were no 
shared superficial cues.
The task we selected to study transfer, a binary decision, has some 
fundamental differences with open ended problems. The first and most 
obvious difference is that binary decisions are very “closed” tasks (only two 
clearly stated options to choose from) while open-ended problem solving 
tasks are at the other end of the spectrum (not even the problem space is 
defined, solutions can be searched for anywhere).
Because analogous binary decision making stories must lead to a final 
closed question which has only two possible answers, they tend to share a 
higher degree o f similarity even when drawn from semantically distant 
domains and carefully formulated to avoid verbal cues. O f course, even with 
binary decision making tasks, there can be differences in the degree of 
similarity of the final question. In the case o f the story we chose as our 
medium semantic distance case, Lucrezia, the task was a switch-or-keep 
choice, exactly like the learning stories. In our other target story, Prisoners, 
which we classified as having a high degree of semantic distance, the final 
decision consisted in deciding if the probability associated with two items 
(the prisoners) was the same or different, which is clearly less similar to the 
learning story switch-or-keep task. O f course, the switch-or-keep decision in 
the learning stories is made based on the probabilities of the items (e.g. the 
probability o f each ball in the 3 Balls story), but since this is not reflected in 
the formulation o f the problem (“the host gives the contestant the choice
between sticking to the ball originally selected or changing selection...”) we 
believe that cues are eliminated or minimal.
Another difference between our task and the open ended problem solving 
tasks is that ours requires some operations to be retrieved from memory: 
insight from the previous problem and correct mapping are not enough to 
solve the target. Our task also requires people to adapt what was learned in 
order to solve the target problem (e.g. to respond correctly in the Lucrezia 
transfer task, participants needed to invert the logic learned in the analog 
because the goal was reversed from “finding” to “avoiding”). As a 
consequence, in our transfer tasks, once the analogy had been recognized, 
there was still the possibility of making mistakes, much more so than in the 
case of Duncker’s Radiation problem.
Moreover, Gick and Holyoak’s 1983 experiments are based on same 
context immediate transfer (a few seconds after the learning task). We never 
adopted same context immediate transfer because we feared a ceiling effect: 
our shortest interval between learning and transfer was five minutes, filled 
with a creativity distractor task. Given that the forgetting curve is 
logarithmic with a steep decrease in remembering performance in the first 
few minutes and that a change in mindset was found to impact transfer in 
open-ended problem solving transfer, these differences should be kept in 
mind while comparing our results to Gick and Holyoak’s. In fact, since in 
our experiments context was always changed (even if in some experiments 
the shift was low, obtained just by interposing a short distractor task), we 
need to also refer to Spencer and Weisberg’s (1986) and Catrambone and 
Holyoak’s (1989) studies which used open-ended problems as transfer tasks, 
but introduced context and time shifts.
In addition, in their experiment 4 (1983), Gick and Holyoak used 
analogical encoding (i.e. brief summarization o f the analogs followed by a 
comparison in search o f similarities between the two) as the learning 
method. This choice was driven by the fact that, with their type of problem,
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analogical encoding facilitated transfer, otherwise difficult to obtain. In our 
experiments we made participants learn either by summarization, guided- 
comparison or free-comparison (which is very close to analogical 
encoding). If this choice allows us to base conclusions on a wider selection 
o f learning methods, on the other hand, it makes our results not always 
straightforwardly comparable to theirs.
Lastly, Gick and Holyoak (1983) made participants compare two stories 
even in the one analog condition (i.e. between two non-analogous stories) 
and we did not. We avoided following the same procedure because looking 
for analogies where there are none might result in confusion, as Gick and 
Holyoak (1983) themselves commented (p.25). Consequently, we slightly 
modified the procedure making our one-analog condition participants 
summarize the analogs they received.
Research question # 1. What is the effect of learning one analog on 
transfer in binary decision making tasks?
To answer the question if one analog is enough to induce transfer and 
explicit recognition o f the analogy, we ran nine experiments (three lab based 
and six online) which compared solution rates of participants learning one 
analog (by summarizing it, except in the first experiment where the learning 
also implied answering some questions) with transfer rates o f control group 
participants. We also ran a simple binary logistic regression on all the 
relevant cases.
One analog was found to lead to significant transfer in all online 
experiments and the result was confirmed by the binary logistic regression. 
The result held true even in challenging circumstances (such as long delays 
coupled with medium context shifts), as found in our online experiments. 
This evidence, however, should be better qualified by completing the 
picture with two other results. Firstly, in our lab experiments No. 1 and 2
(one week delay coupled with a high level of context shift) one analog did 
not lead to significant transfer. Although the number o f cases was low, this 
result hints at possible difficulties in transfer in presence of high context 
shifts. This possibility is further reinforced by another finding, this time 
from our online experiments. Analyzing correctness o f solution at boundary 
conditions (i.e. considering the subset of cases which were on the boundary, 
such as participants transferring to a highly distant problem at several days 
of delay) we found levels not different from control. Once again, 
unfortunately, we did not have enough cases to be conclusive.
Based on these results, we can be rather optimistic on transfer of binary 
decisions based on one analog even in the presence of conditions which are 
far less restricted than those tested by Gick and Holyoak (immediate 
transfer, no context shift o f any type, including type-face and experimenter).
Differently from Spencer and Weisberg (1986) and from Catrambone and 
Holyoak (1989), who failed to obtain transfer when learning and target 
stories were presented after a delay and in different contexts, we were able 
to see transfer happen, even from one analog, in context shifted and delayed 
situations. However, optimism should be mitigated by saying that we do not 
know what would happen stretching conditions even further. Our online 
cases hint that, as conditions are made more challenging, one analog might 
not be enough to trigger transfer and our lab based cases (although 
insufficient for any conclusion to be based on them) suggest that one analog 
does not allow transfer when context shift is high and delay is several days. 
We formulate the hypothesis that high context shift coupled with delay 
hinders transfer and that context is the main cause of the effect. We also 
would expect, given the relevance that we found semantic distance to have, 
that solution rates would drop to control level in conditions of high semantic 
distance and medium context shift (which we have not tested).
In sum, in transfer of binary decision making, one analog is enough to 
trigger un-hinted transfer. Moreover, delay coupled with context shifts up to
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medium and delay coupled with high semantic distance do not, in general, 
impair un-hinted transfer. In this sense, our results would indicate that, in 
binary decision making, transfer from one analog is possible under more 
difficult conditions than were found for open-ended problems. A possible 
explanation for this difference is the already mentioned higher degree of 
similarity between learning and target tasks, which could serve as a cue. 
However, this is probably not a sufficient explanation since Catrambone and 
Holyoak (1989) found that, in open ended problem solving, an increase in 
verbal cues is not enough to induce un-hinted transfer after a delay.
Future research should explore both what limits transfer from one analog 
and what causes it (i.e. which part of the transfer process is failing). In order 
to investigate where the boundaries are, experiments could be run (with 
different delays) varying the number of analogs (0,1), levels o f semantic 
distance and level o f context shifts between learning and transfer in a 
factorial design. If high context shift and high semantic distance are 
confirmed to impair transfer from one analog, a further experiment could be 
performed in which the number o f analogs is increased to two, in order to 
assess the effect on transfer of an increase from one analog to two in 
boundary conditions. Quality of the learning output and explicit recognition 
of the analogy should be analysed seeking correlation with successful 
transfer in the various combinations of semantic distance and delay because 
they may play a different role depending on the transfer conditions.
Future experiments should also extend the final questionnaire and/or add 
an interview at the end of it to seek better understanding o f the causes of 
mistakes and, if the experiment is conducted via the web, to track context 
changes outside o f the experimenter control to better classify cases (e.g. 
asking participants if they performed the two parts in the same room, if  they 
were interrupted by something, etc.). Finally, future research should also 
investigate counter-measures that could help overcome no-transfer effects, 
such as providing detailed analogy-oriented questions in the learning phase
391
and/or adding analogs to the learning phase and/or teaching meta-strategies 
(e.g. how to systematically search for analogies that might help in solving a 
new problem).
Research question # 2. What is the effect of learning two analogs 
rather than one on transfer and explicit recognition in binary decision 
making tasks?
To answer the question if two analogs lead to significantly higher transfer 
and explicit recognition o f the analogy than just one, we ran eight 
experiments (two lab based and six online) which compared solution rates 
and explicit recognition rates of participants who had learned one or two 
analogs by summarization. We also performed two binary logistic 
regressions, one for transfer and one for explicit recognition, including all 
key variables and their interactions, on all the relevant cases.
In all the experiments analysed one-by-one, we never found two analogs 
to lead to significantly higher transfer than one. This result was confirmed 
by the logistic regression results, which show that number o f analogs does 
not have a significant main or interaction effect on transfer.
In sum, all our evidence indicates that the number of analogs learned 
does not significantly influence transfer within the conditions that we 
tested, which were rather wide (context shift up to medium, delays up to 
over 20 days, semantic distance up to high).
A few comments are, however, necessary. Firstly, as we mentioned 
earlier discussing one analog versus no-analog transfer, it is possible that 
more extreme conditions than the ones we tested would make the second 
analog relevant. In fact, we have few cases in true boundary conditions (e.g. 
high semantic distance coupled with delays o f 2 days and higher only had 
three participants learning with one analog) and no cases in extreme 
conditions such as high semantic distance, medium context shift and long
delays. On the other, it should be pointed out that, since the conditions 
under which the second analog did not seem to add significantly to transfer 
were rather wide in terms o f delays, context shifts and semantic distance, 
the importance of the second analog appears greatly reduced compared to 
what was found in open-ended problems solving transfer.
Secondly, a comment should be made regarding Gick and Holyoak’s 
(1983) results which showed that learning with two analogs led to 
significantly more transfer than learning from just one analog. It should be 
underscored that they compared one analog with two analogically encoded 
analogs. In their 1989 experiments, Catrambone and Holyoak compared 
transfer rates of two summarized analogs versus one and did not find a 
significant difference. They did, instead, find that two analogically encoded 
analogs were better than two summarized analogs. This could mean the 
learning method was responsible for the difference that had been found. It 
should be further noted that the conditions under which they examined the 
relationship were quite restricted (only immediate transfer and no context 
shift).
Finally, Spencer and Weisberg (1989), who introduced different context 
shifts and delays, did not see any significant difference in transfer between 
participants who learned one or two analogs, although they used the same 
problem and the same procedure. This indicates that context shifts and 
delays, not only differences in the task, can explain the different results.
As for explicit recognition, evidence from single experiment and logistic 
regression analyses seems to indicate that number of analogs does not have 
a significant relationship with explicit recognition.
Future experiments should seek to investigate if adding a second analog 
can benefit transfer in the more challenging situations. Varying semantic 
distance, context shifts and delays in a factorial type design should help 
identify those situations or rule out that the second analog brings an 
advantage.
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In practical terms, these results cast doubt on the general usefulness of 
adding an analog to increase transfer probability. Without comparison 
between the two analogs the second analog, even in open ended problem­
solving immediate and same context un-hinted transfer the second analog 
was not proven to be useful. Context and time shifts seemed to nullify the 
benefit o f the second analog in open ended problem and in our type of 
closed decision transfer.
A useful next step in solving this issue would be to run Gick and 
Holyoak’s 1983 experiment 4 and Spencer and Weisberg’s 1989 
experiments using our binary decision making problems.
Research question # 3. What is the effect of learning method on 
transfer and explicit recognition of the analogy in binary decision 
making tasks?
To answer this question we ran eight experiments (two lab based and six 
online) which compared solution rates o f participants who had learned with 
three different methods: summarization (writing a brief summary of each of 
the analogs), guided comparison (answering a set o f questions highlighting 
structural analogies between the two analogs) and free  comparison 
(comparing the two analogs and identifying analogies). We also performed 
two binary logistic regressions, one for transfer and one for explicit 
recognition, including all key variables and their interactions, on all the 
relevant cases.
Although in the single experiment analysis results were mixed (learning 
method did not have a significant impact on transfer in three experiments 
out of six), the binary logistic regression which we ran on all the data 
showed that learning method does not have a significant main effect on 
transfer. Learning method does, however, interact with other variables 
significantly, which might explain why we got mixed results. More
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specifically, these interactions happen as learning method is changed from 
summarization (which was our default learning) to free-comparison. The 
strongest significant interaction is between context shift from low to 
medium and the learning method moving from summarization to free- 
comparison. The interaction is positive, which means that a change from 
low to medium context shift increases transfer significantly for free- 
comparison learners compared to summarization learners. This effect is 
difficult to explain with theory and indeed could be spurious (the number of 
cases on which the result is based are probably not large), but it is 
interesting to observe that the same interaction also boosts explicit 
recognition. The meaning appears to be that the increase in context shift is 
positive for this type of learning, possibly thanks to an increased recognition 
of the analogy.
On the other hand, the interaction between delay and learning method 
free-comparison seems to have a significantly negative effect on transfer: 
the probability of transfer decreases with time for the learning method free- 
comparison and not for the other methods. Again, the result needs to be 
verified and the causes understood.
Furthermore, it appears that context shift and delay interact significantly 
and negatively in the case of type of learning free-comparison. This means 
that participants who learn with type of learning free-comparison and must 
transfer in a situation of medium context shift have an initial advantage over 
participants who learned with summarization and transfer with a low 
context shift. However, passing of time diminishes and eventually nullifies 
the advantage. The same comment that we made discussing the previous 
interaction effect applies: the number o f cases is not very high and the effect 
could be spurious.
Finally, semantic distance interacts with delay in the case of learning 
type free  comparison. This interaction, significantly positive, means that the 
negative impact o f high semantic distance, in learning type free comparison,
is lessened by delay. In other words, it seems that the effect of delay, with 
learning type free-comparison, is different depending on semantic distance 
being medium or high. This result should be investigated further (number of 
cases is limited) and its causes explained.
Comparing our results to the ones from open-ended problem solving 
studies requires a few comments. Although Catrambone and Holyoak 
(1989), confirming Gick and Holyoak (1983), showed with a direct 
comparison that analogical encoding leads to higher pre-hint transfer levels 
than just summarization in immediate and not context-shifted transfer, when 
they introduced context and time shifts the advantage o f analogical 
encoding in un-hinted transfer disappeared (as had been found also by 
Spencer and Weisberg, 1986). On the other hand, superiority of analogical 
encoding over other methods was confirmed, even with time-context shifts, 
by further experiments in the domain of transfer of negotiation skills 
(Gentner, Lowenstein and Thompson, 2003). So, in reality, even in open- 
ended problem solving studies, when un-hinted transfer was considered, 
analogical encoding had been found superior only under certain conditions.
We found learning method even less relevant to transfer, since it does not 
have a main effect but only interaction effects. It is possible that the 
mapping and schema abstraction that comparison induces were not a 
significant advantage in our less-open type of task. It is also possible that 
the other mentioned differences (especially context shifts) were responsible 
for the results that we obtained. Moreover, we found free-comparison to be 
a case in itself: in this type of learning delay, context shifts and semantic 
distance interact significantly. These findings, if confirmed, also need to be 
further appreciated because it is unclear what causes free-comparison to be 
different form other learning methods.
In the case of this issue, future research should be aimed at collecting 
more cases in order to base conclusions on firmer grounds and also to 
understand what is making free-comparison different. To pursue the latter
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objective, initially think-aloud protocols should help formulate hypotheses, 
which could then be incorporated in a structured questionnaire.
As for explicit recognition, logistic regression analysis indicates that the 
learning method (summarization vs. guided comparison learning methods) 
has a significant main effect on explicit recognition. It should be noted that, 
although explicit recognition has a significant relationship with transfer, 
learning method alone does not. However, there is one significant and rather 
strong interaction effect o f the learning method free-comparison on explicit 
recognition. This type of learning interacts positively with context shift from 
low to medium, meaning that for participants who learned using free- 
comparison method, explicit recognition is easier when context shift is 
medium than when it is low.
Research question # 4. Does schema formation support transfer in 
binary decision making tasks?
There are two ways of attempting an answer to this question. The first is 
the one followed by Gick and Holyoak (1983) who searched for a 
correlation between quality of schema and transfer rate. As they were able 
to show in open-ended problem solving transfer, the better the schema, the 
higher the transfer rate. Consequently they were able to posit that schema 
mediates transfer.
Our results, however, show that quality o f summaries, not only of 
schemata, was predictive of transfer. We interpret this to mean that, in 
binary decision making tasks, it is not necessarily the schema that mediates 
transfer, but rather learning level or a confound variable (note that this could 
be true for Gick and Holyoak’s cases as well).
Another way to understand if  schemata foster transfer is to compare 
transfer rates o f participants learning with one analog to those o f 
participants learning with two analogs by comparison. The latter category
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should derive a schema by mapping o f the two analogs (which is induced by 
the comparison instructions) while the former should not be able to. In fact, 
Gick and Holyoak (1983) tried unsuccessfully to support schema formation 
from one analog augmenting it with a verbal statement o f the underlying 
principle, in experiment 2, and adding a diagrammatic representation, in 
experiment 3. This made them conclude that schema formation required at 
least two analogs and comparison between them.
As our analyses show, it is never the case that transfer rates are 
significantly higher for participants learning two analogs by comparison to 
those learning from one analog by summarization. To ensure that we were 
considering cases in which learning had taken place following our 
instructions, we eliminated the cases falling in the no/little learning 
category, but still did not reach significance.
Based on these results, we cautiously hypothesize that the role of schema 
in mediating transfer is less relevant in binary decision making than it is in 
open-ended problem solving, possibly due to the more circumscribed type 
o f question that our transfer problems require to answer.
Both methods of assessing the importance of schema in transfer, 
however, have limitations and we think future research should further 
investigate the issue, which has theoretical relevance. On the one hand, 
future experiments should find a way to classify accurately cases in which a 
schema was formed and those in which it wasn’t. Think-aloud protocols 
might help in understanding if participants are recalling the learning stories 
via a schema probably better than final questionnaires as it is difficult for 
participants to accurately self-report what happened during the analogical 
transfer process. On the other hand, future research should be very careful 
about inferring that schema mediates transfer based on the fact that schema 
quality predicts successful transfer because there are several possible 
confounds (including cognitive ability which could favour production of 
high quality schemas as well as transfer).
Moreover, we found that it is difficult to evaluate learning simply from 
participant’s output because some learners appear to learn far more than 
they care to put in writing, thus potentially distorting results. To contain this 
issue, think-aloud protocols in the learning phase may be useful as they 
would allow better assessment the level of learning. Furthermore, offering 
an incentive to good performance in the learning output (although 
potentially distorting) might help epsure that participants reflect their 
learning as much as possible in the output.
Finally, to control individual characteristics which might act as 
confounds, participants could be tested in order to identify and 
counterbalance relevant individual differences in conditions.
Research question # 5. What is the effect of analog diversity on 
transfer and explicit recognition of the analogy in binary decision 
making tasks?
We studied this relationship in a somewhat more limited way than we 
investigated the others (we just considered transfer after 5 minutes, with low 
context shift and high semantic distance), but nevertheless managed to base 
our conclusions on 189 cases.
Confirming Gick and Flolyoak’s findings, diversity does not seem to 
impact transfer nor explicit recognition of analogy. It should however be 
pointed out that we were not able to study interaction effects, thus we can’t 
exclude the possibility that diversity would become relevant in interaction 
with other variables. It should be noted that it is a practical and widely 
accepted practice in training to provide diverse examples in order to allow a 
more flexible use o f what is being learned. It is therefore interesting to 
observe that this seems not to make a difference, at least in terms o f main 
effect. If future research decides to pursue this issue further, it would make 
sense to vary the other variables (context shift, semantic distance and,
possibly, delay) in a factorial design experiment so that interaction effects 
can be detected.
Research question # 6. What is the effect of semantic distance on 
transfer and explicit recognition of the analogy in binary decision 
making tasks?
We base the answer to this question mainly on our two binary logistic 
regressions, one for transfer and one for explicit recognition, including all 
key variables and their interactions, which we performed on all the relevant 
cases. As semantic distance was never varied within experiments, all we 
could examine at an experiment level was if significant transfer and explicit 
recognition had taken place with that level of semantic distance i.e. if our 
task was solved at levels significantly above control.
Our logistic regression shows that semantic distance was the only 
variable having a significant main effect (negative) on transfer. This is 
consistent with research in the domain o f open-ended problem solving 
(Gick and Holyoak, 1983) who found lower transfer from their military and 
fire-fighting stories to the Radiation problem than they did from the Cord 
problem to the semantically closer Birthday party problem  (in which cords 
are substituted by decorative party ribbons).
Moreover, as reported discussing the relationship between type o f the 
learning and transfer, there is a significant three-way positive interaction 
effect of semantic distance and delay in the case o f learning type free  
comparison. This means that the negative impact of high semantic distance, 
in learning type free comparison, is lessened by delay. In other words, it 
seems, that the effect o f delay, with the learning type free-comparison , is 
different depending on semantic distance being medium or high: the effect 
of high semantic distance on transfer is different depending on the moment
in time i.e. that it is more negative right away and then, as time goes by, it is 
reduced.
Despite its negative effect on transfer, semantic distance never impaired 
it in our experiments: transfer levels were always above control levels, even 
in the experiments with several days of delay between learning and transfer. 
It should be underscored, however, that we varied semantic distance only in 
a low context shift situation, thus we do not know anything about its 
interaction effects with context.
As for the relationship between semantic distance and explicit 
recognition, it was not significant. This result, in part surprising since there 
is a significant effect of semantic distance on transfer, may be due to the fact 
that semantic distance does not affect the recognition part o f the transfer 
process, but some later stage, for example retrieval or mapping. However, 
semantic distance shift from low to high was found to have a significant 
positive interaction with delay between learning and transfer, meaning that 
time delay has a different impact on transfer depending on the level of 
semantic distance.
Unfortunately, we did not have cases of medium context shift and high 
semantic distance, which are interesting because they are both challenging 
and realistic (i.e. close to what happens in naturalistic learning). Further 
research, to begin with, should widen the cases investigated. The 
experiments should vary semantic distance and context in a factorial type 
design to study possible interactions between semantic distance and context 
shift. Furthermore, it would be interesting to run experiments aimed at 
understanding what can be done to counter the negative effect of an increase 
in semantic distance. Increasing number of analogs from 2 to 3 does not 
seem promising (given that we found no difference between two and one) 
nor does using a higher number and/or more detailed analogy-oriented 
questions to lead the comparison (guided-comparison was not significantly 
better than the other learning methods), but nevertheless should be tried.
Another possible approach could be to give some participants a short 
training on how to encode learning in a way that helps bridge semantic 
distances (e.g. at a more abstract level).
Research question # 7. What is the effect of delay on transfer and 
explicit recognition of the analogy in binary decision making tasks?
To study the relationship between time delay (from 5 minutes to over 20 
days) and transfer and between delay and explicit recognition, we ran and 
analysed nine experiments (three lab-based and six online). We also 
performed two binary logistic regressions, one for transfer and one for 
explicit recognition, including all key variables and their interactions, on all 
the relevant cases.
In the single experiments, the relationship was tested under different 
conditions (number o f analogs, learning method, context shift and semantic 
distance) and was never found significant with a minor exception (free- 
comparison learning in experiment 8 with medium context shift).
The logistic regression on all experimental data confirmed non 
significance of the relationship, but highlighted a couple of significant 
interactions (with semantic distance and with context) in the case of the 
learning method free-comparison.
In sum, our web experiments indicate that delay (between 5 minutes and 
one day up to around 20 days) does not have a significant impact on transfer 
except in limited cases, occurring in interaction with other variables.
In the two lab experiments in which context shift was high and the delay 
was a week long, however, experimental conditions did not transfer at 
significantly higher levels than control, indicating a possible interaction 
effect with that level of context shift (a main effect seems unlikely as our 
online experiments show that even long delays alone cannot stop transfer).
Delay was also not found to have a significant main effect on explicit 
recognition both in our logistic regression and at a single experiment level 
(in five out o f six cases). This appears consistent with our finding on 
transfer. Delay, however, has a significant interaction with both context 
change from low to medium and with semantic distance shift from medium 
to high. The negative effect on explicit recognition due to increase in 
context shift is less strong as time goes by. Moreover, the increase in delay 
has a positive impact when semantic distance between learning and target is 
high, but not when it is medium. In conclusion, not only does delay not have 
a negative effect on explicit recognition, but it can even, under certain 
circumstances, have a positive one. Again, it should be said that these types 
of interaction effects are found on subsets of the total participant population 
and therefore should be verified with more cases.
Our findings differ from those in the domain of open-ended problem 
solving transfer where delays, which inevitably bring a change in context (at 
least mental context) had a severe impact on un-hinted transfer. Spencer and 
Weisberg (1986), later confirmed by Catrambone and Holyoak (1989), 
showed that introducing even a short time delay (6 minutes) between 
learning and transfer eliminates transfer, if coupled with a context shift 
which was very similar to the one we categorized as medium. In our 
experiments, on the contrary, even long delays and a medium context shift 
did not impair transfer significantly.
Once again, it would be useful to have more data, in particular in high 
context shift situations. To confirm cases in which delay is significant and to 
better understand time effects, targeted experiments should be performed. 
These experiments should adopt free-comparison as a learning method and 
vary in a factorial design variables whose interaction effects are to be 
investigated. Moreover, it would be interesting, from a theoretical point o f 
view, to understand if what we observed is due to the shape of the 
forgetting curve or if  other explanations are necessary. It would also be
useful to study if the pattern o f mistakes is the same or changes with delay. 
To do this, an increase in the quality of data is necessary. This in turn would 
require a categorization of mistakes to allow an in-depth analysis o f missed 
transfer, think aloud protocols and more detailed final questionnaires.
Taking a practical perspective, there is not very much that can be done to 
counter delay effects, with what we know. The first step would be to 
understand the type of mistakes that time induces, what causes them and 
what, if anything reduces them.
Research question # 8. What is the effect of context shift on transfer 
and explicit recognition of the analogy in binary decision making tasks?
We base the answer to this question mainly on our two binary logistic 
regressions, one for transfer and one for explicit recognition, including all 
key variables and their interactions, which we performed on all the relevant 
cases. As context was never varied within experiments, all we could 
examine at an experiment level was if transfer and explicit recognition had 
taken place despite the context shift we had applied.
Based on our two lab experiments with high context shift, where there 
was no significant transfer effect, we could cautiously say that, probably, 
high context shift, alone or in interaction with delay, impairs transfer (if the 
effect was not spurious). We attribute the drop in performance to high 
context shift or to high context shift in interaction with delay since we know 
that delay alone -  well over a week- is not enough to stop transfer.
On the other hand, in all other experiments (web-based), context shifts up 
to medium level were not sufficient to impair transfer, even in presence of 
long delays. It could be hypothesized that context shift becomes critical as it 
changes from medium to high.
Our logistic regression on all online experimental data (which included 
three types of context shift: low, medium-low and medium) resulted in a
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non-significant relationship between context and transfer (i.e. no main 
effect). We found however that context has significant impact in interaction 
with other variables (learning method, delay, semantic distance) as already 
pointed out. There is a two-way interaction between learning method and 
context shift: in the case of learning method free comparison, context shifts 
from low to medium have a strong and significant positive effect on 
transfer. Moreover, there is a significant negative 3-way interaction effect 
between this context shift, type of learning free-comparison and delay which 
means that participants learning with free-comparison in a situation of 
medium context shift loose their initial advantage in transfer (the positive 
two-way interaction effect describe above) versus participants who learned 
with summarization as time elapses.
In conclusion, the role o f context shifts up to medium appears perhaps 
less important in transfer of binary decisions than we were expecting based 
on previous literature (Spencer and Weisberg, 1986). A context shift 
consisting in a large change in presentation format, in source (“a college 
wishing to remain anonymous” vs. Warwick University) and in goal (pre­
testing of materials vs. experiment) did not significantly impact transfer in 
our experiments. In Spencer and Weisberg (1986), with open-ended 
problems, the change of person administering the experiment coupled with a 
different declared goal (experiment vs. class demonstration) were sufficient 
to impair transfer even if physical context did not change (i.e. both parts of 
the experiment were administered in the same room).
On the other hand, context seems to play a more important role in 
explicit recognition: it has a significant main effect and a significant 
interaction effect (positive) with learning type free-comparison. The main 
effect on transfer could, in part, explain why context appeared more 
important in the transfer process o f open ended problems, where recognition 
was the main factor affecting transfer. With insight problems, the critical 
aspect o f the transfer process is retrieval, which is based on recognition. If
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context acts as a cue, as it generally does, it can have a relevant facilitative 
effect on the process, as pointed out by Spencer and Weisberg who wrote: 
“Perhaps contextual similarity, rather than analogy, served as a basis for 
retrieval of the past problem in Gick and Holyoak (1980, 1983) and Bauer 
(1978) studies.” (Spencer and Weisberg, 1986, p. 442).
Caution should be used in drawing conclusions, however, as we do not 
have a precise metric for context shifts (e.g. how important is the change in 
physical space versus the change in person administering the experiment? 
How relevant is the context “on the screen” in a web experiment versus the 
physical context surrounding the participant?) nor did we control context 
completely in the web-based experiments (e.g. we don’t know if learning 
and transfer happened in the same room).
Much more needs to be done to understand the impact of context on 
transfer. To begin with, a metric of context shift is needed and should be 
based on a rigorous definition of what constitutes context. For example, we 
attributed a medium level of context shift to cases in which learning and 
transfer were presented differently (college testing materials vs. experiment) 
and in very different formats. However, it may be that the physical context 
surrounding the participant counts much more than what appears on the 
screen and that the shift is smaller than we think. Moreover, most of our 
results are based on web experiments, in which the level of control over 
context is not complete and in which a high shift is difficult to create. 
Probably it would be useful, even if challenging from a practical point of 
view, to re-run some experiments using the lab because it allows us to 
carefully monitor context. Furthermore, we were not able to fully 
investigate high context shifts. Again, although practical problems make this 
challenging, it would be useful to collect more data on transfer with high 
and with medium context shifts, in particular as it would seem that the 
change from medium to high is the most critical.
Finally, if  further web-experiments were run to analyse the relationship 
between context and transfer, it would be useful to administer, after both 
parts of the experiment, a questionnaire asking about the context that was 
surrounding the participant (e.g. physical space, presence o f other people in 
the same space, music, etc.) while performing the learning and transfer tasks 
in order to attribute a more correct level of context shift to each case.
From a teaching and learning perspective, it is useful to know how much 
context counts, with what it interacts in creating positive or negative effects 
on transfer and if its relevance is the same for different problems. If context 
is as relevant as the problem solving literature reports it to be, then 
practitioners should consider investing heavily on two aspects. The first is 
trying to make people learn in a context which is as close as possible to the 
performance context (the other way around seems less possible). For 
example, e-leaming performed at one’s own desk should be better than 
classroom training if, presumably, the need to transfer will happen at the 
same desk. The second aspect would be to devise some training that would 
teach, as a meta-competency, how to abstract from the external context.
Research question # 9. What is the role of quality of learning in 
transfer?
To study the relationship between quality of learning (on three levels) 
and transfer, we analysed the results o f our 16 experiments (three in the lab 
and 13 online) and performed a binary logistic regression which had explicit 
recognition and quality of learning as independent variables on all the cases.
Although at the single experiment level the relationship between quality 
o f learning and transfer presented mixed evidence (probably due to lack o f 
power), the logistic regression performed on all online data clearly showed a 
significant relationship between quality of learning and transfer. The 
greatest and most significant effect of the internal variables on transfer was
shift from low to high quality. The results have been checked with binary 
regression performed on sub-sets of data (just one analog, all learning 
methods separately) to consistently find significant levels for the 
relationship between quality of learning and transfer, with the only (already 
mentioned) exception of free-comparison learning.
There are no significant interaction effects between quality and explicit 
recognition. Fisher’s exact test was also performed on the same data, 
confirming that quality of learning is highly predictive of transfer. The fact 
that, at a single experiment level we had found mixed results, can probably 
be interpreted as a lack of power of the relationship due to smaller number 
of cases.
Our results therefore confirm and extend the importance o f quality of 
learning as a predictor of transfer that has been found by Gick and Holyoak 
(1983). As we mentioned, the conditions under which quality o f learning 
was found significant in our experiments are wider than those found in 
problem solving transfer studies because the cases we examined include 
learning from summarization and not only from comparison-based learning, 
long term as well as 5 minute delay, different levels of contextual shift and 
of semantic distance.
Spencer and Weisberg (1986) had found that quality of schema is not 
predictive o f transfer in the case of contextually shifted transfer. It should be 
remembered that we found the same result when context shift was high (lab 
experiments 1 and 2). Although the low number of cases and consequent 
lack of power may be a plausible explanation, the finding could also be 
taken to mean that, as context shift becomes high, the relationship between 
quality of learning and transfer changes, becoming non-significant.
It is possible, in conclusion, that there are conditions in which quality of 
learning looses significance. Further experiments might explore this aspect 
varying the conditions in which transfer takes place, testing the limits of the 
relationship’s significance.
Research question # 1 0 .  What is the role of explicit recognition in 
transfer?
To answer this question, we analysed one-by-one our 16 experiments (13 
online and three in the lab), we ran a binary logistic regression which had 
explicit recognition and quality as independent variables on all experimental 
data except experiments 5 and 6 which had used the less reliable version of 
the questionnaire. While at the single experiment level evidence was mixed, 
the logistic regression on all or data showed a significant relationship 
between explicit recognition and transfer and there were no interactions 
with quality of learning.
In all our experiments recognition of the analogy (perhaps inflated by 
self-reporting) was rather high (approximately 70% in online experiments) 
and higher than transfer (which was around 30%), meaning that insight was 
not the only critical factor in transferring this type of problem. On the other 
hand, only rarely did participants who did not recognize the analogy manage 
to transfer, which would indicate that transfer o f binary decision making is 
mostly an explicit process.
One o f the points which remains beyond the reach of our data is the 
differentiation between feeling o f knowing and actual recognition of the 
analogy (explicit recognition was self-reported in our experiments and thus 
we can’t exclude the possibility that some participants might have declared 
that they recognized the analogy in hindsight). In order to assess explicit 
recognition with a higher degree of certitude, distinguishing it from feeling 
of knowing, further experiments should be conducted perhaps with a dual 
pass (seeking un-hinted transfer first and hinted transfer afterwards) or with 
think-aloud protocols.
From a practical point o f view, given the importance o f explicit 
recognition, effort should be put in enhancing people’s recognition
capabilities (possibly a key individual difference for transfer), which could 
be perhaps be developed as a crucial meta-competency, through appropriate 
training.
How much the ability to recognise problems with similar structure is 
distinct from the more general ability to encode information abstractly is a 
question for future work. It is possible that the dependence on abstract 
encoding varies with the type of problem. For the less open type of 
problems, such as the one we used, abstract encoding might be less 
important. Possibly, if the learning and target problems share more 
similarities (in our case, the question at the end was similar), retrieval does 
not rely as heavily on the abstract representation of the learned problem. It 
seems (but is beyond the reach of our data to determine it) that the learning 
story/ies may be retrieved, rather than the schema, when the target problem 
is tackled. Our findings on the lesser role of schemata in mediating transfer 
could be taken to support this view.
On the other hand, for those problems, such as the open-ended ones used 
by Gick and Holyoak, in which recognition is made more difficult by the 
absence of any type of cue, an abstract encoding (e.g. for the military 
learning analog of the Radiation problem: “a story about how to overcome a 
target when a sufficiently great force is available, but cannot be applied 
along one path”) surely is more effective in supporting retrieval o f the key 
principle to transfer than a non-abstract one (e.g. “a military story about a 
fortress that was conquered attacking from several points simultaneously 
because the roads were mined and passage o f a large force would detonate 
them”).
Clearly, if the ability to encode learning analogs abstractly is relevant to 
transfer, then it would be extremely useful to teach learners how to identify, 
to focus attention on and to memorize the key features of training 
exemplars, without becoming “distracted” by the context o f what is learned.
However, as we speculated earlier, this might be more useful in analogical 
transfer o f open-ended problems than o f binary decision making ones.
As we mentioned opening the chapter, this research is to be considered a 
first step in better understanding transfer outside of the traditional open- 
ended problems which have been used in most classic experiments. It 
indicates that what was found to be true in open-ended problems does not 
necessarily extend to other tasks, thus suggesting that further research 
should more widely vary the types of tasks used.
In sum, we were able to see un-hinted transfer happen in challenging 
situations of delay, semantic distance and context shifts. The greatest 
obstacle, we would tentatively conclude, could be high context shifts. If 
these results were to be confirmed, practical efforts in training fo r  transfer 
should be addressed primarily in trying to overcome this type o f obstacle.
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ANNEX 1
Learning stories
Factory is hiring
(experiments 1,2 and 3)
A company decided to expand, so it opened a factory generating 333 job 
postings.
For the 228 blue collar positions, 400 males and 50 females applied. The 
females who applied were more successful, with a success rate of 56% 
(resulting in 28 hires) against a success rate of 50% of the male population 
(which resulted in 200 hires).
Applicants for white collar positions were the same number for males 
and females, with 300 applications each. Again, women were hired in 
greater proportions, with a 20% success rate (60 hires). Out of the males 
applying for the white collar positions, only 15% were hired (45 hires).
The company announced that it had completed its hiring process.
A federal Equal Employment enforcement official, routinely checking for 
compliance of non-discriminatory practices by companies, noted that many 
more males were hired than females, and decided to investigate. The 
government official produced his statistics, which showed that not only men 
had been hired in higher numbers (245 men hired against just 88 women) 
but also that a female applying for a job had a 25% chance of being hired 
(88 hires for 350 applicants) while male applicants had a 35% chance (245 
hires for 700 applicants).
Do you think the company discriminated against women? Please explain 
what happened.
Correct answer:
The company didn’t discriminate and, in fact, women had higher success 
rates in both applications (for white and blue collar positions).
Here is what happened. Women and men did not apply in the same 
measure to the same positions. Most women (300/350: approximately 86% 
of total women applicants) applied to the white collar positions, while only 
42% of male applicants did. The fact is that the two types of positions 
didn’t have the same success rate: white collar ones had a lower success rate 
(i.e. it was more difficult to get a white collar than a blue collar position). 
W omen’s overall success rate was therefore negatively affected by the lower 
success rate of the white collar applications, while men benefited from the 
more generous success rates of the blue collar postings.
This explains the “paradoxical” order reversal by which the global 
success rate (white + blue collar positions) is higher for men, while the 
success rates in both blue and white collar job applications is higher for 
women. In other words, what accounts for the reversal is the different 
application mix (the percentage o f white vs. blue collar applications) o f the 
two groups, which becomes relevant due to the different percentages 
(success rates in application) involved. This phenomenon has been named 
Simpson’s paradox.
Lucrezia (learning story version)
(experiment 1)
Lucrezia Borgia, who lived at the beginning of the XVI century in 
Rome, is known for her cruelty and her attachment to power.
She was as a woman with many enemies, thus very suspicious and 
constantly trying to unmask those surrounding her. The treatment she 
reserved to her enemies was death. The treatment reserved to those of whom 
she suspected was only slightly better. Here is a tale (unconfirmed) giving 
us a sample o f what she would do to test someone of whom she doubted.
One evening Lucrezia invited Rodrigo della Torre, whom she suspected 
o f treason, for dinner. She had four exquisite dishes prepared by her cook. 
However, when the cook was finished, she put enough poison in one of 
them to kill at the first bite.
As soon as her guest took place at the table, she challenged him saying 
that one of the dishes was poisoned, but that he had to eat at least one them, 
he could choose which. She added that, if Rodrigo was honest in his 
intentions, as he claimed, indeed God would guide his hand and he would 
not select the poisoned dish.
Rodrigo saw that he was surrounded by Lucrezia’s armed guards and 
understood there was no way to escape the crazy judgment she had devised. 
Reluctantly, he selected one of the dishes from the center of the table, where 
they all lay, placed it in front of him, but would not taste it.
Lucrezia, seeing his hesitation, insinuated that possibly he was not so 
sure to pass the “trial of God”, as she called it, and that he was afraid. To 
challenge him further, she took one of the three dishes remaining at the 
center of the table, obviously avoided the poisoned one, and ate from it.
Upon finishing her dish, Lucrezia, firmly invited Rodrigo to start eating, 
but offered him to select to another dish if, in the meanwhile, he had been 
inspired to do so.
Rodrigo knew Lucrezia and her insanity well enough to understand that it 
was not a joke, that she had actually poisoned one of the four dishes and that 
she was seeking a “judgement from above” in what she thought to be a fair 
test. What he didn’t know was if he should pick one o f the two plates 
remaining at the center of the table or start eating from the one in front of 
him.
Correct answer:
From a statistical point o f view, there is no doubt that he should eat from 
the plate he has in front of him. Here is an intuitive explanation. Initially, 
Rodrigo has 1 out o f 4 (25%) chances, of selecting the poisoned dish. The
three dishes remaining at the centre of the table have, together, 3 out o f 4 
(75%) chances of containing the poisoned one. It is important to understand 
that when Lucrezia picks one of the three dishes, her choice is constrained 
by the fact that she doesn’t want to eat the poisoned one (she would die and 
there would be no “trial o f God” for Rodrigo). Since she knows which one it 
is, if  one o f the three dishes on the table contains poison, she will leave it 
there and choose another one o f the two. This constrained choice affects the 
probabilities of poison being in the plates remaining on the table. Here is 
why. If the three dishes together had a probability 75% of containing the 
poisoned one, now the remaining two have 75% probability of containing 
the poisoned dish, equal to 37,5% each. On the other hand, the plate initially 
chosen by Rodrigo still has “only” 25% probability of being the deadly one. 
Therefore, choosing one of the two plates at the centre of the table would 
actually increase the probability of being poisoned from 25 to 37,5%.
Call centers compared 
(experiments 2 and 3)
Two major call centers are being compared in terms o f efficiency. One of 
the key productivity parameters under consideration is call processing time, 
i.e. the elapsed time between answering a call and hanging up, having 
successfully performed the task required by the caller.
The tasks clients require by phone differ. Typically, in the case of 
banking inquiries clients ask about their performed transactions, their 
balance and their remaining credit. Fewer times they ask about credit card 
and account conditions as these are pretty standard and well known. In the 
case o f insurance inquiries, usually the client asks for an explanation of his 
current policy conditions, inclusions and exclusions of his policy’s 
coverage or the illustration of other policies that they might underwrite.
The following data reports daily figures o f performance for the two call 
centers expressed in terms of number of inquiries closed in less than 75 
seconds in an average day.
Banking calls 
processed in 
less than 75 
sec.
Insurance calls 
processed in 
less than 75 
sec.
Total calls 
processed in less 
than 75 sec.
Call Center 5000 (67%) 13000(37%) 18000
XY (42%)
Call Center 15000 (63%) 6000 (32%) 21000
ZW (49%)
Total number 
o f banking 
calls received
Total number 
of insurance 
calls received
Total number o f  
calls received
Call Center 
XY
7500 35000 42500
Call Center 
ZW
24000 19000 43000
At a first glance, Call Center ZW looks more efficient with its 49% of 
calls processed in less than 75 seconds (vs. only 42% for Call Center XY). 
However, examining the percentages of calls processed in less than 75 
seconds in each category (insurance and banking inquiries), it is 
immediately clear that in both cases Call Center XY is performing better 
than Call Center ZW (i.e. XY has a higher percentage of calls answered in 
less than 75 seconds). How can this be possible?
The explanation is that the call centers are processing a different mix o f 
calls. If you notice, Call Center XY is processing more insurance-related 
calls, while Call Center ZW is receiving more banking ones. This is relevant 
because banking related calls take on average less than insurance ones to be
processed. So Call Center ZW has an advantage because it receives more 
banking than insurance calls.
Call Center XY, on the other hand, has a disadvantage because it receives 
more insurance type calls (which are longer to process), so even if it is more 
efficient it has a lower percentage of calls answered in less than 75 seconds 
than Call Center ZW.
The general 
(experiment 4)
A small country was ruled from a strong fortress by a dictator. The 
fortress was situated in the middle o f the country, surrounded by farms and 
villages. Many roads led to the fortress through the country side. A rebel 
general vowed to capture the fortress. The general knew that an attack by 
his entire army would capture the fortress. He gathered his army at the head 
of one of the roads, ready to launch a full-scale direct attack. However, the 
general then learned that the dictator had planted mines on each of the 
roads. The mines were set so that small bodies o f men could pass over them 
safely, since the dictator needed to move his troupes and workers to and 
from the fortress. However, any large force would detonate the mines. Not 
only would this blow up the road, but would also destroy many 
neighbouring villages. It therefore seemed impossible to capture the fortress.
However, the general devised a simple plan. He divided his army into 
small groups and dispatched each group at the to the end of a different road. 
When all was ready, he gave the signal and each group marched down a 
different road. Each group continued down its road to the fortress so that the 
entire army arrived together at the fortress at the same time. In this way the 
general captured the fortress and overthrew the dictator.
The commander 
(experiment 4)
A military government was established after the elected government was 
toppled in a coup. The military imposed martial law and abolished all civil 
liberties. A tank corp commander and his forces remained loyal to the 
overthrown civilian government. They hid in a forest waiting for a chance to 
launch a counterattack. The commander felt he could succeed if only the 
military headquarters could be captured. The headquaters were located on a 
heavily guarded island situated in the center of the lake. The only way to 
reach the island was by way o f several pontoon bridges that connected the 
surrounding area. However, each bridge was so narrow and unstable that 
only a few tanks could cross at once. Such a small force would easily be 
repulsed by the defending troops. The headquarters therefore appeared 
invincible.
However, the tank commander tried an unexpected tactic. He secretly 
sent a number of tanks to locations near each bridge leading to the island. 
Then under cover o f darkness the attack was launched simultaneously 
across each bridge. All o f the groups of tanks arrived on the island together 
and immediately converged on the military headquarters. They managed to 
capture the headquarters and eventually restore the civilian government.
Red Adair 
(experiment 4)
An oil well in Saudi Arabia exploded and caught fire. The result was a 
blazing inferno that consumed a quantity o f oil each day. After initial efforts 
to extinguish it failed, famed fire-fighter Red Adair was called in. Red knew 
that the fire could be put out if  a huge amount o f fire retardant foam could 
be dumped on the base of the well. There was enough foam available on the
site to do the job. However, there was no hose large enough to put al the 
foam on the fire fast enough. The small hoses that were available could not 
shot the foam quickly enough to do any good. It looked like there would 
have to be a costly delay before any serious attempt could be made.
However, Red Adair knew just what to do. He stationed men in circle all 
around the fire, with all the available small hoses. When everyone was 
ready all the hoses were opened up and foam was directed at the fire from 
all directions. In this way a huge amount of foam quickly struck the source 
o f the fire. The blaze was extinguished, and the Saudis were satisfied that 
Red had earned his 3 million dollar fee.
The fire chief 
(experiment 4)
One night a fire broke out in a wood shed full o f timber on Mr. Johnson’s 
place. As soon as he saw flames he sounded the alarm, and within minutes 
dozens o f neighbours were on the scene armed with buckets. The shed was 
already burning fiercely and everyone was afraid that if  it wasn’t controlled 
quickly the house would go up next. Fortunately, the shed was right beside a 
lake, so there was plenty of water available. If a large volume of water could 
hit the shed at the same time, it would be extinguished. But with only small 
buckets to work with, it was hard to make any headway. The fire seemed to 
evaporate each bucket o f water before it hit the wood. It looked like the 
house was doomed.
Just then the fire chief arrived. He immediately took charge and 
organized everyone. He had everyone fill their buckets and then wait in a 
circle surrounding the burning shed. As soon as the last man was prepared, 
the chief gave a shout and everyone threw their bucket o f water at the fire. 
The force o f all the water together dampened the fire right down, and it was
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quickly brought under control. Mr. Johnson was relieved that his house was 
saved, and the village council voted the fire chief a raise in pay.
3 balls
(experiments 1-3 and 5-17)
In a popular TV show , three balls, one in gold, another in wood and the 
third in hard plastic, are wrapped up in identical silver foil which makes 
them look identical. The gold ball is the heaviest of the three and weighs 3 
kg. The other two are much lighter, around half a kg each.
The contestant is asked to choose one of the 3 wrapped up balls, totally at 
random since the packages are identical. If it will turn out to be the gold 
ball, the contestant will win a prize of 50.000 £, if not, he will win nothing.
To make the game more interesting, the script is as follows. The 
contestant initially chooses one ball. Before weighing it to determine if it is 
the gold one, the host says something like “You must be wondering if you 
chose the right ball, or if  the golden ball is one of these tw o... well, I can’t 
tell you where the gold ball is, but I will tell you, out of these two balls”-and 
points at the two that weren’t chosen- “where the gold ball isn’t . . .” . The 
host then selects one o f the two remaining balls, his assistant takes it and 
puts it on the scale, revealing that, in fact it is not the gold one.
At this point, the host gives the contestant the choice between sticking to 
the ball originally selected or changing selection to the other remaining ball.
The best choice is actually to switch. The reason can be understood 
intuitively as follows.
Initially, the chance o f choosing the prize ball is 1/3 (one out of three 
balls is the gold one). Consequently, the remaining two balls together have 
2/3 of probability of containing the prize one. Now, here comes the 
important point to understand. The host of the show knows which of the 
balls is the gold one (this is crucial) and can’t choose it because the game
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must go on. So, if the prize ball is one o f the two which were not chosen by 
the participant, he must choose the other one. This means that, while the ball 
chosen initially by the participant continues to have its 1/3 o f probability of 
being the winning one, the remaining ball now has a 2/3 probability of being 
the prize one. From a statistical point of view, switching increases the odds 
(from 1/3 to 2/3).
Videogame 
(experiments 2-3 and 5-17)
In the new and already best-selling video-game Catch the jewel thief! , 
the player must chase a thief who has stolen 50 Million Euros worth of 
diamonds in a fictitious town which resembles Monte Carlo. The virtual 
chase goes on along the French Croisette by car and helicopter, finally 
culminating in the thief barricading himself in the prestigious Plaza Hotel.
The last part of the game has the thief hiding in one of five hotel rooms. 
The thief will be captured (and the game will be won) if the player opens the 
door corresponding to the robber’s hiding place. The player therefore must 
select (at random, as there is no way of knowing where the thief could be) in 
which room he thinks the thief is hiding. Once he has done that, however, 
the game doesn’t immediately reveal what is behind the chosen door. 
Instead, it displays a message saying “Your assistant joined in to help you 
and just opened one o f the other four rooms, which was empty. Do you want 
to open the door you chose or do you wish to switch to one of the other 
three?”. Notice that the door opened by the assistant always leads to an 
empty room, otherwise the game would not be ended by the player and 
players don’t like that.
The best move is to change selection. Here is why. Initially, the player 
has 20% (1/5) probability o f selecting the right door and 80% (4/5) 
probability that the door will lead to an empty room. When the game makes
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the assistant open one o f the 4 doors (choosing among the ones that the 
player hasn’t selected), it does so under the constraint that it can’t be the one 
where the robber is (the game can be ended only by the player making the 
right or the wrong choice). This means that, after opening one of the four 
doors, the 3 remaining have 80% probability o f hiding the thief, so each one 
has 27% probability of being the right door. The door selected initially, on 
the other hand, still has its 20% probability. It is key to understand that the 
game knows behind which door the thief is hiding and will make the 
assistant open another one.
Seatbelts 
(experiments 2,3,5,7,9,11,13,15)
The news, published in the local newspaper, about a fatal car accident 
received a lot o f attention and captured the imagination of many people. A 
women, read the story, was driving at normal speed on a country road 
alongside of a river. When an animal suddenly appeared in front of her, she 
made a sharp turn to avoid it. Unfortunately, doing so, she lost control of the 
car, capsizing and falling in the river. The woman apparently desperately 
tried to free herself of the seat-belt when the car fell in the deep river waters, 
but remained trapped. The sad epilogue, reported in the article, was that the 
woman, who was not wounded in the accident, drowned in her car.
The reporter, commenting on this story, recalled a similar one, happened 
many years earlier, in which a car took fire after a minor accident. Even in 
this case, the reporter wrote, seat-belts were fatal to the driver who, unable 
to free himself, had burned alive in his car.
In the days following the accident many people began to question the 
usefulness of seat-belts and theorizing that they should just be worn while 
driving on highways.
Hearing his students make these types o f comments, a high school 
teacher became very concerned. Apparently, this thinking was quite 
widespread due to the emotional impact of the two stories and this would 
potentially lead many o f his students (and others) to abandon the use of 
seatbelts or to reduce it greatly.
The teacher decided to write a letter to the newspaper in which he 
explained that probability should not be judged by thinking of examples but 
rather by looking at complete data. Immediately after reading the article of 
the woman drowned in her car, the episode is highly available in 
everybody’s minds, but that single episode, or a few others, don’t change 
the fact that seat-belts are life-savers. The teacher produced statistical data 
demonstrating that wearing seat-belts saves more lives than it looses.
4 boxes 
(experiment 17)
A well known TV show featured by the national network of a major 
European country is divided in two parts. In the first part, contestants must 
pass a series o f tests (singing, dancing, answering questions on various 
subject matters, etc.) by which all but one o f them get eliminated. In the 
second part of the show, the contestant who manages to pass the selection 
has the opportunity, but not certainty, of winning 100.000 Euros. This part 
of the show develops as follows.
The four boxes, identical but of different colours, are placed in front of 
the contestant. One of them contains a 100.000 Euro check, the others a 
jack-in-the box programmed to say “You don’t win!”. The aim for the 
contestant is, o f course, to choose the box containing the 100.000 Euro 
check and avoid the dreaded jack-in-the box. The whole suspense of this 
phase of the show draws from the fear that the contestant, after going
through all the tests and succeeding them, might walk out of the show with 
nothing at all.
Initially, the host requires the contestant to select a box. Before allowing 
the contestant to open it, the host o f the show opens one of the three boxes 
that the contestant hasn’t chosen, clearly one containing the jack-in-the box 
(the host must avoid opening the box with the 100.000 Euro check 
otherwise he would remove the only prize from the game).
At this point, the host asks the contestant to either stick to his initial box 
or to change it to one of the two remaining boxes previously not selected. 
While the contestant thinks about it, there is a short commercial. The 
contestant makes his choice and the box (be it the initially chosen one or 
one of the other two) is opened to reveal its content.
Some contestants get very emotional and choose based on their instinct. 
This is a mistake. Here is why.
From a statistical point of view the box selected in the beginning has 'A 
probabilities of being the one with the 100.000 Euro check. The other three 
boxes, as well, all have a lA probability of being the winning box. Therefore, 
together, they have % probabilities of containing the winning check (the 
sum of their individual probabilities). The host had then opened one of the 
boxes. His choice o f which one to open was informed (he knew where the 
check was) and constrained (he had to open one of the boxes with the jack- 
in-the box).
After the host has eliminated a jack-in-the box from the three unselected 
boxes, the remaining 2 together still carry % probability of containing the 
prize check. Consequently, the 2 unselected boxes have increased their 
individual probability o f containing the 100.000 Euro check from 25% (1/4) 
to 37,5%.
Therefore, the contestant should accept the offer to switch to maximize 
his chances o f winning.
Anastasia 
(experiment 17)
Anastasia was a Russian princess who lived a couple of centuries ago and 
was known through the country for her generosity.
For years she helped hundreds o f poor peasant families who would have 
died of hunger without her help. The peasants knew that they could always 
knock on the door of her palace to receive a loaf of bread and a warm soup.
As she grew older, her desire to help others increased, but she was 
frustrated to see that, despite her help, the poorest could not break free of 
their poverty. She thought that feeding the poor to allow their survival was 
not enough.
In her final days, knowing that she was terminally ill, she decided that 
she personally wanted to give her jewellery (she had hundreds o f valuable 
pieces) to the poor, in order to give them a small capital which would allow 
them to start a business or simply live better. Wishing to do so with fairness 
and with the help of God (she was very pious), she devised the following 
scheme.
Anastasia would invite, one at a time, the father of a numerous and poor 
family to dine with her. She would place three dishes on the table. In one o f 
them she had hidden a valuable piece of jewellery. She would then tell her 
guest that one of the plates contained a treasure that he could have, but that 
she wanted God to decide if he were to receive it or not.
At this point Anastasia asked the guest to choose a plate. After making 
his choice, the poor guest always hesitated because he was scared to have 
made a mistake and missed the chance of his life. Anastasia would then take 
one of the two remaining plates at the center of the table saying that she 
would eliminate a plate that did not contain the treasure. She then added, to 
reassure him, that his chances of finding the treasure were indeed high, all 
he needed was a little help from God. Then she kindly asked her guest to go
on, either searching for the treasure in his plate or, if he preferred, changing 
his selection to the other remaining plate and looking into that one.
In fact, although chance played an important role in finding the treasure 
or not, there was a way of maximising one’s chances. Consider the 
following.
As the guest makes his first selection he has 1/3 probabilities of finding 
the hidden jewel in his plate and 2/3 of not finding it because it is in one of 
the other 2 plates.
Now, here comes the important point to understand. Anastasia knows 
which o f the plates contains the treasure (this is crucial) and won’t choose it 
because otherwise she would defeat her own purpose o f giving to the poor. 
So, if the treasure is in one of the two plates which were not chosen by the 
peasant, she must choose the other one. In other words, if the plate with the 
jewel is one o f the two that were not chosen by the peasant, Anastasia can’t 
pick it and must pick the other one.
This means that, while the plate chosen initially by the poor peasant 
continues to have its 1/3 of probability of being the winning one, the 
remaining plate (after Anastasia has eliminated a non- winning one) now 
has a 2/3 probability of being the one with the jewel. From a statistical point 
of view, switching increases the odds (from 1/3 to 2/3).
We do not know for sure why Anastasia chose to donate her jewellery 
with the described approach, but she was known to have a passion for 
mathematically based games and this probably explains the unusual 
methods o f her generosity.
Lucrezia version 2 
(experiment 17)
Lucrezia Borgia, who lived at the beginning of the XVI century in 
Rome, is known for her cruelty and her attachment to power.
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She was a woman with many enemies, thus very suspicious and 
constantly trying to unmask those surrounding her. The treatment she 
reserved for her enemies was death. The treatment reserved for those of 
whom she suspected was only slightly better. Here is a tale (unconfirmed) 
giving us a sample of what she would do to test someone of whom she 
doubted.
One evening Lucrezia invited Rodrigo della Torre, whom she suspected 
o f treason, for dinner. She had four exquisite dishes prepared by her cook. 
However, when the cook was finished, she put poison in all o f them except 
one.
As soon as her guest took place at the table, she informed him that all 
dishes were poisoned except one. She then added, with measured cruelty, 
that he had to eat at least one them: he could choose which o f the four, God 
would choose if he should live. If  Rodrigo was honest, she continued, God 
would guide his hand and he would select the dish that was not poisoned.
Rodrigo was uncertain on how to react: was it all a joke or was serious? 
He knew that Lucrezia was observing his reactions and so he defiantly 
selected one of the dishes from the centre o f the table, where they all lay, 
placed it in front of him, and looked at Lucrezia.
Lucrezia, understanding that he was incredulous and wanting to 
challenge him further, took one of the three dishes remaining at the centre of 
the table, asked the servant to bring in a dog and gave the plate to the poor 
beast to eat. She then said to Rodrigo: “Now you will believe what I say!”. 
The dog ate a couple o f mouthfuls and died almost instantly. At this point, 
Rodrigo understood that she had actually poisoned three of the four dishes 
and that she was really seeking a “judgement from above” in what she 
would run as a fair (although inhuman and delirious) test.
Rodrigo managed to maintain cold blood. As luck would have it, he was 
very skilled in mathematics and understood that the choice of which plate to
eat from should be made based on statistical probabilities and not on gut 
instinct.
His thoughts were as follows. In the beginning, the plate he chose had V a  
probability o f being the safe dish. The remaining dishes, as well, all had % 
probability each o f being un-poisoned. Therefore, together, they had Va 
probabilities of containing the safe meal (the sum of their individual 
probabilities).
Lucrezia had then taken one o f the unselected dishes and given it to the 
dog. Her choice o f which plate to give the dog was informed (she knew 
where the poison was) and constrained (she had to eliminate a poisoned 
plate).
After she has eliminated a poisoned plate from the three unselected ones, 
the 2 remaining dishes at the centre o f the table still carry, together, 3A 
probability of containing the safe meal. Consequently, the 2 unselected 
plates have increased their individual probability of being safe from 25% 
(1/4) to 37,5%.
Therefore, Rodrigo accepts Lucrezia’s offer to switch and bravely selects 
another dish, knowing that he has maximized his chances of survival.
Distractor stories
Healing Nature 
( experiment 1)
Healing Nature is a very small Swiss company specializing in natural 
remedies. It markets its products through herbal shops and is run by two 
herbalists, the original founders, who get their herbs in the Swiss Alps. The 
remedies it markets have had huge success in Switzerland in recent years 
just by word-of-mouth.
Recently, Healing Nature has begun to 4est a remedy, called Relax Herb, 
composed o f 12 different herbs, all o f which, it claims, have relaxation- 
inducing properties. To support this claim, Healing Nature decides to 
distribute 2 free packets of Relax Herb to a group o f 1000 people who 
suffer from problems related to difficulties in relaxing (the most frequent 
problems being tension headaches and insomnia). The participants, in 
exchange for the two packets, have to keep a daily journal reporting their 
tension symptoms.
The test results, at the end of the two weeks, are the following. 490 
participants in the study report that, after 2 weeks treatment with Relax Herb 
they feel more relaxed. 410 participants reported no change since they 
started the treatment and 100 reported a mild worsening o f symptoms.
Healing Nature is puzzled, as it was expecting its remedy to have a more 
striking impact (“If half of the people improve and half don’t, does this 
mean that our remedy is good for nothing? But it is impossible, all those 
herbs are effective, w e’ve used them for years!”). Healing Nature, 
incredulous at the results, decides to call an advisor to explain what is going 
on and suggest further action.
The advisor declares that, based on the data provided, he cannot 
determine whether Relax Herb is effective in inducing relaxation or not. He 
says that there are a number o f flaws in the way the test was conducted and 
he particularly underlines the lack o f data concerning people, similar 
(particularly in their relaxation problems) in to the ones who have taken 
Relax Herb, but who haven’t been treated. The results obtained using Relax 
Herb, he says, can only be interpreted in the light o f what would have 
happened without using it. So, he explains, we need to have a group, which 
we will call control group, which is similar to the treatment group (he will 
ensure through appropriate recruitment procedures that it is), but will 
receive no treatment (nor Relax Herb nor any other). Then, he concludes,
we will compare what happens in the two groups and we will start drawing 
some first conclusions.
Following his advice, a test is conducted on 1000 people: 500 are treated 
with Relax Herb and 500 receive no treatment. After two weeks, 51% of 
those treated with Relax Herb improve, 39% remain stable and 10% 
worsen. In the control group, where no treatment is given, things go less 
well. Only about 10% of people improve spontaneously, about 20% have a 
worsening of symptoms and about 70% remain stationary. In the light o f 
this, the results obtained with Relax Herb seem quite good.
The two founders are very happy to see the effectiveness o f Relax Herb 
confirmed by the test.
A cure for BTB 
( experiment 2)
BTB is a chronic degenerative disease of the arteries. It progressively 
reduces the quality o f life by decreasing motor function and tissue nutrition 
in general; it runs a chronic course which, eventually, is fatal. The economic 
impact of the disease, due to lost time at work and hospitalization, is very 
high.
Although several drugs of limited efficacy are believed to play a role in 
the long term management of this condition, a definitive cure for BTB does 
not exist. Quite a few pharmaceutical companies have an active program to 
search for pharmacological treatment, but so far none of them has come up 
with a breakthrough.
Dr. Strauss o f Alfa Pharmaceuticals, a US based pharmaceutical 
multinational, leads one o f the teams that investigates BTB. The team’s 
research resulted in the patenting o f a compound, called Riverade which is 
considered one o f the most promising drugs in Alfa’s pipe-line. The
company has invested 200 million $ (Alfa's greatest investment in a single 
research project ever) over the last 4 years to develop its anti-BTB drug.
Following the latest favourable results of clinical trials meetings with the 
FDA (the federal agency that regulates drug development and gives 
approval for marketing of new drugs in the US); Alfa Pharmaceuticals has 
estimated that it will be able to register Riverade in 6-12 months.
A recent event, however, has changed the situation completely requiring 
a decision to be made.
Three weeks ago, the FDA called a public meeting of the Advisory 
Committee on Cardiovascular Drugs to discuss the final results of a drug 
from a bio-tech company based in Sweden, BioLife. In short, the last 
interim analysis o f two pivotal clinical studies has shown the substantial 
superiority in efficacy and safety of Biolife’s drug versus the control drug, 
which happens to be the same that Alfa Pharmaceutical had adopted for 
Riverade. The Advisory Committee, after detailed cross questioning, 
supported further progression o f BioLife’s drug. Given the social impact of 
the disease, the news quickly made the headlines and patient associations 
(BTB disease's patient associations are amongst the most vocal and 
powerful in the US) publicly asked the FDA to grant BioLife’s drug special 
status in order to make it available to the public as quickly as possible.
Competing A&E Units 
(experiment 3)
Task 1. A charity board has to decide which of two Accident & 
Emergency (A&E) units, based in the same developing country, will get 
funding for the next three years (not enough funds available for both and 
doesn’t make sense to divide the amount). The funds available would cover 
up to 30% of costs for the unit that receives them, which would make the 
charity a large donor.
A&E Unit X is in a large village and A&E Unit Y is located close to a 
chemical factory and to a small village (mainly populated by factory 
workers and their families). The Emergency Units have been evaluated as 
equivalent (e.g. both areas equally need an emergency unit).
The charity wants to fund the A&E unit which has the best outcomes (i.e. 
is better at saving lives) to reward and encourage its good work. The data 
available for both A&E Units refers to last 12 months and reports number of 
deaths o f accepted patients (i.e. deaths of patients entering the unit for 
treatment). The instances have been classified in either workplace or 
domestic accidents. Workplace accidents are more severe while domestic 
accidents are usually of minor entity.
Taking just this set o f data into account (no other data available and all 
other conditions are equal) and wanting to fund the A&E Unit which is best 
at saving lifes, which one would you give the money to? Why?
A&E UnitX A&E UnitY
No. of
patients
entering
emergency
unit
No. of 
deaths
No. of
patients
entering
emergency
unit
No. of 
deaths
Workplace accidents 90 30 600 120
Domestic accidents 600 12 100 1
Total (domestic and 
workplace)
690 42 700 121
Overall death rate 
(measured on both 
types o f accidents)
6% (=42/690) 17%(= 121 /700)
Task 2. Three years later the same charity board examines the data of the 
two A&E units again to decide who will get the funding.
In the meantime, many things have changed within the A&E units and in 
the nearby villages.
Both A&E Units underwent a reorganization, some medical and para­
medical staff left, new staff was brought in.
A big chemical factory opened in village X, hiring workers by the 
hundreds. The village, which was already pretty big, grew even larger and 
almost became a small city.
In village Y a multinational company opened a call centre and a SW 
Development Centre, causing the small village to attract new residents and 
to expand. The chemical factory, on the other hand, was denied permission 
to expand, thus remained more or less the size it was 3 years before.
One thing which hasn’t changed, unfortunately, is that the charity cannot 
fund both A&E units due to lack o f resources. To decide which unit to fund, 
the charity will continue using the same criteria it did three years ago, i.e. it 
will choose the best performing unit in terms of lives saved. Other criteria 
will not be considered.
The Head of A&E Unit Y, speaking in front of the Charity Board to 
request the funding for his unit, highlights that his outcomes are better than 
those of A&E Unit X. Would you endorse his request? Please explain why.
A&E UnitX A&E UnitY
No. o f patients 
entering 
emergency unit
No. of 
deaths
No. o f patients 
entering 
emergency unit
No. of 
deaths
Workplace
accidents
1000 200 600 180
Domestic
accidents
800 8 1200 12
Total (domestic 
and workplace)
1800 208 1800 192
Overall death rate 
(measured on both 
types o f accidents)
12% (=255/1800) 11%(= 192/1800)
Lucrezia
(experiment 3)
Task 1. Lucrezia Borgia, who lived at the beginning of the XVI century 
in Rome, is known for her cruelty and her attachment to power.
She was a woman with many enemies, thus very suspicious and 
constantly trying to unmask those surrounding her. The treatment she 
reserved for her enemies was death. The treatment reserved for those of 
whom she suspected was only slightly better. Here is a tale (unconfirmed) 
giving us a sample o f what she would do to test someone of whom she 
doubted.
One evening Lucrezia invited Rodrigo della Torre, whom she suspected 
o f treason, for dinner. She had four exquisite dishes prepared by her cook. 
However, when the cook was finished, she put enough poison in one of 
them to kill at the first bite.
As soon as her guest took place at the table, she challenged him saying 
that one o f the dishes was poisoned, but that he had to eat at least one them, 
he could choose which. She added that, if  Rodrigo was honest in his 
intentions, as he claimed, indeed God would guide his hand and he would 
not select the poisoned dish.
Rodrigo saw that he was surrounded by Lucrezia’s armed guards and 
understood there was no way to escape the crazy judgment she had devised. 
Reluctantly, he selected one o f the dishes from the centre of the table, where 
they all lay, placed it in front o f him, but would not taste it.
Lucrezia, seeing his hesitation, insinuated that possibly he was not so 
sure to pass the “trial o f God”, as she called it, and that he was afraid. To 
challenge him further, she took one o f the three dishes remaining at the 
centre o f the table, obviously avoided the poisoned one, and ate from it.
Upon finishing her dish, Lucrezia, firmly invited Rodrigo to start eating, 
but offered him to pick another dish, of the remaining two, if  he wanted to.
Rodrigo knew Lucrezia and her insanity well enough to understand that it 
was not a joke, that she had actually poisoned one of the four dishes and that 
she was seeking a “judgement from above” in what she would run as a fair 
(although inhuman and delirious) test. What he didn’t know was if he 
should eat from one of the two plates remaining at the centre of the table or 
from the one in front of him.
What do you think he should do? Why?
Task 2. A couple of years later, Lucrezia invited another noble, 
Adalberto Del Lago, whom she suspected of treason. Once again she 
prepared 4 dishes and planned a similar script to the one she had followed 
with Rodrigo.
What Lucrezia didn’t know was that Adalberto was accompanied 
everywhere by his faithful bodyguard Ignazio.
Lucrezia’s servants, seeing the two together, thought best to let Ignazio 
come in (although he was clearly not part of their master’s script) since not 
allowing him to enter the palace could have made Adalberto suspicious.
As soon as Lucrezia declared that Adalberto had to eat one o f the four 
dishes, one of which was poisoned, Ignazio extracted his sword. Lucrezia’s 
guards immobilized him immediately.
Lucrezia made Adalberto pick a dish, which he did swiftly and almost 
defiantly. He placed the dish in front o f him and was about to start eating it, 
when Ignazio said that he would rather die himself than see his master die, 
pleading Lucrezia to let him eat one of the dishes instead of Adalberto. 
Lucrezia, amused, said that he could eat one, but if it wasn’t the poisoned 
one, then Adalberto had to go on and eat.
Before Adalberto could stop him, Ignazio bravely selected one of the 
three dishes remaining at the centre o f the table and consumed it. Since
when he finished eating he was still alive, it was clear that he had not 
selected the poisoned one.
At this point, Lucrezia told Adalberto that it was now his turn to eat, but 
added that he could change his mind regarding which plate to eat. He was 
free to eat one of the remaining two dishes at the centre of the table or to 
eat the one he had chosen at first.
What should he do? Why?
Creativity experiment
(experiments 5,6, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17)
You have 5 minutes to identify and write in the appropriate space the 3 
mistakes contained in this sentence.
This sentnece contains three mistake.
Target stories
Competing A&E Units 
(experiments 1,2 and 3)
Task 1. A charity board has to decide which of two Accident & 
Emergency (A&E) units, based in the same developing country, will get 
funding for the next three years (not enough funds available for both and 
doesn’t make sense to divide the amount). The funds available would cover 
up to 30% of costs for the unit that receives them, which would make the 
charity a large donor.
A&E Unit X is in a large village and A&E Unit Y is located close to a 
chemical factory and to a small village (mainly populated by factory 
workers and their families). The Emergency Units have been evaluated as 
equivalent (e.g. both areas equally need an emergency unit).
The charity wants to fund the A&E unit which has the best outcomes (i.e. 
is better at saving lives) to reward and encourage its good work. The data 
available for both A&E Units refers to last 12 months and reports number of 
deaths of accepted patients (i.e. deaths of patients entering the unit for 
treatment). The instances have been classified in either workplace or 
domestic accidents. Workplace accidents are more severe while domestic 
accidents are usually of minor entity.
Taking just this set of data into account (no other data available and all 
other conditions are equal) and wanting to fund the A&E Unit which is best 
at saving lifes, which one would you give the money to? Why?
A&E UnitX A&E UnitY
No. o f patients 
entering emergency 
unit
No. of 
deaths
No. o f patients 
entering 
emergency unit
No. of 
deaths
Workplace accidents 90 30 600 120
Domestic accidents 600 12 100 1
Total (domestic and 
workplace)
690 42 700 121
Overall death rate 
(measured on both 
types o f accidents)
6% (=42/690) 17%(= 121 /700)
Task 2. Three years later the same charity board examines the data of the 
two A&E units again to decide who will get the funding.
In the meantime, many things have changed within the A&E units and in 
the nearby villages.
Both A&E Units underwent a reorganization, some medical and para­
medical staff left, new staff was brought in.
A big chemical factory opened in village X, hiring workers by the 
hundreds. The village, which was already pretty big, grew even larger and 
almost became a small city.
In village Y a multinational company opened a call centre and a SW 
Development Centre, causing the small village to attract new residents and 
to expand. The chemical factory, on the other hand, was denied permission 
to expand, thus remained more or less the size it was 3 years before.
One thing which hasn’t changed, unfortunately, is that the charity cannot 
fund both A&E units due to lack of resources. To decide which unit to fund, 
the charity will continue using the same criteria it did three years ago, i.e. it 
will choose the best performing unit in terms of lives saved. Other criteria 
will not be considered.
The Head of A&E Unit Y, speaking in front of the Charity Board to 
request the funding for his unit, highlights that his outcomes are better than 
those of A&E Unit X. Would you endorse his request? Please explain why.
A&E UnitX A&E UnitY
No. o f patients 
entering 
emergency unit
No. of 
deaths
No. o f patients 
entering 
emergency unit
No. of 
deaths
Workplace
accidents
1000 200 600 180
Domestic
accidents
800 8 1200 12
Total (domestic 
and workplace)
1800 208 1800 192
Overall death 
rate (measured 
on both types o f  
accidents)
12% (=255/1800) 11%(= 192/1800)
Lucrezia 
(experiments 2,3,5-12)
Task 1. Lucrezia Borgia, who lived at the beginning of the XVI century 
in Rome, is known for her cruelty and her attachment to power.
She was a woman with many enemies, thus very suspicious and 
constantly trying to unmask those surrounding her. The treatment she 
reserved for her enemies was death. The treatment reserved for those o f 
whom she suspected was only slightly better. Here is a tale (unconfirmed) 
giving us a sample of what she would do to test someone of whom she 
doubted.
One evening Lucrezia invited Rodrigo della Torre, whom she suspected 
of treason, for dinner. She had four exquisite dishes prepared by her cook. 
However, when the cook was finished, she put enough poison in one of 
them to kill at the first bite.
As soon as her guest took place at the table, she challenged him saying 
that one of the dishes was poisoned, but that he had to eat at least one them, 
he could choose which. She added that, if Rodrigo was honest in his 
intentions, as he claimed, indeed God would guide his hand and he would 
not select the poisoned dish.
Rodrigo saw that he was surrounded by Lucrezia’s armed guards and 
understood there was no way to escape the crazy judgment she had devised. 
Reluctantly, he selected one of the dishes from the centre of the table, where 
they all lay, placed it in front of him, but would not taste it.
Lucrezia, seeing his hesitation, insinuated that possibly he was not so 
sure to pass the “trial of God”, as she called it, and that he was afraid. To 
challenge him further, she took one of the three dishes remaining at the 
centre o f the table, obviously avoided the poisoned one, and ate from it.
Upon finishing her dish, Lucrezia, firmly invited Rodrigo to start eating, 
but offered him to pick another dish, o f the remaining two, if  he wanted to.
Rodrigo knew Lucrezia and her insanity well enough to understand that it 
was not a joke, that she had actually poisoned one of the four dishes and that 
she was seeking a “judgement from above” in what she would run as a fair 
(although inhuman and delirious) test. What he didn’t know was if he 
should eat from one o f the two plates remaining at the centre of the table or 
from the one in front o f him.
What do you think he should do? Why?
Task 2. A couple of years later, Lucrezia invited another noble, 
Adalberto Del Lago, whom she suspected of treason. Once again she 
prepared 4 dishes and planned a similar script to the one she had followed 
with Rodrigo.
What Lucrezia didn’t know was that Adalberto was accompanied 
everywhere by his faithful bodyguard Ignazio.
Lucrezia’s servants, seeing the two together, thought best to let Ignazio 
come in (although he was clearly not part o f their master’s script) since not 
allowing him to enter the palace could have made Adalberto suspicious.
As soon as Lucrezia declared that Adalberto had to eat one of the four 
dishes, one o f which was poisoned, Ignazio extracted his sword. Lucrezia’s 
guards immobilized him immediately.
Lucrezia made Adalberto pick a dish, which he did swiftly and almost 
defiantly. He placed the dish in front of him and was about to start eating it, 
when Ignazio said that he would rather die himself than see his master die, 
pleading Lucrezia to let him eat one of the dishes instead of Adalberto. 
Lucrezia, amused, said that he could eat one, but if it wasn’t the poisoned 
one, then Adalberto had to go on and eat.
Before Adalberto could stop him, Ignazio bravely selected one of the 
three dishes remaining at the centre of the table and consumed it. Since 
when he finished eating he was still alive, it was clear that he had not 
selected the poisoned one.
At this point, Lucrezia told Adalberto that it was now his turn to eat, but 
added that he could change his mind regarding which plate to eat. He was 
free to eat one o f the remaining two dishes at the centre o f the table or to 
eat the one he had chosen at first.
What should he do? Why?
The prisoners 
(experiments 13-17)
Task 1. Three prisoners, Alexander, Ben and Carl, who took part in a 
crime together, are imprisoned in separate cells in a remote country. They 
are awaiting execution to take place on the following morning.
As luck would have it, the following day is the monarch’s 40th birthday. 
His prime minister convinces him to announce that he will pardon one of the 
three prisoners (it doesn’t matter who as they participated in the same crime 
and are equally guilty) to celebrate, but advises him not announce which of 
the three till the following morning. The monarch agrees.
The warden, a compassionate man, is informed of who will be pardoned, 
but is forbidden to reveal it.
Alexander manages to approach the warden and to ask him, between Ben 
and Carl, who w on’t be pardoned and thus will die (one o f the two, or 
perhaps both, will die since only one prisoner will be pardoned).
The warden, at first, says he can’t answer. He is, however, sympathetic. 
He decides, after some thinking, that, by answering the question, he would 
not be violating instructions (he is only forbidden to reveal who will be 
pardoned). The warden says that he can confirm that, between Ben and Carl, 
Carl will certainly die. He adds that, since two prisoners out o f  three must 
die, its possible that Ben will die also, but he cannot say anything more 
because, otherwise, he would be revealing who will be pardoned and he is 
not allowed to.
At this point of the story, do you think Alexander and Ben have different 
or equal chances o f survival? Why?
Task 2. In the same remote country, exactly ten years later, a similar 
situation occurs. The prisoners, this time, are four: Alexander, Ben, Carl, 
and Dave.
The day o f the execution will be the monarchs 50th birthday and, the 
night before, he announces that he will pardon three o f the four prisoners (a 
man turns 50 only once in a life-time, after all). He will, however, announce 
who will be executed only the following morning.
The warden, a compassionate man, is informed o f who will be executed, 
but is forbidden to reveal it.
Alexander manages to approach the warden when he is alone and tells 
him: “Dave is my best friend, we grew up together and I always looked after 
him since he was a child because I’m a few years older...when he lost his 
parents, I became almost a father for him ...well, you won’t believe it, but I 
am more concerned about him than about myself. I wanted to ask you if he 
is one o f the three who will receive the grace.”
The warden, at first, says he can’t answer the question. He is, however, 
moved by Alexander’s words, which he believes are sincere. He knows 
Dave will be pardoned and decides, after some thinking, that he will not 
violate the monarch’s instructions if he tells Alexander (he is only forbidden 
to reveal who will be executed).
At this point o f the story, do you think Alexander, Ben and Carl, have 
different or equal chances o f survival? Why?
Final questionnaires
Final questionnaire 
(experiments 1,2 and 3)
1. Were you familiar with the types of decisions you were required to 
make before starting this experiment?
2. If the answer is yes, when have you learned about these type of 
decisions?
3. Did you see an analogy between something that you recently learned 
and the decisions you were required to make?
4. If the answer is yes:
• what was the analogy?
• did it help you in making the decision?
5. did you have difficulties in using the analogy to make the decisions 
required?
6. As you started this experiment, did you think that it was 
interconnected with the previous experiments in the one hour session? If  the 
answer is yes, did this influence you? How?
Final questionnaire
(experiment 4)
The problem you just tried to solve was actually analogous to the 
problems in the stories you read for the Reading and Comprehension task 
(the first task you did).
It is important for us to know if you have recognized this analogy while 
doing the problem solving task . Please answer the following question:
While trying to solve The Tumor problem, did you realize that the 
problem was analogous to the stories you had read about previously?
YES NO
If you had not noticed the analogy earlier, now that it has been pointed 
out, can you think of a solution to The Tumor problem using the analogous 
stories that you have read in the Reading and Comprehension task? Please 
write the solution below.
Finally, were you familiar with The Tumor problem solving story before 
starting this experiment?
YES NO
If the answer was yes, please explain
Final questionnaire A 
(web experiments)
1. Were you familiar with the type of decision you were required to make 
in Experiment 3 (the last one) before starting the experiment?
YES NO
If the answer is yes, when have you learned about these or similar types 
of decisions?
2. As you started the three experiments, did you think that there was 
some connection between them?
YES NO
Final questionnaire B (web experimnts)
First part
1. Were you familiar with the type of decision you were required to 
make in this experiment BEFORE STARTING IT?
YES NO
If the answer is yes, when have you learned about this type or similar 
types of decisions?
2. Did the stories presented in the experiment remind you of similar 
stories you had heard or read about previously?
YES NO
If the answer is yes, please write what you were reminded of, even if it 
not a precise memory
Second part (displayed on subsequent screen)
The decisions you just made are actually analogous to the ones contained in 
some stories you have read in the past days (they were presented to you 
disguised as a pre-test of the materials used by a college for their admission 
procedure, sorry about that).
In order to interpret the experiment’s results correctly, it is important for us 
to double check if you had consciously recognized the decisions or not 
during the experim ent. Please answer the following question:
While deciding if Rodrigo/Adalberto should switch plates, did you 
explicitly realize the decision was similar to the one you had read about 
previously?
YES NO
Anything you can add about what went through your mind is very useful to 
our research
ANNEX 2
Table A1
Participant's gender - all online experiments fo r  which biographical data is 
available
Frequency Percent
M 265 45,7
F 315 54,3
Total 580 100
Table A2
Participants ’ age group -  all online experiments fo r  which biographical 
data is available
Age Freqency Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
<25 131 22,6 22,6
>=25 but <30 110 19,0 41,6
>=30 but <40 169 29,1 70,7
>=40 170 29,3 100,0
Total 580 100,0
Table A3
Participants ’ age groups -  experiment 7
Age Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid <25 19 21,8 21,8
>=25 but <30 10 11,5 33,3
>=30 but <40 24 27,6 60,9
>=40 34 39,1 100,0
Total (*) 87 100,0
(*) Biographical information was not available for 38 participants
Table A4
Frequencies and Percentages o f  delays between learning and transfer
experiment 7
Elapsed time in 
days Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
Valid 1,00 22 17,6 17,6
2,00 4 3,2 20,8
3,00 23 18,4 39,2
4,00 8 6,4 45,6
5,00 3 2,4 48,0
6,00 1 ,8 48,8
10,00 1 ,8 49,6
11,00 6 4,8 54,4
12,00 8 6,4 60,8
13,00 1 ■8 61,6
15,00 2 1,6 63,2
16,00 1 ,8 64,0
17,00 25 20,0 84,0
18,00 6 4,8 88,8
19,00 5 4,0 92,8
20,00 3 2,4 95,2
21,00 6 4,8 100,0
Total 125 100,0
Table A5
Frequencies and Percentages o f  delays between learning and transfer -  
experiment 8
Days of delay Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
1,00 36 36,7 36,7
2,00 5 5,1 41,8
3,00 1 1,0 42,9
4,00 3 3,1 45,9
7,00 31 31,6 77,6
8,00 8 8,2 85,7
9,00 1 1,0 86,7
10,00 2 2,0 88,8
17,00 10 10,2 99,0
20,00 1 1,0 100,0
Total 98 100,0
Table A6
Frequencies and Percentages o f  delays between learning and transfer- 
Experiment 9
Fre
quency
Percen
t
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
2,00 14 25,0 25,0 25,0
3,00 1 1,8 1,8 26,8
5,00 1 1,8 1,8 28,6
13,00 35 62,5 62,5 91,1
14,00 1 1,8 1,8 92,9
15,00 2 3,6 3,6 96,4
18,00 1 1,8 1,8 98,2
28,00 1 1,8 1,8 100,0
Total 56 100,0 100,0
Table A7
Participants ’ age group -  Experiment 10
Age Frequency Percent Valid Percent
Cumulative
Percent
<25 13 15,3 24,5 24,5
between25 (inc.) and 30 10 11,8 18,9 43,4
Between30 (inc.) and 40 11 12,9 20,8 64,2
>=40 19 22,4 35,8 100,0
Total 53 62,4 100,0
not available 32 37,6
Total 85 100,0
Table A8
Participant age group -  Experiment 13
Cumulative
Age Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent
<25 4 11,1 11,1 11,1
between25 (inc.) 
and 30
10 27,8 27,8 38,9
Between30 (inc.) 
and 40
9 25,0 25,0 63,9
>=40 13 36,1 36,1 100,0
Total 36 100,0 100,0
Table A9
Elapsed time in days -  Experiment 13
Days Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
1,00 16 44,4 44,4
2,00 12 33,3 77,8
4,00 4 11,1 88,9
6,00 1 2,8 91,7
12,00 1 2,8 94,4
14,00 2 5,6 100,0
Total 36 100,0
Table A10
Participants ’ age group- Experiment 14
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
<25 12 13,2 13,2 13,2
>=25 but <30 17 18,7 18,7 31,9
>=30 but <40 28 30,8 30,8 62,6
>=40 34 37,4 37,4 100,0
Total 91 100,0 100,0
Table A l l
Frequencies and percentages o f  delays between learning and transfer —
Experiment 14
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent
< 2 days 30 33,0 33,0 33,0
>=2 and <= 8 days 39 42,9 42,9 75,8
> 8 and < =15 days 14 15,4 15,4 91,2
>15 days 8 8,8 8,8 100,0
Total 91 100,0 100,0
A 1 A
Table A12
Participants ’ age group — Experiment 15
Age Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
<25 20 24,7 24,7
between25 (inc.) and 30 15 18,5 43,2
Between30 (inc.) and 40 29 35,8 79,0
>=40 17 21,0 100,0
Total 81 100,0
Table A13
Participants age group -  Experiment 16
Frequency Percent
Valid
Percent
Cumulative
Percent
<25 21 18,8 18,8 18,8
Between25 (inc.) and 30 23 20,5 20,5 39,3
Between30 (inc.) and 40 40 35,7 35,7 75,0
>=40 28 25,0 25,0 100,0
Total 112 100,0 100,0
Table A14
Participants ’ age group -  Experiment 17
Age Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent
<25 51 34,5 34,5
between25 (inc.) and 30 32 21,6 56,1
Between30 (inc.) and 40 37 25,0 81,1
>=40 28 18,9 100,0
<25 148 100,0
ANNEX 3
Sample emails used in web-based experiments 
Sample email anonymous college
Dear Email Tester,
Take part in this survey and earn 30 points.
A college, who wishes to remain anonymous, has asked us to pre-test some 
of the materials they use as part o f their admission procedure. The task is 
reading and comprehension. It will take 15 minutes to complete and will 
give you 15 ipoints.
Click here to participate:
http://graphics.ipoints.co.uk/url.php?u=colltes95/9112/4761379/149896742/ 
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Regards,
The ipoints team 
www.ipoints.co.uk
Sample email Warwick University running experiments 
Dear Email Tester,
Take part in this survey and earn 30 points.
Warwick University are running an experiment on decision making and 
would like you to take part. You will be asked to make two decisions and to 
explain them. It will take 15 minutes to complete and we will give you 30 
ipoints.
Click here to participate:
http://www.steptacular.warwickcompsoc.co.uk/experiments5.html
Regards,
The ipoints team 
www.ipoints.co.uk
Sample screenshots of web-experiments (by level of context shift)
Experiment with low context shift between learning and transfer
^Admissions Material Beta Test - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View Go Bookmarks Tools Het>
- v A htlp://steptacular.i. i dc/mater iakxin.html
A college, who wishes to remain anonymous, has asked us to pre-test some of the materials they use 
therefore, complete the following task, as best as you can It will take 15 minutes to complete
It is of utmost importance that you complete the task with attention and care
As this is a timed activity please do not use the refresh button JavaScript is required to run die task
Your performance wiD remain confidential
On completion of the task you will rec eive 15 ipoints
Please enter your e-mail here in order to receive credit
Please indicate 
Your age
Your sex • Mai* Female
Registration and 
welcome screen 
learning task
File Edit View Go Bookmarks Tools Help
hnp://steptacuiaM
In a popular TV show, three balls, one in gold, another 
loc k identical The gold ball is the heaviest of the three arid weighs 3 kg The oth<
>d and the third m hard plastic. are wrap
much lighter, around half a kg each
Admissions Material Beta Test - Mozilla Firefox Learning task 
sample screen
The contestant is asked to choose one of the 3 wrapped up t  alls. totally at rando: 
t  all, the contestant will win a pnze of 150.000. if not. he will win nothing
* the packages are identic al If it wiD turn out to be die gold
To make the game more interesting, the script is at follows The contestant initially chooses one ball Before weiglung it to determine if it is the gold 
one. the host says something like "You must be wondering if you chose the nglit ball, ot if the golden ball is one of these two well, I can't tell you 
where the gold ball is, but 1 wiD tell you, out of these two bafls*- arid points at the two that weren't chosen “where the gold ball icn't ‘ The host then 
selects one of the two remaining balls, has assistant takes it and puts it on the scale, revealing that, in fact it is not the geld one
At this pomt. the host gives the contestant the choice between sticking to the ball originally selected or changing selection to die other remaining ball
The best, choice is actually to switch The reason can be understood intuitively as follows
Initially, the chanc e of choosing the pnze ball is 1 /* (one out of three balls is the gold one) Consequently, the remaming two balls together have 2/3 of 
probability of containing the pnze one Now, here comes the important pomt to understand The host of the show knows which of the balls is the gold 
one (this is crucial) and can't choose it because the game must go on So, £  the pnze ball is one of the two which were not chosen by the participant, he 
must choose the other one This means that, while the ball chosen initially by the participant continues to have its 1/3 of probability of being the winning 
one. the remaining ball now has a 2/3 probability of being the pnze one From a statistical point of view, switching increases the odds (from 1/3 to 2/?)
^Admissions Material Beta Test - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View Go Bookmarks Tools Help 
’ :v :" ' d i*  i - hHpy/staptacular.i ». co ck/mater iatsXIV .html
A  college, who wishes to remain anonymous, has asked us to pre-test some of die materials they use a  
therefore, complete the following task as best as you cam It will take 15 minutes to complete
It is of utmost importance that you complete the task with attention and care.
As this is a timed activity please do not use the refresh button JavaScript is required to run the task
Your performance will remain confidential
O n completion of the task you wiD receive 30 ipomts
Please enter your e-mail here in order to receive credit
Registration and 
welcome screen 
transfer task
Done 0
Transfer task 
sample screenFile Edit View Go Bookmarks Tools Help
<Nrf±i • - h ttp://steptxular.uw ci.co.tA/iriateriaMIV htmt
T ask  1
You have
Three prisoners, A lexander, Ben and Carl, who took part in a crime together, are imprisoned in separate cells in a remote country They are 
|  4 -  awaiting execution to take place on the following morning
.n n j .. .  A s luck would have it, the following day is the m onarch’s 40th birthday His prime minister convinces him to announce that he wiD pardon one of
the three pnsoners (it doesn 't matter who as they participated m the same cnme and are equally guilty) to celebrate, but advises him not announce 
which o f the three fell the following morning The monarch agrees
The w arden, a com passionate man, is informed of who will be pardoned, but is forbidden to reveal it
Alexander manages to approach the warden and to ask lum. between Ben and Carl, who won’t be pardoned and thus wiD die (one of the two. a
perhaps both, will die since only one prisoner wiD be pardoned)
The w arden, at first, says he can’t answer He is, however, sympathetic He decides, after some thinking, that, by answering the question, he would
not be violating instructions (he is only forbidden to reveal who will be pardoned) The warden says that he can confirm that, between Ben and 
Carl, it will be Carl who wiD die.
At this point of the story, do you think Alexander and Ben have different or equal chances of survival? "Why?
Please record  your answer here
Experiment with low-medium context shift between learning and transfer
3  University of Warwick e x p e m te n ts  - Microsoft in te rne t Explorer
gfe &A $ew Fflyortes look befc
Back * . k! ■ y • Search FavorRes ^0 }
Address http://steptacii»Ti
G o o g l e  -  j
:o.ii</experin©nl*.Kfnl
” 3 : C  Search g 52b*octod j Check * x AutoUr* * y  Options
Experiment 
resgistration and 
welcome screen 
screen
W elc o m e to  a group o f  J  ex p e r im e n ts  by the 1IN T \T R M 1 V  O F  W A R W IC K  - 
D E P A R T M E N T  O F  P S Y C H O L O G Y  011 the topics o f  ir a i l in g  an d  
c o m p r e h e n s io n , c r e a tiv ity  and d e c is io n  m a k in g  In all tlu ee  o f  them  y o u  will 
be icq im ed  to  read so m e text and to type so m e sen tences
Y o u  are k ind ly  required to com plete all tliree experim ents w ithout delay b etw een  
them , fo r  a t o t a l  t im e  o f  5 5  m in u te s  T he sy ste m  w ill not allow  y o u  to m o v e  to 
the next ex p eiiiu eu t b efo r e  the allocated  tim e is fin ished  and w ill m o v e y o u  
fon va i d w h en  tune is  up
T H E  U N I V E R S I T Y  O F
W A R W I C K
Y o u i inputs w ill be com piled  w ith  th ose o f  otliei participants (a n o m in ity  is granted) and w ill be u sed  in a scn es  o f  s c ie n tif ic  s tu d ie s  that 
w e  are conducting  For tlus reason , it is v e r y  im p o r ta n t to  u s  th a t y o u  g iv e  y o n r  fu ll a tte n t io n  t o  th e  ta sk s  svh ile  d o in g  th e m  W e  
will need  to exclude f io m  the studies input that reveals n eglect in perform ing the tasks As a con seq u en ce  p o in ts  w ill n o t  b e  cr e d ite d  
to  p a r tic ip a n ts  w h o s e  a n sw ers sh o w  la c k  o f  a tte n tio n  a n d  d u e  care .
P lea se  do n ot u se  the 'B ack' 01 'R ch esh ' functions dunng the iiuuung o f  the expenm ents. T he tim e y o u  take is m om to ied  and pom ts will 
not be credited i f  the ex p eiu n en t has been  invalidated
It is  a r e q u ir e m e n t th a t  p a r tic ip a n ts  c o m p le te  a ll t lire e  ex p e r im e n ts  a n d  an sw er th e  fin a l q u e s t io n n a ir e  (i e p n itn ipants w ill be 
credited o n ly  it tlus con d ition  is m et)
Y o u  are fr e e  to  w ith d ra w  fr o m  th e  e x p e r im e n t a t a n y  t im e  f o i  a n y  r e a so n .
Y o«u p e r fo r m a n c e  in  t l i is  s tu d y  w ill b e  c o m p le te ly  c o n fid e n tia l .
T H IS  E X P E R IM E N T  W IL L  G T \T  Y O U  -10 IP O IN T S .
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. z\
4f)Don» local Intraoat
3 |  I h re e  ex p e rim en t*  M icrosoft I n te rn e t  Explorer
Learning task
instruction
screen
Experiment 1 on Reading and Comprehension
.  P lease read the two stories reported in the following pages carefully and write a summary of each one 
that will help you remember the key elements of the stories.
.  Writing space  will be available at the end of the two stories.
.  You will have a  total of 15 minutes to complete this task.
.  To help you pace your work, the program will display a m essage In the central-upper part of the 
screen when you have used half of the time and a minute before the end.
.  If you complete the task before the time ends, you will have to wait for the assigned time to end before 
you can proceed to the next experiment.
.  The program will automatically move you to experiment 2 when time is expired and will save your 
input.
• You can go back to the stories and to these instructions at any time while writing the summaries.
Once you have read these instructions, press ’Next' to continue.
N e x l - >  |
/I^O
3  Three experim en t*  -M kruvoft In te rn e t fxpbirer
Learning task 
task sample 
screen
i
Story Number 1
A company decided to expand, so it opened a factory generating 333 job postings.
For the 228 blue collar positions, 400 males and 50 females applied. The females who applied were more 
successful, with a success rate of 56% (resulting in 28 hires) against a success rate of 50% of the male 
population (which resulted in 200 hires).
Applicants for white collar positions were the same number for males and females, with 300 applications 
each. Again, women were hired in greater proportions, with a 20% success rate (60 hires). Out of the males 
applying for the white collar positions, only 15% were hired (45 hires).
The company announced that it had completed its hiring process.
A federal Equal Employment enforcement official, routinely checking for compliance of non-discriminatory 
practices by companies, noted that many more males were hired than females, and decided to investigate.
The government official produced his statistics, which showed that not only men had been hired in higher 
numbers (245 men hired against jusl 88 women) but also that a female applying for a job had a 25% chance 
of being hired (88 hires for 350 applicants) while male applicants had a 35% chance (245 hires for 700 
applicants).
The company didn't discriminate and. in fact, women had higher success rates in both applications (for white 
and blue collar positions). Here is what happened. Most women (300/350: approximately 86%) applied to the 
white collar positions which had a lower success rate than the blue collar ones (i.e. it was more difficult to get 
a  w hite  co llar th a n  a  b lu e  collar n nsitinn l O n th e  o th e r h a n d  onlv 4 7 %  of m ale  a n n lira tio n s  w e re  for th e  z i
Learning task 
task sample 
screen
[3
Y o u 'v e  Ikkl h a l f  y o u r  tu n e
The contestant Is asked to choose one of the 3 wrapped up balls, totally at rant 
identical. If it will turn out to be the gold ball, the contestant will win a prize of £5
nothing.
To make the game more interesting, the script is as follows. The contestant initially chooses one ball. Before 
weighing it to determine if it is the gold one. the host says something like "You must be wondering if you 
chose the right ball, or if the golden ball is one of these two...well, I can't tell you where the gold ball is, but I 
will tell you. out of these two balls'*-and points at the two that weren't chosen- \vhere the gold ball isn’t...'’. 
The host then selects one of the two remaining balls, his assistant takes it and puts It on the scale, revealing 
that, in fact it is not the gold one.
At this point, the host gives the contestant the choice between sticking to the ball originally selected or 
changing selection to the other remaining ball.
The best choice is actually to switch. The reason can be understood intuitively as follows.
Initially, the chance of choosing the prize ball is 1/3 (one out of three balls is the gold one). Consequently, 
the remaining two balls together have 2/3 of probability of containing the prize one. Nov/, here comes the 
important point to understand. The host of the show knows which of the balls is the gold one (this Is crucial) 
and can’t choose it because the game must go on. So. if the prize ball is one of the two which were not 
chosen by the participant, he must choose the other one. This means that, while the ball chosen initially by 
the participant continues to have its 1/3 of probability of being the winning one. the remaining ball now has a 
2/3 probability of being the prize one. From a statistical point of view, switching increases the odds (from 1/3 
to 2/3 k
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Transfer task 
(presented as 
separate 
experiment) 
instruction screen
.  You have a  total o f  15 minutes to perform I  tasks.
• Each task requires you to read a  text and to make the decision a t the end o f  it 
and briefly explain wiry you made it.
• Space fo r  typing your answers is available a t the end o f  each story.
• You may go back to the instructions a ton y time.
• To help you pace your work, the program will display a  message m the 
central-upper part o f  the screen when you have used half o f  the time cord a  
minute before the end.
• I f  you complete the two tasks before the time ettds, you will have to wait fo r  
the assigned rime to end before you can proceed to the questionnaire.
Once you have read these, instructiom you may1 click the 'Next' button to 
continue, The program will start the task automatically in three minutes i f  you do 
not.
N e x t - >  |
| £ | |  Three Experim ents • M icrosoft In te rn e t Explorer
Experiment Number 3 on decision making
Three E xperim ents - M icrosoft In te rn e t Explorer
You Ji.i'. c used <>{ won ,1' jimmies so I n
Task 1.
Transfer task 
task sample 
screen
| Lucrezia Borgia, who Trvedat the beginning o f  the XVI century in Rome, is known 
fo r  her cruelty and her attachtmnt to power.
She was a woman with many enemies, thus very suspicious and constcmtly trying to 
unmask those surrounding her. The treatment she reserved fo r  her enemies was 
death. The treatment reservedfor those o f  whom she suspected was on/v slightly 
better Here is a  tale (unconfirmed) giving us a  sample o f  what she would do to test \ 
someone o f  whom she doubted.
One evening Lucrezia invited Rodrigo della Torre, whom she suspected o f  treason, 
fo r  dinner. She hadfour exquisite dishes prepared bv her cook. However, when the \ 
cook was finished, she pu t enougft poison in one o f  them to kill a t the firs t bite
As soon as her gitest took place a t the table, she challenged him scrying, that one o f  
the dishes was poisoned, but that he had to eat at least one them, he could choose 
which. She added that, i f  Rodrigo was honest in his intentions, as he claimed, indeed \ 
God would guide his hand and he would not select the poisoned dish. \
Experiment with medium context shift
Learning part 
registration and 
welcome screen
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I lE F A R T M E N T  O F  P S Y C H O L O G Y  on  the  topic o f  t le d v iu n  m a k iitg  Y ou 
will b e  tvqtiiret] to tnuke (w o dect*ioii> arid to  explain Uk ij i . T o ld  d io ah o a  ol the 
cxpciitiicu l i> 15 B i in u tn
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Transfer part 
welcome and 
registration 
screen
T V "f"lv".TT T T  t~H -------
W A R W I C KY ouj inputs wiD be com piled  w ith  those  o f o tlicr participant* (anonvrn it) ' is 
p  Aiitedt am i will he u sed  in s* scries o l s d m t iH r  s tu d ie s  th a t w e are conducting.
F in this reason , it is v t r y  v in p o r ta n t to  us d i a l  y o u  g ive y o u r  h it)  a t te n t io n  to
th e  ta s k s  %%4ilU d o in g  t h « «  W e will n eed  to  exclude from  the  stud ies input tha t reveals ncglccl in p e r lo m u n g  d ie  task s . As a 
consequence , p o in ts  w ill n o t  h+  r r r d i f r d  t o  p a r t ic ip a n t*  w lio s r  a n s w m  sh o w  la r k  o f  a t te n t io n  a n d  d u e  r a r e .
Please do nor u se  the 'H a c k 1 o r ’Kcfrcsh* functions during  the  runn ing  o f  the  experim ents. The tim e you  tak e  is m o n ito red  a n d  po ints 
ssill n o t he cred ited  if the  experim ent has b een  m s'alidated.
W« also k indly  require you  to  rareftiUy com plete the fina l questionnaire at Ok end o f  the experiment.
You are free to  w ithdraw  from  th e  experim ent at any tim e fo r any reason.
Y o u r  p e r f o n s ia m e  in  Uii» a iu d y  w ill b e  c o m p le te ly  v o n A d e u tia l .
Ttiik expetiiiien l wiD give y o u  Ml ip o in ts  and  sh o u ld  b e  c o m p le te d  id th in  th e  n e x t 24  h o u r* .
Please click ’Launch K\peri incuts' to confirm you have read and understood all the above and 
that you voluntarily consent to participate in the experiment. Once you have done so, the 
experiments will open in a new window.
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Transfer part 
instructions
Experiment on decision making
. You have a  total o f 15 minutes to perform 2 tasks.
. Each task requires you to read a text and to make the decision at the end of 
it and briefly explain whvvou made it.
• Space for typing your answers is available at the end o f each story,
* You may go back to the instructions a t any time.
» To help you pace your work, the program will display a message in the 
central-upper part o f the screen when you have used half o f the time and a 
minute before the end.
. I f  you complete the two tasks before the time ends, you will hive to wait for  
the assigned time to end before you can proceed to the questionnaire.
Once you have read these instructions you may click the 'Next' button to 
continue.
I^Done
Transfer task 
sample screen
Task 1.
Lucrezia Borgia, who lived at the beginning o f the XVI century in Rome, is known 
fo r her cruelty and her attachment to power.
She was a woman with many enemies, thus very suspicious and constantly trying to 
unmask those surrounding her, The treatment she reserved fo r  her enemies was 
death. The treatment reserved for those of whom she suspected was only slightly 
better. Here is a tale (unconfirmed) giving us a sample of what she would do to test 
someone o f whom she doubted.
One evening Lucrezia invited Rodrigo della Torre, whom she suspected o f treason, 
fo r  dinner. She had four exquisite dishes prepared by her cook. However, when the 
cook was finished, she put enough poison in one o f them to kill at the first bite.
As soon as her guest took place at the table, she challenged him saying that one o f  
the dishes was poisoned, but that he had to eat at least one them, he could choose 
which. She added that, i f  Rodrigo was honest in his intentions, as he claimed, indeed 
God would guide his hand and he would not select the poisoned dish.
t tjD o n e  ______________________________________________________________________  £  Internet
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